



2024 G20 Rio de Janeiro Summit Interim Compliance Report

20 November 2024 to 31 May 2025

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Contents

Research Teams.....	4
Compliance Directors.....	4
Lead Analysts.....	4
Compliance Analysts	4
Introduction and Summary	6
Methodology and Scoring System	6
Commitment Breakdown	6
Selection of Commitments	6
2024 Rio de Janeiro Summit Interim Compliance Scores	7
2024 Rio de Janeiro Summit Interim Compliance by Member	7
2024 Rio de Janeiro Summit Interim Compliance by Commitment.....	7
Table 1: 2024 G20 Rio de Janeiro Summit Commitments Selected	8
Table 2: 2024 G20 Rio de Janeiro Interim Compliance Scores.....	9
Table 3: 2024 G20 Rio de Janeiro Interim Compliance by Member	10
Table 4: 2024 G20 Rio de Janeiro Interim Compliance Scores by Commitment	10
Table 5: G20 Compliance by Member, 2008–2024	11
1. Energy: Energy Transition Supply Chains.....	13
2. Development: Financial Support for Low- and Middle-Income Countries.....	62
3. Development: Integration of the African Union.....	219
4. Institutional Reform: Reforming Global Governance Institutions	250
5. Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Reduction.....	307
6. Climate Change: Disaster Risk Reduction	367
7. Environment: Biodiversity	416
8. Health: Inclusive Health Systems	473
9. Macroeconomics: Fiscal Policy.....	576
10. Regional Security.....	618
11. Food and Agriculture: Fertilizer Shortages.....	700
12. Gender Equality: Labour Markets	727
13. Digitalization: Digital Platform Transparency	765

4. Institutional Reform: Reforming Global Governance Institutions

“In order to deliver on the promises of the United Nations and other relevant international organizations around the world, we pledge to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.”

G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Argentina	–1		
Australia		0	
Brazil		0	
Canada		0	
China		0	
France		0	
Germany		0	
India		0	
Indonesia		0	
Italy		0	
Japan			+1
Korea		0	
Mexico		0	
Russia	–1		
Saudi Arabia		0	
South Africa		0	
Türkiye			+1
United Kingdom		0	
United States	–1		
African Union		0	
European Union			+1
Average		+0 (50%)	

Background

The G20’s commitment to institutional reform has evolved significantly since the leaders’ first summit in 2008, which began with a focus on international financial institutions in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, after it caused massive and worldwide financial and economic collapse.¹⁴²⁷ At the 2008 Washington Summit, the G20 prioritized the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, expanding financial oversight bodies improving regulatory frameworks to prevent future crises. Over subsequent summits, the G20 broadened the agenda of institutional reform, pushing for greater inclusivity, representation, and accountability in global financial governance. Reforms gradually expanded beyond financial institutions to include multilateral development banks (MDBs), debt transparency and broader governance structures. At New Delhi in 2023 and Rio de Janeiro in 2024, G20 leaders emphasized making international institutions better, bigger, and more effective, advocating for a more representative global order that aligns with 21st century challenges.

¹⁴²⁷ The Great Recession and Its Aftermath, Federal Reserve History (Missouri) 22 November 2013. Access Date: 5 March 2025. <https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-and-its-aftermath>

At the 2008 Washington Summit, G20 leaders acknowledged and listed “Reforming International Financial Institutions.”¹⁴²⁸ The members outlined immediate actions such as expanding the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to include emerging economies and reforming the IMF and World Bank Group, as well as medium-term actions such as underscoring the necessity of reforming the Bretton Woods institutions and conducting surveillance reviews.

At the 2009 London Summit, G20 leaders pledged to fund and reform international financial institutions to overcome financial crises and prevent future ones.¹⁴²⁹ G20 members also published a progress report about the 47 actions set out previously in the Washington Action Plan and agreed on major reforms such as expanding the FSF, strengthening international cooperation, implementing prudential regulation, ensuring compensation, protecting public finances and international standards from non-cooperative jurisdictions, improving accounting standards and increasing oversight of the Credit Rating Agencies’ activities.¹⁴³⁰

At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, G20 leaders expressed the need to reform the “global architecture” to align with the needs of the 21st century.¹⁴³¹ The G20 members acknowledged their implementation of reforms to tackle the causes of the financial crisis and make the existing system suited for global financial regulation.

At the 2010 Toronto Summit, G20 leaders expressed their ongoing efforts to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and accountability for MBDs such as committing financial support to the poorest countries, increasing transparency and accountability for improved institutional governance as well as recommitting these institutions to lead in the provision of global solutions to global problems such as climate change and food security.¹⁴³² The G20 members also welcomed the World Bank’s voice reform to increase voting power for developing and transitioning countries by 3.13 per cent, as mentioned at Pittsburgh.

At the 2010 Seoul Summit, G20 leaders addressed the need to reform and modernize the IMF with more representation from developing countries and newly emerging markets, to better reflect the current situation of the global economy.¹⁴³³

At the 2011 Cannes Summit, G20 leaders reaffirmed the importance of bringing countries together on equal footing to catalyze action and agreed to put their collective political will towards reforming international institutions.¹⁴³⁴ For the first time, G20 leaders addressed reforms to the G20, announcing that after 2015, the annual presidencies of the G20 would be chosen from rotating regional groups, starting with the Asian grouping.

At the 2012 Los Cabos Summit, G20 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform by the date agreed upon by the 2012 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings.¹⁴³⁵

¹⁴²⁸ Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 15 November 2008. Access Date: 2 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html>

¹⁴²⁹ London Summit – Leaders’ Statement 2 April 2009, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 2 April 2009. Access Date: 2 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html>

¹⁴³⁰ Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System – London Summit, 2 April 2009, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 2 April 2009. Access Date: 2 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html>

¹⁴³¹ G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 25 September 2009. Access Date: 2 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html>

¹⁴³² The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 June 2010. Access Date: 2 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html>

¹⁴³³ The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 November 2010. Access Date: 4 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html>

¹⁴³⁴ Cannes Summit Final Declaration - Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 4 November 2011. Access Date: 4 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html>

¹⁴³⁵ G20 Leaders Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 19 June 2012. Access Date: 4 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html>

At the 2013 St. Petersburg Summit, G20 leaders reiterated the importance of completing the ongoing IMF governance reforms to strengthen the IMF's "credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness."¹⁴³⁶ Additionally, G20 members called for the urgent ratification of the 2010 IMF Quota and Governance Reform. G20 leaders also stressed that quota distribution should reflect shifts in the global economy while ensuring representation for developing nations and emerging economies.

At the 2014 Brisbane Summit, G20 leaders stressed their role in ensuring effectiveness and better reflection of the changing world economy within global economic institutions.¹⁴³⁷ The G20 members also reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining a strong and quota-based IMF and spoke about their disappointment towards the delay in the progress for governance reforms as agreed in 2010 and the 15th General Review of Quotas.

At the 2015 Antalya Summit, G20 leaders announced their completion of core pillars in the financial reform agenda intended to enhance the resilience of the global financial system.¹⁴³⁸ G20 leaders also reaffirmed the high priority of the 2010 reforms and urged the US again to ratify them to further strengthen the IMF as an international institution.

At the 2016 Hangzhou Summit, G20 leaders stressed the need for an efficient international financial governance system and supported the Global Financial Safety Net centered on a well-equipped IMF.¹⁴³⁹ G20 members backed stronger cooperation between the IMF and regional financing arrangements. The G20 reaffirmed its support for the World Bank Group's efforts to achieve equitable voting power over time so that the voices of the poorest members are represented. Additionally, G20 members committed to supporting the Paris Club's efforts to include emerging creditors in bilateral debt restructuring forums.

At the 2017 Hamburg Summit, G20 leaders reaffirmed their commitment from the 2016 Hangzhou Summit to maintain a Global Financial Safety Net that is centered around a strong, well-equipped IMF.¹⁴⁴⁰ On strengthening health governance, G20 members called for increased funding for the World Health Organization's Health Emergencies Programme.

At the 2018 Buenos Aires Summit, G20 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintain a Global Financial Safety Net, as well as its commitment from Hangzhou to support the Paris Club in its efforts to include emerging creditors into bilateral debt restructure forums.¹⁴⁴¹ G20 leaders also called on the IMF and World Bank to cooperate with borrowers and creditors to improve transparency and sustainability in their reporting of public and private debt obligations. Additionally, G20 members expressed support for efforts by the IMF, World Bank Group and Paris Club on Low-Income Country debt and welcomed the G20 Eminent Persons Group's final report on Global Financial Governance, remaining committed to maintaining a resilient global financial system.

At the 2019 Osaka Summit, G20 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintain a Global Financial Safety Net that is centered on a strong, well-equipped IMF, as well as its commitment to support the Paris Club in

¹⁴³⁶ Russia G20 Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 6 September 2013. Access Date: 4 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html>

¹⁴³⁷ G20 Leaders' Communique, Brisbane, November 16, 2014, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 16 November 2014. Access Date: 4 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-communique.html>

¹⁴³⁸ G20 Leaders' Communique, Antalya, Türkiye, November 16, 2015, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 16 November 2015. Access Date: 4 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html>

¹⁴³⁹ G20 Leaders' Communique: Hangzhou Summit, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 5 September 2016. Access Date: 3 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-communique.html>

¹⁴⁴⁰ G20 Leaders' Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2017. Access Date: 3 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-G20-leaders-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁴¹ G20 Leaders' Declaration: Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 1 December 2018. Access Date: 3 March 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-leaders-declaration.html>

its efforts to include emerging creditors into bilateral debt restructure forums.¹⁴⁴² The G20 called on the IMF and World Bank Group to continue their efforts in strengthening borrowers' capacity.

At the 2020 Riyadh Summit, G20 leaders acknowledged the need for a resilient "international financial architecture."¹⁴⁴³ In light of the Covid-19 crisis, G20 members called on the IMF to continue exploring tools that cater to members' needs and affirmed its support for the IMF's assistance efforts towards developing states that face significant challenges. Beyond pandemic response, G20 members pledged to continue their support of the IMF in its governance reform and called on the World Bank Group to expand its efforts in mobilizing private financing for developing countries.

At the 2021 Rome Summit, the G20 reacknowledged its commitment in maintaining a resilient "international financial architecture."¹⁴⁴⁴ The G20 reaffirmed its commitment from the previous summits to maintain a Global Financial Safety Net that is centered on a strong, well-equipped IMF. G20 members re-committed to supporting the IMF's governance reform.

At the 2022 Bali Summit, the G20 continued its pledge to strengthen "the long-term financial resilience of the international financial architecture."¹⁴⁴⁵ Additionally, G20 members anticipated further dialogue with international organizations to ensure consistent application of international frameworks for capital flow management measures.

At the 2023 New Delhi Summit, the G20 stressed "reforming international financial institutions" to make them "better, bigger and more effective," thereby marking a stride in commitments from previous summits.¹⁴⁴⁶ This was in light of its recognition of the "need" for "revitalized multilateralism" in solving 21st-century global challenges and making global governance "more representative, effective, transparent and accountable." G20 members recalled the Declaration on the Commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. G20 members also recognized the need to "evolve" the MDB ecosystem, particularly stressing it must cater to the poorest countries.

At the 2024 Rio de Janeiro Summit, the G20 reiterated the need to "reform global governance" anchored in the UN Charter principles and international law, to sustain a multilateral system that is "more representative, effective, transparent and accountable" as stated at the 2023 New Delhi Summit.¹⁴⁴⁷ The G20 also pledged to strengthen the role of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Notably at Rio, the G20 welcomed the creation of a 25th chair at the IMF Executive Board for Sub-Saharan Africa, celebrating increased representation of developing countries in MDB decision-making.

Commitment Features

The overarching welfare target of this commitment is to effectively govern social, economic and political global realities by reforming both UN bodies and other relevant international organizations to be 1) more representative, 2) more effective and 3) more transparent and accountable. Therefore, each G20 member must take strong action to meet all three key criteria for reforming both the UN bodies and other relevant international organizations to advance the welfare target. UN bodies include the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN Human Rights

¹⁴⁴² G20 Osaka Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 29 June 2019. Access Date: 3 March 2025.
<https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-osaka-leaders-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁴³ Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 21 November 2020. Access Date: 3 March 2025.
<https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-leaders-declaration-1121.html>

¹⁴⁴⁴ G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 31 October 2021. Access Date: 3 March 2025.
<https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/211031-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁴⁵ G20 Bali Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 16 November 2022. Access Date: 3 March 2025.
<https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2022/221116-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁴⁶ G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2023. Access Date: 3 March 2025.
<https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2023/230909-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁴⁷ G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders' Declaration, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 3 March 2025.
<https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2024/241118-declaration.html>

Council, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Other relevant international organizations include the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Overall, the focus of this commitment is on reforming international institutions.

Definitions and Concepts

“Deliver” refers to “achieve or produce something that has been promised.”¹⁴⁴⁸

“Institution” refers to an organization or body “established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality.”¹⁴⁴⁹ Its members, typically states, public entities and private entities, are themselves “subjects of international law with the capacity of concluding international treaties.” Institutions serve as mechanisms for “organizing the international political order.”

“Promise” refers to the act of making an assurance or a statement committing to doing something.¹⁴⁵⁰

“Pledge” refers “to make a serious or formal promise to give or to do something.”¹⁴⁵¹

“Reinvigorated” is understood to mean “to make something stronger, ... or successful again.”¹⁴⁵²

“Strengthened” is understood to mean to make or become stronger.¹⁴⁵³ A reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system is better able to sustain the purposes and principles set out in international law.

“Renewed” is understood to mean “happening again after having stopped for a period of time.”¹⁴⁵⁴

“Purpose” is defined as “an intention or aim; a reason for doing something or for allowing something to happen.”¹⁴⁵⁵

“Principle” is defined as “a basic idea or rule that explains or controls how something happens or works.”¹⁴⁵⁶

The “UN Charter” is “the founding document of the United Nations” and “an instrument of international law” by which “UN Member States are bound by.”¹⁴⁵⁷ The UN Charter also codifies major principles underlying international relations.

“International law” defines “the legal responsibilities of States in their conduct with each other, and their treatment of individuals within State boundaries.”¹⁴⁵⁸

¹⁴⁴⁸ Deliver, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 13 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/deliver>

¹⁴⁴⁹ International Organizations or Institutions, General Aspects, Oxford Public International Law (Oxford) n.d. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e499>

¹⁴⁵⁰ Promise, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 13 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/promise>

¹⁴⁵¹ Pledge, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 13 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/pledge>

¹⁴⁵² Reinvigorate, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 3 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reinvigorate>

¹⁴⁵³ Compliance Coding Manual for International Commitments, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 3 March 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

¹⁴⁵⁴ Renewed, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 3 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/renewed>

¹⁴⁵⁵ Purpose, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 13 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/purpose>

¹⁴⁵⁶ Principle, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 13 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/principle>

¹⁴⁵⁷ United Nations Charter, United Nations (New York) n.d. Access Date: 13 March 2025. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>

“Reformed” is understood to mean “changed and improved because of no longer doing something harmful.”¹⁴⁵⁹ For this assessment, renewed and reformed refers to directing institutions towards more effectively achieving their main aims.

General Interpretive Guidelines

This commitment requires strong actions in the renewal of institutions through reforming UN bodies and other relevant international organizations and emphasizing the key criteria of a) institutional representation, b) institutional effectiveness and c) institutional transparency and accountability. In the context of this commitment, “institutional representation” refers to inclusive and meaningful participation of different G20 members in the decision-making process representing diverse social, economic and political interests.¹⁴⁶⁰ “Institutional effectiveness” refers to the extent to which an organization’s goals are met.¹⁴⁶¹ “Institutional transparency and accountability” refers to an organization’s ability to provide accessible, reliable and timely information regarding their actions, conditions and decisions.¹⁴⁶²

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to a G20 member that takes strong actions to reform at least one UN body or at least one other international organization and meets all of the key criteria: a) institutional representation, b) institutional effectiveness and c) institutional transparency and accountability.

Strong actions reforming the “institutional representation” of a UN body includes evidence of individual member contribution at meetings to reform regional imbalances in the UNSC. Strong actions reforming the “institutional effectiveness” of a UN body includes ratifying enforcement measures in the UNGA. Strong actions reforming the “institutional transparency and accountability” of a UN body includes establishing a framework for disclosing UNSC negotiations. Strong actions reforming the “institutional representativeness” of other relevant international organizations include expanding OECD membership to economies in the Global South for broader regional representation. Strong actions reforming the “institutional effectiveness” of other relevant international organizations include implementing a dispute resolution system at the WTO or altering the quota system at the IMF. Strong actions reforming the “institutional transparency and accountability” of other relevant international organizations include amending the dispute settlement process when appealing to the WTO Appellate Body.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to a G20 member that has taken moderate action to reform one UN body or one other international organization and meets two of the key criteria: a) institutional representation, b) institutional effectiveness and c) institutional transparency and accountability. Moderate actions include verbal affirmations to reform the role of the WTO Secretariat or participating in meetings to reform the UNSC veto power representation.

Non-compliance, or a score of –1, will be assigned to a G20 member that has taken no steps to reform the UN nor other relevant international organizations and failed to meet any of the key criteria: a) institutional representation, b) institutional effectiveness and c) institutional transparency and accountability; or 2) if it has engaged in actions directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment. Actions that are antithetical to the commitment include terminating agreements on governance reform, halting funding to international organizations and withdrawing from international institutions. G20 members that take steps to weaken the

¹⁴⁵⁸ International Law, United Nations Information Service (Vienna) n.d. Access Date: 14 March 2025.

<https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/topics/international-law.html>

¹⁴⁵⁹ Reformed, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 3 March 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reformed>

¹⁴⁶⁰ Representation of Organizations of the United Nations System at Conferences and Meetings, United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (Geneva) October 1988. Access Date: 30 March 2025. https://www.unjiu.org/sites/www.unjiu.org/files/jiu_document_files/products/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_1988_7_English.pdf

¹⁴⁶¹ The Group of Twenty: A History, G20 Information Centre (Toronto) n.d. Access Date: 31 March 2025.

<https://g20.utoronto.ca/docs/g20history.pdf>

¹⁴⁶² Transparency, United Nations Development Programme (New York) n.d. Access Date: 31 March 2025.

<https://popp.undp.org/taxonomy/term/5251>

multilateral system through weakening international law or not abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter will also be scored as non-compliant.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The G20 member has not taken any steps to reform a UN body or another relevant international organization and has failed to meet the key criteria of being a) representative, b) effective and c) transparent and accountable; or has taken actions directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment.
0	The G20 member has taken moderate action to reform either one UN body or one other relevant international organizations and has met two of the three key criteria of being a) representative b) effective and c) transparent and accountable.
+1	The G20 member has taken strong action to reform at least one UN body or at least one other relevant international organizations and has met all three key criteria of being a) representative, b) effective and c) transparent and accountable.

Compliance Director: Grace (Yujung) Choi
Lead Analyst: Alisha Aslam

Argentina: -1

Argentina has not complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 5 February 2025, presidential spokesperson Manuel Adorni announced that President Javier Milei ordered Foreign Minister Gerardo Werthein to withdraw Argentina from the World Health Organization (WHO) because of distinct divergences over the WHO's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.¹⁴⁶³

Argentina has not complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Instead, Argentina has taken an action antithetical to the commitment, withdrawing from the WHO.

