



PRE-EMPTIVE PEACE  
Collective Security & Rogue States in the 21st Century



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## **ABSTRACT**

What is the most effective arrangement for global collective security to prevent interstate conflict with rogue states that might pose a nuclear threat? The author seeks to answer this question by analysing the collective security capabilities of a formal organisation, the United Nations Security Council, and an informal organisation, the G8 and its Foreign Affairs Ministers' Forum. Both are important for global security and are fairly effective in facing up to rogue states for containing their aggressiveness. However the threat they pose must nonetheless be removed, and in order to do this a high-level informal forum of representatives of the world's major economic powers and rogue states could help solve these conflicts. This framework for discussions and cooperation between all parties could ease the United Nations Security Council's work in the disarmament of the same rogue states.

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*Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression.*

*A new partnership of nations has begun, and we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: A new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.*

*A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavour, and today that new world is struggling to be born.*

- UNITED STATES PRESIDENT GEORGE H. W. BUSH'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 11, 1990

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Foreword

At the beginning of the 1990s, many assumed that the “new world order” that emerged after the end of the Cold War would pave the way for a world of peace, of greater freedom and economic prosperity. Political economist Francis Fukuyama (1989) suggested that we were perhaps witnessing the end of history itself. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ sole challenger, it was believed that institutions like the United Nations (UN) and its Security Council (UNSC) would finally be allowed to truly fulfil the collective security objectives they had been assigned. That, in turn, could result in a fundamental redefinition of peace and conflict.

While in Europe, the threat of major interstate warfare subsided after the end of the Yugoslav War at the latest, there are countries of so far lesser strategic importance that have challenged this “new world order” and continue to do so.

Year after year, countries that many in the international community came to label as “rogue states” have maintained a confrontational stance and elude the post-historical mantra advocated by Fukuyama. From suppression of democracy, active militarisation, sponsoring of terrorism to the development of weapons of mass destruction, these regimes’ behaviour and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric make them one of the biggest threats to global security.

The two most prominent rogue states today are Iran and North Korea. The first is suspected of developing nuclear weapons, and the second is openly claiming their possession and has carried out two nuclear weapon tests in 2006 and 2009.

The nuclear threat posed by these two rogue states has not yet led to military action against them, but tensions remain high and trust between them and the international community is practically non-existent. The nuclear threat posed by rogue states has led to great challenges in the world’s collective security systems, as the actors waltz between stronger and less

pronounced sanctions, figuratively taking a few steps forward and then hiding behind barricades.

Whether or not war against a nuclear rogue state is a viable option for the international community, the confrontational rhetoric of both the Iranian and North Korean leadership has been a cause for serious concern. How can a collective security arrangement effectively remove the nuclear threat that Iran and North Korea pose?

Two events that occurred in 2009 provide inspiration to answer this question. Trying to renew ties with Russia and aiming to build a coalition to corner Iran, United States President Barack Obama announced the scrapping of the ballistic missile defence project in Eastern Europe in September 2009; an endeavour, that Russian President Dimitrij Medvedev and his predecessor Vladimir Putin considered to be a menace to their nation, although the United States claimed that the system's goal would be to potentially intercept a missile coming from the Middle East.

Following this trust-building gesture, President Medvedev announced shortly afterwards that Russia would further cooperate with the United States against an increasingly aggressive Iran. This action by Medvedev was a clear break from the position that had been adopted in recent years by the Kremlin, in which Iran would be privy to at least some Russian support. (Brower and Pronina, 2009)

Further east, former US President Bill Clinton's visit to North Korea in August 2009 had been surprisingly successful. While Clinton's primary goal was to secure the release of two imprisoned American reporters, it was an opportunity for North Korea to emerge for a moment out of the isolation it has found itself in for a long time. As unusual as the image of Kim Jong-Il posing with Bill Clinton may be, they might be indicating a new dynamic that international relations could consider, because after this meeting, the North Korean leader pledged the return of his country to the multiparty disarmament talks. (Reuters, 2009)

## 1.2 Research Question & Hypothesis

*What is the most effective arrangement for global collective security to prevent interstate conflict with rogue states that might pose a nuclear threat?*

This paper will seek to answer this question by analysing the collective security capabilities of two institutions: First, a formal organisation, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and second, an informal organisation, namely the G8 and its Foreign Affairs Ministers' Forum. The analysis will be conducted through the scope of institutional and sociological liberalism.

Since the UNSC has so far been able to contain the threat of nuclear rogue states but has not been able to end it, this paper hypothesises that a peripheral, high-level, informal institution including both the world's leading powers and the rogue states would form a collective security arrangement that could help ending the nuclear threat from rogue states.

## 1.3 Definitions

### 1.3.1 Collective Security

The Conflict Research Consortium at the University of Colorado defines collective security as *“one type of coalition building strategy in which a group of nations agree not to attack each other and to defend each other against an attack from one of the others, if such an attack is made.”* (Conflict Research Consortium, n.d.)

The views on the range of tasks a collective security institution should be responsible for differ widely. In his 2005 report *In Larger Freedom*, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan uses a rather broad definition which includes *“civil violence, organised crime [...], deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation.”* (Annan, 2005: 24)

While all these issues are important, this paper will solely focus on a state versus state definition of collective security. This perspective can also be called “*pure collective security.*” (Frederking, 2007: 23)

Inis Claude defines the term pure collective security by explaining that is an “*international system in which the danger of aggressive warfare by any state is to be met by the avowed determination of virtually all other states to exert pressure of every necessary variety – moral, diplomatic, economic, and military to frustrate attack upon any state.*” (Claude, 1962: 110)

### **1.3.2 Rogue State**

The idea of a rogue state implies the presence of an important state-driven internal repression, which is sometimes coupled with external aggressive behaviour in the international order. (Rotberg, 2007: 6)

Just like in the case of collective security, this paper will not be discussing the internal matters of rogue states which encompass the way states treat their own peoples, for instance the human rights dimension. (Preble, 2005: 26) Internally, rogue states according to Rotberg (2007) include Syria, Belarus and Burma.

