

The G20 Summit as an International Negotiation Process: Shaping the Systemic Summit Club for Toronto and Seoul

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Abstract

The new Group of Twenty (G20) has now acquired a sufficient degree of all the three core characteristics necessary for it to behave as a systemic summit club. Due to its small group membership and participation, its direct delivery by leaders through collective, face-to-face interaction and its highly informal, intense interaction, the G20 has become a club of equals with a distinctive diplomacy of its own. Here all can lead, follow or combine with any others in flexible, issue-specific coalitions in pursuit of collective responsibilities and goals, integrate issues in mutually reinforcing, innovative ways, and cope with uncertainty and complexity through flexibility and a focus on the future shape of global order as a whole. The G20 has thus performed well to produce generally desirable outcomes for all members, for the club and for the larger global community. The fourth G20 summit, taking place in Toronto, Canada, on June 26-27, 2010, will probably take a further step in this direction. But if the Seoul Summit on November 11-12 is to build fully on this foundation, the G20 must revise its institutional architecture and operation to become more like the old Group of Eight (G8) major democratic power concert. In short, the G20 is developing the distinctive diplomacy of a systemic summit club, but still must do more to cope well with the demands of an increasingly complex, uncertain, intensely globalizing world.

Introduction

Small-group summit diplomacy of the new Group of Twenty (G20) variety stands somewhere between, on the one hand, the negotiations within an international organization and, on the other, the interaction among strong sovereign states that forms the staple of diplomatic life. But it requires and has given rise to a distinctive diplomacy with powerful global governance effects. Such diplomacy flows from three defining contextual characteristics of the G20: small-group plurilateralism in membership and participation, direct delivery by leaders through face-to-face summitry and institutionalization in a highly informal, intense forum. These characteristics create a club of equals in which anyone can lead or follow in pursuit of collective responsibilities and goals, to integrate all issues in mutually reinforcing, innovative ways and to cope with uncertainty and complexity through a focus on the future of global order as a whole.

The new G20 summit has now acquired enough of these core characteristics to operate as a systemic summit club. It has increasingly displayed the distinctive diplomatic style that such a forum breeds, to produce generally desirable outcomes for all members, the club and the larger global community as a whole. The prospects are that the fourth G20 summit, taking place in Toronto, Canada, on June 26-27, 2010, will take a further step in this direction. But if the Seoul Summit on November 11-12 is to build fully on this foundation, the G20 must revise its institutional architecture and operation in several ways, to make it work more like the older Group of Eight (G8) major power concert long has. In short, the G20 is increasingly developing the distinctive diplomacy of an institutionalized systemic summit club, and the thus working well as one. But it still has some way to go before it can realize its full potential to cope with the demands of a complex, uncertain, intensely globalizing world.

To develop this argument, this paper first identifies the three core characteristics of institutionalized summit clubs. It then identifies the distinctive diplomacy that arises as a result and reviews the diplomacy within the three G20 summits held thus far to show that the institution is increasingly acquiring these characteristics, the diplomacy that follows, and the beneficial bargains and outcomes for its members and outsiders that result. It proceeds to assess the prospects for the Toronto Summit to show that these trends will likely continue there. It concludes by arguing that if the fifth summit in Seoul, as the first hosted and chaired in full by a non-G8 member, is to reap the full advantage of institutionalized systemic summit club diplomacy, it must reshape the institution to become and operate more like the smaller G8 concert of old.

The G20 as an Institutionalized Systemic Summit Club

The new G20 summit is a club of systemically significant countries devoted to international financial stability, rather than a major democratic power concert like the old G8, which is devoted to promoting open democracy and individual liberty around the world. Yet it otherwise shares the same central characteristics and a similar style of diplomacy that have long made the G8 a club of equal leaders that lead in comprehensive, integrative, innovative, future-oriented effective and desirable ways.

A Systemic Club

First, the G20 is a small, set, systemically significant and dedicated top-tier club. Its constitutional mission is to provide for the global system financial stability, sustained growth and growth that benefits all.¹ It has a restricted, well-defined, well-understood, highly fixed membership and participation. Its members are composed of almost all the systemically significant states in the world. Its small size and systemically significant top-tier membership lend it prestige and gives its members a shared sense of systemic responsibility and equality. This sense of responsibility and equality is reinforced because each of its members are either providers or consumers of financial security, which is

¹ These are the modern equivalents of the “milieu” goals that Arnold Wolfers first added to the realist repertoire long ago. This is distinct from Hedley Bull’s individual and collective responsibility of great powers to provide international order.

important, if not essential, for systemic financial stability in a world that is intensely interconnected in complex and uncertain ways.