Thus, Argentina receives a score of -1.¹⁴⁶⁴

Analyst: Rhea Uppal

Australia: 0

Australia has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 28 November 2024, the Australian government and New Zealand government endorsed the Call to Action on the Shadow Fleet initiative, in response to the rise of Russia and North Korea's "shadow fleet activity," which threatens international trade and maritime law.¹⁴⁶⁵ This initiative promotes practices to

¹⁴⁶³ Argentina to withdraw from World Health Organization, Buenos Aires Herald (Buenos Aires) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://buenosairesherald.com/world/international-relations/argentina-to-withdraw-from-world-health-organization>

¹⁴⁶⁴ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: <https://buenosairesherald.com>, <https://kpmg.com/us/en.html>, <https://derechadiario.com.ar/us/>, <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/>, <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/jefatura>, <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/>, <https://www.batimes.com.ar/>, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/> and <https://www.lagaceta.com.ar/>.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Joint Statement from Australia and New Zealand, Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 28 November 2024. Access Date: 8 April 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-australia-and-new-zealand>

increase compliance with international standards for safety and environmental protection, which aims to increase accountability towards existing international institutions such as the International Maritime Organization.

On 3 December 2024, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade announced the recommencement of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) reporting and Australia's realignment with international development transparency standards.¹⁴⁶⁶

On 17 December 2024, the Australian government contributed AUD13 million to the core resources of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This contribution demonstrates Australia's commitment to international organizations and allows the UNDP to continue delivering their programmes with effectiveness, efficiency and transparency.¹⁴⁶⁷

On 27 February 2025, the Australian government published their 2025 foreign policy, highlighting Australia's candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2029-2030 term, as well as their aspiration to reform the UNSC for increased permanent and non-permanent representation for countries in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific.¹⁴⁶⁸

On 28 March 2025, Australia collaborated with Japan to monitor and survey illicit maritime activities that are prohibited by the UNSC resolutions at the Kadena Air Base in Japan.¹⁴⁶⁹ This marks the 15th time Australian aircraft engaged in these activities, which will help ensure effective implementation of the resolutions.

On 21 April 2025, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area was upgraded to ensure greater openness and emphasize the importance of a rules-based system.¹⁴⁷⁰ This upgrade demonstrates compliance with creating greater transparency within international treaty regimes.

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, United Kingdom and United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁴⁷¹ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing efforts to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

Australia has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Australia has taken moderate action in endorsing initiatives to enhance the effectiveness, and transparency and accountability of a UN body and international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and IATI. However, Australia has not taken strong action towards reforming a UN body or another relevant international organization.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Australia delivers greater transparency and accountability in international development, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 5 April 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/development/australia-delivers-greater-transparency-and-accountability-international-development>

¹⁴⁶⁷ Australia continues support for UNDP to address global development challenges, United Nations Development Program (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.undp.org/news/australia-continues-support-undp-address-global-development-challenges>

¹⁴⁶⁸ Australia in the World – 2025 Snapshot, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/australia-world-2025-snapshot>

¹⁴⁶⁹ Monitoring and surveillance activities by Australia against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 18 May 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01131.html

¹⁴⁷⁰ AANZFTA Upgrade enters into force, Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 21 April 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/aanzfta-upgrade-enters-force>

¹⁴⁷¹ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

Thus, Australia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Ngila Stone

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 6 December 2024, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the European Union concluded negotiations for the MERCOSUR-EU Partnership Agreement, where Brazil emphasized its commitment to transparency and inclusivity by allowing local communities, unions and non-governmental organizations to participate in monitoring the Agreement.¹⁴⁷² Brazil's participation in the Agreement and the provisions it has placed aims to foster greater investment and ensure that civilians can adequately benefit from it.

On 19 December 2024, Brazil voted in favour of a resolution on the "Request for an advisory opinion of the internal Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States."¹⁴⁷³ This demonstrates Brazil's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 1 January 2025, Brazil took over the BRICS presidency with aims to create more inclusive global artificial intelligence governance, reform the multilateral peace and security architecture to improve effectiveness, as well as improve the structure of the BRICS, more broadly.¹⁴⁷⁴ By leading and overseeing BRICS, Brazil is strengthening its commitment to promoting multilateralism and transparency within international institutions.

On 21 January 2025, Secretary for Economic and Financial Affairs Mauricio Carvalho Lyrio announced Brazil's launch of the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under the G20 Task Force at the ECOSOC Financing for Development Forum.¹⁴⁷⁵ The initiative highlights efforts to address climate change internationally and the reform of global governance institutions, including the Bretton Woods system and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These efforts strengthen Brazil's commitment to multilateralism and growing international alliances.

On 28 February 2025, Brazil partnered with National Defence Canada on the Canada-Brazil Defence Cooperation Agreement, solidifying United Nations peacekeeping and defence procurement between the two countries.¹⁴⁷⁶ This partnership aims to promote the representativeness and effectiveness of defence cooperation and bolster UN capabilities.

¹⁴⁷² FACTSHEET Mercosur-European Union Partnership Agreement, Government of Brazil (Brasília) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 27 March 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/statements-and-other-documents/factsheet-mercotur-european-union-partnership-agreement-december-6-2024>

¹⁴⁷³ Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States – GA draft Resolution (A/79/L.28/Rev.1) – Revised (Adopted on 19 Dec 2024), United Nations General Assembly (New York) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-icj-12dec24/>

¹⁴⁷⁴ Brazil takes over the BRICS presidency in 2025, Government of Brazil (Brasília) 1 January 2025. Access Date: 28 March 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/01/brazil-assumes-the-presidency-of-brics-in-2025>

¹⁴⁷⁵ Address by Ambassador Mauricio Carvalho Lyrio, Secretary for Economic and Financial Affairs, at the 2024 ECOSOC Financing for Development (FFD) Forum, Government of Brazil (Brasília) 21 January 2025. Access Date: 27 March 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/diplomats/speeches/address-by-ambassador-mauricio-carvalho-lyrio-secretary-for-economic-and-financial-affairs-at-the-2024-ecosoc-financing-for-development-ffd-forum>

¹⁴⁷⁶ Canada-Brazil Defence Cooperation Agreement Enters into Force, National Defence Canada (Ottawa) 3 March 2025. Access Date: 28 March 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/03/canada-brazil-defence-cooperation-agreement-enters-into-force.html>

On 6 March 2025, the European Union and Brazil signed an agreement to strengthen and grow ties between Europol and the Brazilian Government for the prioritization of international security measures.¹⁴⁷⁷ This agreement will allow for more effective and coordinated methods to fighting global crime, alongside reinforcing the relationship between Brazil and the EU.

On 13 March 2025, the German Federal Foreign Office published an article on Germany and Brazil's bilateral relations, highlighting their collaboration on the reform of the UN, particularly the expansion of the United Nations Security Council to include new permanent and non-permanent members, as well as cooperation in 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.¹⁴⁷⁸

On 28 March 2025, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Vietnamese President Luong Cuong launched a five-year action plan to collaborate on issues of defense, trade, agriculture, energy and technology as part of a larger plan to strengthen its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.¹⁴⁷⁹ Brazil aims to expand global exports and investments, as well as deepen ties through MERCOSUR.

On 24 April 2025, BRICS under the Brazilian presidency formally included civil society voices in its decision-making process during a meeting in Rio, marking a major step toward more inclusive and participatory governance within the group.¹⁴⁸⁰

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Brazil has made efforts to increase multilateralism by engaging with international organizations such as MERCOSUR and Europol, as well as through its 2025 BRICS presidency. Brazil has also taken initiatives to emphasize its support for representative, effective and transparent and accountable international governance in its partnerships. However, Brazil has not taken steps to reform a UN body.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Rhea Uppal

Canada: 0

Canada has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 6 December 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies including Canada released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication to "to manage and

¹⁴⁷⁷ EU and Brazil sign international agreement to fight organised crime and terrorism, Europol (The Hague) 6 March 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/eu-and-brazil-sign-international-agreement-to-fight-organised-crime-and-terrorism>

¹⁴⁷⁸ Germany and Brazil: Bilateral relations, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/brazil-228932>

¹⁴⁷⁹ Brazil, Vietnam officially launch Action Plan for 2025-2030, Government of Brazil (Brasília) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/03/brazil-vietnam-officially-launch-action-plan-for-2025-2030>

¹⁴⁸⁰ Civil Society at BRICS: Brasil promotes unprecedented dialog to align policies to popular demands, BRICS (Brasília) 24 April 2025. Access Date: 9 May 2025. <https://brics.br/en/news/civil-society-at-brics-brasil-promotes-unprecedented-dialog-to-align-policies-to-popular-demands>

mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence” and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁴⁸¹

On 24 December 2024, Global Affairs Canada noted its commitment to leading, engaging and advocating for reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to ensure it aligns with the changing context of international trade in its 2023-2024 Departmental Results Report.¹⁴⁸²

On 18 February 2025, Global Affairs Canada reaffirmed its commitment to participating in the WTO reform agenda, citing its leadership within the Ottawa Group, where Canada collaborates and discusses with 13 WTO member states on how to strengthen, modernize and reform the WTO.¹⁴⁸³

On 28 February 2025, National Defence Canada announced the Canada-Brazil Defence Cooperation Agreement, solidifying United Nations peacekeeping and defence procurement between the two countries.¹⁴⁸⁴ This partnership aims to promote the representativeness and effectiveness of defence cooperation and bolster UN capabilities.

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁴⁸⁵ The ministers reaffirmed the G7’s commitment to “a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.” The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the “Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight,” “Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security,” “Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources” and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for “Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security,” “Regional peace and stability in the Middle East,” “Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific,” “Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela,” “Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and “Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage.”¹⁴⁸⁶ The joint statement reflects the G7’s commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 1 May 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and re-emphasized Canada’s commitment to further UN reform.¹⁴⁸⁷ This demonstrates Prime Minister Carney’s alignment and continuity of Canada’s previous goals of institutional reform.

¹⁴⁸¹ Thirty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Malta) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/582397.pdf>

¹⁴⁸² Global Affairs Canada’s 2023-24 Departmental Results Report, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 24 December 2025. Access Date: 8 April 2025. <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/departamental-results-reports-rapport-resultats-ministeriels/2023-2024.aspx?lang=eng>

¹⁴⁸³ Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development appearance before the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) on the 2024 CIIT Study: Study on the Protection of Canada’s Manufacturing Sector from Chinese Imports, Including Electric Vehicles, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 30 April 2025. <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/briefing-documents-information/parliamentary-committee-comite-parlementaire/2024-10-21-ciit.aspx?lang=eng>

¹⁴⁸⁴ Canada-Brazil Defence Cooperation Agreement Enters into Force, National Defence Canada (Ottawa) 3 March 2025. Access Date: 28 March 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/news/2025/03/canada-brazil-defence-cooperation-agreement-enters-into-force.html>

¹⁴⁸⁵ G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁸⁶ Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

¹⁴⁸⁷ Prime Minister Carney speaks with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Prime Minister of Canada (Ottawa) 1 May 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/05/01/prime-minister-carney-speaks-united-nations-secretary-general-antonio>

On 16 May 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence David McGuinty and Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree committed CAD40 million to supporting UN peace operations following the 2025 United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial meeting.¹⁴⁸⁸ The financial commitments support training and capacity-building efforts in the areas of misinformation and disinformation, medical operations, peacekeeping training institutions and women in peace operations.¹⁴⁸⁹

On 17 May 2025, Australia, Canada and New Zealand issued a joint statement following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting committing to support Korea as the 2025 APEC chair and condemning Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine.¹⁴⁹⁰ This initiative reaffirms Canada's commitment to upholding the

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of United Security Council resolutions.¹⁴⁹¹ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing UN's institutional effectiveness.

Canada has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Canada has taken moderate action in reiterating its commitment to reform international organizations such as the WTO and solidify the representativeness and effectiveness of a UN body. However, it has not taken action that meets the criteria of transparency and accountability.

Thus, Canada receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Ngila Stone

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 19 February 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscored the importance of reforming the UN Security Council (UNSC) to reflect democratic principles and ensure representativeness of developing countries at the

¹⁴⁸⁸ Canada strengthens support and commitments following 2025 United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial meeting, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 16 May 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/05/canada-strengthens-support-and-commitments-following-2025-united-nations-peacekeeping-ministerial-meeting.html>

¹⁴⁸⁹ Backgrounder - Canada's commitments at 2025 United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial meeting, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 17 May 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/05/backgrounder---canadas-commitments-at-2025-united-nations-peacekeeping-ministerial-meeting.html>

¹⁴⁹⁰ Australia, Canada and New Zealand release statement following APEC Ministerial Meetings in Jeju, Korea, on Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 17 May 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/05/australia-canada-and-new-zealand-release-statement-following-apec-ministerial-meetings-in-jeju-korea-on-russias-illegal-invasion-of-ukraine.html>

¹⁴⁹¹ Monitoring Team on the first report covering Democratic People's Republic of Korea-Russia military cooperation, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 29 May 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/05/joint-statement-of-the-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-on-the-first-report-covering-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-russia-military-coo.html>

UNSC High-Level Meeting “Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance.”¹⁴⁹² His remarks reflect China’s commitment to address longstanding institutional injustices.

On 1 April 2025, Minister Wang and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov underscored the importance of aligning on international issues within multilateral forums including “the UN, the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation], BRICS, the G20, APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation].”¹⁴⁹³ This demonstrates a commitment towards bolstering the institutional effectiveness of various intergovernmental organizations.

On 24 April 2025, the governments of China and Kenya issued a joint statement during Kenyan President William Ruto’s state visit, which emphasized their goal to promote unity and cooperation with the Global South.¹⁴⁹⁴ The two governments reaffirmed their call for reform of the World Trade Organization to be more inclusive and equitable, and promised to strengthen coordination and cooperation for necessary reforms of the UNSC to enhance the representation and voice of the Global South in global governance systems.

On 28 April 2025, Minister Wang and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening coordination in the UN, the SCO, BRICS and other international organizations.¹⁴⁹⁵

On 27 May 2025, Premier Li Qiang delivered an address at the ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-China-GCC (the Gulf Cooperation) Summit to reaffirm China’s commitment to work with ASEAN and the GCC to align on development initiatives, macro policy and mobilizing resources and talents across borders.¹⁴⁹⁶ His remarks reflect China’s commitment to facilitating institutional effectiveness.

China has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, as China has not taken strong actions to directly reform at least one UN body or other international organization.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Tze Tsun Ernest Tang

France: 0

France has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 21 November 2024, Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the UN Jay Dharmadhikari reiterated France’s commitment to reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC), emphasizing the need to increase

¹⁴⁹² Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi at the United Nations Security Council High-Level Meeting “Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 8 April 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202502/t20250219_11558555.html

¹⁴⁹³ Press release on Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to the Russian Federation, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 1 April 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2006568/

¹⁴⁹⁴ Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kenya on Creating an Inspiring Example in the All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing) 24 April 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202504/t20250424_11603292.html

¹⁴⁹⁵ Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2012255/

¹⁴⁹⁶ Remarks by Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the ASEAN-China-GCC Summit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing) 28 May 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250528_11635023.html

representativeness within the UNSC.¹⁴⁹⁷ He called for the expansion of the Council, with permanent membership to the Group of 4, Germany, Brazil, India and Japan, as well as Africa, to better reflect the current global order and voices within countries.

On 5 December 2024, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot met and spoke with Minister of State and Foreign Affairs of Portugal Paulo Rangel about the importance of reforming international institutions, particularly to expand the representation of countries in the UNSC and the effectiveness of the UN body.¹⁴⁹⁸

On 6 December 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies including France released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication to "to manage and mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence" and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁴⁹⁹

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁵⁰⁰ The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to "a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources." The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the "Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight," "Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security," "Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources" and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for "Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security," "Regional peace and stability in the Middle East," "Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific," "Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela," "Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage."¹⁵⁰¹ The joint statement reflects the G7's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 31 March 2025, the governments of France and Mexico welcomed Armenia's decision to joining their effort in restricting the Security Council's veto powers.¹⁵⁰² This declaration reflects France's commitment to reforming the Security Council and promote effective multilateralism.

On 1 April 2025, the French Embassy in India announced that during its presidency of the UNSC for the month of April, France would lead discussions on UNSC reform, which includes giving India a permanent seat.¹⁵⁰³

¹⁴⁹⁷ Réforme du CSNU : l'élargissement du Conseil de sécurité est indispensable, Mission Permanente de la France auprès des Nations Unies à New York (New York) 21 November 2024. Translation Provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://onu.delegfrance.org/reforme-du-csnu-l-elargissement-du-conseil-de-securite-est-indispensable>

¹⁴⁹⁸ Meeting between M. Jean-Noël Barrot and his Portuguese counterpart, Mr Paulo Rangel, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (Paris) 5 December 2024. Access Date: 8 April 2025. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/portugal/events/article/meeting-between-m-jean-noel-barrot-and-his-portuguese-counterpart-mr-paulo>

¹⁴⁹⁹ Thirty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Malta) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/582397.pdf>

¹⁵⁰⁰ G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html>

¹⁵⁰¹ Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

¹⁵⁰² UN – Armenia signs on to French-Mexican initiative to regulate veto powers at the Security Council (31 March 2025), Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (Paris) 31 March 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/news-and-events/article/un-armenia-signs-on-to-french-mexican-initiative-to-regulate-veto-powers-at-the>

On 3 April 2025, Minister Barrot delivered a speech on the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting underscoring the importance of solidarity between NATO members amid threats to security and defense, and territorial integrity and sovereignty.¹⁵⁰⁴

On 25 April 2025, Minister of Economy, Finance, Industrial and Digital Sovereignty Eric Lombard reaffirmed France's engagement to work on approaches for guiding an International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota share realignment under the 17th General review of Quotas during his IMFC statement.¹⁵⁰⁵ This demonstrates France's call for increased institutional representativeness at the IMF and the World Bank.

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, United Kingdom and United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁵⁰⁶ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

France has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. France has taken moderate action in reforming a UN body through verbal affirmations and satisfying the criteria of representativeness and effectiveness. However, it has not taken strong action to reform an international organization nor satisfied the criteria of institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, France receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Logan Klierer

Germany: 0

Germany has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 6 December 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies including Germany released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication to "to manage and mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence" and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁵⁰⁷

On 29 January 2025, Germany joined the Working Group on the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) Report on the Governance and Oversight of the Executive Boards of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UN-Women (JIU/REP/2023/7) tasked with reviewing the

¹⁵⁰³ France reiterates call for UNSC reform to give India permanent seat (New Delhi) 1 April 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.indianarrative.com/india-news/france-reiterates-call-for-uns-c-reform-to-give-india-permanent-seat-168917.html>

¹⁵⁰⁴ The efforts led by France and the United Kingdom must enable a huge boost in support for Ukraine, Embassy of France in Washington D.C. (Washington D.C.) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article11686>

¹⁵⁰⁵ IMFC Statement by Eric Lombard, Minister of Economy, Finance, Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, France, International Monetary and Financial Committee (Washington D.C.) 25 April 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. <https://meetings.imf.org/en/2025/Spring/Statements#statements>

¹⁵⁰⁶ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

¹⁵⁰⁷ Thirty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Malta) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/582397.pdf>

JIU's recommendations and developing actionable implementation strategies on strengthening governance, oversight and risk management across participating Executive Boards.¹⁵⁰⁸

On 29 January 2025, the Federal Foreign Office published an article, reaffirming the need to reform the UN Security Council (UNSC) to ensure it reflects the current geopolitical context.¹⁵⁰⁹ The article also highlighted how Germany has been coordinating with the G4 to demand comprehensive reform, such as adding six new permanent and four or five non-permanent members and changing existing working methods more broadly.