This paper will only look at rogue states manifesting an externally “aggressive” behaviour. In that light, former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright defines the most important features of what an aggressive rogue state tends to do: “*They have to possess or be working to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sponsor or give support to terrorists, or traffic in fissile material, WMD components, long-range or short-range delivery systems, small arms, or narcotics*”, which can sometimes lead to regional destabilisation. (Rotberg, 2007: 6)

Following this definition, Iran fits this category. The country’s aggressive rhetoric directed primarily at Israel, but also at the United States and the West in general, paired with a possible nuclear threat, the traffic of weapons to militants in Iraq and the financing of terrorist



movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah are amongst the grounds for the labelling it as a rogue state.

North Korea also fits the definition, as it does not shy away from threatening its southern neighbour as well as continuously menacing Japan and the United States with the possibility of war. Having performed two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, it is widely seen in the international community as a threat to both regional stability and global security.

### **1.3.3 Interstate Conflict**

The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme defines interstate conflict as “*a conflict between two or more governments.*” It further specifies that the entities that have initiated the conflict must on both sides be governmental parties. (Uppsala Universitet, n.d.)

### **1.3.4 Effectiveness**

In the context of this paper, effectiveness will encompass two components:

First, a temporal component, as it is preferable that disputes with rogue states, which exacerbate international tensions, be resolved promptly instead of being prolonged over longer periods of time.

Second, it implies the capacity to ensure a mutually agreed settlement over the nuclear matter, and a non-revival of the dispute in question and it will also imply the end of the rogue state’s external aggression and belligerent behaviour towards other states.

## **1.4 Past Research and Innovation**

### **1.4.1 Learning from Versailles**

Important lessons on collective security arrangements towards a potentially belligerent state can be found in the analysis of the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, in the aftermath of the First World War.

As the Austro-Hungarian and German empires found themselves dismantled, nationalist sentiments amongst its diverse peoples emerging during the second half of the nineteenth-century – Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles amongst others – formerly integrated into those gigantic entities broke free. This created a chaotic situation in which the main Allied powers in charge of the Paris negotiations – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – were overwhelmed with demands from nationalist leaders whose border proposals were overlapping and contradicting each other.

The constant demands for the establishment of new states were responsible for significant delays in the pre-negotiation process. Originally set to be rather short, this preliminary phase was prolonged due to the US, the UK and France trying to balance each other's aspirations by supporting or defying different emerging countries' existence. Because of this dynamic, the preliminary negotiations became de facto negotiations. (MacMillan, 2001: xxviii)

Fearing a third confrontation with Germany within 50 years, France was very vocal in imposing tough sanctions on the new German state. The French saw the physical containment of its rival as the most viable option. It demanded disproportionately high monetary reparations, the foreign acquisition of coal resources in western Germany, the annexation of Elsaß-Lothringen/Alsace-Lorraine resulting in the subsequent displacement of over 200,000 Germans from the region and the militarisation of its borders on the German side of the Rhine. (MacMillan, 2001: 194-203)

One of the most interesting facts about this process is that Germany was to the largest extent excluded from the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles. One could even say that its role was reduced to merely sign the dotted line to put the document into force. The country was forced to accept conditions that were extremely harsh on its people and left its economy in ruin. The German delegation left Versailles with a bitter sentiment, which was partly responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War roughly two decades later. (MacMillan, 2001: 477)

Another lesson that can be learned from the aftermath of the Great War is that in order for international institutions to work, the world's big powers must be included. For example, the US Congress refused their country's membership in the League of Nations. The question whether US membership in the League would have significantly altered the unfolding of the events leading up to the Second World War is certainly an interesting one to ponder.

#### **1.4.2 Options in Dealing with Rogue States**

When discussing concrete solutions concerning rogue states, most literature is focused on what criteria a state must possess to be generally considered a rogue state, and authors take interest in the behaviour of its regimes both internally and externally as well as the global response to their presence and actions. (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003)

Some former government officials have come up with proposals for dealing with rogue states. In the case of Iran, for instance, a former member of the US National Security Council advocates the *“negotiation of a comprehensive agreement that addresses Iranian security concerns in return for an end to the threatening elements of the Iranian nuclear and missile programme.”* (Caravelli, 2008: 121)

Interestingly, he further adds that unilateralism will not work, that to deal with Iran a multilateral solution is necessary. The parties involved must include big powers and countries *“such as Russia as well as presumably more supportive European Union members.”* He

mentions that ultimately the solution will have to be agreed on and enforced by the United Nations Security Council. (Caravelli, 2008: 126)

### 1.4.3 The View on Collective Security

Two of the most prominent collective security institutions today are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). They are the subjects of most discussions and debates on collective security. Few new models are being discussed, and no system designed for specifically engaging with rogue states has been put forward.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Krishnan Srinivasan (2009: 42) paints a bold picture when it comes the future of our world's collective security institutions. First, he questions NATO's prospects by stating that "*the effort by the United States to encourage the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as an 'out of area' force will be aborted by its experience in Afghanistan.*"

Second, he argues that big powers, like the United States, the European Union and large emerging economies like China and India will play a much bigger role as the multipolar world becomes very tangible:

*The world's hegemonic powers will lose faith in the Security Council as an effective mechanism to deliberate issues of peace and security. World bodies will be used for discussion of global issues such as the environment and climate change, pandemic disease, energy and food supplies, and development, but resulting action will primarily devolve on the big powers in the affected regions.* (Srinivasan, 2009: 46)

Finally, his most interesting argument is his prediction on how collective security arrangements will morph soon:

*Due to the worldwide redistribution of economic growth, technological skills and military capacity, security theories like deterrence and containment will lose their validity. A return to something akin to the 19th-century scenario of the Concert of Powers seems likely, but this time on a global scale, and with the participation of the emerging strong nations, who will take their places both in formal and informal governance structures.* (Srinivasan, 2009: 41)

#### **1.4.4 Research Innovation**

While changes in collective security arrangements and rogue states have been the research subject of many papers before, the focus has been either on one of these two topics, individually analysed. This paper will align both topics into one picture.

