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Explaining G20 Summit Success

Professor John Kirton
Founder and Co-Director, G20 Research Group,
Munk School of Global Affairs at Trinity College, University of Toronto
Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China
Author, G20 Governance for a Globalized World
Brisbane, December 17, 2013
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Paper prepared for a presentation to the Queensland Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, Australia, December 17, 2013. This paper draws on and extends the analysis in John Kirton (2013), "Growing G20 Governance for a Globalized World," Global Review, September (in Chinese, forthcoming in English).

Introduction

The Significance of G20 Governance

On December 15-16, 1999, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the world's 19 systemically significant countries and the European Union assembled in Berlin, Germany, for the initial meeting of the Group of 20 (G20) {Kirton, 2013 #488}. Their new group was initiated by two finance ministers, Paul Martin of Canada and Lawrence Summers of the United States, in response to the Asian-turned-global financial crisis that had erupted in Thailand in June 1997, spread to Indonesia and Korea by the end of 1997, and engulfed Russia, Brazil and the United States with the collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management by the autumn of 1998. With the clear failure of the old G7 and G8 and older International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide financial stability for a new world of globalizing finance, a new, broader permanent group of established and emerging systemically significant states was needed to do the job.

Almost ten years later, on November 14-15, 2008, the same systemically significant countries and the EU assembled in Washington DC for the first "G20 Leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy." This time the meeting was initiated by France's Nicholas Sarkozy and America's George Bush, with the energetic assistance of Britain's Gordon Brown and Australia's Kevin Rudd. They were responding to an American-turned-global financial crisis far more contagious and destructive than that in 1997 for a now globalized world. A new, summit-level centre of global economic governance was now clearly needed to provide financial stability through financial regulation, economic growth, trade liberalization and development.

Competing Assessments of G20 Governance

Now, after eight summits in five years and with the ninth coming to Brisbane within the year, it is important to ask how well and why G20 summits have worked. Different answers arise from five schools of thought.

The first sees the G20 as redundant, because it is too large, diverse and informal, or has revived the older Bretton Woods bodies, United Nations and G8 (Kirton 2013a; Strauss-Kahn 2013; Gilman undated). The second rejects the G20's claim primacy, given the superior power of the established IMF and old G7, and the G20's lack of legitimacy and benefits for G8 states (Kirton 2013a, 6–8). The third school sees the G20 usefully reinforcing the G8 and similar groups, by providing financial stability, making globalization work for all, containing preventing global economic crises and becoming a broader steering committee for the world (Kirton 2013a, 8–10; Cooper 2013; Cooper and Thakur 2013; Vogt 2010). The fourth school sees the G20's effective replacement of the G7/8, IMF and a UN with the Security Council is immobilized by the Permanent Five powers of old (Kirton 2013a, 1–12). The fifth school sees decline after the G20's summit's initial success, now that the great financial crisis that created it has gone (Angeloni 2011; Darling 2011; Pickford 2013; Callick 2013, Tower 2013; Kawai 2013).

The Argument of Systemic Hub Governance

Now that the first full-length books on the G20 have arrived, it is possible to test and go beyond these various claims (Postel-Vinay 2011; Kirton 2013a; Cooper 2013; Hajnal 2013; Penttilä 2009). My own book G20 Governance for a Globalized World develops a model of what I call "systemic hub governance" for this task (Kirton 2013a). It argues that the G20's performance has grown across a widening, more demanding, more domestically intrusive agenda and across all the governance functions that such bodies have. This growing performance is due to proliferating shocks that exposed the new, equalizing vulnerabilities of all countries, the failure of older international institutions to cope, the rising capabilities and increasing political openness of the non-G7 members, the domestic political cohesion that participants brought, and their rational attachment to a compact G20 club at the hub of a global governance network in the world.

More specifically, since 1999 the G20 has grown quickly and flexibly to govern a broadening agenda, including core security subjects such as terrorist finance, corruption, good governance and chemical weapons in Syria now. Especially after G20 summitry arrived in 2008, the G20 has moved from domestic political management, deliberation and direction setting into decision making, delivery and the development of global governance within and beyond the G20 (see Appendix A). It successfully responded to the global financial crisis in 2008–09, then prevented an escalating Euro-crisis from going global, and now become a global steering committee advancing financial reform, economic growth, trade, development, environmental protection and security of an energy, food, political and military sort. Yet with inequality and healthcare costs rising within most G20 countries, it still has much to do to make globalization work for all.