On 16 February 2025, Development Minister Svenja Schulze launched an international initiative to support the United Nations Development System at the Munich Security Conference.¹⁵¹⁰ The initiative aims to strengthen multilateralism broadly and support the development work at the UN in response to recent financial cuts and major donor withdrawals.

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁵¹¹ The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to "a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources." The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the "Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight," "Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security," "Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources" and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for "Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security," "Regional peace and stability in the Middle East," "Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific," "Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela," "Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage."¹⁵¹² The joint statement reflects the G7's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 8 April 2025, Germany hosted the Second Global Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) workshop in partnership with the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) to facilitate dialogue between VNR countries and stakeholders, bolstering the institutional transparency and accountability of the UN system.¹⁵¹³ The initiative features peer-to-peer learning and knowledge exchange to strengthen the evidence-based national reviews of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) progress and transparent reporting processes through stakeholder engagement.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Inspectors of the Joint Inspection Unit, Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 3 September 2025. <https://www.unjiu.org/content/inspectors-joint-inspection-unit>; Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Joint Working Group, United Nations Development Programme (New York) n.d. Access Date: 3 September 2025.

https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-12/jiu-draft_terms-of-reference-joint-working-group.pdf

¹⁵⁰⁹ Why the United Nations Security Council needs to be reformed, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 29 January 2025. Access Date: 9 April 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/reformsr-231604>

¹⁵¹⁰ Development Minister Schulze attends Munich Security Conference, launches initiative to support United Nations Development System, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Berlin) 16 February 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. <https://www.bmz.de/en/news/archive-press-releases/schulze-msc-initiative-support-for-un-development-system-247594>

¹⁵¹¹ G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html>

¹⁵¹² Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

¹⁵¹³ Second Global VNR Workshop Facilitates Peer-to-Peer Learning, International Institute for Sustainable Development (Winnipeg) 7 May 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/second-global-vnr-workshop-facilitates-peer-to-peer-learning/>

On 12 May 2025, Germany hosted the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin, which was a forum aimed to discuss reform of UN peacekeeping to enhance the long-term effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping missions and response against current complex geopolitical challenges and conflicts.¹⁵¹⁴

On 14 May 2025, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul attended an informal meeting of NATO Foreign Affairs hosted in Türkiye to discuss defence spending and strengthen defence and deterrence strategies.¹⁵¹⁵ The initiative aims to foster collaboration between NATO Foreign Ministers and increase the institutional effectiveness of NATO.

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁵¹⁶ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

Germany has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Germany has taken moderate action in reforming a UN body through verbal affirmations to bolster institutional representativeness and effectiveness. However, it has not taken strong action to reform an international organization or satisfied the criteria of institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, Germany receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Logan Klierer

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 28 November 2024, Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reaffirmed India's engagement in the ongoing Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) towards United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reforms, as well as collaborating with other countries in the G-4 and L.69 Groups to expand representation of countries in the UNSC.¹⁵¹⁷

On 20 December 2024, Minister of State Shri Kirti Vardhan Singh reinforced Minister of External Affairs Jaishankar's statement and reiterated that India's top priority was to gain permanent membership in the reformed and expanded UNSC.¹⁵¹⁸

¹⁵¹⁴ More than just blue helmet missions – an important conference in Berlin on 13 and 14 May will discuss the future of UN peacekeeping, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 13 May 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintentionen/un-peacekeeping-ministerial-2714890>

¹⁵¹⁵ Transatlantic security now and in the future: Foreign Minister Wadephul is travelling to the informal meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Antalya, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 14 May 2025. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/2718324-2718324>

¹⁵¹⁶ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

¹⁵¹⁷ Question NO. 38 India's Permanent Position in the UNSC, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 24 November 2024. Access Date: 30 March 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/38630/QUESTION_NO_38_INDIAS_PERMANENT_POSITION_IN_UNSC

¹⁵¹⁸ Question NO-4238 India's Leadership in Global Governance Reform, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 20 December 2024. Access Date: 30 March 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/38846/QUESTION+NO+4238+INDIAS+LEADERSHIP+IN+GLOBAL+GOVERNANCE+REFORM>

On 23 December 2024, Minister of External Affairs Jaishankar called for UN reform amid persisting conflicts in his address during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly.¹⁵¹⁹

On 7 February 2025, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Gerapetritis reaffirmed their commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¹⁵²⁰ This reflects India's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the UN with respect to sovereignty, maritime security and territorial integrity.

On 19 February 2025, India's Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations Parvathaneni Harish condemned nations that opposed the expansion of UNSC permanent seats.¹⁵²¹ Ambassador Harish also outlined three fundamental principles essential to the success of UNSC reform: increase in membership of both permanent and non-permanent categories, as well as the commencement of text-based negotiations and linking ambitious timelines with concrete outcomes.

On 23 February 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs in partnership with the Ministry of Defence and the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping held the first Conference for Women Peacekeepers, "Women in Peacekeeping – A Global South Perspective."¹⁵²² This initiative reflects India's commitment to fostering dialogue between relevant stakeholders and bolstering institutional representativeness in the defence and peacekeeping sector.

On 25 February 2025, the government of India in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) organized the first India-UNODA Capacity Building Programme on the UNSC Resolution 1540 and Strategic Trade Controls for countries in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁵²³ The programme featured 24 government experts and speakers sharing best practices and implementation processes for UNSC Resolution 1540 and Strategic Trade Controls. This initiative reflects India's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of global non-proliferation efforts.

On 27 February 2025, Ambassador Harish called for UNSC reform during the IGN Plenary and outlined five actions the UNSC should take to improve institutional representation, effectiveness and transparency.¹⁵²⁴ They include engagement with the wider membership of the UN through a discussion on the Report of the Security Council in the General Assembly, increasing transparency in the working of the subsidiary bodies of the council, implementing peacekeeping mandates that factor in the concerns of the troop and police contributing countries, removing obsolete and irrelevant items from the agenda of the UNSC and considering reform in its entirety rather than in isolation.

On 4 April 2025, Ambassador Harish reaffirmed India's active participation in multilateral processes that address the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on international security during the UNSC Meeting on

¹⁵¹⁹ UN 2024: India calls for change at UN as conflicts persist, The Hindu (New Delhi) 23 December 2024. Access Date: 31 March 2025. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/un-2024-india-calls-for-change-at-un-as-conflicts-persist/article69017874.ece>

¹⁵²⁰ Visit of H.E. Mr. George Gerapetritis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic to India (February 5-7, 2025), Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 8 February 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39016/Visit_of_HE_Mr_George_Gerapetritis_Minister_of_Foreign_Affairs_of_the_Hellenic_Republic_to_India_February_57_2025

¹⁵²¹ 'Status quoists with narrow focus': India calls out nations opposing expansion of UNSC permanent seats, The New Indian Express (Chennai) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 31 March 2025. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2025/Feb/19/status-quoists-with-narrow-focus-india-calls-out-nations-opposing-expansion-of-uns-c-permanent-seats>

¹⁵²² Conference for Women Peacekeepers: "Women in Peacekeeping – A Global South Perspective" (February 23, 2025), Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 23 February 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39097/conference+for+women+peacekeepers+women+in+peacekeeping++a+global+south+perspective+february+23+2025>

¹⁵²³ India-UNODA Capacity Building Programme on the UNSC Resolution 1540 and Strategic Trade Controls for Asia-Pacific Countries at NACIN Palasamudram (February 25-27, 2025), Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 9 June 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39101/IndiaUNODA_Capacity_Building_Programme_on_the_UNSC_Resolution_1540_and_Strategic_Trade_Controls_for_AsiaPacific_Countries_at_NACIN_Palasamudram_February

¹⁵²⁴ IGN Plenary – Cluster Debate on Working Methods, Permanent Mission of India to the UN (New Delhi) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 8 May 2025. <https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNGA?id=NTMyNA>

“Harnessing Safe, Inclusive, Trustworthy AI for Maintenance of International Peace and Security.”¹⁵²⁵ These include the Disarmament Commission, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN General Assembly mandated Working Groups on Outer Space and on Information and Communication Technologies and under Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention and non-proliferation export control regimes.

On 15 April 2025, Ambassador Harish delivered a statement on behalf of the G4 during the IGN Meeting on Size of the Future Council and cluster discussion on Regional Representation, calling for an increase of UNSC membership to 25 or 26 with 11 permanent and 14 or 15 non-permanent members, with particular consideration given to Small Island Developing States in the non-permanent category.¹⁵²⁶

On 30 April 2025, Ambassador K.D. Dewal reiterated the importance of multilateral cooperation in the United Nations and other international institutions including BRICS, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and Financial Action Task Force in countering terrorism at the 4th Meeting of the India-Egypt Working Group on Counter Terrorism.¹⁵²⁷ Both India and Egypt’s delegations underscored their commitment to the adoption of the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism to bolster cooperation and capacity building efforts of institutions.

On 4 May 2025, Ministry of External Affairs Secretary Dammu Ravi stated that Angolan President Joao Lourenco shared India’s urgent calls for UN reform, such as the expansion of UNSC membership to include voices from Africa and developing countries, particularly in the Global South.¹⁵²⁸

India has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. India has taken moderate action in reforming global institutions such as the UNSC and the UN through verbal affirmations that reiterate the importance of institutional representativeness and effectiveness. However, it has not taken strong action in reforming international organizations or advanced institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Aditi Malhotra

Indonesia: 0

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 19 December 2024, Indonesia voted in favour of a resolution on the “Request for an advisory opinion of the internal Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United

¹⁵²⁵ UNSC Meeting under Arria Formula on “Harnessing Safe, Inclusive, Trustworthy AI for Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” Permanent Mission of India to the UN (New Delhi) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 8 May 2025.

<https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNGA?id=NTMyNA>

¹⁵²⁶ India calls out attempts to introduce new parameters such as religion, faith as basis for representation in reformed UNSC, The Hindu (Chennai) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-calls-out-attempts-to-introduce-new-parameters-such-as-religion-faith-as-basis-for-representation-in-reformed-unscc/article69455469.ece>

¹⁵²⁷ 4th Meeting of India-Egypt Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism (April 30, 2025), Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 9 June 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39453/4th_Meeting_of_IndiaEgypt_Joint_Working_Group_on_Counter_Terrorism_April_30_2025

¹⁵²⁸ India, Angola share collective interest in UN reform: MEA Secy Dammu Ravi, ANI (New Delhi) 4 May 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/india-angola-share-collective-interest-in-un-reform-mea-secy-dammu-ravi20250504092605/>

Nations, other international organizations and third States.”¹⁵²⁹ This demonstrates Indonesia’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 21 February 2025, Deputy Foreign Minister Arrmanatha Nasir, during the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, highlighted critical issues in current global governance, emphasizing the erosion of multilateralism and calling upon G20 members to support concrete actions toward institutional reform.¹⁵³⁰ Minister Nasir advocated for the G20’s increased active role in promoting comprehensive reforms within global institutions, endorsing the UN Future Pact as a practical step forward.

On 23 February 2025, Deputy Minister Nasir reinforced Indonesia’s position in a separate address, calling for reforms focused on inclusiveness, equality, solidarity and strengthened partnerships between the G20, the United Nations and other international organizations.¹⁵³¹ This reinforced Indonesia’s stance in urging comprehensive and equitable institutional reform to ensure global governance institutions remain effective and legitimate.

On 21 April 2025, Deputy Minister Nasir addressed the 81st session of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in Bangkok, Thailand.¹⁵³² He emphasized the need for a renewed and reformed global governance architecture that empowers the Global South and its 21st-century dynamic. He reaffirmed Indonesia’s support for multilateralism rooted in the principles of the UN Charter and international law, calling attention to the continued imbalance in access to global decision-making spaces and financial systems.

On 21 April 2025, Foreign Minister Sugiono reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to closely cooperating with international organizations such as BRICS, the G20 and the United Nations to enhance global collaboration and multilateralism at the 1st Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun.¹⁵³³

On 25 April 2025, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati participated in bilateral discussions with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during the Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington D.C.¹⁵³⁴ The meeting focused on the future of multilateral trade and financial institutions, with particular attention to proposed reforms at the World Trade Organization. Minister

¹⁵²⁹ Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States – GA draft Resolution (A/79/L.28/Rev.1) – Revised (Adopted on 19 Dec 2024), United Nations General Assembly (New York) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-icj-12dec24/>

¹⁵³⁰ Indonesia urges G20 to strengthen global governance reform, ANTARA News (Jakarta) 21 February 2025. Access Date: 9 April 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/345905/indonesia-urges-g20-to-strengthen-global-governance-reform>

¹⁵³¹ Indonesia calls for multilateral reform at G20 foreign ministers’ meeting, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta) 23 February 2025. Access Date: 9 April 2025. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2025/02/23/indonesia-calls-for-multilateral-reform-atg20-foreign-ministers-meeting.html>

¹⁵³² Remarks by H.E. Arrmanatha C. Nasir, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia at the 81st ESCAP Session, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok) 21 April 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.kemlu.go.id/publikasi/pidato/pidato-lainnya/remarks-by-he-arrmanatha-c-nasir-vice-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-indonesia-at-the-81st-escap-session-agenda-2-policy-issues-for-inclusive-and-sustainable-development-in-asia-pacific-bangkok-21-april-2025?type=publication>

¹⁵³³ Transcript of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Y.M. Sugiono at the Joint Press Statement in the 1st Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) Between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, April 21, 2025, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta) 21 April 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. <https://www.kemlu.go.id/publikasi/siaran-pers/transkrip-menteri-luar-negeri-indonesia-ym-sugiono-pada-pernyataan-pers-bersama-dalam-the-1st-joint-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-dialogue-22-between-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-beijing-21-april-2025?type=publication>

¹⁵³⁴ Indonesia engages U.S. on multilateralism, WTO reform at G20 and IMF Spring Meetings, Indonesia Business Post (Washington D.C.) 25 April 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/4182/capitol-influence-and-lobbying/ri-engages-u-s-on-multilateralism-wto-reform-at-g20-and-imf-spring-meetings>

Indrawati advocated for reforms that prioritize developmental equity, capacity-building and inclusive representation.

On 2 May 2025, Minister Sugiono reaffirmed Indonesia's commitment to enhance collaboration in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on regional and global issues including Myanmar, human trafficking and energy security at a joint press conference of the 10th Joint Commission Meeting Indonesia-Thailand.¹⁵³⁵

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Indonesia has taken moderate action in reforming global governance at the G20 and fostering partnerships between the G20, the UN and other international organizations to advance institutional representation and effectiveness in the areas of trade, financial systems, international law and counter terrorism efforts. However, it has not taken strong action to reform both a UN body and other relevant international organizations or advanced institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Lou Cardot

Italy: 0

Italy has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 5 December 2024, Undersecretary of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Giorgio Silli attended the 31st Ministerial Council of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) where he reaffirmed Italy's commitment to "safeguarding the OSCE," the organization's values and principles, as well as initiatives in maintaining Europe's security order.¹⁵³⁶

On 6 December 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies including Italy released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication to "to manage and mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence" and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁵³⁷ On 15 January 2025, Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN Maurizio Massari reiterated Italy's commitment to advancing the work of the UN including the Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact and upholding the UN Charter amid ongoing global security threats at the UNGA Plenary.¹⁵³⁸

¹⁵³⁵ Joint Press Conference of the 10th Joint Commission Meeting Indonesia-Thailand Bangkok, 2 May 2025, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta) 2 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. <https://www.kemlu.go.id/publikasi/siaran-pers/joint-press-conference-of-the-10th-joint-commission-meeting-indonesia-thailand-bangkok-2-may-2025?type=publication>

¹⁵³⁶ Malta – Undersecretary Silli attends the 31st OSCE Ministerial Council, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Malta) 5 December 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/12/malta-il-sottosegretario-silli-partecipa-al-31mo-consiglio-ministeriale-dellosce/

¹⁵³⁷ Thirty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Malta) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/582397.pdf>

¹⁵³⁸ STATEMENT OF ITALY'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, AMB. MAURIZIO MASSARI AT THE GA PLENARY FOR THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION, Rappresentanza permanente d'Italia presso le Nazioni Unite New York (New York) 15 January 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/01/statement-of-italys-permanent-representative-amb-maurizio-massari-at-the-ga-plenary-for-the-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-work-of-the-organization/

On 29 January 2025, Undersecretary of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Giorgio Silli visited Mexico and discussed collaboration within reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) with Mexican Undersecretary of Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Enrique Javier Ochoa Martínez.¹⁵³⁹

On 25 February 2025, Italy reaffirmed its commitment to the universal abolition of the death penalty at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Biennial High-Level Panel on the Death Penalty.¹⁵⁴⁰ This demonstrates Italy's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN, as well as international legal systems, human rights-centre penal reforms and advancing human rights and accountability in sentencing processes.

On 10 March 2025, Ambassador Massari and the Italian delegation participated in the 69th Commission on the Status of Women (CSW69) where Italy led events related to “women, peace and security” and “youth, peace and security” in partnership with several UN organizations.¹⁵⁴¹

On 12 March 2025, Undersecretary Silli co-chaired the third session of the Political Dialogue Mechanism with El Salvadoran Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Adriana Mira, where they discussed development cooperation, regional issues and UNSC reform.¹⁵⁴²

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁵⁴³ The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to “a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.” The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the “Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight,” “Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security,” “Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources” and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for “Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security,” “Regional peace and stability in the Middle East,” “Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific,” “Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela,” “Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and “Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage.”¹⁵⁴⁴ The joint statement reflects the G7's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 18 March 2025, Ambassador Maurizio Massari on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group presented a proposal for the reform of the UNSC to facilitate equitable representation and increase in

¹⁵³⁹ Visita in Messico del Sottosegretario agli Affari Esteri Giorgio Silli, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 29 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 May 2025. https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/01/visita-in-messico-del-sottosegretario-agli-affari-esteri-giorgio-silli/

¹⁵⁴⁰ Biennial High-Level Panel on the Death Penalty, Geneva Centre for Human Rights Advancement and Global Dialogue (Geneva) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. <https://gchragd.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Biennial-High-Level-Panel-on-the-Death-Penalty.pdf#:~:text=In%20its%20resolution%2054%2F35%2C%20the%20Council%20decided%20that,rights%20and%20the%20question%20of%20the%20death%20penalty.>

¹⁵⁴¹ PRESS RELEASE – THE 69TH COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (CSW69) KICKS OFF AT THE UN, Rappresentanza permanente d'Italia presso le Nazioni Unite New York (New York) 10 March 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/03/press-release-the-69th-commission-on-the-status-of-women-csw69-kicks-off-at-the-un/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

¹⁵⁴² Missione istituzionale del Sottosegretario Silli in El Salvador, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 12 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 May 2025. https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/03/missione-istituzionale-del-sottosegretario-silli-in-el-salvador/

¹⁵⁴³ G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html>

¹⁵⁴⁴ Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

membership to the Council.¹⁵⁴⁵ The document proposes expanding the non-permanent category, introducing longer-term re-electable non-permanent seats, prioritizing equitable geographical distribution for underrepresented regional groups, creating special arrangements for cross-regional groups, increasing the number of affirmative votes for UNSC decisions, abolishing the veto and formalizing rules of procedure and working methods.