By trying to find the best collective security arrangement to get rogue states to cooperate over nuclear matters, this paper will seek to find ways through the current structures to establish a *pre-emptive peace* with rogue states that eliminates their external aggression, mainly through ending the potential nuclear threat they could pose to their region or the global order.

#### **1.5 Theories: The Liberal Perspective**

This paper will be answering the research question from a liberal perspective. Combining both sociological liberalism and institutional liberalism theories, it will emphasise a solution to the problem of potential conflicts with rogue states based on main elements of liberalism in international relations, being human reason and the advantage of cooperation.

The reason for this choice is that a liberal perspective has seemingly become the main approach in US foreign policy in facing up to rogue states. President Barack Obama's strategy of returning to multilateralism and international cooperation has been recently highlighted in the Washington Post:

*In a commencement speech to the graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the president outlined his departure from what Bush had called a 'distinctly American internationalism.' Instead, Obama pledged to shape a new 'international order' based on diplomacy and engagement. Obama has spoken frequently about creating new alliances, and of attempts to repair the U.S. image abroad after nearly a decade in which Bush's approach was viewed with suspicion in many quarters. (Shear, 2010)*

This comes in direct opposition to the unilateralism – derived from realism – that could justify the 2003 Iraq War. The tremendous human and financial cost of the US-led war against Iraq

and its following civil war has put the idea of a military operation against Iran at the end of the list of options. This idea has manifested itself many times over the last year:

*'We have said directly to the Israelis that it is important to try and resolve this in an international setting in a way that does not create major conflict in the Middle East,' Obama said, referring to Iran's nuclear ambitions. [...] 'It is the policy of the United States to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear capabilities in a peaceful way through diplomatic channels,' he said. (CNN, 2009)*

### **1.5.1 Sociological Liberalism**

Sociological liberalism's perspective on international relations is particularly relevant in an era of globalisation. James Roseneau (1990: 1) defines it as *"the process whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplanted by relations between private individuals, groups and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events."*

It favours a "microscopic" perspective on the nature of international relations. It argues that ties between people in different states – what it calls "transnational relations" – can ultimately affect the unfolding of global events much more than governments can. Whereas governments in themselves represent a continuity whose foundations are difficult to alter, individuals in contrast are more dynamic and can change the nature of transnational relations through their personal international interactions with each other. (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 101)

A prime example of this would be the close relationship between US President Ronald Reagan and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. It allowed the creation of a personal bond between the heads of the two competing superpowers. Reagan described his relationship to Gorbachev as *"a chemistry that kept our conversations to a man-to-man basis, without hate or hostility."* (Reagan, 1990: 707)

In no small way, that personal bond helped causing a *détente* in the historically confrontational relationship between the Western and Eastern blocs. This in turn led to accords for the scaling down of military forces and political reforms, which paved the way for the end of the Cold War and peace in Europe.

While this theory puts emphasis on people rather than on governments, the latter is certainly not excluded from its field of interest. Friendships between world leaders can turn seemingly stalled situations involving their governments around completely. While this can happen, the flip-side in contrast can also hold true: leaders with no personal connection to each other finding themselves in a similar situation would not likely be able to agree as easily, if at all.

### **1.5.2 Institutional Liberalism**

The proponents of institutional liberalism believe that global peace and stability is generally served well by the presence of international institutions in which states cooperate with each other, reducing the state of natural anarchy and chaos that tends to plague the international order.

According to institutional liberalism, these international institutions serve in building trust between nations, and decrease the likelihood of an armed conflict occurring between them, as a result of their mutual membership in the organisation and the subsequent agreement to basic principles. These institutions can be as elaborate as the United Nations' and its entire apparatus, or it can be a simple treaty. Therefore, "institutions" in that sense does not necessarily correspond to huge, bureaucratic organisations. (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 110).

These institutions allow dialogue to be held, disputes to be settled and solutions to be found through their established rules and procedures. They are founded upon the idea that nations are better off in a system in which disputants can make their claims heard and can defend them within an established and respected framework that provides an alternative to violent confrontation. Institutional liberalism also argues that the presence of international institutions and the states' collaboration in them provide an opportunity for information to circulate, and allow states an "*opportunity to negotiate*" (Keohane, 1989: 2) between themselves.

The end of the Cold War brought a reinvigoration of this perspective as “*international institutions were again seen as the best way to resolve transnational issues according to the application of international legal norms and obligations that were to be based on consent.*” (Srinivasan, 2009: 38).

It is possible to doubt the effectiveness of international organisations inspired by institutional liberalism at reaching decisions. Keohane and Nye spoke about this issue in *Power and Interdependence*, but they did not go as far as dismissing the usefulness of international institutions. In a way, they agreed that international organisations inspired by international liberalism play a certain role of influence in international relations:

*In today’s world, universal international organisations are more valuable as sounding boards than as decision-making bodies. If the United States listens carefully, but not naively, these organisations may tell it something about the intensity of, and shifts in others’ views. These forums do influence the agenda of world politics.* (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 292)



## 2. INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH COLLECTIVE SECURITY

### 2.1 The United Nations Security Council

#### 2.1.1 Background

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) one of the principal organs of the United Nations. Its main task is the maintenance of international peace and security. It is a formal institution, explicitly charged with guaranteeing collective security, as stated by Article 1 of the UN Charter:

*Maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations; investigating any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction; recommending methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; formulating plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; calling on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; taking military action against an aggressor.*