The G20's rising performance has been driven first by steadily escalating shocks in finance, economics, terrorism, energy, the environment, food and war, whose sources have shifted from emerging Asia to an established but newly vulnerable United States, Europe and the Middle East. In the face of such shocks that exposed and equalized the vulnerability of the major powers, the formal multilateral organizations that America and its Atlantic allies had constructed in the 1940s and supplemented with more informal ones since could not cope. Unlike its many international institutional competitors, the G20 alone contained as full, equal members the countries that increasingly possessed the collectively predominant and internally equal capabilities required to respond. Its members also increasingly, if unevenly, became more open, democratic polities, driven by economic growth within, globalization without and G8 guidance and G20 socialization in between. The G20 further benefited from the domestic political control, capital, continuity and competence of its participants. It increasingly became a club that its members valued, at the hub of an expanding network of global summit governance for a globalized world.

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G20 Summit Governance

The Creation

The G20 summit emerged when the Atlantic-turned-global financial crisis struck in full force, with the collapse of investment banker Lehman Brothers in New York City on September 15, 2008 (Kirton 2013a, 227–68). At the UN General Assembly eight days later, French president Nicolas Sarkozy suggested a special summit of the G8 to respond, with a few countries such as China, India and Brazil added on. But very quickly, amidst cascading financial collapse and intense high-level diplomacy, the G20 won — because it already existed as a proven performer and because the departing Bush administration knew that it had worked for them, including in their traumatic, terrorist shocked autumn of 2001 (see Appendix B).

Washington, November 14–15, 2008

The first G20 summit in Washington on November 14-15, 2008, was a strong success (Kirton 2013a, 227–68; Pickford 2013). It was the first gathering of so many top world leaders to discuss economics and finance. They focused on ensuring financial stability, by addressing the core cause and the cure of the current crises — domestic financial regulation. They easily agreed on key principles, notably that regulation must be strengthened and internationally harmonized and supervised. To do so they intruded deeply into the sovereignty of member states and the private sector, to deal with credit default swaps, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, credit ratings agencies, bankers' pay and accounting standards. They renounced protectionism, dealt with tax havens and created a process for financial reform with specific deadlines and deliverables. Because they knew that they could not save the global economy in one gathering of less than 24 hours, they called for a second summit a mere four and a half months hence.

London, April 1–2, 2009

At their second summit in London on April 1–2, 2009, leaders produced a very strong success (Kirton 2013a, 269–96; Darling 2011; Bradford 2013). The global economy was contracting faster than during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Spurred by speedily spreading financial shocks and their destructive economic consequences, British prime minister Gordon Brown, a determined G20 veteran, and a newly elected U.S. president Barack Obama on his first major trip abroad, relied on frank freewheeling decisions and decisions directly among the leaders themselves. They encouraged their central banks to provide massive monetary policy stimulus, agreed on large-scale, simultaneous, discretionary fiscal stimulus by all and produced $1.1 trillion in new financing for hard-hit emerging and developing countries, through $250 billion special drawing rights for the IMF, $500 billion for the New Arrangements to Borrow, $250 billion in trade finance and $100 billion for the World Bank. They created the Financial Stability Board (FSB) with all G20 members inside, to regulate all systemically important financial institutions, and agreed to reform IMF quotas and voting rights. They more strongly renounced trade protectionism and endorsed action against tax havens. They broadened their agenda to embrace climate change, at the urging of Brown's African partners in the Commonwealth.

Pittsburgh, September 24–25, 2009

Less than six months later, on September 24–25, 2009, G20 leaders at their third summit in Pittsburgh produced a strong success (Kirton 2013a, 297–320; Pickford 2013). With the global financial crisis contained, they shifted from defence to offence. They declared that the G20 would be the permanent, premier forum for their international economic cooperation. They created the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) to make it work. They agreed to transfer at least 5% of the quota at the IMF from the established powers to the emerging ones and to create a flexible credit line there to strengthen its financial safety net. They agreed on the need for new rules on banking capital, implementation of FSB standards and the completion of OTC derivative reforms. They expansively agreed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies in the medium term, in a commitment that would bring major gains in climate change control, fiscal consolidation, maternal and child health, and anti-corruption. Obama as host used the summit to show Iran that more sanctions would come if its nuclear weapons program remained.