On 12 May 2025, the Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) hosted the SDG16 Conference on “Advancing Peace, Justice and Institutions for Sustainable Development.”¹⁵⁴⁶ This initiative aims to strengthen the transparency and accountability of institutions and support intergovernmental processes.¹⁵⁴⁷

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁵⁴⁸ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN’s institutional effectiveness. Italy has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. It has reaffirmed its support for the reform of UN organizations and bolstering efforts for UN institutional effectiveness. However, it has not taken strong action to reform both a UN body and other relevant international organizations or advanced institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, Italy receives a score of 0.

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Japan: +1

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 22 November 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwama Takeshi reaffirmed Japan’s support for UN peacekeeping operations during a meeting with the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations at the UN

¹⁵⁴⁵ Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maurizio Massari on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group – The intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, Rappresentanza permanente d’Italia presso le Nazioni Unite New York (New York) 18 March 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2024/03/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-the-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-the-question-of-equitable-representation-on-and-increase-in-the-membe-2/

¹⁵⁴⁶ The Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN hosts the SDG16 Conference 2025 with UNDESA and IDLO, Rappresentanza permanente d’Italia presso le Nazioni Unite New York (New York) 22 April 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/04/the-permanent-mission-of-italy-to-the-un-hosts-the-sdg16-conference-2025-with-undesa-and-idlo/

¹⁵⁴⁷ SDG 16 Conference 2025 Advancing Peace, Justice and Institutions for Sustainable Development, Rappresentanza permanente d’Italia presso le Nazioni Unite New York (New York) 12 May 2025. Access Date: 3 September 2025. <https://italyun.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025.Programme-and-guiding-Questions.SDG16-Conference.March-25.pdf>

¹⁵⁴⁸ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

Jean-Pierre Lacroix.¹⁵⁴⁹ This demonstrates Japan's commitment to supporting the institutional effectiveness of the UN and the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.

On 26 November 2024, Minister Iwaya attended the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting and session on the "Indo-Pacific and Regional Issues" where he reiterated Japan's commitment to cooperating with G7 members to uphold "free and open international order based on the Rule of Law."¹⁵⁵⁰ This demonstrates Japan's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 11 December 2024, Japan, Uruguay and the United Kingdom co-hosted the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Preparatory Meeting.¹⁵⁵¹ The meeting facilitated discussions between government officials from over 60 countries, experts, universities and research institutes on capacity-building in Peacekeeping and bolstering the capacities of peacekeepers under the Triangular Partnership Programme. This provided opportunities to bolster the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of the UN.

On 13 December 2024, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Miyaji Takuma held a meeting with Assistant Secretary General of Foreign and Community Relations from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat.¹⁵⁵² Minister Miyagi reaffirmed Japan's commitment to strengthening Japan-CARICOM relations to overcome sustainable development vulnerabilities and continue exchanging dialogue on various international issues.

On 14 December 2024, Minister Iwaya held and co-chaired the Eighth Japan-CARICOM Ministerial-Level Conference.¹⁵⁵³ Minister Iwaya reaffirmed Japan's commitment to continued cooperation towards supporting sustainable development and addressing vulnerabilities in the areas of "maritime issues, disaster risk reduction, climate change, and human security."

On 14 December 2024, Director-General of the International Cooperation Bureau from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Ishizuki Hideo and Head of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Investment and Technology Promotion Office Adachi Fumio signed Japan's grant of JPY730 million for "The Project for Industrial Development and Technology Transfer in the Member States of the Caribbean Community" following the Japan-CARICOM Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁵⁵⁴

On 16 December 2024, Senior Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Akahori Takeshi committed to strengthening strategic cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) during a meeting with the Administrator of the UNDP Achim Steiner.¹⁵⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴⁹ Courtesy Call on Foreign Minister IWAYA by UN Under Secretary General for Peace Operations Lacroix, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 22 November 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00751.html

¹⁵⁵⁰ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Italy (Overview of the "Indo-Pacific" session), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00681.html

¹⁵⁵¹ United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial Preparatory Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00816.html

¹⁵⁵² Meeting between State Minister for Foreign Affairs MIYAJI and Ms. Elizabeth Solomon, Assistant Secretary General, Foreign and Community Relations, CARICOM Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 December 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00830.html

¹⁵⁵³ The Eighth Japan-CARICOM Ministerial-Level Conference, Working Lunch, Signing Ceremony, and Press Announcement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 December 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00839.html

¹⁵⁵⁴ Signing and Exchange of Notes concerning Japan's Grant Aid to 14 CARICOM countries "The Project for Industrial Development and Technology Transfer in the Member States of the Caribbean Community", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 December 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00838.html

¹⁵⁵⁵ Meeting between Senior Deputy Minister AKAHORI and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Steiner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 December 2024. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000500.html

On 16 December 2024, Minister Iwaya committed to further strengthening collaboration with the UNDP and underscored UNDP efforts in facilitating private sector partnership for market development.¹⁵⁵⁶

On 18 December 2024, Minister Iwaya committed to strengthening Japan's relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations during a meeting with the Secretary-General of the Kao Kim Hourn.¹⁵⁵⁷

On 18 December 2024, Minister Iwaya reiterated Japan's commitment to supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) and stated the importance of ICC autonomy to fulfill its function as an independent body and strengthen the rule of law during a meeting with President of the ICC Akane Tomoko.¹⁵⁵⁸

On 1 January 2025, Japan and Norway assumed the positions of Co-Chairs for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Focal Points Network for a one-year term.¹⁵⁵⁹ The Co-Chairs aim to host several convenings under the theme of "Deepening WPS Commitments for Action: Innovating and adapting to deliver on peace and security." These initiatives align with the three key priority areas of "Significance of the Development and Implementation of National and Regional Action Plans," "The role of Women in Peace Mediation and Peacebuilding, and as Human Rights Defenders" and "Further Elaboration of the WPS Agenda, Including Advancing Its Application to Disaster Risk Reduction." This partnership demonstrates Japan's commitment to advancing institutional effectiveness and the WPS agenda.

On 14 January 2025, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Eri Arfiya reiterated Japan's commitment to strengthening cooperation with the UNDP and committed to promoting cooperation efforts focussed on "human dignity, human security in the field of development, and the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus" during a meeting with the Director of the Crisis Bureau of the UNDP.¹⁵⁶⁰

On 16 January 2025, Vice-Minister Eri attended the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-Southeast Asia High-Level Panel Discussion in Tokyo.¹⁵⁶¹ Minister Eri reiterated the importance of strengthening collaboration between the OECD and Southeast Asia to facilitate development efforts in the region.

On 16 January 2025, Japan held the 18th Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) High-Level Consultation where both the Japanese and NATO delegation reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen their working relationship.¹⁵⁶²

On 17 January 2025, Minister Miyaji reiterated Japan's commitment to resolve development issues between International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states.¹⁵⁶³ He further expressed his commitment to continue cooperation with the IAEA and IAEA Governors.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Meeting between Foreign Minister Iwaya and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Steiner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 December 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000499.html

¹⁵⁵⁷ Meeting between Foreign Minister IWAYA and Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, Secretary-General of ASEAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 18 December 2024. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean/pressite_000001_00001.html

¹⁵⁵⁸ Courtesy Call on Foreign Minister Iwaya by President Akane of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 18 December 2024. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00858.html

¹⁵⁵⁹ Japan and Norway are the 2025 Co-Chairs of the WPS Focal Points Network, Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network (New York) n.d. Access Date: 10 June 2025. <https://wpsfocalpointsnetwork.org/>

¹⁵⁶⁰ Courtesy Call on Parliamentary Vice-Minister Ms. ERI Arfiya by Ms. Shoko Noda, Director of the Crisis Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 January 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00913.html

¹⁵⁶¹ Parliamentary Vice-Minister ERI's attendance at the OECD – Southeast Asia High-Level Panel Discussion in Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00925.html

¹⁵⁶² The 18th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00923.html

On 24 January 2025, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujii Hisayuki attended the informal ministerial gathering of the World Trade Organization (WTO).¹⁵⁶⁴ Minister Fujii underscored the importance of strengthening the WTO system and the dispute settlement reform. Further, he exchanged views with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore Gan Kim Yong and the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of Australia to the WTO James Baxter on progress for the WTO Electronic Commerce Negotiations. Japan's participation in the Ministerial Gathering demonstrates its commitment to advancing the institutional effectiveness of the WTO.

On 31 January 2025, Minister Iwaya held a meeting with President of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Philemon Yang.¹⁵⁶⁵ Minister Iwaya acknowledged progress on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform and discussed the revitalization of UNGA. Further, Minister Iwaya underscored the need for the UN to leverage its position to facilitate reconciliation and collaboration amongst increasingly fragmented international community members.

On 3 February 2025, Minister Fujii held a meeting with President of the 79th session of UNGA Philemon Yang.¹⁵⁶⁶ Minister Fujii underscored the importance of cooperation and dialogue to resolve international disputes. In addition, he highlighted the significance of “upholding the principles of the UN Charter” and “strengthening multilateralism with the UN at its core.”

On 3 February 2025, Japan held the Japan-NATO Conference on Strategic Communications with attendees including officials from the Government of Japan, NATO, Indo-Pacific partners and the EU.¹⁵⁶⁷ The conference facilitated dialogue between participants on challenges related to disinformation and future opportunities for cooperation.

On 4 February 2025, Minister Iwaya committed to furthering cooperation with the IAEA in the area of “nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation” during a visit by the Director General of the IAEA Rafael Mariano Grossi.¹⁵⁶⁸

On 4 February 2025, Minister Fujii held a meeting with the Deputy Executive Director of UN Women Kirsi Madi where he expressed ongoing collaborations between Japan and UN Women, and reiterated Japan's commitment to further partnerships to promote WPS and advance efforts toward gender equality.¹⁵⁶⁹

On 5 February 2025, Japan held the WPS Focal Points Network 7th Capital-Level meeting in Tokyo.¹⁵⁷⁰ State Minister of Foreign Affairs Fujii Hisayuki committed that the government of Japan will contribute USD2

¹⁵⁶³ State Minister for Foreign Affairs MIYAJI Receives a Courtesy Call from Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 17 January 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00930.html

¹⁵⁶⁴ Visit of State Minister for Foreign Affairs FUJII Hisayuki to Switzerland (Attendance at the Informal WTO Ministerial Gathering hosted by Switzerland) (Results), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 24 January 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00948.html

¹⁵⁶⁵ Foreign Minister IWAYA's Meeting and Working Dinner with H.E. Mr. Philemon YANG, President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 31 January 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00958.html

¹⁵⁶⁶ Working Dinner between State Minister for Foreign Affairs FUJII and H.E. Mr. Philemon YANG, President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 3 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00967.html

¹⁵⁶⁷ Japan-NATO Conference on Strategic Communications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 3 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00964.html

¹⁵⁶⁸ Visit of H.E. Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00971.html

¹⁵⁶⁹ Courtesy call on State Minister for Foreign Affairs FUJII by Ms. Kirsi Madi, Deputy Executive Director of UN Women, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00969.html

million to support the establishment of national and regional WPS action in the Asia-Pacific. He further reiterated his support to continue promoting the WPS agenda and expand women's participation in disaster risk reduction, peace mediation and peacebuilding efforts.

On 11 February 2025, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Hisashi held a meeting with the Secretary-General of the OECD Mathias Cormann where he reiterated Japan's commitment to the role of the OECD as a "standard setter."¹⁵⁷¹

On 12 February 2025, Minister Iwaya expressed Japan's commitment to strengthening collaboration between Japan and the World Intellectual Property organization (WIPO) and reiterated the role of the WIPO as a leader in "free and fair economic order" during a meeting with WIPO's Director General Daren Tang.¹⁵⁷²

On 18 February 2025, Minister Iwaya held a meeting with the IAEA Director General Grossi where he reiterated the role of the IAEA and the importance of non-proliferation efforts.¹⁵⁷³

On 19 February 2025, Minister Matsumoto received a courtesy call from trainees from the "The Shimanami Collective: Sea and Human Security For Free and Open Indo-Pacific" hosted by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).¹⁵⁷⁴ Minister Matsumoto underscored the importance of UNITAR's prioritization of human resource development and encouraged feedback from participants to facilitate dialogue and knowledge-sharing.

On 26 February 2025, Minister Iwaya reaffirmed Japan's commitment to supporting the integration and building of relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN countries.¹⁵⁷⁵ Minister Iwaya underscored Japan's commitment to promoting the fundamental principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific of "openness, transparency, inclusivity, and a rules-based framework." This reflects Japan's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of ASEAN.

On 26 February 2025, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikuina Akiko attended the High-Level Segment of the UN Human Rights Council and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.¹⁵⁷⁶ Minister Ikuina pressed for a "reinvigoration of existing disarmament institutions" and the commencement of negotiations and treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation. Minister Ikuina also reaffirmed Japan's commitment to upholding international rules-based order in alignment with the Human Rights Council.

¹⁵⁷⁰ WPS Focal Points Network 7th Capital-Level Meeting, Tokyo, Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00977.html

¹⁵⁷¹ Visit of Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs MATSUMOTO to the Republic of France (Results), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00994.html

¹⁵⁷² Courtesy Call on Foreign Minister Iwaya by Mr. Daren Tang, Director General, World Intellectual Property Organization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e_000521.html

¹⁵⁷³ Foreign Minister IWAYA's Meeting and Working Dinner with IAEA Director General Grossi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01005.html

¹⁵⁷⁴ Courtesy call on Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs MATSUMOTO Hisashi by trainees from the "The Shimanami Collective: Sea and Human Security For Free and Open Indo-Pacific" hosted by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 14 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01007.html

¹⁵⁷⁵ Video Message by Mr. IWAYA Takeshi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the ASEAN Future Forum 2025, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 26 February 2025. Access Date: 13 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01026.html

¹⁵⁷⁶ Participation of Ms. IKUINA Akiko, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the High-Level Segment of the UN Human Rights Council and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 13 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01030.html

On 6 March 2025, Japan held the 40th ASEAN-Japan Forum where participants engaged in discussions on progress related to the “Vision and the Implementation Plan” and various regional and international issues.¹⁵⁷⁷ This initiative reflects Japan’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of ASEAN through promoting constructive dialogue.

On 11 March 2025, Minister Fujii reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to strengthening and reforming the WTO system on global trade during a courtesy call with the Deputy Director-General of the WTO Angela Ellard.¹⁵⁷⁸

On 12 March 2025, Vice-Minister Eri reaffirmed Japan’s alignment with and contribution to UN action on addressing sexual violence in conflict, public-private sector partnership for gender equality and the promotion of the WPS agenda at the 69th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women.¹⁵⁷⁹ This reflects Japan’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of the UN in advancing their agenda on women’s empowerment and gender equality.

On 13 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reiterated Japan’s commitment to collaborating with G7 members, stakeholders and like-minded countries on issues related to maritime security at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and session on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁵⁸⁰ This reflects Japan’s commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 13 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reiterated the importance of the G7 and future collaboration to strengthen the unity of the group on issues affecting the international community at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and session on “Strengthening the G7 at 50 Years.”¹⁵⁸¹

On 13 March 2025, Minister Iwaya requested “understanding and cooperation” from G7 members on North Korea’s abductions issue during the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and session on the Indo-Pacific.¹⁵⁸²

On 13 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reiterated the importance of the G7 in establishing a framework for peace and security during the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and session on Ukraine.¹⁵⁸³

On 13 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reiterated Japan’s position on challenges pertaining to peace and security in the Middle East at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and session on the Middle East.¹⁵⁸⁴ Minister Iwaya expressed that Japan aims to expand support for the reconstruction of Gaza through partnering with the Council for the East Asian Promotion for Palestinian Development, support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria and continue dialogue with Iran to address its nuclear development activities. This reflects Japan’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the G7 in its humanitarian activity in the Middle Eastern region.

¹⁵⁷⁷ The 40th ASEAN-Japan Forum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 6 March 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01051.html

¹⁵⁷⁸ Courtesy call on State Minister Mr. FUJII Hisayuki by Ms. Angela Ellard, Deputy Director-General of the WTO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01073.html

¹⁵⁷⁹ Attendance of Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs ERI Arfiya at the Sixty-Ninth Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01085.html

¹⁵⁸⁰ G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 6 on Maritime Security and Prosperity), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00847.html

¹⁵⁸¹ G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the “Session 1 Strengthening the G7 at 50 Years”), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00840.html

¹⁵⁸² G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 2 on the Indo-Pacific), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00841.html

¹⁵⁸³ G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 3 on Ukraine), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00842.html

¹⁵⁸⁴ G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 5 on the Middle East), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00846.html

On 13 March 2025, Minister Iwaya stated the importance of increasing the G7's economic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean to further foster public-private partnerships in the infrastructure sector at the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting and session on the Americas.¹⁵⁸⁵

On 14 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reiterated the importance of strategic collaboration between G7 members amid contestation and confrontation on issues such as economic security and disinformation, with continued partnerships with European countries on Indo-Pacific security at the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁵⁸⁶

On 14 March 2025, Minister Iwaya stressed the importance of G7 members strengthening relations with African countries to address regional instability in countries such as the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan at the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting and session on Africa.¹⁵⁸⁷

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁵⁸⁸ The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to "a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources." The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the "Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight," "Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security," "Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources" and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for "Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security," "Regional peace and stability in the Middle East," "Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific," "Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela," "Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage."¹⁵⁸⁹ The joint statement reflects the G7's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 22 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reiterated Japan's commitment to fully implementing UNSC resolutions on the denuclearization of North Korea at the 11th Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁵⁹⁰

On 22 March 2025, Minister Iwaya committed to strengthening cooperation between ASEAN to expand cooperation and promote ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific region at the 11th Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁵⁹¹ This reflects Japan's commitment to bolstering ASEAN's institutional effectiveness.

On 24 March 2025, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa spoke with Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the UN and Chair of Intergovernmental Negotiation on Security Council Reform (IGN) Ambassador Tareq Albanai, reaffirming the Japanese government's efforts in enhancing the UN's operations,

¹⁵⁸⁵ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 4 on the Americas), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00844.html

¹⁵⁸⁶ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 7 on Strategic Cooperation and Contestation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00851.html

¹⁵⁸⁷ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix (Overview of the Session 8 on Africa), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/pageite_000001_00852.html

¹⁵⁸⁸ G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html>

¹⁵⁸⁹ Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

¹⁵⁹⁰ The Eleventh Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 22 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01107.html

¹⁵⁹¹ The Eleventh Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 22 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01107.html

including reforming the Security Council.¹⁵⁹² Secretary Hayashi added that the G4 countries, Japan, Brazil, Germany and India, would continue to engage in efforts towards reform.

On 25 March 2025, Minister Iwaya spoke with Ambassador Tareq Albanai about the cooperation with Japan in UNSC reform.¹⁵⁹³ Minister Iwaya also reaffirmed particularly, the G4 countries, Japan, Brazil, Germany and India's continued efforts towards UNSC reform.