However, because of the Cold War and ensuing constant tensions between the United States-led and Soviet Union-led blocs, the UNSC's activities were not necessarily aligned with its goals. The fact that international relations were somewhat frozen and that the only animation was in the alignment of countries in the balance of power traded collective security for an international game of chess whose primary goal was to maintain the status quo between East and West.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union came the hope that the UNSC's mission of ensuring global collective security would be finally attainable. Starting in the late 1980s, the USSR played a more cooperative role in the organisation. However, some academics argue that this change in behaviour was merely a way for the decaying Soviet Union to instead focus its power on internal matters the leadership in Moscow judged more important. Its authority on far-away republics and satellite states was withering away at an increasing rate, and given the

fact that many in Moscow realised there was no going back, that drastic changes were imminent and that they needed to be addressed, it resulted in a relatively low priority of foreign affairs matters in distant lands. (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004: 18)

At first, this era of new cooperation led US President George H. W. Bush to speak of a “new world order” in international politics. The first threat to collective security in that new era, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, was met with a swift response. The US-led coalition – endorsed by the USSR – was victorious, resulting in the quick and decisive demise of Saddam Hussein’s forces and the rapid liberation of Kuwait. It was hoped that this event would set the precedent for the manner in which the UNSC would meet the new challenges in a unipolar world, in the years ahead.

After the initial euphoria came the realisation that the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc had given way to a “new world disorder”, as regimes in Africa that had been dependent on Soviet support found themselves without funds and political capital while some nationalist struggles in the Balkans and in the Caucasus that had been dormant under the communist rule violently awoke.

If one is to evaluate the success of the UNSC during the 1990s, results are ambiguous. Clearly it had not responded to the growth of conflicts as well as it could have, in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda for instance. Wallensteen and Johansson (2004: 25) underline that fact when they talk about *“the relative neglect of some parts of the world contrasts with the attention accorded to conflicts north, east, and south of the Mediterranean. These areas have a particular legacy in UN affairs: Yugoslavia, Iraq, and issues in sub-Saharan Africa.”*

While the 1990s have seen their share of tragedies in which the Security Council could have made a difference, it is important to note that none of the new conflicts arising in that decade have significantly weakened global stability or led the world near a major war. Whether an important part this outcome can be attributed to the UNSC’s effectiveness or not remains to be found.

## 2.1.2 Decision-making Process

Roberts and Kingsbury (1993: 29) sum up the task that had been assigned to the UNSC in the United Nations system at its founding:

*In order to enable the UN to deal with threats to the peace, the Security Council was seen as having responsibility for the use of sanctions of various types, and for the use of military forces.*

The decision-making process of the UNSC is laid out in the Charter of the United Nations. It is charged with maintaining global peace and security, and when if a threat arises, it should attempt to stop it by inciting the concerned country to halt its actions, in default of which the UNSC can adopt sanctions against that state or authorise military action against it.

Chapter V of the United Nations Charter states that the UNSC is composed of fifteen members, nine of which much support a resolution for it to pass. Five of them, the victors of the Second World War, are permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. They can veto any substantive resolution. This power was granted to them because since the founding of the United Nations, there was a *“highly realistic belief that UN action will not be possible if one of the great powers seriously dissents.”* (Roberts and Kingsbury, 1993: 10)

The remaining ten are UN member states who are elected for a two-year term by the General Assembly. The Presidency of the UNSC rotates every month, and representatives of UNSC members must be present at all times on site of the UN Headquarters in New York City in case of an emergency meeting.

Article 32 states that it is possible for UN members to be heard at the Security Council to speak and testify before the body. However, this opportunity does not entitle the UN member speaking to a vote. Still, it is the only possibility within the UNSC for rogue states like Iran and North Korea to participate and make their voices and opinions heard.

In chapter VI of the UN Charter pertaining to the pacific settlement of disputes, its Article 34 stipulates that the UNSC has the power to investigate situations of its choice which could be deemed a threat to security, while Article 35 states that it can also investigate situations at the request of a state which is a member of the United Nations.

### **2.1.3 Dealing with Rogue States**

Most of the UNSC's array of actions that it can use against aggressive rogue states falls under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter titled *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression*, establishing that the UNSC can recognise a disturbance or a threat to peace. In response to such a situation, Articles 40 through 42 provide the guide for the escalation of measures to preserve peace and order. First, the UNSC issues recommendations and urges parties to restraint. If the situation does not change or worsens, it can impose sanctions restraining communications and transportation and economic sanctions on the trouble-making state. Further deterioration can trigger a military operation to restore peace with the approval of the UNSC.

Articles 42 to 45 are explicit collective security measures that are meant to deter potential aggressors. In the event the world would face an important threat to global security by a belligerent state, these articles ask for the support and assistance of the other UN member states in the advent of a confrontation with the aggressor against which military operations would be conducted. These articles also require UN members to have national contingents at the disposal of the UNSC, ready for battle. Basically, the sole possibility of the use of force in response to a belligerent state's actions is meant to deter aggression.

Historically, the escalation procedure meant to be followed according to these articles have rarely been carried it to the endpoint. Litigious situations have often not escalated to armed confrontation. Warnings were issued or sanctions were imposed. Michael Howard (1993: 67) highlights this important dynamic:

*The lessons of 1956 were clear. First the UN could take action against 'aggression' only if the two great powers agreed, or if one of them was indifferent.*

The Security Council has reached the ultimate step in measures against aggressive rogue states on only two occasions:

On 27 June 1950, the Security Council adopted Resolution 83 – in the absence of the Soviet Union – calling for all UN members to support South Korea against North Korea with all they can spare, but not going as far as declaring war, though it was practically the case. That was the beginning of the Korean War, in which the UN played an active role.

The Gulf War is a textbook example of the UNSC using the ultimate collective security measures to confront a rogue state. In 1990, UNSC Resolutions 660, 663 and 665 increased the pressure on Saddam Hussein's regime after its invasion of Kuwait, first demanding withdrawal, then imposing economic sanctions and a blockade. Resolution 678 gave Saddam Hussein's troops until 15 January 1991 to withdraw, after which it authorised the use of "all necessary means" to remove them from Kuwait.