Unlike the expanding G8, the G20's membership has been fixed from its 1999 start at 19 countries plus the European Union, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank being permanent participants in the club (Kirton 2010). It was this G20 that was chosen, among a myriad of possible configurations, to leap to summit level to combat the acute financial crisis erupting in America in the autumn of 2008. It has continued in essentially unchanged form, with the few additions of Spain and the Netherlands as recurrent guests, but ones that still must invoke the authority of the established EU membership in order to make it in.

A Summit Club

Second, the G20 is a club created, controlled and operated by leaders. It was they rather than their finance ministers or others who proposed and invented it in November 2008, with the leaders of America, France, Canada and Australia being in the forefront. Although it relied heavily for its first summit on the decade-old finance ministers forum, even here at Washington in November 2008 there was sufficient time, at meals and breaks, for leaders to engage directly as equals and collectively redefine what their ministers, sherpas and officials had proposed.

It is striking how much leaders like the G20 summit, for, unlike the G8, they always all come for the full time to each one.² And new leaders who have arrived in office somewhat skeptical of a forum created by their predecessors and political rivals — above all U.S. president Barack Obama — have quickly bonded with the G20 summit club. This sense of ownership on the part of the leaders has been enhanced by the fact that the G20 summit, compared to the G8 at its start, has enjoyed exceptional continuity in incumbency. To be sure, in both cases America changed leaders during the first four summits, followed by Britain a little later (see Appendix A). But unlike the G8, the chairs of the first four and prospectively six G20 summits (save the first by definition) have all been founders or previously serving members of the G20.

An Institutionalized Club

Third, this continuous, compounding attendance and resulting cherished sense of ownership by the same individual leaders is enhanced by the frequency with which the G20 leaders meet face to face. Its five summits within two calendar years (November 2008, April 2009, September 2009, June 2010, November 2010) give it greater intensity of interaction that the original G8, which took five years, from 1975 to 1979, to hold its first five summits. This intensity of interaction has increased the institutionalization of the G20 as a club, for having only five or so months between summits has meant a greater reliance on the same preparatory process and other institutional features.

² The one exception was a participant, not a member: the prime minister of the Netherlands did not attend due to a death in his family, requiring him to return home before the summit began.

These features start with the fact that although the G20 at the ministerial level had had for its first decade only a forum of finance ministers and central bank governors, which met annually in the autumn. The crisis catalyzed several additional ad hoc and scheduled meetings and conference calls, starting in October 2008. There has also been a parallel with the old G8 in the G20's hosting order. In both cases the eager Asian member, Japan, has had its early and repeated bid to host continuously refused, while the traditional Atlantic great powers of the U.S., Britain and France have been given their turns. The one stark difference is how soon Canada and Korea have been chosen to host and chair the G20.³

G20 Summit Diplomacy, Negotiation and Performance, 2008–09

These three core institutional characteristics have each given rise to a commensurate distinctive dynamic of diplomacy and negotiation within the G20 systemic summit club (Kirton 2010b, 2010c).

The Diplomacy of Equals

First, as a continuing club of systemically significant equals, each able existentially to harm or help the others in the economic realm, each member can lead, follow and form coalitions with any other member to win. In addition, the prerogatives of hosting are formidable, and the new pentarchy of hosts — the U.S., Britain, Canada, Korea and France — has a greater responsibility and role than the other members do.

At the first summit, hosted by the U.S. as the world's most powerful country, France and its European coalition won their initiative for harsh action against tax havens. Canada put a simultaneous concern with exit strategies alongside fiscal stimulus into the communiqué.⁴

More recently, in the lead-up to Toronto, on the issue of a bank levy, a Canadian-led coalition backed by G8 member Japan and all the non-G20 members save a bridge-building Korea defeated an initiative strongly advanced by Britain, France, Germany and Italy with support from the United States. The smaller Asian-Pacific powers whose financial systems had escaped the crisis thus beat the bigger Atlantic ones whose financial systems had not.⁵

³ This was due to American leadership under President Obama, but both Canada and Korea had to agree for the outcome to arise.