On 25 March 2025, Minister Iwaya reaffirmed Japan's commitment to continued cooperation with the International Energy Agency (IEA) on energy security and institutional effectiveness at a meeting with the IEA's Executive Director Fatih Birol.¹⁵⁹⁴

On 28 March 2025, Japan collaborated with Australia to monitor and survey illicit maritime activities that are prohibited by the UNSC resolutions at the Kadena Air Base in Japan.¹⁵⁹⁵ This marks the 15th time Australian aircraft engaged in these activities with Japan, which will help ensure effective implementation of the UNSC resolutions.

On 21 April 2025, Minister Iwaya reaffirmed Japan's commitment to continue collaborative efforts with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) during the 81st Session of the UN ESCAP.¹⁵⁹⁶ This reflects Japan's commitment to increase capacity building in the Asia-Pacific through bolstering the institutional effectiveness of ESCAP.

On 29 April 2025, Minister Iwaya met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and reaffirmed the need for UNSC reform.¹⁵⁹⁷ Minister Iwaya stated that Japan would work closely with the UN to reform the UNSC, including increasing permanent and non-permanent membership, as well as other global issues.

On 13 May 2025, Minister Iwaya held a meeting with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.¹⁵⁹⁸ Minister Iwaya underscored the need to advance WTO reform to improve the institutional representativeness and involvement of all WTO members.

On 15 May 2025, Minister Fujii attended the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin, Germany.¹⁵⁹⁹ Minister Fujii reaffirmed Japan's commitment to promoting capacity-building and training programs under the UN Triangular Partnership Programme, foster peacekeeping dialogue and knowledge-sharing and fulfil its obligations as the Vice-Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission to streamline peacekeeping efforts and the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

¹⁵⁹² 安保理改革に関する政府間交渉 (IGN) 議長 (アル・バンナーイ・クウェート国・国連常駐代表) による林内閣官房長官表敬, 外務省 (Tokyo) 24 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 May 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/fp/unp/pageit_000001_01743.html

¹⁵⁹³ 安保理改革に関する政府間交渉 (IGN) 議長 (アル・バンナーイ・クウェート国・国連常駐代表) による岩屋外務大臣表敬, 外務省 (Tokyo) 25 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 May 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/pressit_000001_01947.html

¹⁵⁹⁴ Foreign Minister IWAYA's Meeting with IEA Executive Director Fatih BIROL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 25 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01119.html

¹⁵⁹⁵ Monitoring and surveillance activities by Australia against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 18 May 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01131.html

¹⁵⁹⁶ Video Message by Mr. IWAYA Takeshi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the 81st Session of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 21 April 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01195.html

¹⁵⁹⁷ Iwaya and Gueterres reaffirm need for U.N. Security Council reform, The Japan Times (Tokyo) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/04/29/japan/iwaya-guterres-un-security-council-reform/>

¹⁵⁹⁸ Meeting, Joint Press Statement and Working Dinner between Mr. IWAYA Takeshi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 13 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01261.html

¹⁵⁹⁹ Attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs FUJII to the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 15 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01269.html

On 16 May 2025, Minister Miyagi expressed Japan's support to advance reforms at the WTO at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting.¹⁶⁰⁰ This reflects Japan's commitment to promote the WTO's rules-based multilateral trading system and sustainable economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region.

On 19 May 2025, Minister Iwaya committed to further strengthening relations with Germany within the G7 framework during a meeting with German Minister for Foreign Affairs Johann Wadephul.¹⁶⁰¹

On 22 May 2025, Minister Fujii received a courtesy call from Deputy Executive Director of UN Women Kirsi Madi where he committed to continued cooperation with UN Women and reaffirmed the importance of UN Women as a partner in advancing Japan's WPS agenda.¹⁶⁰²

On 22 May 2025, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Hisashi committed to strengthening Japan's partnership with the UNDP during a courtesy call with UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific Kanni Wignaraja.¹⁶⁰³ This reflects Japan's commitment to upholding international rules-based order and promote the UNDP's institutional effectiveness.

On 23 May 2025, Japan held a visit by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Global Communications Melissa Fleming.¹⁶⁰⁴ The visit involves meetings with government officials and representatives from the private sector. This initiative aims to bolster relationships between Japan and the UN in the area of strategic and digital communications on issues related to the Sustainable Development Goals, the climate crisis, public health and misinformation.

On 27 May 2025, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission in the Cabinet Office co-hosted IAEA's Lise Meitner Programme to provide development opportunities and resources for female researchers and professionals in the nuclear science and technology sector.¹⁶⁰⁵ This reflects Japan's commitment to promoting the institutional representativeness of international organizations.

On 27 May 2025, Minister Iwaya held a meeting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) Philippe Lazzarini to highlight the important role UNRWA plays in facilitating humanitarian efforts.¹⁶⁰⁶ This reflects Japan's commitment to supporting UNRWA's activities and improvements to its governance structure.

On 28 May 2025, Minister Iwaya held a bilateral meeting with Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia Prak Sokhonn to reaffirm their commitment to cooperation in ASEAN on regional and international issues.¹⁶⁰⁷

¹⁶⁰⁰ 2025 APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade (MRT) Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01271.html

¹⁶⁰¹ Japan-Germany Foreign Ministers' Telephone Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 19 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01279.html

¹⁶⁰² Courtesy call on State Minister for Foreign Affairs FUJII by Ms. Kirsi Madi, Deputy Executive Director of UN Women, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 22 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01289.html

¹⁶⁰³ Courtesy Call on Parliamentary Vice-Minister Matsumoto by Ms. Kanni Wignaraja, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 22 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01292.html

¹⁶⁰⁴ Visit of Ms. Melissa Fleming, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Global Communications to Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 23 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01294.html

¹⁶⁰⁵ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Lise Meitner Programme (LMP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 27 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01305.html

¹⁶⁰⁶ Meeting between Foreign Minister IWAYA and Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 27 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01307.html

¹⁶⁰⁷ Japan-Cambodia Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 28 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01312.html

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁶⁰⁸ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

On 29 May 2025, Minister Iwaya reaffirmed Japan's commitment to promote WTO reform at the Nikkei Forum 30th "Future of Asia" forum.¹⁶⁰⁹

On 29 May 2025, Minister Iwaya reaffirmed Japan's commitment to cooperation between Japan and Canada within the G7 with Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand.¹⁶¹⁰

On 30 May 2025, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Funakoshi Takehiro met with French Secretary General of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs Anne-Marie Descôtes to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening cooperation at the G7 and in other international settings.¹⁶¹¹

On 30 May 2025, Japan held a visit of international experts and officials from the IAEA for review of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.¹⁶¹² This independent review by the IAEA Task Force consisting of international experts from 11 countries demonstrates ongoing efforts to facilitate the use of nuclear energy, enhancing the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of the IAEA.

On 30 May 2025, Minister Iwaya held a bilateral meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand Maris Sangiampongsa to reaffirm Japan's support for Thailand's accession to the OECD.¹⁶¹³ This reflects Japan's commitment to promoting institutional representativeness of international organizations.

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Japan has taken strong action to reform an international organization in its co-chairing of the WPS Focal Points Network. Further, it has taken moderate action in facilitating dialogue and reaffirming its commitment to promoting the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of international organizations such as the UN, the G7, the WTO and the IAEA. However, it has not taken strong action to reform a UN body or advanced institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, Japan receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Natalie Lau

Korea: 0

Korea has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with

¹⁶⁰⁸ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

¹⁶⁰⁹ Foreign Minister IWAYA's Attendance at the Nikkei Forum 30th "The Future of Asia" Welcoming Dinner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 29 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01320.html

¹⁶¹⁰ Japan-Canada Foreign Ministers' Telephone Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 29 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01319.html

¹⁶¹¹ Japan-France Vice Ministers' Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 30 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01330.html

¹⁶¹² Visit of IAEA Officials and International Experts for a Review on the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water from TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the Sea (Results), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 30 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01327.html

¹⁶¹³ Japan-Thailand Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Working Lunch, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 30 May 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01323.html

renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 26 November 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul attended the Indo-Pacific Outreach Session of the Second G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁶¹⁴ The meeting aimed to provide a platform for dialogue on ways to strengthen Korea-G7 cooperation in foreign policy issues and maintaining rules-based international order. This demonstrates Korea's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 6 December 2024, Korea hosted the final Replenishment Meeting of the International Development Association in Seoul, bringing together donor countries to finalize contributions and strategic directions for the next funding cycle.¹⁶¹⁵ By convening this high-level event, Korea demonstrated its leadership in fostering transparent and representative governance processes within the World Bank system, with an emphasis on inclusion and accountability in institutional decision-making.

On 5 February 2025, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Hong Kyun held a meeting with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Committee.¹⁶¹⁶ Minister Kim reaffirmed Korea's commitment to "ensuring stable governance" and strengthening partnerships with ASEAN. He also reaffirmed Korea's commitment to implementing cooperation initiatives in alignment with ASEAN principles and priorities.

On 22 February 2025, Minister Cho attended the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁶¹⁷ The meeting focused on strengthening multilateral cooperation and institutional reform, culminating in a Call to Action on Global Governance Reform. Korea endorsed reforms to the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and International Financial Institutions to make them more representative, effective and transparent. Minister Cho reaffirmed Korea's commitment to ensuring multilateral institutions respond equitably to global challenges and give greater voice to developing countries.

On 26 February 2025, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Insun attended the High-Level Segment of the 58th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).¹⁶¹⁸ Minister Kang presented Korea's priorities as a member of the UNHRC including supporting UN human rights mechanisms and capacity building efforts in developing countries. This demonstrates Korea's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UNHRC.

On 14 May 2025, Deputy Director-General for International Economic Affairs Lee Jiyeon represented Korea at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Second Senior Officials' Meeting.¹⁶¹⁹ The meeting aimed to provide a platform for APEC member economics to discuss areas for enhanced regional collaboration.

On 16 May 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the 29th ASEAN-Korea Dialogue.¹⁶²⁰ Deputy Minister for Political Affairs Chung Byung-won underscored the importance of strengthened relationship between ASEAN and Korea in key focus areas such as digital transformation and the environment. In

¹⁶¹⁴ Minister Cho Tae-yul Attends Second Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Group of Seven (G7), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 27 November 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322721&page=16

¹⁶¹⁵ IDA21 Final Replenishment Meeting, The World Bank (Seoul) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2025. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2024/11/01/ida21-final-replenishment-meeting-south-korea#1>

¹⁶¹⁶ Vice Minister Kim Hong Kyun Holds Luncheon Meeting with ASEAN Committee in Seoul - ASEAN Countries Reaffirm Confidence in Korea's Stability and Discuss Future ASEAN-Korea Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322830&page=13

¹⁶¹⁷ Statement by H.E. Cho Tae-yul Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 30 April 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5689/view.do?seq=319663

¹⁶¹⁸ Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Insun Attends High-Level Segment of 58th Session of Human Rights Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 26 February 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322754&page=10

¹⁶¹⁹ APEC Second Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM2) held in Jeju again in 20 Years, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 14 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322812&page=3

¹⁶²⁰ Outcome of 29th ASEAN-ROK Dialogue (May 15-16, Thailand), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 16 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322838&page=3

addition, participants discussed various regional and global security challenges. The meeting aimed to facilitate dialogue and align on key focus areas to bolster the institutional effectiveness of ASEAN.

On 21 May 2025, Korea attended the high-level plenary meeting organized by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the human rights situation in North Korea.¹⁶²¹ Ambassador Hwang Joonkook called on UN member states to uphold the principle of non-refoulement. The meeting aimed to bolster the institutional effectiveness of the UNGA by facilitating dialogue between member states.

On 26 May 2025, Minister Kang chaired the working-level coordination meeting for the 2025 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting.¹⁶²² The meeting provided an opportunity for participants from various ministries, government agencies and economic organizations to discuss follow-up implementation measures to bolster the operational capacity across key issue areas.

On 27 May 2025, Vice Minister for Strategy and Intelligence at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cho Koo-rae reaffirmed Korea's commitment to strengthening their partnership with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in countering threats to transnational security during the 3rd Inter-Regional Conference on the Impact of Emerging Technologies.¹⁶²³

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of United Security Council resolutions.¹⁶²⁴ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

Korea has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Korea has taken moderate action through its financial leadership, high-level diplomatic engagement and public endorsement of institutional reform agendas across the G20, G7, ASEAN and the UN. Korea has clearly demonstrated its support for multilateralism that is representative, effective and transparent and accountable. However, Korea has not taken strong action to reform a UN body or another international organization.

Thus, Korea receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Beisen (Sam) Gao

Mexico: 0

Mexico has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

¹⁶²¹ First-Ever High-Level Plenary Meeting Organized by UN General Assembly to Discuss Human Rights Situation in DPRK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 21 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025.

https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322841&page=2

¹⁶²² Working-Level Coordination Meeting for 2025 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 26 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322870&page=2

¹⁶²³ 3rd Inter-Regional Conference on Impact of Emerging Technologies Held - Expanding global dialogue on international cooperation in emerging security technologies in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul) 27 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322854&page=1

¹⁶²⁴ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

On 28 November 2024, Mexico chaired the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).¹⁶²⁵ Mexico reiterated its commitment to upholding the United Nations Charter and the key principles underlying international humanitarian law. This demonstrates Mexico's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness of OPANAL through facilitating dialogue between OPANAL representatives, international organizations and civil society participants. In addition to its commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of OPANAL.

On 9 December 2024, the Mexican delegation consisting of Foreign Ministry Legal Advisor Pablo Arrocha, Mexico's Ambassador to the Netherlands Carmen Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission at the embassy Alfonso Ascencio and Legal Advisor at the embassy Patricia Pérez requested an advisory opinion on States' climate change obligations during a hearing held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).¹⁶²⁶ The Mexican delegation advocated for the ICJ to strengthen the international legal framework by incorporating a human rights and gendered lens for tackling the climate crisis. Mexico also stated the importance of accountability mechanisms when States fail to meet obligations. This demonstrates Mexico's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and transparency and accountability of the ICJ.

On 21 February 2025, Undersecretary María Teresa Mercado reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening multilateralism and underscored diplomacy and international law as the key principles of global security at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁶²⁷

On 31 March 2025, Mexico and France welcomed Armenia's decision to joining their effort in restricting the veto powers of the UN Security Council (UNSC).¹⁶²⁸ This declaration reflects Mexico's commitment to reforming the UNSC and promote effective multilateralism.

On 9 April 2025, officials from Mexican government agencies and UN representatives developed a new Mexico Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2026-2031.¹⁶²⁹ The framework includes four strategic areas: 1) Governance and Rule of Law, 2) Social Inclusion and Substantive Equality, 3) Inclusive and Resilient Economy and 4) Environment and Climate Change. This collaboration demonstrates Mexico's commitment to strengthening strategic alliances, promoting multilateralism and bolstering the UN's institutional effectiveness.

On 30 May 2025, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights Enrique Ochoa met with the UN Office at Nairobi Director-General Zainab Bangura to discuss strengthening operations at the African UN headquarters during the Second Session of the UN-Habitat Assembly in Nairobi.¹⁶³⁰ This demonstrates Mexico's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

¹⁶²⁵ Mexico chairs OPANAL General Conference, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City) 28 November 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-chairs-opanal-general-conference?idiom=en>

¹⁶²⁶ Mexico calls on ICJ to establish clear guidelines for States' climate change obligations, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 15 June 2025. <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-calls-on-icj-to-establish-clear-guidelines-for-states-climate-emergency-obligations?idiom=en>

¹⁶²⁷ Mexico Reaffirms Commitment to Strengthening Multilateralism at G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City) 21 February 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-reaffirms-commitment-to-strengthening-multilateralism-at-g20-foreign-ministers-meeting?idiom=en>

¹⁶²⁸ UN – Armenia signs on to French-Mexican initiative to regulate veto powers at the Security Council (31 March 2025), Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (Paris) 31 March 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/news-and-events/article/un-armenia-signs-on-to-french-mexican-initiative-to-regulate-veto-powers-at-the>

¹⁶²⁹ Technical Teams from Mexican Government Agencies and UN Mexico Work on New 2026-2031 Cooperation Framework, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City) 9 April 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/technical-teams-from-mexican-government-agencies-and-un-mexico-work-on-new-2026-2031-cooperation-framework?idiom=en>

¹⁶³⁰ Mexico Chairs Resumed Second Session of UN-Habitat Assembly in Nairobi, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City) 30 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-chairs-resumed-second-session-of-un-habitat-assembly-in-nairobi?idiom=en>

Mexico has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Mexico has taken moderate action through engaging in efforts to limit veto powers in the UNSC and strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the UN. It has also taken moderate action in bolstering institutional representativeness and effectiveness through chairing and facilitating dialogue with intergovernmental organizations such as OPANAL. However, it has not taken strong action to reform the UN or other international organizations or met two of the key criteria of institutional representation, effectiveness or transparency and accountability.

Thus, Mexico receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Christina Carballo

Russia: -1

Russia has not complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 5 December 2024, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attended the 31st Meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Ministerial Council where he attributed institutional weaknesses at the OSCE to Western and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansionism.¹⁶³¹ Although Minister Lavrov stated Russia's critiques of the organization, he offered no tangible actions to bolster institutional representativeness, effectiveness and transparency and accountability.

On 20 December 2024, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Vershinin reiterated its support for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform including extending permanent member status to India.¹⁶³²

On 23 January 2025, Minister Lavrov held a meeting with the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Nurlan Yermekbayev where the two parties emphasized strengthening the role of the SCO in Eurasia and facilitating dialogue and cooperation with international organisations, in particular, the UN, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁶³³

On 27 January 2025, Minister Lavrov participated in a meeting with the ambassadors of the ASEAN member states where they discussed opportunities to enhance Russia-ASEAN collaboration and mutually construct a sustainable security framework for the Asia-Pacific region that aligns with international law.¹⁶³⁴ This demonstrates Russia's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of ASEAN.

¹⁶³¹ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at the 31st Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Valletta, December 5, 2024, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 5 December 2024. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1985630/

¹⁶³² 13th meeting of the India-Russia Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter Terrorism (CT) and 6th round of India-Russia consultations on United Nations related issues, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India (New Delhi) 21 December 2024. Access Date: 9 June 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38854/13th_meeting_of_the_IndiaRussia_Joint_Working_Group_JWG_on_Counter_Terrorism_CT_and_6th_round_of_IndiaRussia_consultations_on_United_Nations_related_i

¹⁶³³ Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's meeting with SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 23 January 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1992636/#sel=4:9:V,4:9:V

¹⁶³⁴ Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's meeting with the ambassadors of the ASEAN Moscow Committee, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 27 January 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1993158/

On 4 February 2025, Minister Lavrov released an article for Russia in Global Affairs magazine, “The UN Charter as the legal foundation of a multipolar world,” where he stated the significance of the UN as an institution for maintaining international peace and security, promoting dialogue between Member States and upholding international law and order.¹⁶³⁵

On 18 February 2025, Russia participated in a ministerial-level open debate “Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance” at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).¹⁶³⁶ This engagement underscored Russia’s commitment to enhancing multilateral cooperation and advocating for reforms in global governance structures.