#### **2.1.4 Dealing with Disarmament**

The UNSC has a rather strong and coherent record of being united regarding disarmament and non-proliferation in rogue states. Looking at three of the four UNSC resolutions adopted against North Korea, all of them being the direct result of the development of North Korea's military nuclear programme from 2006 and onwards – the organisation spoke unanimously in favour of taking very concrete measures against the rogue state's nuclear objectives.

UNSC Resolution 1695, adopted in July 2006, banned the sale of materials that can assist North Korea in build long-range ballistic missiles. In October 2006, UNSC Resolution 1718 pushed for the dismantling of North Korea's military programme, banning the sale of heavy military equipment to that country, authorised the inspection of North Korean ships in international waters, froze overseas assets of North Koreans affiliated with its nuclear programme and imposed a travel ban on them and their families. Finally, UNSC Resolution

1874, adopted in June 2009 in response to a nuclear test conducted by North Korea, extended the measures of Resolution 1718 to extending inspections to land and air cargo destined for North Korea, blocking financial transactions that could contribute to advancing the programme, demanding that states do not commit finances to North Korea and banning all exports and imports of heavy weapons to the country. In all three resolutions, North Korea was urged to stop its nuclear programme and rejoin the six-party talks.

In the wake of the development of its nuclear programme, Iran also became the target of UNSC resolutions in 2006. Teheran still claims that it does not have a military nuclear programme, but merely aims at enabling Iran to develop nuclear power for civilian purposes. However, the regime's provocative foreign policy rhetoric has inspired suspicion in the international community and resulted in sanctions aimed at preventing it from further enriching uranium that might be used to produce nuclear weapons.

Through Resolution 1696, adopted in late July 2006, the UNSC demanded that Iran stopped its nuclear enrichment programme. In December 2006, as a result of Teheran's non-compliance, Resolution 1737 was adopted, freezing the assets of individuals and companies involved in Iran's nuclear programme and forbidding the sale of nuclear technology components to the regime. Shortly thereafter, Resolution 1747 banned military transactions with Iran and called for a restriction on financial operations with the Iranian government. UNSC resolution 1808 adopted in March 2008 demanded again that Iran put its nuclear enrichment operations to a halt. This position was reiterated through Resolution 1835 in September 2008.

### **2.1.5 Representativeness**

Representativeness is an important challenge that the UNSC currently has to deal with. While the United Nations General Assembly represents 192 of the 196 countries in the world, the UNSC is a bit less universal than its ideals would let known.

Its permanent members, possessing a veto right over the resolutions that are brought forward, are the victors of the Second World War. They were the sole remaining economic and cultural

powers at that time and would be the guardians of global peace and security in the post-World War II reality.

However, six decades later, the world is a wholly different place. Former Axis players, Germany, Italy and Japan are matching the power of the United Kingdom and France and the first two cooperate with them in the emerging superpower that is the European Union. New regional powers, like Brazil and India, take their place on the world stage because of their dramatic demographic expansion coupled with their democratic progress. In the meantime, conflicts and potential confrontation centres that could threaten the global stability have moved from Europe towards Asia. Aware of this reality, Anna Dimitrijevic (2005: 5) notes that:

*The OCGG recommends changing the composition of the Security Council so that the seats held by Britain and France give way to a European Union seat, and permanent seats are allocated to Brazil, Egypt, India, Japan and South Africa. In this way the dominant countries of all continents would be represented permanently, with two members from each continent and three from Australasia. The inclusion of Egypt, although less frequently discussed than the other nominees, would be particularly important by bringing a Muslim country into the permanent structure of the Security Council.*

Kofi Annan also advocated a representativeness reform in 2005, and argued that if the Security Council will have to change the composition of its organisation if it wants to remain a credible player, especially since it is the most powerful organ of the world's biggest international organisation. (Annan, 2005)

Put in perspective, these changes could affect the way rogue states are dealt with, especially in the case of Iran. While many believe that the Islamic Republic's civilian program has a hidden military element to it, President Lula da Silva of Brazil – an emerging world power – on the other hand was quoted saying that he believed that Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad's nuclear aims were in fact, peaceful as he had stated. (Al Jazeera, 2009) It would be interesting to see if Brazil became a permanent member of the Security Council how its attitude towards Iran's nuclear programme would affect the discussions and the measures taken by the organisation,

whether it would rejoin the growing consensus against the regime, or whether it would seek to defend it or play a mediating role in the resolution of the crisis.

### **2.1.6 Legitimacy**

The UNSC's legitimacy could be strongly questioned when one looks at the selectiveness of the body when it decides the conflicts it chooses to address, and the ones it has acted upon. For example, it did not authorise the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo even though it clearly fell into its mandate, and this raises serious legitimacy questions:

*Good governance based on the rule of law requires that legitimacy be anchored in legality. However, as the NATO intervention in Kosovo demonstrated, in practice they are often disconnected. The Kosovo case has generally been seen as technically illegal yet legitimate since it was undertaken in accordance with the fundamental principles held in common and agreed on by the members of a given community, in the spirit if not the letter of documents such as the UN Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Dimitrijevics, 2005: 5)*

The flip-side of this situation is the 2003 Iraq War led by the Americans and the British. The coalition powers then simply ignored the recommendations of the Security Council. The fact that permanent members of the Council put their national interests before global interest provoked much ire in the international community.

While the UNSC might have hit serious bumps, no conflict of the scale of the Second World War has taken place since the organisation had been founded, and this remains a reality that is understated. Managing to avoid shocks that have rocked the international order like the two world wars of the twentieth century is no small feat. From macroscopic perspective, one could be boldly say that the UNSC has in fact achieved its goals in preserving global security and this in turns makes the organisation very legitimate.