⁴ An explanation grounded in rationalist calculation of national preferences would predict that the exit strategy point would be raised by the one member among the 20 with the highest level and growth of deficit and debt burdens and the greatest loss of economic growth. Canada was far from being such a country, but was led by an individual with an M.A. in economics, who had headed an economics-oriented non-government organization and who came from a country with a profound, painful but successful performance in defeating its cancerous deficits and debt a decade before, from 1993 to 1997. Thus individual expertise and experience, along with distinctive domestic lessons of the past, made an autonomous difference in the G20 summit club.

⁵ The character of the G20 as a systemic club is further confirmed by the source of the positions that are produced and that prevailed. The bank levy advocates that lost were driven primarily by domestic political pressure and the need for tax revenues to stem their ballooning deficits. Their victorious

This dynamic of equality through flexible coalition building can be seen in the cadence of Chinese diplomacy in the G20. At the first summit China was a rapid follower in offering massive fiscal and monetary stimulus. It secured an exemption for Hong Kong and Macau from the move to shut tax havens down. At the second summit, China took its first, successful initiative, when its central bank governor's suggestion to use special drawing rights (SDRs) was adopted. China also showed a club-like sense of systemic responsibility, offering \$50 billion as part of the \$1.1 trillion package of international stimulus for development, and did so before the IMF was reformed to give China a greater voice and vote.

The Diplomacy of Leaders

Second, as a club created, controlled, delivered and increasingly cherished by ever more self-confident leaders who trust one another, the G20 summits have seen autonomous injections of individual political will. There has even been “spontaneous combustion,” where the leaders themselves intervene to go beyond what their ministers, sherpas and officials have previously negotiated on their behalf.

At the first summit in Washington it was the leaders, led by President Lee Myung-Bak, who demanded that the G20 speak out much more strongly on the need to prevent trade protectionism, and that its members not repeat the spirals of the 1930s had done so much damage to the global economy then (Alexandroff and Kirton 2010).⁶ At the second summit in London, it was Gordon Brown as the host leader and his ministers' political staffs who went beyond their civil servants' design for the summit, which was focused on the details of financial regulation, to add — at a very late stage — a new initiative on climate change and the \$1.1 trillion stimulus-development package, with its innovative \$250 billion allocation of SDRs.⁷ At the Pittsburgh Summit many leaders, led by President Obama as host, were dissatisfied with the predominant practice of leaders spending too much time reading speeches to one another, much like at the General Assembly of the United Nations. This catalyzed the American demand for a G20 sherpa meeting, held in Mexico City on January 12, 2010, to discuss how the G20 summit process should be reformed.

The impact of leaders is also evident in the summits' increasingly comprehensive, interconnected agenda and action. Here, leaders and their personal representatives take

opponents were more driven by calculations of what would best contribute to systemic financial stability as a whole. The outcome was determined not only by the numbers and relative capabilities of the opposing coalitions but also by the substance of their arguments, with the unifying systemic beating the divisive domestic political ones.

⁶ An explanation based on rational interest preference would have predicted that among the 20 members, the agent of the country that depended most on exports and experienced the greatest growth and demand decline from its export markets would have raised this point. But it was not Germany or similar countries that did. Individuals do make a difference in the summit club.

⁷ It is also possible that the UK's Gordon Brown, who personally cared deeply about poverty, and his close ministerial advisor Mark Malloch Brown, who had previously headed the United Nations Development Programme, were responding to a letter from the UN secretary general Ban Ki-Mon, which suggested the \$1.1 trillion figure.

advantage of their ability and responsibility to make inter-issue connections, to deal with anything they wanted and to use their summit stage, regardless of the issue, to help with their key priorities at home and abroad.

Starting as a forum for financial stability, its summit first focused on domestic financial regulation and reform of the international financial institutions (IFIs), along with macroeconomic policy, trade and development. But from the start it also dealt with the key new security issues of terrorism, in the form of terrorist finance, as well as crime and corruption and good governance, through its concern with tax havens. At the second summit it added climate change, again moving from the bastion of finance to enter a new domain. At the third summit it served as a stage where President Obama and a few others could send a stronger message to a nuclear-arming Iran. The Pittsburgh communiqué also made three references to health, including one directed at the debate then underway over publicly funded health care in the United States. The sherpas at their January 2010 meeting issued a statement on Haitian earthquake relief.