On 20 February 2025, Minister Lavrov called attention to NATO’s expansionism policies as undermining the principles and goals of intergovernmental organizations like ASEAN and threaten security in the Asia Pacific and Middle Eastern regions.¹⁶³⁷ Minister Lavrov also reiterated the importance of cooperation through upholding principles of the UN Charter and strengthening collaboration through multilateral partnerships in BRICS, the SCO, the EAEU, the African Union, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). He also expressed South Africa’s leadership in the G20 will achieve progress towards “reforming the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO [World Trade Organization] and expanding the representation of Asia, Africa and Latin America – and them alone – at the UN Security Council.” While Russia’s remarks demonstrate a commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of the UN and other relevant intergovernmental organizations, it is also openly critical of NATO.

On 20 February 2025, Minister Lavrov and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated their commitment to a strategic partnership to bolster the institutional effectiveness and transparency and accountability of the UNSC, the SCO, BRICS, ASEAN and the G20 on the sidelines of the G20 Ministerial Council meeting.¹⁶³⁸

On 21 February 2025, Minister Lavrov held a press release following the G20 ministerial meeting where he stated the urgency of reforming international economic institutions and highlighted opportunities to stabilize multilateral frameworks through the “SCO, EAEU, African Union, LAS, CELAC, and others.”¹⁶³⁹ However, Minister Lavrov attributed loan and credit agreements provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to be undermining global stability. While Russia’s remarks in part demonstrate its commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of intergovernmental organizations, its position regarding the IMF and World Bank are antithetical to the commitment.

On 24 February 2025, Russia voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 2774 which called for an end to the conflict in Ukraine without assigning blame.¹⁶⁴⁰ This action reflects engagement with multilateral processes and a

¹⁶³⁵ Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s article for Russia in Global Affairs magazine, «The UN Charter as the legal foundation of a multipolar world», February 4, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1994357/

¹⁶³⁶ Ministerial-Level Open Debate on “Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance,” Security Council Report (New York) 17 February 2025. Access Date: 30 April 2025. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/02/ministerial-level-open-debate-on-practicing-multilateralism-reforming-and-improving-global-governance.php>

¹⁶³⁷ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks on the Global Geopolitical Situation at the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Johannesburg, February 20, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1998882/

¹⁶³⁸ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks at the meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the G20 Ministerial Council, Johannesburg, February 20, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1998780/

¹⁶³⁹ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions following the G20 Ministerial Council meeting, Johannesburg, February 21, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 21 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1999163/

¹⁶⁴⁰ With 10 Votes in Favour, 5 Abstentions, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2774 (2025) Mourning Loss of Life, as Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine Enters Fourth Year, United Nations (New York) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 9 April 2025. <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16005.doc.htm>

willingness to support neutral diplomatic resolutions. The resolution's lack of accountability and Russia's ongoing role in the conflict limit the extent of compliance.

On 26 February 2025, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations office Gennady Galitov released a statement in response to claims of withdrawing from the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) during the high-level segment of the UN Conference on Disarmament.¹⁶⁴¹ Representative Galitov reiterated Russia's commitment to upholding the principles of the UN and international law despite UN Member States expressing concern with Russia's cooperation with countries such as Belarus and Iran, and Russia's remarks targeted towards "Western delegations" for undermining disarmament efforts. While Russia reaffirmed their commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN, its withdrawal from the ratification of the CTBT is antithetical to the commitment.

On 26 February 2025, Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian BRICS Sherpa Sergey Ryabkov participated in the BRICS sherpas/sous-sherpas meeting.¹⁶⁴² The meeting aimed to facilitate dialogue on "maintaining continuity in BRICS operations" and bolstering its institutional effectiveness in addressing key priority areas.

On 11 March 2025, Minister Lavrov held a meeting with the OSCE Secretary General Feridun Sinirlioglu.¹⁶⁴³ Minister Lavrov and Secretary General of OCSE discussed the potential for OSCE to "become a building block of the new security architecture."¹⁶⁴⁴ In addition, Minister Lavrov affirmed Russia's commitment to bolstering transparency across OSCE institutions.

On 31 March 2025, Minister Vershinin met with UN Under-Secretary-General and the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Digital and Emerging Technologies Amandeep Singh Gill to highlight the role of the UN in regulating information and communication technologies.¹⁶⁴⁵

On 1 April 2025, Minister Lavrov and China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscored the importance of aligning on international issues within multilateral forums including "the UN, the SCO, BRICS, the G20, APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]."¹⁶⁴⁶ This demonstrates a commitment towards bolstering the institutional effectiveness of various intergovernmental organizations.

On 2 April 2025, Russian representatives challenged findings from the Arria-formula meeting of the UNSC.¹⁶⁴⁷ Russia challenged the legitimacy of international bodies such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the international Criminal Court. Russia also attributed inconsistencies

¹⁶⁴¹ Statement of the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva G.M.Gatilov at the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament by the right of reply, February 26, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2000509/

¹⁶⁴² Press release on Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's participation in the meeting of BRICS sherpas/sous-sherpas, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 26 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2000146/

¹⁶⁴³ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's opening remarks during talks with Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Feridun Sinirlioglu, Moscow, March 11, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2002521/

¹⁶⁴⁴ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement and answers to media questions following talks with OSCE Secretary General Feridun Sinirlioglu, Moscow, March 11, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2002594/

¹⁶⁴⁵ Press release on Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin's telephone conversation with Amandeep Singh Gill, UN Under-Secretary-General and the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Digital and Emerging Technologies, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 31 March 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2006373/

¹⁶⁴⁶ Press release on Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to the Russian Federation, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 1 April 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2006568/

¹⁶⁴⁷ Press release on UN Security Council Arria-formula meeting in connection with the third anniversary of the Bucha provocation, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2008066/

to Western narratives relying on “information manipulation, distortion of public consciousness, and the suppression of facts.” These remarks demonstrate Russia taking actions directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment.

On 28 April 2025, Minister Lavrov told the Brazilian newspaper O Globo that Russia believes the UNSC must be reformed to better reflect broader representation from the Global South and East, including countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹⁶⁴⁸

On 28 April 2025, Minister Lavrov and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening coordination in the UN, the SCO, BRICS and other international organizations.¹⁶⁴⁹

On 29 April 2025, Minister Lavrov participated in the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting.¹⁶⁵⁰ The meeting aimed to facilitate dialogue between ministers and further cooperation in key strategic partnership areas while reforming the international system.

On 27 May 2025, Minister Lavrov reaffirmed its commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and expanding the Treaty as a universal tool during a meeting with the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).¹⁶⁵¹ This demonstrates Russia’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the CTBTO.

On 27 May 2025, Minister Vershinin stated the importance of implementing a permanent mechanism on the existing international information security negotiation process during a meeting with the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN Burhan Gafoor.¹⁶⁵² This demonstrates Russia’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 27 May 2025, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation Gennady Gatilov released a Joint Statement between the Russian Federation and China on “Global Strategic Stability” at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament where they reaffirm their commitment to implementing and strengthening international agreements and preserving the role of the UN in the area of “arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.”¹⁶⁵³ This underscores Russia’s commitment to promoting cooperation and dialogue to strengthen global strategic stability and international security.

Russia has not complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Russia has taken moderate action in reforming a UN body through meeting participation and voting procedures that advance institutional effectiveness and transparency and accountability. It has taken moderate action through its attendance of meetings and verbal affirmations to bolster the institutional representativeness, effectiveness

¹⁶⁴⁸ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s written interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo, April 28, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2011929/

¹⁶⁴⁹ Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2012255/

¹⁶⁵⁰ Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s participation in BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2012475/

¹⁶⁵¹ Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s meeting with Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 27 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2020213/

¹⁶⁵² Press Release on the meeting of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Vershinin with Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN in New York, Chairman of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs 2021-2025 Burhan Gafoor, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 27 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2020383/

¹⁶⁵³ Statement of the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and Other International Organisations in Geneva Gennady Gatilov at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, May 27, 2025, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 28 May 2025. Access Date: 15 June 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2020438/

and transparency and accountability of organizations such as ASEAN and OSCE. However, it has taken actions antithetical to the commitment by undermining the legitimacy of the UN and NATO.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1 .¹⁶⁵⁴

Analyst: Eimaan Khurram Raja

Saudi Arabia: 0

Saudi Arabia has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 19 December 2024, Saudi Arabia voted in favour of a resolution on the “Request for an advisory opinion of the internal Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States.”¹⁶⁵⁵ This demonstrates Saudi Arabia’s commitment to bolstering the UN’s institutional effectiveness.

On 11 February 2025, Saudi Arabia officially assumed the presidency of the Global Operational Network of Anti-Corruption Law Enforcement Authorities (GlobE Network).¹⁶⁵⁶ In their opening address, they focused on the need for greater international cooperation and also promised to ensure a fair, just and sustainable governance system.

On 17 February 2025, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Saudi Arabia forged a partnership with the New Sustainable Investment Program and signed a joint declaration of intent at the Conference for Emerging Market Economies in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia.¹⁶⁵⁷ The partnership aims to foster greater cooperation, international economic integration and connections between Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

On 23 February 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah participated in the second session of the G20 foreign ministers meeting.¹⁶⁵⁸ He gave a speech titled “Restructuring Global Governance,” where he emphasized the necessity of making multilateral frameworks more effective and coordinated. He highlighted multilateral trade and investment, stating that reform is necessary to reduce disparities in the international system and restore credibility to international institutions.

On 2 April 2025, President of the General Court of Audit Hussam Alangari attended the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions Development Initiative Board Meeting hosted in Thimphu, Bhutan.¹⁶⁵⁹ The discussion focused on adjustments to guidelines and ways to enhance ongoing programs.

¹⁶⁵⁴ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: <http://government.ru/en/>, <https://www.mid.ru/en/>, <https://www.mea.gov.in/index.htm>, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/>, <https://www.un.org/en>, <http://www.g77.org/> and <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/>.

¹⁶⁵⁵ Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States – GA draft Resolution (A/79/L.28/Rev.1) – Revised (Adopted on 19 Dec 2024), United Nations General Assembly (New York) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-icj-12dec24/>

¹⁶⁵⁶ Saudi Arabia Assumes Presidency of GlobE Network, Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh) 11 February 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2259720>

¹⁶⁵⁷ AIIB and Saudi Arabia Forge Strategic Partnership with New Sustainable Investment Program, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Beijing) 17 February 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2025/aiib-saudi-arabia-forge-strategic-partnership-new-sustainable-investment-program.html>

¹⁶⁵⁸ Foreign Minister Participates in 2nd G20 Session on Restructuring Global Governance, Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh) 23 February 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2052845>

¹⁶⁵⁹ GCA President Participates in INTOSAI Development Initiative Board Meeting in Bhutan, Government of Saudi Arabia (Thimphu) 2 April 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://my.gov.sa/en/news/143208>

This aligns with Saudi Arabia's commitment to creating greater functionality within international bodies and reform which supports greater global development.

Saudi Arabia has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Saudi Arabia has taken moderate action to reform international institutions such as the Globe Network and the AIIB and participated in ministerial meetings to advance institutional representation, effectiveness and transparency and accountability. However, it has not taken action to reform a UN body.

Thus, Saudi Arabia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Ngila Stone

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 21 November 2024, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Thandi Moraka participated in the Second Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-South Africa Joint Cooperation Committee.¹⁶⁶⁰ The meeting aimed to facilitate dialogue on progress on existing ASEAN-South African partnerships and opportunities for future collaboration. This demonstrates South Africa's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness and effectiveness of ASEAN.

On 19 December 2024, South Africa voted in favour of a resolution on the "Request for an advisory opinion of the internal Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States."¹⁶⁶¹ This demonstrates South Africa's commitment to bolstering the UN's institutional effectiveness.

On 24 February 2025, South Africa voted in favour of a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution which reiterated the purpose of the UN to "maintain international peace and security and to peacefully settle disputes" as outlined in the UN Charter during a meeting commemorating the anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁶⁶² This demonstrates South Africa's commitment to bolstering the UN's institutional effectiveness.

On 12 March 2025, President Ramaphosa met with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa where the leaders issued a joint statement on a renewed commitment to multilateral cooperation of international organizations at the 8th Summit between the EU and South Africa.¹⁶⁶³ The leaders committed to strengthening the G20, reforming the UN Security

¹⁶⁶⁰ Deputy Minister Moraka optimistic about the potential for further collaboration between South Africa and ASEAN, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 21 November 2024. Access Date: 18 June 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/deputy-minister-moraka-optimistic-about-the-potential-for-further-collaboration-between-south-africa-and-asean/>

¹⁶⁶¹ Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States – GA draft Resolution (A/79/L.28/Rev.1) – Revised (Adopted on 19 Dec 2024), United Nations General Assembly (New York) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-icj-12dec24/>

¹⁶⁶² South Africa participates in a General Assembly Meeting commemorating the third anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/south-africa-participates-in-a-general-assembly-meeting-commemorating-the-third-anniversary-of-the-conflict-between-russia-and-ukraine/>

¹⁶⁶³ EU - South Africa Summit Declaration, European Commission (Cape Town) 12 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_773

Council to include underrepresented regions and reforming the World Trade Organization to improve its governance and align with today's realities.

On 27 March 2025, South Africa attended a G20 Dialogue Session that took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bringing together African ambassadors, the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations Development Programme.¹⁶⁶⁴ The discussions focused on prioritizing African participation in G20 processes, mainly regarding international financial systems. This session showcases a collective African effort to strengthen engagement within global governance.

On 3 April 2025, in his capacity as G20 Sherpa for the South African presidency, Director-General of the Development of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Zane Dangor chaired the Second Meeting of the G20 Sherpas.¹⁶⁶⁵ He reiterated the importance of collaborating with multilateral institutions such as the UN.¹⁶⁶⁶

On 30 May 2025, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Alvin Botes delivered a speech at the G20 Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs), Domestic Resource Mobilisation and Financing for Development.¹⁶⁶⁷ Minister Botes reiterated the importance of inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing to address IFFs and developing robust legal instruments and tools to address transnational crimes.

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. South Africa has taken strong action in advancing the institutional effectiveness of UNGA in through voting in favour of an UNGA resolution which reiterated the purpose of the UN to “maintain international peace and security and to peacefully settle disputes” as outlined in the UN Charter. It has also taken moderate action to reform other relevant international organizations including the G20 and ASEAN through reiterating its commitment to bolstering their institutional representativeness, effectiveness and accountability and transparency. However, South Africa has not taken strong action to reform international organizations, nor has it taken actions in the areas of institutional representativeness and institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Christina Carballo

Türkiye: +1

Türkiye has fully complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with

¹⁶⁶⁴ Saiia, Auda-Nepad and UNDP: Push for Stronger Alignment, Institutional Clarity and Long-Term Influence for G20 Engagement, United Nations Development Programme (Addis Ababa) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 1 April 2025. <https://www.undp.org/africa/press-releases/saiia-auda-nepad-and-undp-push-stronger-alignment-institutional-clarity-and-long-term-influence-g20-engagement>

¹⁶⁶⁵ G20 Sherpa and Director-General of the Development of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Zane Dangor, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 2 April 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/south-africa-convenes-the-second-g20-sherpa-meeting/>

¹⁶⁶⁶ South Africa hosts virtual meeting of G20 Sherpas, highlights importance of working with multilateral institutions, The Tribune (Chandigarh) 9 April 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/south-africa-hosts-virtual-meeting-of-g20-sherpas-highlights-importance-of-working-with-multilateral-institutions/>

¹⁶⁶⁷ Remarks by the Deputy Minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr Alvin Botes, (MP), to the G20 Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs), Domestic Resource Mobilisation (DRM) and Financing for Development (FFD), hosted by SGN Grant Thornton in partnership with the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 30 May 2025, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 30 May 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/remarks-by-the-deputy-minister-of-the-department-of-international-relations-and-cooperation-mr-alvin-botes-mp-to-the-g20-multi-stakeholder-dialogue-on-illicit-financial-flows-iffs-domestic-res/>

renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 6 December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies including Türkiye released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication to "to manage and mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence" and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁶⁶⁸

On 17 February 2025, Türkiye signed a USD5 billion memorandum of understanding with Asian Infrastructure Development Bank to finance public-sector sustainability and green developmental projects.¹⁶⁶⁹ This action strengthens effective and inclusive international financial institutions and directly fulfills the G20 Rio commitment of institutional reform that promotes sustainable development through multilateral cooperation.

On 19 February 2025, Türkiye's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Ahmet Yıldız reiterated its call for reforming the UN Security Council (UNSC) to be more democratic, accountable, and representative at a high-level UNSC meeting on multilateralism and global governance reform.¹⁶⁷⁰ Ambassador Yıldız reaffirmed the importance of the UN and its bodies in the international order and the need to include more countries.

On 24 February 2025, Türkiye reaffirmed its support for multilateral diplomacy and a rules-based international order at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁶⁷¹ Türkiye emphasized the need for UN reform and more equitable representation for developing countries and demonstrated commitment to building more representative global institutions.

On 10 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan hosted the Arab-Islamic ministerial committee meeting for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League Ministerial Committee.¹⁶⁷² This demonstrates Türkiye's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of the OIC through fostering multilateral dialogue.

On 11 April 2025, Minister Fidan and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Representatives of the Ministerial Committee on Gaza of the League of Arab States and , and the Representatives of Ireland, Norway, China and Russia released a joint statement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where they reiterated their support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and ongoing collaboration with the UN and other international organizations.¹⁶⁷³ The ministers further reiterated their commitment to

¹⁶⁶⁸ Thirty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Malta) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/582397.pdf>

¹⁶⁶⁹ AIIB and Türkiye Formalize Strategic Partnership for Green and Resilient Infrastructure, Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (Beijing) 17 February 2025. Access Date: 9 April 2025. <https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2025/aiib-turkiye-formalize-strategic-partnership-green-resilient-infrastructure.html>

¹⁶⁷⁰ Türkiye calls for 'democratic' and 'accountable' UN Security Council reform, Türkiye Today (Istanbul) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <https://www.turkiyetoday.com/turkiye/turkiye-calls-for-democratic-and-accountable-un-security-council-reform-121340/>

¹⁶⁷¹ Interview of H.E. Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bloomberg TV, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 28 April 2025. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-bloomberg-tv-mulakati-24-subat-2025.tr.mfa>

¹⁶⁷² Arab-Islamic ministerial committee to meet in Türkiye for 'lasting peace in Middle East' meeting, Anadolu Ajansı (Ankara) 10 April 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/arab-islamic-ministerial-committee-to-meet-in-turkiye-for-lasting-peace-in-middle-east-meeting/3534467#>

¹⁶⁷³ Joint Statement of Antalya Ministerial Meeting for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution and Lasting Peace in the Middle East, 11 April 2025, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara) 11 April 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of-antalya-ministerial-meeting-for-the-implementation-of-the-two-state-solution-and-lasting-peace-in-the-middle-east-11-april-2025.en.mfa>

bolstering international efforts through upholding international law and the efforts of the UN. This demonstrates Türkiye's commitment to bolstering the UN's institutional effectiveness.

On 14 May 2025, Minister Fidan hosted the Informal Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs.¹⁶⁷⁴ The meeting aims to provide a platform to discuss areas to strengthen "Allied deterrence and defence."¹⁶⁷⁵ This demonstrates Türkiye's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness and effectiveness of NATO.

Türkiye has fully complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. Türkiye has taken strong action to bolster the institutional effectiveness of international organizations through a funding scheme. Türkiye has also taken moderate action to advance institutional representation and effectiveness through verbal affirmations and hosting multilateral meetings. However, it has not taken strong action to reform a UN body or advanced institutional transparency and accountability.