However rogue states that pose a threat to the global security today do take advantage of the Security Council's shortcomings. Iran and North Korea are keen at exploiting the



organisation's legitimacy as a point of derision. This mindset was clearly visible in a recent article of the New York Times:

*Iran's ambassador to Moscow said he hoped Russia would dissuade the other Council members from imposing sanctions, and warned that Russia risked manipulation by the United States. 'Russia should not think that short-term cooperation with the United States is in its interest.' said the ambassador, Mahmoud-Reza Sajjadi. 'The green light the United States is showing Russia will not last long.'* (Barry, 2010)

Their leaders often point out a "hidden agenda" of the Council's members and spare no effort to defy its will. While sanctions are imposed time and again upon their regimes, the measures the Security Council adopt against them hardly make them budge. Even while its legitimacy was attacked by rogue regimes and that it has not been successful in removing the threat the aggressive rogue states pose, the Security Council has been able to contain rogue states with nuclear aims and to limit their belligerence.

### **2.1.7 Effectiveness**

To this day, the under the UNSC's watch there has not been an interstate war with a rogue state over nuclear matters. However, the organisation has not been able to stop the nuclear programmes in Iran and in North Korea from progressing, and the potential nuclear threat therefore remains, even though unanimous sanctions against those rogue states have been adopted for years now.

While one might argue that this situation makes an important point against the effectiveness of the organisation for dealing with rogue states, it remains nonetheless the premier forum for cooperation over security matters that bring together the big powers to make crucial decisions for global security. Even though the Security Council does not necessarily have the capacity to enforce what it preaches and the resolutions it adopts, it still commends quite a bit of moral authority, especially if all members agree. When this happens, rogue states do not tend to be spared in the global opinion.

However one might wonder if the Security Council's proceedings do not make the situation of international security worse by exacerbating the already high tensions with rogue states. The exclusion of Iran and North Korea in the crafting of resolutions – as contradictory as the proposition may sound – could be an important factor stimulating their aggressive behaviour.

While the UNSC has been doing the groundwork as a collective security institution to prevent an armed conflict with Iran and North Korea, there must be additional options on the table if the threat these rogue states pose is to be defused. Lee Feinstein (2006) of the Council of Foreign Relations, sums up the situation the UNSC is faced when dealing issues pertaining to major threats to global security:

*The United Nations can and has been relevant in addressing first-order security concerns. Relying on the United Nations as the exclusive option, however, is unrealistic and, in cases of inaction, at times immoral. The choice cannot simply be the United Nations, unilateralism, or doing nothing. There can and must be other choices.*

## **2.2 The G8 and its Foreign Ministers' Forum**

### **2.2.1 Background**

The Group of Eight (G8) consists of the heads of government of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the representation of the European Union, and could be called an informal collective security organisation.

The organisation does not have a secretariat, it does not have permanent staff and its agreements are not binding. While it could be argued that this is a weakness which undermines the G8's credibility as an international actor, it can be argued that this is exactly what the organisation aims to be: loose, dynamic and not constrained by a bureaucracy that might hamper progress on issues of international concern, as advocated by Henry Kissinger. (Penttilä, 2003: 17) Professor John J. Kirton defines it as the "*late twentieth century global equivalent of the Concert of Europe that helped produce peace among the great powers, and prosperity more widely from 1818 to 1914.*" (Kirton, 1995: 64f.)

Its origins can be traced to the economic shocks of the 1970s – the end of the Bretton Woods system, the 1973 oil crisis and the 1973-1974 stock market crash. Because of these events, the finance ministers of France, West Germany, the US and the UK decided to come together in 1973 to address the coordination of their economies and policy decisions which were increasingly intertwined with the advance of globalisation (Hajnal, 2007: 12) Japan joined later that year, Canada did the same in 1976, and Russia followed in 1997.

It has served until 2009 as the main forum for international economic coordination in which world leaders meet to also deal with “*intractable international problems which cannot be settled at lower levels*” (Bayne, 2005: 3) on a wide range on issues from security, to climate change and poverty, in an informal, non-bureaucratic setting.

Former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark (1995: 213ff.) sums up the activities of the G8 as “*extremely constructive. They focus the attention of governments and leaders and often allow breakthroughs that would not occur in the more cumbersome traditional system. [...] Summits free leaders of [patterns] and allow both a wider experience of international issues and a real opportunity for initiative and cooperation. They rescue multilateralism from its inherent bureaucracy and caution.*”

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the G8 has partly shifted its focus more towards the themes of global security and the fight against terrorism. (Hajnal, 2007: 30) The G8 dealings on global security is in part the responsibility of its the Foreign Affairs Ministers “sub-forum” that has been happening twice a year since the Miyakazi, Japan summit in 2000. Its role is to “*to consult and coordinate on the critical political and security challenges facing the world.*” (DFAIT, 2010)

Change is in the air for the G8. With the coming of age of the G20 as the world’s “*new steering committee*” (Martin 2010) since its designation as the “*premier forum for economic cooperation*” (Tapscott, 2010), the G8’s future hangs in the balance. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the rise of the Chinese, Indian and Brazilian demographics and economies,

the G8 might not suffice anymore when it comes to dealing with questions of global economy and increasingly, with questions of international security.

### **2.2.2 Decision-making Process**

Penttilä (2003: 7) argues that the G8's role "*is to facilitate and direct the work of international organisations, coordinate policies and pool the resources of its members states, and, when suitable conditions manifest or other options have failed, to act as a de facto decision-making forum.*" Over the past 30 years, the G7-G8 has played an important role in international security, as summed up by Kirton (2010) in the Ottawa Citizen:

*During the past 36 years, the G8 has made a vast number and range of political-security commitments -- more than 1,000 since 1975, with those on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation leading the list. G8 members have kept these commitments at the same substantial level as the G8 overall: 75 per cent for political security as a whole, led by 85 per cent for conflict prevention, 82 per cent for non-proliferation, and 81 per cent for counter-terrorism, according to the most recent compliance report by the G8 Research Group. Most recently, a mere six months after the G8 last met in Italy in July 2009, compliance stands at about 95 per cent on regional security in Afghanistan and on piracy, 86 per cent on corruption and 78 per cent on counter-terrorism.*

Three components are recurrent at every G8 meeting. Since the first 1975 G6 in Rambouillet, France, it has been to the host country's discretion to set the agenda. (Hajnal, 2007: 53) This tradition has been maintained up to this day, both at the leaders' and the ministers' level. However, the host country does tend to pick issues that are of an overall priority to those present.