Toronto, June 26–27, 2010

The fourth summit, held nine months later in Toronto on June 26–27, 2010, was also a strong success (Kirton 2013a, 321–72). It moved from crisis response to crisis prevention by containing the new financial shock that erupted from Greece. It shifted from the easy task of fiscal stimulus to the more difficult one of fiscal consolidation. America reluctantly adjusted so that all advanced country members other than Japan agreed to cut their fiscal deficits in half as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2013 and stop the growth in their accumulated debt as a percentage of GDP by 2016. Leaders renounced trade protectionism for the next three years. They agreed to a capital increase of $350 billion for the multilateral development banks, to cancel Haiti's debts, to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by their due date of 2015, and to establish new financial safety nets for emerging and developing countries. Institutionally, Toronto transferred G20 hosting beyond the Anglo-American imperial powers of old, embraced emerging members' priorities on the agenda, added a labour and employment ministerial meeting in April 2010, created the Development Working Group, to pioneer a new approach to development, brought civil society in with the birth of the Business 20 (B20), the Young Entrepreneurs Summit and a post-summit meeting of G20 parliamentarians, and defined the G20's relationship with the G8 summit taking place in nearby Muskoka immediately before.

Seoul, November 11–12, 2010

The fifth G20 summit in Seoul, Korea on November 11–12, 2010, was a substantial success, in a system-reforming way (Kirton 2013a, 383–84; Bayne and Woolcock 2011). Defensively, leaders delayed the escalation of the Euro-crisis now infecting Ireland and managed disagreements over current account imbalances and so-called "currency wars." Offensively, they finally agreed on the second stage of reforming IMF quota shares and on a larger, more automatic redistribution to take place in a few years They also agreed on the long awaited Basel 3 regime of strong capital and liquidity ratios for financial institutions. To help make globalization work for all, at the host's initiative they created the Seoul Development Consensus, embedded in 25 commitments on development and employment and established the precautionary credit line as another preventive financial safety net. At their first summit in Asia and their first hosted by an emerging country, they began moving from working as a rationally calculating toward a personally cherished club.

Cannes, November 3–4, 2011

The sixth G20 summit, held a full year later in Cannes, France on November 3–4, 2011, was a substantial success, in a crisis response and prevention way (Kirton 2013a, 384–85). Defensively, it contained the latest stage of the Euro-crisis by helping Greece decide to stay in the Eurozone, Italy to accept stronger international financial supervision and Italy's leader Silvio Berlusconi to depart. Offensively, G20 leaders moved to augment IMF resources, strengthen the resources, role and status of the FSB, and appoint as the highly respected Mark Carney as its new chair. They recommitted to medium-term fiscal consolidation, sought trade assistance for the poorest countries, and wisely rejected a proposed global financial transaction tax and G20 secretariat. They also started work on calming volatile commodity markets for food and fuel.

Los Cabos, June 18–19, 2012

The seventh summit, at Los Cabos, Mexico, on June 18-19, 2012, was a strong success, transitioning from a crisis prevention to a global steering committee role (Kirton 2013a, 385–386, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Kirton, Kulik and Bracht 2013; Cooper 2012). Defensively on the Euro-crisis, as debt-ridden Spain and even France joined Greece and Italy on investors critical list, G20 leaders helped induce the European members to take the decisive steps to create the necessary regional institutions and regimes, with the latter promising to take "all necessary policy measures to safeguard the integrity and stability of the area" (G20 2012). Preventively, virtually all G20 members contributed to a new IMF firewall fund, should the Europeans or others need financial help. The summit set a credible strategy that emphasized stimulus now and fiscal consolidation soon, and to this end mandated more discretionary and automatic fiscal stimulus, monetary policy and a broad array of structural reforms. It strengthened employment and social protection, trade and investment, the international financial architecture, financial regulation and inclusion, food security and commodity price volatility, development, green growth, corruption and G20 governance, and addressed gender issues for the first time. Institutionally, Mexico's year created the Los Cabos Accountability Assessment Framework, added new G20 ministerial meetings for foreign affairs, trade and tourism, established a civil society Think 20, and institutionalized the chairing rotation between an advanced G8 member and an emerging non-G8 one and among geographic regions.