Thus, Türkiye receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Eimaan Khurram Raja

United Kingdom: 0

The United Kingdom has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 21 November 2024, the government pledged up to GBP310 million in flexible, multi-year core funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) as part of its first Investment Round.¹⁶⁷⁶ This funding supports the WHO's 14th General Programme of Work and its internal "Transformation Agenda," including reforms aimed at improving operational agility, transparency and global health responsiveness. Minister for Development at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for Women and Equalities at the Department for Education Anneliese Dodds described the pledge as an investment towards making WHO stronger and more effective, underscoring the UK's support for transparent and accountable multilateral health governance.

On 28 November 2024, the UK announced a GBP1.98 billion pledge to the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) for the 2025–2027 cycle.¹⁶⁷⁷ This represents a 40 per cent increase over the UK's previous contribution and restores the UK as a leading IDA donor. In negotiations, the UK also successfully introduced the first-ever "water security" performance target into IDA's results framework, ensuring measurable progress on clean water and sanitation in the world's poorest countries. These actions advance both financial effectiveness and outcome-based accountability within multilateral development institutions.

On 6 December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies including the United Kingdom released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication

¹⁶⁷⁴ No: 103, 13 May 2025, Regarding the Informal Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara) 13 May 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-103_-nato-disisleri-bakanlari-gayriresmi-toplantisi-hk.en.mfa

¹⁶⁷⁵ NATO Foreign Ministers meet to prepare the Summit in The Hague, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 15 May 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235113.htm.

¹⁶⁷⁶ World Health Organization Investment Round, United Kingdom Parliament (London) 21 November 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2025. <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2024-11-21/hcws243>

¹⁶⁷⁷ The United Kingdom Announces Early and Increased Pledge to IDA21, The World Bank (London) 29 November 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2025. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/11/29/united-kingdom-increased-pledge-to-ida21>

to “to manage and mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence” and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁶⁷⁸

On 9 December 2024, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN James Kariuki stated the importance of strengthening coordinated humanitarian assistance of the UN with a focus on funding, the international architecture to predict and prevent crises and aligning political and diplomatic priorities.¹⁶⁷⁹ This demonstrates the UK’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN’s humanitarian activities.

On 19 December 2024, Ambassador Kariuki voted in favour of a resolution on the “Request for an advisory opinion of the internal Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States.”¹⁶⁸⁰ This demonstrates the UK’s commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the UN system and upholding international law and rules-based order.¹⁶⁸¹

On 15 January 2025, Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Barbara Woodward stressed the importance of upholding the rule of law and facilitating cooperation and peace at the UN during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) briefing on 2025 priorities.¹⁶⁸² Ambassador Woodward reiterated the UK’s commitment to fulfilling their responsibilities as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in enhancing meaningful participation in peace and decision-making processes in line with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Ambassador Woodward also underscored the importance of bolstering the institutional representativeness of the UN. She reiterated the UK’s commitment to revitalizing UNGA and reforming the UNSC.

On 17 January 2025, Ambassador Woodward commended efforts of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in maintaining transparent operational activities and supported the UNIFIL’s role at the UNSC meeting on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the UNIFIL.¹⁶⁸³

On 21 January 2025, Ambassador to the General Assembly Archie Young committed to defending freedoms and civic space within the UN system and support the decision-making capacity of the UN at the opening

¹⁶⁷⁸ NATO Allies: Joint statement to the OSCE Ministerial Council 2024, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nato-allies-joint-statement-to-the-osce-ministerial-council-2024>

¹⁶⁷⁹ We must focus our diplomatic efforts on resolving crises and protecting the most vulnerable: UK statement at the UN General Assembly, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-must-focus-our-diplomatic-efforts-on-resolving-crises-and-protecting-the-most-vulnerable-uk-statement-at-the-un-general-assembly>

¹⁶⁸⁰ Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States – GA draft Resolution (A/79/L.28/Rev.1) – Revised (Adopted on 19 Dec 2024), United Nations General Assembly (New York) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/request-for-an-advisory-opinion-icj-12dec24/>

¹⁶⁸¹ The UK voted in favour of this resolution in line with our strong commitment to the international rule of law: UK statement in the UN General Assembly, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 19 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-voted-in-favour-of-this-resolution-in-line-with-our-strong-commitment-to-the-international-rule-of-law-uk-statement-in-the-un-general-assembly>

¹⁶⁸² 2025 should be a year of progress and reform, in the service of the rule of law, cooperation and peace: UK Statement at the UN General Assembly, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 15 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2025-should-be-a-year-of-progress-and-reform-in-the-service-of-the-rule-of-law-cooperation-and-peace-uk-statement-at-the-un-general-assembly>

¹⁶⁸³ The UK will continue to support UNIFIL’s essential role in maintaining calm along the Blue Line: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 17 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-will-continue-to-support-unifils-essential-role-in-maintaining-calm-along-the-blue-line-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

session of the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).¹⁶⁸⁴ Ambassador Young called on increased meaningful civil society inclusion in UN operations. This demonstrates the UK's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness of the UN.

On 21 January 2025, Ambassador Kariuki stated the importance of collaboration between UN agencies, regional organizations, governments and civil society organizations in Africa to address the threat of terrorism and bolster security interventions at the UNSC meeting on Counterterrorism in Africa.¹⁶⁸⁵ This demonstrates the UK's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness and effectiveness of the UN in counterterrorism efforts.

On 23 January 2025, Ambassador Kariuki committed to supporting coordination between UN and the League of Arab States (LAS) on issues related to international peace and regional security and development at the UNSC meeting on cooperation between the UN and the LAS.¹⁶⁸⁶ This demonstrates the UK's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and representativeness of the UN and the LAS.

On 23 January 2025, Ambassador Kariuki highlighted the role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in supporting essential services during the UNSC meeting on Children in Gaza.¹⁶⁸⁷ Ambassador Kariuki called on the Council to support the UNRWA in delivering essential education and healthcare services.

On 27 January 2025, Ambassador Kariuki highlighted the function of the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in holding perpetrators accountable for war crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan, at the UNSC Meeting on the ICC's investigations in Sudan.¹⁶⁸⁸ Ambassador Kariuki welcomed the establishment of "structured dialogue between the Office of the Prosecutor and Civil Society Organisation" to bolster institutional representativeness and institutional transparency and accountability.

On 30 January 2025, Head of the United Kingdom's Delegation to the organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Neil Holland underscored the UK's commitment to collective action and strengthening democracy.¹⁶⁸⁹ Ambassador Holland further reiterated the importance of leveraging the capabilities of the OSCE in strengthening democracy through election monitoring and supporting OSCE members in meeting their commitments.

¹⁶⁸⁴ The UK is committed to defending fundamental freedoms and civic space including within the UN: UK statement at the UN NGO Committee, Government of United Kingdom (London) 21 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-is-committed-to-defending-fundamental-freedoms-and-civic-space-including-within-the-un-uk-statement-at-the-un-ngo-committee>

¹⁶⁸⁵ The UK is committed to working with African partners to build resilience against threats from terrorism: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-is-committed-to-defending-fundamental-freedoms-and-civic-space-including-within-the-un-uk-statement-at-the-un-ngo-committee>

¹⁶⁸⁶ The UK will continue to champion coordination between the UN and LAS: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 23 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-will-continue-to-champion-coordination-between-the-un-and-las-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁸⁷ UNRWA plays a crucial role in delivering essential services like education and healthcare: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 23 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/unrwa-plays-a-crucial-role-in-delivering-essential-services-like-education-and-healthcare-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁸⁸ The ICC has a key role in ensuring perpetrators are held accountable for crimes committed in Darfur: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 27 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-icc-has-a-key-role-in-ensuring-perpetrators-are-held-accountable-for-crimes-committed-in-darfur-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁸⁹ Head of the United Kingdom's Delegation to the organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Neil Holland, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 30 January 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-response-to-the-president-of-the-osce-parliamentary-assembly-uk-statement-to-the-osce-january-2025--4>

On 18 February 2025, Ambassador Kariuki the importance of bolstering UN Peacekeeping Operations through implementing contingency plans, improving intelligence and communications and countering disinformation and misinformation at the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34).¹⁶⁹⁰ This demonstrates the UK's commitment to supporting the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 18 February 2025, Ambassador Woodward reiterated the country's deep support for reforming UNSC membership at the UNSC meeting on practicing multilateralism and reforming and improving governance.¹⁶⁹¹

On 20 February 2025, Foreign Secretary David Lammy reiterated the importance of upholding international law and the principles of the UN Charter with regards to global geopolitical challenges at the G20 Foreign Ministerial Meeting in South Africa.¹⁶⁹²

On 27 February 2025, Minister Counsellor Fergus Eckersley reiterated the UK's commitment to bolstering the United Nations Police (UNPOL) capabilities to facilitate peace and security, while addressing emerging challenges.¹⁶⁹³

On 14 March 2025, Ambassador Neil Holland reiterated the UK's support for the OSCE's human dimension commitments on human rights violations committed by Russia and Belarus.¹⁶⁹⁴ Ambassador Holland stated the importance of addressing ongoing human rights challenges, upholding the rule of law, renewed partnerships and a commitment to openness towards civil society.

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity.¹⁶⁹⁵ The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to "a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources." The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the "Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight," "Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security," "Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources" and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for "Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security," "Regional peace and stability in the Middle East," "Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific," "Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela," "Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and

¹⁶⁹⁰ Peacekeeping is one of the UN's most valuable tools to support global peace and security: UK statement on Peacekeeping Operations, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/peacekeeping-is-one-of-the-uns-most-valuable-tools-to-support-global-peace-and-security-uk-statement-on-peacekeeping-operations>

¹⁶⁹¹ The United Kingdom remains deeply committed to the United Nations: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-united-kingdom-remains-deeply-committed-to-the-united-nations-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁹² The Global Geopolitical Situation: Foreign Secretary's speech at the G20 in South Africa, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-global-geopolitical-situation-foreign-secretary-speech-at-g20-south-africa>

¹⁶⁹³ We must ensure UN policing has the capabilities it needs to effectively deliver mandates and tackle emerging challenges: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 28 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-must-ensure-un-policing-has-the-capabilities-it-needs-to-effectively-deliver-mandates-and-tackle-emerging-challenges-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁹⁴ Report by the Director of the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): UK response, March 2025, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 28 June 2025.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/report-by-the-director-of-the-osces-office-for-democratic-institutions-and-human-rights-odihr-uk-response-march-2025>

¹⁶⁹⁵ G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html>

sabotage.”¹⁶⁹⁶ The joint statement reflects the G7’s commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 24 March 2025, Ambassador Woodward reiterated the UK’s support for UN peace operations and areas of adaptation during a UNSC meeting on UN peace operations.¹⁶⁹⁷ Ambassador Woodward highlighted three areas to strengthen peacekeeping efforts: 1) adapting peace operations to the political and security contexts informed by local realities and communities, 2) equipping peace operations to address modern challenges to security including misinformation and technological innovations through leveraging intelligence, digital tools and “data-driven decision-making” and 3) fostering regional, national and global collaboration with organizations, civil society and across the UN system to improve the service delivery of UN peace operations. This demonstrates the UK’s commitment to bolstering the UN’s institutional effectiveness and representativeness.

On 26 March 2025, Ambassador Kariuki reiterated the UK’s commitment to upholding the principles of the UN Charter with regards to peace and security in Ukraine during a UNSC Meeting.¹⁶⁹⁸

On 3 April 2025, Foreign Secretary Lammy reiterated the UK’s support for the NATO Alliance and the need to bolster the institutional capacity of NATO through collective defence spending to address shared security threats.¹⁶⁹⁹

On 8 April 2025, Minister Counsellor Eckersley reiterated the UK’s support for UN peacekeeping and key functions including implementing and monitoring ceasefires at the UNSC meeting on UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁰⁰ This demonstrates the UK’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 29 April 2025, UK Spokesperson to the UN Letisha Lunin stated the importance of protecting the integrity of the UN amid disinformation about Peacekeeping operations and committed to support the UN’s Mis and Disinformation in Peacekeeping Settings Project.¹⁷⁰¹ This demonstrates the UK’s commitment to reinforcing the institutional transparency and accountability of UN Peacekeeping operations.

On 7 May 2025, Foreign Secretary Lammy proposed convening a global conference in Autumn 2025 to reform the international aid architecture.¹⁷⁰² This conference aims to address the strategic use of limited aid

¹⁶⁹⁶ Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Charlevoix) 14 March 2025.

Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

¹⁶⁹⁷ UN peace operations need to become more agile and responsive to remain effective: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 24 March 2025. Access Date: 28 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-peace-operations-need-to-become-more-agile-and-responsive-to-remain-effective-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁹⁸ We must have enduring peace in Ukraine, which ensures Ukraine’s future security and upholds the UN Charter: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 26 March 2025. Access Date: 28 June 2025.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-must-have-enduring-peace-in-ukraine-which-ensures-ukraines-future-security-and-upholds-the-un-charter-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁶⁹⁹ NATO must be ‘stronger, fairer, and more lethal’ Foreign Secretary to say, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 28 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nato-must-be-stronger-fairer-and-more-lethal-foreign-secretary-to-say>

¹⁷⁰⁰ The UK remains a steadfast supporter of UN peacekeeping as a vital tool in global peace and security: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 28 June 2025.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-remains-a-steadfast-supporter-of-un-peacekeeping-as-a-vital-tool-in-global-peace-and-security-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁷⁰¹ The UK is committed to doing all we can to protect information integrity with a human rights-based approach: UK statement at the UN, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 24 June 2025.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-is-committed-to-doing-all-we-can-to-protect-information-integrity-with-a-human-rights-based-approach-uk-statement-at-the-un>

¹⁷⁰² Conversation on future of aid long overdue’: UK looks to lead response to swingeing US cuts, The Guardian (London) 7 May 2025. Access Date: 8 May 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/may/07/conversation-on-future-of-aid-long-overdue-uk-looks-to-lead-response-to-swingeing-us-cuts>

funds and respond to significant US-led cuts to international aid and the UN budget and seeks to ensure that multilateral aid institutions like the UN remain effective and representative.

On 7 May 2025, Ambassador Kariuki reiterated the UK's commitment to the principles of international peace and security and the UN Charter at the UN General Assembly meeting.¹⁷⁰³ This demonstrates the UK's commitment to maintaining the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 13 May 2025, Ambassador Woodward refused to "support any model" that undermines the operations and capacity of the UN in its ability to operate independent of political or military objectives in a joint statement delivered at a UNSC meeting.¹⁷⁰⁴ This demonstrates the UK's commitment to maintaining the institutional effectiveness and transparency and accountability of the UN in its humanitarian activities in Gaza.

On 15 May 2025, Minister for the Armed Forces Luke Pollard committed over GBP1 million to international programmes to enhance institutional accountability and bolster the UN's capacity in delivering peacekeeping operations during the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial summit.¹⁷⁰⁵

On 15 May 2025, Foreign Secretary Lammy committed to strengthening Euro-Atlantic security during the NATO informal Foreign Ministers Meeting in Antalya.¹⁷⁰⁶ The meeting provided an opportunity for NATO Foreign Ministers to reaffirm the Alliance's support for Ukraine and to secure the Euro-Atlantic through bolstering the institutional capacity of NATO.

On 20 May 2025, Ambassador Kariuki reiterated the UK's commitment to partnering with NATO and strengthening collaboration with the UNSC at a UNSC meeting on maritime security.¹⁷⁰⁷

On 21 May 2025, the UK's Permanent Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN Simon Manley reiterated the UK's support for the World Health Organization (WHO) to advance its institutional effectiveness and global health initiatives.¹⁷⁰⁸

On 22 May 2025, Ambassador Kariuki called on the UNSC to leverage its tools to protect civilians in armed conflict at a UNSC Meeting.¹⁷⁰⁹ Further, he reiterated the UK's support to working with the UNSC and other relevant international organizations.

¹⁷⁰³ The UK will continue to pay tribute to the victims of war by pressing for a just and lasting peace in response to conflicts around the world: UK Statement at the UN General Assembly, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 7 May 2025. Access Date: 24 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-will-continue-to-pay-tribute-to-the-victims-of-war-by-pressing-for-a-just-and-lasting-peace-in-response-to-conflicts-around-the-world-uk-state>

¹⁷⁰⁴ Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 13 May 2025. Access Date: 24 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/humanitarian-aid-must-never-be-used-as-a-political-tool-or-military-tactic-joint-statement-on-the-humanitarian-situation-in-gaza>

¹⁷⁰⁵ UK reaffirms commitment to UN peacekeeping operations as Minister announces new funding for programmes, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 15 May 2025. Access Date: 24 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reaffirms-commitment-to-un-peacekeeping-operations-as-minister-announces-new-funding-for-programmes>

¹⁷⁰⁶ UK at heart of NATO talks on strengthening Euro-Atlantic security and support for Ukraine, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 15 May 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-at-heart-of-nato-talks-on-strengthening-euro-atlantic-security-and-support-for-ukraine>

¹⁷⁰⁷ Global action is needed to tackle the growing threats that face our seas, people and shared prosperity: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 20 May 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/global-action-is-needed-to-tackle-the-growing-threats-that-face-our-seas-people-and-shared-prosperity-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁷⁰⁸ 78th World Health Assembly: UK National Statement, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 21 May 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/78th-world-health-assembly-uk-national-statement>

On 28 May 2025, Ambassador Kariuki reiterated the UK's support for the UN, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all aid agencies at the UNSC Meeting.¹⁷¹⁰

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁷¹¹ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

On 29 May 2025, Ambassador Holland reiterated the UK's commitment to upholding international rules-based order and upholding the guiding principles and practices of the UN during the UK/EU Summit.¹⁷¹² Ambassador Holland recognized the importance of a renewed partnership between the UK and the EU, furthering the principles and commitments of the OSCE. This demonstrates the UK's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the OSCE.

The United Kingdom has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. The UK has taken moderate action in reforming UN bodies and international organizations such as NATO and OSCE. It has also taken steps to address the key criteria of institutional representation, institutional effectiveness and institutional transparency and accountability. However, it has not taken strong action to reform a UN body or a relevant international organization.

Thus, the United Kingdom receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Beisen (Sam) Gao

United States: –1

The United States has not complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 6 December 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies including the United Kingdom released a joint statement to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Russia's invasion of Ukraine where members reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining channels of communication to "to manage and mitigate risk, prevent escalation and build trust and confidence" and align with the principles of transparency at the OSCE Ministerial Council.¹⁷¹³

¹⁷⁰⁹ This Council should use the tools at its disposal to press parties to conflict to protect civilians: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 22 May 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/this-council-should-use-the-tools-at-its-disposal-to-press-parties-to-conflict-to-protect-civilians-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁷¹⁰ Israel must immediately let aid into Gaza and enable the UN to operate: UK statement at the UN Security Council, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 28 May 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/israel-must-immediately-let-aid-into-gaza-and-enable-the-un-to-operate-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

¹⁷¹¹ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

¹⁷¹² Outcomes of the UK/EU Summit on 19 May: UK statement to OSCE, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 29 May 2025. Access Date: 21 June 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/outcomes-of-the-ukeu-summit-on-19-may-uk-statement-to-osce>

¹⁷¹³ Thirty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Malta) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/582397.pdf>

On 20 January 2025, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order pausing US foreign aid for 90 days, affecting approximately USD5 billion in governance and transparency-related programs globally.¹⁷¹⁴ Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently approved selective waivers but drew criticism for interrupting these critical programs, impacting nearly 280 US-assisted governance and transparency initiatives worldwide.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald Trump issued an executive order stating that the US would not participate in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC), would conduct a review of its membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and would not make any payments to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).¹⁷¹⁵ Additionally, a review of all international intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were to be reviewed within 180 days.