Diplomacy for the Future from the Past

The intense, informal institutionalization of the summit has given rise to iteration and a longer shadow of the future, guided by the collective lessons the leaders themselves have learned. This focus on the future had been evident as early as Washington, when Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper saw the need to look far ahead to the day when exit strategies and not only extraordinary stimulus, would be required to save the global economy and financial system. The sovereign debt crisis that began in Greece and spread through Europe to the rest of the world in May 2010 showed the prescience of the G20.

The decision in Pittsburgh to make the G20 permanent, and to have it serve as the priority forum for international economic cooperation, shows how strongly the leaders have come to value the club. This decision reinforced its potency by giving the G20 a shadow of the future that had no end.⁸ The decision made there to hold two summits in 2010 helped too. It was at Pittsburgh that the substantive policy focus clearly shifted to the future, in the form of the signature decision to establish the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.

This institutionalization has seen a move toward equality between G8 and non-G8 members in the hosting and chairing of G20 summits, starting in Toronto in June 2010. It has also seen a convergence in the timing and hosting between the old finance ministers' G20 and the new leaders' G20 one, with France acquiring the chair of both in 2011 but the G20 summit locking on to the autumn date its finance ministers had used for their meetings from their start. Much like the old G8, the G20 has now started to institutionally thicken from the top down, by adding a separate ministerial meeting for labour ministers in April 2010 in Washington and resolutely refusing a stand-alone secretariat in any separate bureaucratic form.

⁸ This is in sharp contrast to the G8, which, in its 36 years, has only identified its future existence one year in advance. The two exceptions are the eight-year future identified in 2002 and the two-year future identified in 2009.

Prospects for the Toronto G20 Summit

Toronto's Challenges

These trends will likely continue at the fourth G20 summit, taking place in Toronto on June 26-27, 2010. They will do so even in the face of the exceptional challenges facing G20 leaders then. First, the G20 will embark on its new mission, proclaimed at Pittsburgh in September 2009, of serving as the world's premier, permanent forum for international economic governance. Second, the summit will take place in tandem with the G8 summit being held on June 25-26 in nearby Muskoka. This will produce a need for close co-ordination, for the relationship between the two to be defined and for a close comparison of their character and performance by those inside and out. Third, the twinned summits will provide an expanded global governance capacity to address many pressing issues across the financial and economic, social and development, and political and security domains. Fourth, it will be the first test of the institutionalized equality of the G20 at its core, with Canada, a veteran G8 developed country from North America co-chairing with the Republic of Korea, a newly emerged country from Asia that has just joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Fifth, their joint G20 will have to function in the face of extraordinary uncertainty, complexity and even crisis, as the recent American-turned-global financial and economic crisis, with its deep and durable damage, has now been joined by an unprecedentedly large European-turned-global one.

Toronto's Plan

For the Toronto Summit the G20 leaders have stuck even more closely to the strict formula that has served them well in the past. Membership has been limited to the 20, with only a few additional participants — Spain, the Netherlands, Ethiopia, Malawi and Vietnam — added as guests. Most of the key leaders, especially from the governing pentarchy, are G20 veterans who feel personally bound by all the previous decisions made. Both co-chairs, Canada's Prime Minister Harper and Korea's President Lee, have been there from the start, and have long been leaders on exit strategies and trade. The agenda is firmly focused on the financial and economic fundamentals, while reaching out to those social issues that are most closely connected to the financial and economic realm. The emphasis is strongly on iteration and implementation, rather than agenda expansion and issue or institutional innovation, although the European crisis will call forth all the creativity and flexibility the leaders can muster in response. The format is the familiar one: opening with an evening working dinner and continuing through working sessions at a downtown big city conventional centre into the next afternoon.

Toronto's Tasks

The first task for the Toronto G20 leaders is to stay the course on stimulus until private sector-led recovery is assured, while simultaneously designing and implementing smart exit strategies to convince nervous markets that they have credible plans for medium-term fiscal consolidation and long-term fiscal sustainability — so they will not go the way of Greece and can help others that do.

The second, closely related challenge is implementing and improving the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth that the G20 invented in Pittsburgh, by ensuring that all members produce their promised national plans with precise numbers attached. This is a prerequisite for a proper analysis of how the plans fit together to achieve shared global objectives and what options are available to get the necessary adjustments made. Only then can the leaders at Toronto credibly signal their determination to make the balanced and broadly shared policy changes on exchange rates, fiscal policy, microeconomic policy and social policy required to put a durable recovery in place.