The second component is the informal structure, more specifically the idea that national representatives are taking part in a non-bureaucratic forum. In this context, the participants tend to refer to each other by first names and do not read out prepared statements. (Carin and Smith, 2009: 18) It can be said that G8 meetings attempt to foster an atmosphere of familiarity and friendship, in which leaders can express themselves freely. In a still globalising world, this can potentially contribute to faster decision-making. This pragmatic, direct, hands-on

approach clashes with the traditional conduct of international relations and its focus on customs, procedures and large institutions.

The third established element is that on most occasions, after the summits are over, the G8 host nation will publish a communiqué in which it sums up the consensus on which the member countries agreed. Although they tend to be broad in scope, they do represent guidelines according to which countries should conduct further policies on given topics. (Hajnal, 2007: 155) These policies can represent many things: an increase in spending in a certain sector, the deployment of resources in another, or a taking a different position in certain international institutions.

The main weakness of this process is that there is no guarantee that the G8 countries will follow the prescriptions as they are set out in the press *communiqués*. While compliance seems to have been on a steady slow slide in 1980s, but in the late 1990s and since the 2000s it scored fairly well. (Hajnal, 2007: 143)

### **2.2.3 Dealing with Rogue States**

The G8 regularly declares through its communiqués that it stands for peace, stability, democracy and the rule of law; hence it generally takes a firm stance on rogue states. Meeting after meeting, summit after summit, the G8 members give very little room for concessions to countries like Iran and North Korea. At almost every gathering, these rogue states are the subjects of strong warnings due to their militaristic, confrontational rhetoric. A good example of this would be the 2009 L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation.

At G8 Foreign Affairs Ministers' gatherings especially, considerable attention is given to both Iran and North Korea's rogue regimes. Discussions are usually centred both countries' current political situations, their cooperation with international institutions like the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the ensuing potential increase or decrease of sanctions against the rogue regimes. At the March 2010 Gatineau Summit, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that: "*While G8 ministers agreed*

*to remain open to dialogue with Iran, they also called on the international community to take appropriate steps to put pressure [on Iran]. In addition, foreign ministers urged North Korea to come back to the table.” (DFAIT, 2010)*

It is important to notice that the G8 regroups 4 of the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council and this gives the organisation considerable leeway on the kinds of resolutions that will be presented to the UNSC as well as their content.

In that sense, the G8 and its Foreign Ministers’ forum serve as important coordination tools for the member states as they allow them to discuss frankly and openly their concerns, their options regarding rogue states. Through the informal discussions, they facilitate the preparation of member states for the formal, institutionally driven business held at the UN Security Council. However, they does not seek to replace the latter, as the G8 is set to remain *“a meta-institution that facilitates and guides the work of other organisations.”* (Penttilä, 2003: 95)

While there is no pact official pact or military accord binding the G8 countries together, 6 of the 8 member countries – minus Russia and Japan – are NATO members, and according to that organisation’s Charter, Article 5 states that an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all. Considering the United States’ military might, as well as the capable Canadian, German, French and British military forces, the fear of massive retribution against a rogue state who would plan an attack can pressure a regime which would even consider that option. While it is spectre is hardly ever raised, when dealing with rogue states the G8 members generally do not explicitly exclude military intervention situations dramatically escalate.

The G8 is no stranger to military intervention. Perhaps one of its defining moments was the pivotal role it has played in ending the 1999 NATO-led war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Through authorizing the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo, the government of Slobodan Milošević caused their country to be perceived as a rogue state. This in turn triggered a military response from NATO. Penttilä (2003: 6) explains the G8’s pivotal role in establishing peace in the Balkans during the war:

*The G8 emerged as the forum in which the Western powers and Russia could reach a common position. Within hours, the Security Council accepted the agreement; within days, former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević had been presented with an ultimatum and the conflict had been brought to an end.*

Overall it can be said that the G8's dealing with rogue states involves many peripheral discussions between the eight powers, which sometimes result in partnerships and multinational programs to be created, and new measures being put to vote at the UN Security Council. It is a global think-tank of sorts, so while it is sometimes hard to trace where it has succeeded for collective security, the UNSC might be harder to manage if the organisation did not exist.

#### **2.2.4 Dealing with Disarmament**

At the 1983 Williamsburg summit for instance, the then-G7 declared one of its goals as “*achieving lower levels of arms through serious arms control negotiations.*” (Pentillä, 2003: 39) Today, the G8's response to the spread of nuclear menaces is generally unanimous, outspoken and direct.

It is intolerant of any act of provocation by Iran and North Korea as they expand their nuclear programs, and never fails to comment at nearly every summit on how these rogue states continue to fail their international responsibilities in that domain. For instance it often refers to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the baseline for governmental behaviour regarding the use of nuclear energy.

The G8 tends to refer the supervision of nuclear issues and nuclear disarmament to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as it reports on its monitoring of both Iran and North Korea. Two of the G8 members, the United States and Russia, were until recently involved with the latter in what became known as the six-party talks also involving China, Japan and South Korea; however, as of 2007 its activities remain suspended. At the March 2010 gathering of the G8 Foreign Ministers in Gatineau, Canada, the Ministers stated:

*We reiterate our serious concerns about the proliferation risks posed by Iran's nuclear program, and underscore the importance of Iran's full and immediate compliance with its international obligations. We also strongly urge North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without precondition. (DFAIT, 2010)*

To disarm rogue states or prevent them from developing nuclear weapons, G8 members favour a carrot-and-stick approach. For instance, after the shutdown of North Korea's nuclear programme in 2007, the United States removed them from the US State Department list of states sponsoring terrorism, and resumed the transfer of aid to the country. However, in the wake of its reactivation and of further nuclear testing in 2009, North Korea has fallen back into the bad graces of the State Department.