On 18 February 2025, Ambassador Dorothy Shea emphasized reform at a UN Security Council debate.¹⁷¹⁶ She criticized inefficiencies in UN institutions, including those managing multi-billion-dollar humanitarian aid programs, explicitly urging greater transparency and fiscal accountability.

On 22 February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio did not participate in the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting.¹⁷¹⁷ This action is antithetical to the commitment and undermines global governance initiatives.

On 4 March 2025, US representative on the United Nations Loss and Damage Fund board Rebecca Lawlor announced the US's withdrawal from the board of the fund, which is a multilateral climate finance mechanism established to compensate vulnerable countries for climate-induced losses.¹⁷¹⁸ The decision involved the resignation of the primary and alternate US board members without replacement. This withdrawal undermines the operational legitimacy of the fund and weakens global efforts to ensure equitable climate governance.

On 8 March 2025, the US formally announced that it would deny all future funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), citing the Kemp-Kasten Amendment as legal justification.¹⁷¹⁹ This decision terminated over USD335 million in humanitarian health grants, eliminating one of the most significant funding streams for maternal care, reproductive health and gender-based violence prevention in over 20 conflict-affected countries.

On 13 March 2025, Counselor for Economic and Social Affairs at the US Mission to the UN Edward Hartney announced the US rejects the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, citing concerns over

¹⁷¹⁴ US Overseas Governance and Accountability Assistance is Critical to Achieving US Foreign Policy Goals, Transparency International US (Washington D.C.) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://us.transparency.org/resource/u-s-overseas-governance-and-accountability-assistance-is-critical-to-achieving-u-s-foreign-policy-goals/>

¹⁷¹⁵ Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations, The White House (Washington D.C.) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and-reviewing-united-states-support-to-all-international-organizations/>

¹⁷¹⁶ Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance, United States Mission to the United Nations (New York) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-open-debate-on-practicing-multilateralism-reforming-and-improving-global-governance/>

¹⁷¹⁷ G20 Meeting a Success Despite US Absence, Priorities Backed, G20 South Africa (Johannesburg) 22 February 2025. Access Date: 29 March 2025. <https://g20.org/news/g20-meeting-a-success-despite-us-absence-priorities-backed/>

¹⁷¹⁸ United States quits board of UN climate loss and damage fund, Reuters (New York) 4 March 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/united-states-quits-board-un-climate-damage-fund-letter-shows-2025-03-07/>

¹⁷¹⁹ United States Government cuts future funding for UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund (New York) 8 March 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.unfpa.org/press/statement-response-united-states-decision-deny-future-funding-unfpa>

national sovereignty.¹⁷²⁰ This decision marked a significant departure from international commitments to address global challenges collectively, such as poverty, inequality and climate change.

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity. The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to "a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources." The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the "Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight," "Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security," "Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources" and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for "Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security," "Regional peace and stability in the Middle East," "Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific," "Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela," "Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage." The joint statement reflects the G7's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 2 April 2025, President Trump announced a sweeping tariff policy dubbed "Liberation Day," imposing a universal ten per cent tariff on all imports, with higher rates for specific countries, including a 54 per cent effective tariff on Chinese goods.¹⁷²¹ This move, justified under a declared national emergency, undermines the World Trade Organizations' (WTO) principles and escalates global trade tensions.

On 25 April 2025, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent participated in bilateral discussions with Indonesian Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati during the G20 and IMF Spring Meetings in Washington D.C.¹⁷²² The meeting focused on the future of multilateral trade and financial institutions, with particular attention to proposed reforms at the WTO.

On 29 May 2025, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States as a part of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team issued a joint statement on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, in violation of UNSC resolutions.¹⁷²³ The multilateral mechanism aims to monitor and report on sanction measures implemented by the United Nations. This initiative underscores ongoing to advancing the UN's institutional effectiveness.

The United States has not complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. The G20 member has verbally committed to reforming governance structures, however, policy shifts and widespread withdrawals from multilateral organizations and meetings undermine are actions antithetical to the commitment.

¹⁷²⁰ U.S. Rejects UN Sustainable Development Goals, Seneca ESG (Singapore) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 20 May 2025.

<https://senecaesg.com/insights/u-s-rejects-un-sustainable-development-goals/>

¹⁷²¹ Trump imposes 10 percent universal tariff, higher for top trade partners, Politico (Washington D.C.) 2 April 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/02/trump-tariff-trade-partners-liberation-day-00267350>

¹⁷²² Indonesia engages U.S. on multilateralism, WTO reform at G20 and IMF Spring Meetings, Indonesia Business Post (Washington D.C.) 25 April 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/4182/capitol-influence-and-lobbying/ri-engages-u-s-on-multilateralism-wto-reform-at-g20-and-imf-spring-meetings>

¹⁷²³ Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on the first report covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra) 30 March 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-military-cooperation>

Thus, the United States receives a score of -1 .¹⁷²⁴

Analyst: Lou Cardot

African Union: 0

The African Union has partially complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 10 December 2024, the African Union (AU) delegation represented by Legal Counsel of the AU Hajer Gueldich and Mekan Moïse Mbengue delivered a statement at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligations of states with regards to the legal consequences of failing to address climate change.¹⁷²⁵ The AU delegation affirmed the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and accountability mechanisms for major emitting states. The address demonstrates the AU's commitment to bolstering the international legal order and the institutional effectiveness of the ICJ.

On 23 February 2025, the AU delegation attended the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting where they stated key areas of focus under South Africa's G20 Presidency: 1) "Inclusive Economic Growth, Industrialization, Employment, and Inequality," 2) "Food Security and Agriculture," 3) "Artificial Intelligence, Data Governance, and Innovation," 4) "Compact with Africa (CWA)," 5) "Cost of Capital Commission" and 6) "G20 @20 Review Process."¹⁷²⁶ This highlights the AU's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness in global governance and decision-making processes of the G20.

On 17 April 2025, Chairperson of the AU Commission Mahmoud Ali Youssouf met with the Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) where they discussed enhancing strategic cooperation between the AU and UNOPS in the areas of "peace & security, governance, health systems strengthening, infrastructure and pandemic preparedness."¹⁷²⁷

On 28 April 2025, AUC Chairperson Youssouf met with the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region Huang Xia where they reaffirmed their commitment to an AU-UN partnership and focusing on coordinated regional and international peacekeeping efforts to pursue peace and stability.¹⁷²⁸

On 7 March 2025, members of the bureau of the Committee of the Directors general of the National Statistics offices and representatives from the African Union Institute for Statistics (AU STATFRIC)

¹⁷²⁴ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: <https://www.usa.gov/>, <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/>, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/>, <https://2021-2025.state.gov/press-releases/>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250116154937/https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250101021131/https://www.congress.gov/>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250101061622/http://www.senate.gov/>, <https://www.senate.gov/>, <https://www.house.gov/>, <https://www.usatoday.com/>, <https://www.wsj.com/>, <https://www.msnbc.com/>, <https://www.osce.org/>, <https://us.transparency.org/>, <https://usun.usmission.gov/>, <https://g20.org/>, <https://www.reuters.com/>, <https://www.unfpa.org/>, <https://senecaesg.com/>, <https://www.politico.com/>, <https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/> and <https://www.dfat.gov.au/>.

¹⁷²⁵ The African Union (AU) Delivered a Landmark Oral Statement at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Climate Justice, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 10 December 2024. Access Date: 1 July 2025.

<https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20241210/african-union-au-delivered-landmark-oral-statement-international-court>

¹⁷²⁶ African Union Delegation Attends 1st G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Under South Africa's G20 Presidency, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 23 February 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250223/african-union-delegation-attends-1st-g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-under>

¹⁷²⁷ AU Commission Chairperson Meets UNOPS Executive Director to Strengthen Strategic Cooperation, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 17 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250417/chairperson-met-un-usg-executive-director-unops>

¹⁷²⁸ AUC Chairperson met with the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mr. Huang Xia., African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250428/chairperson-met-un-special-envoy-great-lakes-region>

participated in the 56th session of the United Nations Statistical Commission.¹⁷²⁹ This demonstrates the AU's commitment to supporting the work of the UN Statistical Commission in setting global statistical standards and its role in wider UN processes.

On 7 March 2025, the AU and the United Nations Development Coordination Office (UNDCO) signed the Spotlight Initiative Africa Regional Programme 2.0 (SIARP) Agreement to formalize the AU-UNDCO strategic partnership.¹⁷³⁰ This agreement builds on SIARP 1.0 on driving action towards gender equality and promoting women's empowerment. It aims to consolidate cooperation between the AU, the EU and the UN through policy harmonization and capacity building. This initiative demonstrates the AU's commitment to multilateral cooperation and bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 11 March 2025, the African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the United Nations on the Status of Women and the European Economic and Social Committee reaffirmed their commitment to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.¹⁷³¹ This demonstrates the AU's commitment to gender equality policy frameworks and bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 3 May 2025, Representatives for the AU Hajer Gueldich and Mamadou Hébié addressed the ICJ regarding actions committed by Israel that violate international laws and the operation of international organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.¹⁷³² This demonstrates the AU's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the UN.

On 16 May 2025, AUC Chairperson Youssouf met with the Secretary-General of the UN António Guterres where they reaffirmed enhancing strategic partnerships between the AU and the UN focusing on political processes, preventive diplomacy and peace support operations.¹⁷³³

On 24 May 2025, the AU and the World Health Organization (WHO) renewed their strategic partnership through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding at the 78th World Health Assembly in Geneva.¹⁷³⁴ This agreement reaffirms the AU's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the WHO in advancing health security, strengthening regulatory harmonization and responses in humanitarian crisis and emergencies and implementing frameworks for disease prevention and control.

The African Union has partially complied in its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. The African Union has taken moderate action to reform international organizations such as the ICJ, the WHO, the G20 and relevant UN bodies. In addition, it had taken steps to meet the key criteria of institutional effectiveness

¹⁷²⁹ African Union takes part in the 56th session of the UN Statistical Commission, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 7 March 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250307/african-union-takes-part-56th-session-un-statistical-commission>

¹⁷³⁰ African Union and the United Nations Signs the Spotlight Initiative Africa Regional Programme 2.0 Agreement. African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 7 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250307/african-union-and-united-nations-signs-spotlight-initiative-africa-regional>

¹⁷³¹ Joint EESC-AU ECOSOC Declaration for the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW69) / Beijing+30, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250311/joint-eesc-au-ecosoc-declaration-un-commission-status-women-csw69-beijing30>

¹⁷³² African Union Addresses International Court of Justice on Humanitarian Crisis in Occupied Palestinian Territory, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 3 May 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250503/african-union-addresses-international-court-justice-humanitarian-crisis>

¹⁷³³ AUC Chairperson met with H.E. Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 16 May 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250516/auc-chairperson-met-he-antonio-guterres-secretary-general-un>

¹⁷³⁴ African Union and World Health Organization renew strategic partnership to drive impact and strengthen health systems in Africa, African Union Commission (Addis Ababa) 24 May 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250524/african-union-and-world-health-organization-renew-strategic-partnership-drive>

Thus, the African Union receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Natalie Lau

European Union: +1

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with renewed institutions and a reformed governance that is more representative, effective, transparent and accountable, reflecting the social, economic and political realities of the 21st century.

On 24 November 2024, Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders delivered a statement at the 13th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights.¹⁷³⁵ He stated the importance of international frameworks including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines. Commissioner Reynders further supported the development of a Legally Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights at the UN level to bolster institutional effectiveness and institutional transparency and accountability.

On 5 December 2024, the EU and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) reached an agreement on a partnership agreement.¹⁷³⁶ This initiative promotes the institutional effectiveness of MERCOSUR through advancing and removing barriers to economic growth and sustainable development.¹⁷³⁷ It bolsters the institutional transparency and accountability of MERCOSUR through the implementation of a dispute settlement mechanism involving external representatives and a commitment towards regulatory transparency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). The partnership aligns with international standards and regulations, upholding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

On 6 January 2025, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security; Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency Maroš Šefčovič stated the EU's commitment to revitalizing the World Trade Organization (WTO) through strengthening rules-based trade; promoting the WTO's role on industrial policies; a level-playing field and economic security.¹⁷³⁸

On 19 January 2025, Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius committed to strengthening cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and implement information sharing mechanisms on NATO capability targets at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council.¹⁷³⁹ This demonstrates the EU's commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness and institutional transparency and accountability of NATO.

On 21 January 2025, Commissioner Kubilius reaffirmed the EU's support for and collaboration with NATO and the European Defence Agency in assessing defense capabilities and setting defense targets.¹⁷⁴⁰

On 4 February 2025, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) held a joint high-level conference: 'Social Justice in the Digital Era: AI's impact on work

¹⁷³⁵ Video statement by Commissioner Reynders for the opening plenary of the 13th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, European Commission (Geneva) 24 November 2024. Access Date: 1 July 2025.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_6082

¹⁷³⁶ EU and Mercosur reach political agreement on groundbreaking partnership, European Commission (Brussels) 5 December 2024. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6244

¹⁷³⁷ Questions and answers on the EU-Mercosur partnership agreement *, European Commission (Brussels) 5 December 2024. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_6245

¹⁷³⁸ Remarks by Commissioner Šefčovič following his visit to the World Trade Organization, European Commission (Geneva) 6 January 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_61

¹⁷³⁹ Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 20 January 2025, European Commission (Brussels) 19 January 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_296

¹⁷⁴⁰ Commissioner Kubilius's speech at the European Defence Agency Annual Conference, 22 January 2025, European Commission (Brussels) 21 January 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_313

and society’ with the agenda of “how AI can contribute to inclusive labor markets, decent work, and social justice.”¹⁷⁴¹ The conference concluded with a call for multilateral cooperation. The EESC and ILO also committed to continued collaboration with the Global Coalition for Social Justice, ensuring that AI governance remains a key priority for policymakers across Europe and beyond.

On 8 February 2025, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stated the importance of bolstering collective efforts between the EU and NATO to secure critical network infrastructure at the joint press conference at the Synchronisation Baltic Connectors opening event.¹⁷⁴² President von der Leyen outlined four key priorities including prevention, detection, fast response and repair and deterrence. This demonstrates the EU’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of NATO defense capabilities.

On 10 February 2025, Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath reaffirmed the EU’s support for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the principal judicial organ of the UN and its contribution to maintaining international rules-based order.¹⁷⁴³ Commissioner McGrath further reiterated the binding force of and compliance to ICJ decisions. This demonstrates the EU’s commitment to bolstering the institutional effectiveness of the ICJ.

On 11 February 2025, the European Commission adopted the 2025 work programme where the EU committed to investing strategically through NATO partnership to “enhance crisis anticipation and resilience” and reinforce collective defense and security.¹⁷⁴⁴

On 12 February 2025, Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth Wopke Hoekstra stated the importance of increasing system compatibility and collaboration with NATO to address global geopolitical challenges at the Munich European Conference.¹⁷⁴⁵

On 11 March 2025, Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas called for multilateralism and urged reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in a speech at the annual session on UN-EU cooperation.¹⁷⁴⁶ She reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to multilateral solutions and held reform of the Security Council as a necessary condition for the fulfillment of the responsibilities of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

On 12 March 2025, President von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa met with President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa where the leaders issued a joint statement on a renewed commitment to multilateral cooperation of international organizations at the 8th Summit between the EU and South Africa.¹⁷⁴⁷ The leaders committed to strengthening the G20, reforming the UNSC to include underrepresented regions and reforming the WTO to improve its governance and align with today’s realities.

¹⁷⁴¹ EESC and ILO join forces to shape a fair and inclusive AI-driven future at high-level conference, European Economic and Social Committee (Brussels) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 1 April 2025.

¹⁷⁴² Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference at the Synchronisation Baltic Connectors opening event, European Commission (Vilnius) 8 February 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_452

¹⁷⁴³ Commissioner McGrath delivers remarks at the European plenary debate, "Protecting the system of international justice and its institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, European Commission (Brussels) 10 February 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_521

¹⁷⁴⁴ A bolder, simpler, faster Union: the 2025 Commission work programme, European Commission (Brussels) 11 February 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_466

¹⁷⁴⁵ Keynote speech by Commissioner Hoekstra at Münchner Europakonferenz, European Commission (Munich) 12 February 2025. Translation by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_512

¹⁷⁴⁶ United Nations: Speech by High Representative Kaja Kallas at the annual UN Security Council session on EU-UN cooperation, European Union External Action (New York) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/united-nations-speech-high-representative-kaja-kallas-annual-un-security-council-session-eu-un_en

¹⁷⁴⁷ EU - South Africa Summit Declaration, European Commission (Cape Town) 12 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_773

On 14 March 2025, G7 Foreign Ministers released the G7 Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity. The ministers reaffirmed the G7's commitment to "a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources." The ministers also reiterated their commitment to tackling the "Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight," "Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security," "Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources" and partnerships. This reflects their commitment to promoting dialogue between G7 members and stakeholders and bolstering the institutional effectiveness on matters related to maritime security and prosperity. They also released a joint statement that reaffirmed G7 support for "Ukraine's long-term prosperity and security," "Regional peace and stability in the Middle East," "Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific," "Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela," "Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage." The joint statement reflects the G7's commitment to strengthening the institutional effectiveness of the G7.

On 3 April 2025, the EU, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed a joint declaration following the first EU-Central Asia Summit, committing to upholding the principles of the UN Charter and the principles of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.¹⁷⁴⁸ This demonstrates the EU's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness and effectiveness of the UN and the OSCE through engaging with Central Asian countries and strengthening cooperation.

On 4 April 2025, President Costa and President von der Leyen reaffirmed their support for the accession of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the WTO.¹⁷⁴⁹ This demonstrates the EU's commitment to bolstering the institutional representativeness of the WTO.

On 20 May 2025, Commissioner for Equality Hadja Lahbib reaffirmed the EU's commitment to international rules-based order rooted in the principles of the United Nations and committed to collaborating with UN agencies and international NGOs to reform the humanitarian system at the European Humanitarian Forum.¹⁷⁵⁰

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to work for a reinvigorated and strengthened multilateral system, rooted in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. The European Union has taken strong action to reform international organizations such as MERCOSUR and aligned with the key criteria of institutional effectiveness and transparency and accountability. It has taken several moderate actions to bolster the OSCE, G7, NATO, UNSC and ICJ through verbal reaffirmations.

Thus, European Union receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Aditi Malhotra

¹⁷⁴⁸ Joint Declaration following the First European Union-Central Asia Summit, European Commission (Samarkand) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_980

¹⁷⁴⁹ Joint press release on the EU-Central Asia Summit, European Commission (Samarkand) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_983

¹⁷⁵⁰ Closing Speech by Commissioner Lahbib at the European Humanitarian Forum, European Commission (Brussels) 20 May 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_1300