The third task is to modernize G20 members' domestic financial regulations and supervision in a more comprehensive, internationally coordinated and forward-looking way. Here the priorities, which leaders will likely achieve, are to tighten consensus on definitions and higher quality and quantity of bank capital and liquidity and lower leverage, to avoid getting bogged down by divisive, politically driven debates over new taxes or levies on banks, and to advance stronger, shared standards on accounting and derivatives.

The fourth task is to open trade and investment, in order to fuel private sector-led growth and development, especially in the emerging and developing economies upon which future global prosperity increasingly depends. G20 leaders will again promise to avoid and redress protectionism and to finally complete the long overdue Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. But, following the lead of their Canadian co-chair, they could more usefully cut tariffs unilaterally, forge ambitious bilateral and plurilateral trade, investment and regulatory agreements, and establish regimes to contain financial protectionism, eliminate nuisance tariffs among themselves and foster freer trade in environmentally enhancing services and goods.

The fifth task is to reform the IFIs. This starts with shifting 5 percent of the voting share at the IMF from relatively shrinking established economies to rapidly rising emerging ones, and doing so in ways that make it easier for legislatures in all member countries to ratify the change. Also important is improving governance and expanding resources within the IMF and the World Bank. The situation with the IMF has become particularly acute, given the large financial support packages of about \$30 billion for Greece, more than \$200 billion for Europe and potentially more for a future cash-strapped Europe and other countries around the world.

The sixth task, lying outside this financial and economic core, is incrementally advancing an inherited array of social issues that have overwhelmed the capacity of other global governance forums. These include climate finance, starting with the delivery of the fast-start \$30 billion in new money promised to developing countries at the UN Copenhagen conference in December 2009 and the reduction of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. They also include promoting green growth, implementing economic moves that make the environment mainstream, generating good jobs and training, and following up on the first G20 labour ministers' meeting held in Washington in April 2009. Other priorities include

food security, health, development, tax havens and terrorist finance. As the latter issues suggest, G20 leaders will want to act in ways that support their larger political-security goals.

Shaping the Systemic Summit Club for Toronto and Seoul

Beyond the challenges of managing these individual, tightly interconnected issues, the leaders face the institutional challenges of developing the new permanent G20 club. These start with defining what issues will be addressed at the next summit in Seoul on November 11-12, 2010, when and where the G20 summit will be held in France in 2011 and how it will relate to the G8 one that will also take place in France that year.⁹ Those challenges extend to deciding who will host the G20 in 2012 and the years following, to show it is a genuinely global club of equals that can get the growing global economic governance job done effectively and legitimately. Above all, they culminate in making the G20 work like a real summit so it can deal as an equal with the G8 and other plurilateral summit institutions that do. This task requires making G20 summits events where leaders are free to be leaders, and thus able to provide the integrated, innovative initiatives in accountable and effective ways that a more open global economy, society and political community wants and needs.

At their meeting in Mexico in January 2010, the G20 sherpas recognized the need to move in this direction. They came to a general, if not complete, consensus that summits should take place once a year, just like the G8 has since its start. Leaders alone would meet together, rather than with their finance ministers always by their side. Leaders alone would deliberate, with the heads of invited multilateral organizations speaking only when spoken to, when a leader asked for technical advice. Ministerials and working groups would be kept to a minimum, arising only as the agenda required. Membership would be fixed at 20, with participation limited to only a few additions chosen by the host and changing each year. No secretariat was needed, because the leaders were capable of governing on their own. The agenda would be limited to economics, even though the sherpas rushed to issue a statement on the Haitian earthquake in response to the immediate crisis of the day. Communiqués would be concise and clear. Accountability would be strengthened by monitoring compliance through a private website and by two-country teams. Above all, the time had come to stop talking about institutional architecture and focus on substance — on delivering the G20's outstanding promises and demonstrating real results.

Thus far, the Toronto Summit is taking several steps in this direction.¹⁰ But the greatest challenge here will come in Seoul. Only then does the hosting pass fully into the hands of

⁹ The Seoul Summit further shows the prerogative of the chair, agenda expansion by leader, and the instinct for innovation by having added to its agenda the new issues of and prospective initiatives on financial safety nets and development based on the distinctive experience of Korea and other rapidly emerging and now emerged states.