St. Petersburg, September 5-6, 2013

The eighth G8 Summit, in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 5-6, was a very strong success, acting as a global steering committee on bigger, broader, burning concerns. The summit spontaneously and flexibly took the critical step to pave the way to disarm weapons of mass destruction in Syria, as all 20 leaders now agreed that chemical weapons had been used on August 21 and a fundamental international norm had thus been breached, and as Barack Obama and Russia's Vladimir Putin were inspired to meet bilaterally to agree on the historic disarmament agreement that was quickly reached. The summit moved toward coherent growth strategies backed by credible medium-term fiscal consolidation and newly emphasized jobs, small and medium-sized enterprises, young entrepreneurs and business start-ups. It also forwarded key financial regulatory reforms, extended its anti-protectionist pledge to 2016, spurred a trade facilitation deal at the World Trade Organization  meeting in December, started innovative work on financing for investment, and seriously addressed economic inclusiveness and inequality for the first time. On tax fairness it moved to ensure rich individuals and firms paid the taxes they owed in a globalized world, and that automatic information exchange, adherence to a multilateral convention and new rules on multinationals' transfer pricing would soon arrive. Institutionally it added a joint meeting for finance and employment ministers and integrated the B20, L20, Y20 and C20 as never before.

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Dimensions of G20 Summit Performance, 2008–13

A careful count of the G20's performance across seven basic dimensions of global governance confirms this rising trend (Kirton 2013a, 439–41) (see Appendix A).

Domestic Political Management through Communication

In its domestic political management, the initial measure of leaders' attendance shows a decline, as the perfect attendance at the first three summits was lost at Toronto when the leaders of Australia and Brazil stayed home. However, on the second dimension of compliments conferred on individual countries in the concluding communiqué, there was a strong rise when Toronto awarded 7, Seoul 3, Cannes 11, Los Cabos 6 and St. Petersburg 2.

Deliberation through Conversation and Conclusions

In its deliberation, the public component of the leaders' collective communiqué conclusions has seen a steady rise, from Washington's 3,567 words, to the sharp spike to St. Petersburg's 28,766 in the 11 documents issues there. The private component also surged at St. Petersburg, with the spontaneous, extended, first night dinner discussion on Syria where all leaders spoke.

Direction Setting through Consensus

In its principled and normative direction-setting, as measured by affirmations of democratic and human rights principles, there has also been a rise. There was a spike to 29 affirmations at Pittsburgh, and an all-time peak of 34 at Los Cabos.

Decision Making through Commitments

In its decision making through precise, obligatory, future-oriented commitments, the rise again appears. Starting at Seoul there were higher totals at every summit, with a peak of 282 at Cannes, and then a sharp spike to 449 at St. Petersburg. These commitments covered a broadening agenda, but with a continuing emphasis on the initial economic and finance core.

Delivery through Compliance

In its delivery of these decisions there is a three-phase cadence. With the 107 commitments assessed for compliance thus far. Compliance was high for Washington at 77% (or +0.53 on the scientific scale) and London at 71%, then dropped to 64% for both Pittsburgh and Toronto, but rose to 75% for Seoul, 77% for Cannes and 78% for Los Cabos.

Development of Global Governance through Institutional Construction

In its development of global governance, the rise also appears. On the first component of institutional construction inside the G20, communiqué references steadily grew to a peak of 114 in St. Petersburg. References to institutions outside the G20 similarly rose, starting with the 31 references at Seoul.

Distinctive Mission Done through Correction and Cures

In doing its distinctive mission, G20 summit performance has risen too. Its first mission of providing financial stability was done through its effective global financial crisis response in 2008–09 and crisis prevention since 2010. Its second mission of making globalization work for the benefit of all is slowly been done to a still limited level. Since Pittsburgh it has given increasing attention to employment. In development it created the Development Working Group at Toronto, adopted the Seoul Development Consensus at Seoul and added the post-2015 MDGs for St. Petersburg in 2013. On inclusion and the increasing economic inequality in most G20 members and elsewhere, its start at St. Petersburg has left much to do (Civil 20 Task Force on Inequality 2013).

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Causes of G20 Performance: the Systemic Hub Model

The causes of the G20's growing performance are well captured by the model of systemic hub governance (Kirton 2013a, 444–70).

Shock-Activated Vulnerability

The key cause of the G20's successful performance is shock-activated vulnerability. This starts with a sequence of shocks on the same subjects as the G20 takes up, starting with a second more serious shock and subsequent shocks even if of a smaller scale. This shock sequence shows the cybernetically learning leaders of even the most powerful G20 countries how vulnerable their states and societies are to old state-to-state and to new non-state, even non-human shocks that cause destruction and death within their sovereign states, arising in a densely interconnected, complex, uncertain, globalized world, defined by the demise and death of distance and delay. This awareness activates them to govern more directly through new informal institutions of their own.