¹⁰ For example, in contrast to the 57 individuals around the table in Pittsburgh, Toronto has invited only the 21 leaders of the members (including two from the EU), the five invited leaders of Spain, the Netherlands, Malawi, Ethiopia and Vietnam, and, on call as experts, the heads of seven multilateral

the G20's first chair that takes up this responsibility without the first-hand experience and the embedded culture of this way that the G8 has long worked, to good effect.

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organizations, led by the IMF, World Bank and UN. There is, however, no plan to extend the G8's Accountability Working Group or report on development to embrace G20 issues or be replicated there.

Appendix A: Leader Continuity

G20	# of changes	Summit 1 (Nov 2008)	Summit 2 (Apr 2009)	Summit 3 (Sep 2009)	Summit 4 (Jun 2010)	Summit 5 (Nov 2010)	Summit 6 (2011)
United States	1	Bush	Obama	Obama	Obama	Obama	Obama ^a
Britain	1	Brown	Brown	Brown	Cameron	Cameron	Cameron ^b
Canada	0	Harper	Harper	Harper	Harper	Harper	Harper ^c
Korea	0	Lee	Lee	Lee	Lee	Lee	Lee ^d
France	0	Sarkozy	Sarkozy	Sarkozy	Sarkozy	Sarkozy	Sarkozy
Argentina	0	Kirchner	Kirchner	Kirchner	Kirchner	Kirchner	Kirchner ^e
Australia	0	Rudd	Rudd	Rudd	Rudd	Rudd	Unknown
Brazil	0	da Silva	da Silva	da Silva	da Silva	Unknown	Unknown
China	0	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu
Germany	0	Merkel	Merkel	Merkel	Merkel	Merkel	Merkel
India	0	Singh	Singh	Singh	Singh	Singh	Singh
Indonesia	0	Yudhoyono	Yudhoyono	Yudhoyono	Yudhoyono	Yudhoyono	Yudhoyono
Italy	0	Berlusconi	Berlusconi	Berlusconi	Berlusconi	Berlusconi	Berlusconi ^f
Japan	1	Aso	Aso	Hatoyama	Hatoyama	Hatoyama	Hatoyama
Mexico	0	Calderón	Calderón	Calderón	Calderón	Calderón	Calderón
Russia	0	Medvedev	Medvedev	Medvedev	Medvedev	Medvedev	Medvedev
Saudi Arabia	0	Abdullah	Abdullah	Abdullah	Abdullah	Abdullah	Abdullah
South Africa	1	Motlanthe	Motlanthe	Zuma	Zuma	Zuma	Zuma
Turkey	0	Erdoğan	Erdoğan	Erdoğan	Erdoğan	Erdoğan	Erdoğan ^g
<i>Total:</i>	<i>4</i>						
G8	# of changes	Summit 1 (Nov 1975)	Summit 2 (Jun 1976)	Summit 3 (May 1977)	Summit 4 (Jul 1978)	Summit 5 (Jun 1979)	Summit 6 (Jun 1980)
France	0	d'Estaing	d'Estaing	d'Estaing	d'Estaing	d'Estaing	d'Estaing
United States	2	Ford	Ford	Carter	Carter	Carter	Carter
Britain	2	Wilson	Callaghan	Callaghan	Callaghan	Thatcher	Thatcher
Germany	0	Schmidt	Schmidt	Schmidt	Schmidt	Schmidt	Schmidt
Japan	2	Miki	Miki	Fukuda	Fukuda	Ohira	Ministers ^h
Italy	2	Moro	Moro	Andreotti	Andreotti	Andreotti	Cossiga
Canada	2	N/A	Trudeau	Trudeau	Trudeau	Clark	Trudeau
European Union	0	N/A	N/A	Jenkins	Jenkins	Jenkins	Jenkins
<i>Total:</i>	<i>10</i>						

Notes:

- a. Assumes Barack Obama completes his term as president.
- b. Assumes the coalition holds and no election is called.
- c. Assumes no Canadian election is called before 2012.
- d. Assumes Lee Myung-Bak completes his term as president.
- e. Assumes the 2011 Argentinian elections are not scheduled before the G20 summit.
- f. Assumes no change in government. Next election date is variable.
- g. Next election date is variable.
- h. Masayoshi Ohira died a few days before the G7 Venice Summit. Japan was represented by Saburo Okita, minister of foreign affairs, Noboru Takeshita, minister of finance, and Kiyooki Kikuchi, the prime minister's personal representative (sherpa).