Thus Asian-turned-global financial crisis from 1997 to 2001 was central to the G20's creation in 1999 and its early success. The much larger, faster, bigger American-turned-global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009 was similarly essential for its rapid upgrade to the leaders' level in 2008, following the failure of the campaign to do so in the financial crisis-free years from 2004 to 2005. The continuing succession of escalating Euro-crises, starting in early 2010 in Greece, then Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus by March 2013, fuelled the global crisis prevention success from 2010 to 2013, for the G20 was now sensitive to such similar if smaller shocks and the global damage their rapid contagion and escalation could produce in an interconnected world. Moreover, the sources of these financial shocks changed, from an emerging Asia to a once hegemonic but now highly vulnerable America and Europe by 2007.

A second set of shocks came in security, starting with terrorism in 2001 and continuing with chemical weapons in 2013. The September 11, 2001, attack on America propelled the success of the G20 finance ministerial in Ottawa that November, the G20's subsequent work on terrorist finance and the eventual decision of the Bush administration to choose the G20 for a summit in 2008. The terrorist attack on London on July 7, 2005, helped all leaders save one to agree to hold a G20 summit by the end of Paul Martin's campaign in 2004–05. The escalating use of chemical weapons in Syria, culminating in the massive deadly attack on August 18, 2013, led the G20 leaders to act surprisingly, spontaneously and successfully on this new but similar subject at St. Petersburg on September 5-6. Small shocks spurring G20 success came from spiking food and energy prices, oil rig spills, natural disasters as in Haiti and climate change.

Multilateral Organizational Failure

The second cause important is the failure of the old formal multilateral organizations from the 1940s and the more informal, plurilateral institutions since 1975 to respond adequately to such shocks. This failure is first in their competence in performing their legally embedded responsibilities such as economic growth, second in collaborating with other multilateral organizations to address interconnected issues such as terrorist finance, and third in creating new bodies to deal with new issues such as terrorism and domestic financial regulation.

The failure of the European-dominated IMF to preserve financial stability amidst the Asian-turned-global financial crisis, especially in the eyes of rising Asian powers, spurred the creation of the G20 and its ascendance over the Financial Stability Forum and IMF's International Financial and Monetary Committee (IMFC), both created at the same time. The September 2001 terrorist shock on America dramatically showed that only the fledgling G20 forum could function, and that the IMFC could work only because the G20 did. The inadequacies of the IMF and G8 Plus Five led George Bush to select the G20 over his initial G7-centric instincts to respond at the summit level to great financial shock in the autumn of 2008. Only with the advent of G20 summitry did the IMF abandon its strategy, there since the start in 1999, of eliminating its G20 rival, in order to make itself indispensable to the G20's work. The IMF and the World Bank thus gave the G20 a critical, formal "G192" supporter, to go along with the G20's informal G7 ally. The G20 created the Financial Stability Board in its image to provide the missing international organization to supply the need for stronger domestic financial regulations in the wake of the 2008 American-turned-global financial shock. And the failure of the regional EU to control its escalating regional crisis from 2010 to 2013 led the G20 increasingly to step in and succeed.

Predominant Equalizing Capability

The third cause — globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities and connectivity compared to the available PSI alternatives — helps explain why these particular 20 members came to create and succeed in a group that continued from 1999 to 2010 with an unchanged membership, unlike the recurrently expanding G7/8, IMF and Financial Stability Forum. These 20 members gave the G20 the critical collective predominance and increasingly internal equality in the relative capabilities and of its systemically significant members that its international institutional alternatives lacked. Summers and Martin's initial consideration of which countries should be in or out of their new group, the continuing inclusion of South Africa and Argentina, and the closing of the list at 19 countries shows that the selection criterion was both relative capability and global connectivity, as the new category of "systemic significance" captured very well. It was a highly appropriate criterion for a globalized world defined by the death of distance and delay. It was also a highly prescient criterion and selection, because the major consumers of financial security from 1997 to 2002 — Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey — rationally and responsibly became providers of financial security from 2008 to 2013, while the Europeans moved the other way. The Asian powers of China, Japan and India, now joined as equals in the top-tier group, were the continuing great stabilizers, serving as producers of global financial security since the 1997 start.

Common Characteristics

The fourth cause of the G20's growing performance is its members convergence on their desire for recognition as satisfied top-tier powers and on the domestic principles and practices of economic, social and political openness needed to sustained their position and to be accepted as legitimate members of this top tier (Plattner 2011). It helps explain why not all systemically significant candidates made it in as full members at the start. At the beginning Indonesia but not Nigeria passed the additional test of behaving as a recognizably democratizing polity. By the time Nigeria did, the G20 was frozen in its now familiar membership. Few agreed that a non-democratic Egypt should be added as a substitute. The two non-democratic members of Saudi Arabia and China shared with their G20 colleagues the core conviction about the centrality of political stability, based on underlying social stability, economic growth and financial stability, and slowly if slightly became more economically, socially and politically open from 1998 through to 2013. G7 leaders valued this quality to lock in the post-1975 democratic revolution in Asia, the Americas, Russia and Turkey in 1997–2001, and then in Europe itself from 2008 to 2013.

Domestic Political Cohesion

The fifth cause, which helps explain the G20's great leaps forward in 2001 and 2008–13, is its members' domestic political cohesion, specifically its participants' political capital, control, continuity, financial-economic competence, personal commitment to the G20 forum and popular support for governing through the G20. They were led by Paul Martin, who was a CEO before entering politics and then Canada's finance minister from 1993 to 2002 and leader in 2003–06. Martin was accompanied by Larry Summers as the U.S. treasury secretary in 1999–2001 and economic advisor to Barack Obama in 2009–10. They were aided by Gordon Brown, who was Britain's chancellor of the exchequer from 1997 to 2007 and leader from 2007 to 2010, George Bush as U.S. president from 2001 to 2008, Manmohan Singh, who had served as India's finance minister three times and had been the prime minister since 2004, and Hu Jintao, president of China from 2003 through 2012.

The Club at the Hub

Above all, under the initial leadership of its founding visionary, Paul Martin, from 1997 to 2001 and again from 2003 to 2005, the G20 became a club with the unchanging membership and constricted participation necessary to reduce transaction costs, foster learning and promote socialization among the established and emerging country members, and confer on them the status, identification and new conceptions of systemic interests that came with membership in a new top-tier club. This was reinforced by the increasing intensity of interaction among leaders, ministers, officials and non-governmental communities from business, labour, young entrepreneurs, youth and think tanks after the autumn of 2008. The G20 also became the hub of a growing global network in which combinations of its established and emerging country members connected in overlapping combinations in the many other relevant plurilateral institutions of global relevance and reach that joined the G20 at the centre with the rest of the world all around.

These dynamics fostered the global sensitivity and collegiality that allowed members search for common solutions to new problems, to align in flexible, issue-specific combinations of advanced and emerging members, and to lead, adjust and govern for their own and the world's greater public good. In doing so they bonded together as individuals, fully but temporarily in 2001 and then slowly since 2008, moving the G20 toward becoming an interpersonal club participants cared about as a core element of their personal sense of interest and even identity in some respects.

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Conclusion

Key Findings

Growing G20 governance, from its initial crisis-catalyzed creation in 1999 to its global centrality by 2013, came through five distinct phases. In its first phase of generation from 1999 to 2001, the G20 established itself as an effective group of operational equals, led largely by Canada, the United States and other G7 members, governing to produce financial stability, globalization that worked for all and the suppression of terrorist finance. In its second phase of equalizing the influence from 2002 to 2007, the G20 became a more genuine group of equals in hosting and chairing, broadening its agenda to embrace emerging members' priorities, and seeing initiatives from emerging members that met with success. In its third phase of creating the summit crisis response group from 2008 to 2009, the G20 became a successful leader-level, central, global governance group, as its relatively unscathed, rapidly rising emerging country members successfully rushed to the assistance of the now afflicted, advanced American-Atlantic-European ones. In its fourth phase of developing as a global crisis prevention group from 2010 to 2013, G20 hosting passed to the emerging members; the agenda expanded on their key issues and on political-security issues; key decisions were made on fiscal consolidation, bank capital and IMF reform; and the escalating Euro-crisis was contained and controlled in its regional home. And its fifth phase assuming dominance in 2013, the G20 became a global steering committee, taking up the critical security issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and helping pave the way for their elimination in a short time. As the substantive breath, domestic intrusiveness and level of difficulty of its challenges grew, as its achievements accumulated, and as its interaction intensified, the G20 slowly became more of a personal club of participants, not just a convenient forum for advancing domestic preferences but as a group that they valued for taking care of themselves, their citizens and the global community as a whole.

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Appendix A: G20 Summit Performance

Compiled by Julia Kulik, November 21, 2013.

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Appendix B: G20 Finance Performance

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