### **2.2.5 Representativeness**

On the issue of representation in the G8, former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin (2008: 468) stated: *"Excluding countries such as China or Russia would be a throwback to the era of strategic and antagonistic alliances. The consequences would be international gridlock at best, war at worst."* As the United States' economic and political influence wanes, the world is shifting from a unipolar world to multipolar reality where emerging economies like India, Brazil and China are becoming forces to be reckoned with, along with the European Union standing very well on its own.

The G5-G6-G7 were representative of the period from the 1970s until the 1990s, as they included the key players of the Western bloc whose decisions and influence were determinant in the competition against the communist bloc. The major shift in the organisation occurred after the end of the Cold War, as Russia's membership in the big economies club became the hot topic.

Even though Russia's political, economic and social institutions were not quite up to par with its G7 partners – and they still are not – it was nevertheless agreed that it would be better for



our world's stability if Russia, the 140 million-strong, largest landmass in the world spanning two continents would be made an integral part of the organisation. This in turn improved the G8's representativeness.

The fact that the G8's quiet demise is upon us can be seen in its member countries' attempts at dealing with rogue states. The United States for instance has been engaging in its own initiatives with China regarding North Korea due to its historical and political with the regime, while Beijing is not taking part in the G8's discussions on the matter. The hesitation of the G8 members to allow the Asian giant in its ranks was perhaps due to the same political concerns that were surrounding Russia's membership a decade earlier.

Representativeness is important for another reason. If crises arise with rogue states in other parts of the world, in Africa with the Sudan-Darfur situation for instance, the G8 has no African members and no Muslim members. While there is very little risk for a war between Western countries and Sudan, should the G8 decide to further expand the measures against Sudan under the responsibility to protect, the support of fellow African members in the same organisation would go a long way in standing up to rogue states.

The liberal perspective on the G8's representativeness would likely argue that there are important gaps that are left unfilled. For instance, some may argue that the United Nations system is a better representative system as it includes all states, regardless of economic power or political positions, as opposed to the G8's "discrimination."

### **2.2.6 Legitimacy**

The G8 has important issues that prevent the organisation from being a force to be reckoned with in the international community and that raise questions on its legitimacy in quite a number of categories.

First, as highlighted in the previous section, it is not representative of today's global reality; it is mainly a vehicle of representation of Western European and North American political and economical interests, which may or may not be compatible with the rest of the world, especially with the new economic powerhouses that are China and India.

Its representatives are the organisation's biggest problem, as its members seem to defend the values and interests of the most developed countries at their meetings. While they have managed to capture the media and public attention and have made the organisation recognised, the forum that has not necessarily gained thorough respect from the civil society. (Hajnal, 2007: 133) Crowds whose protests often require police intervention attend most of their meetings.

Moreover, the G8's authority is not stable. As it lacks a constitution and defined powers its level of legitimacy in public perception goes through shifts year after year. The key into understand this is that the G8's perceived success and performance depends on a myriad of internal and external factors such as the political turnover as well as global financial shocks which can affect its priorities, and in turn the public's opinion.

For instance, the short 2008 Russia-Georgia caught the G8 by surprise. One of the organisation's most important members was caught in a conflict with a strong ally of the European Union and NATO. Regardless of which party is responsible for the beginning of the hostilities, it has put the "original" seven members in a very awkward position in this short but surprisingly intense conflict, and a G7 declaration was made concerning Russia's actions.

Events like this war can handicap the legitimacy of the G8, as it was divides and raises questions on its role in supporting collective security arrangements against rogue states.

However, they might only be small bumps on the road for the organisation. Looking back to 2004, perhaps the politically soft words of US Secretary Powell, speaking about internal problems in Russia, summed up best how the G8 deals with such interactions:

*We have not been the least bit reluctant to point out those concerns to President Putin and to his colleagues, and we point it out to them as friends, as partners, as somebody who is interested in nothing but the best for the Russian people and for the Russian Government and for Russian democracy. (G8 Information Centre, 2004)*

### **2.2.7 Effectiveness**

Overall, it could be said that the G8 has had an average performance so far in helping to prevent interstate warfare with rogue states. Of course this is not the direct result of the organisation's work itself, but rather of the generally coordinated policies of its members in regard to rogue states.

Since this paper is interested in the prevention of interstate warfare, there is certainly a measure of success that the G8 can claim from the absence of armed conflict with Iran and North Korea. However the tensions from nuclear issues remain far from settled, and the absence of armed conflict does not calm the fears of G8 members for global security.

Beyond the *communiqués*, which draw broad lines on which all member countries expressing their concerns for peace and stability agree on, condemning actions by rogue states in a common front in a timely manner, there perhaps is something else to be understood. It is a remarkable phenomenon that the G8's members can agree on some bold line to be held when it comes to defending international peace and security. One hundred years ago such a thing would have been unthinkable, and fifty years ago it would have been an idealist's dream to see the world's biggest powers coming together in a fairly friendly manner, forming a common front for their security and partly for the rest of the world's too. This is not to be overlooked.

Given the consensus-building approach currently in place in regard to North Korea and Iran, interactions between G8 members over rogue states are likely to be fine-tuned in the years ahead. While there might be differences of opinion and approaches, over time a culture of mutual influence will likely help to smoothen a solution between members, in the common front, especially if the G20 begins to get involved in questions of global security.

## **3. ANALYSIS: ALTERNATIVE IDEAS**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This section will present paths of alternative solutions based on the current institutions to the research question what is the most effective arrangement for global collective security to prevent interstate conflict with rogue states that might pose a nuclear threat?

In that past section, two institutions dealing with collective security have been analysed: the United Nations Security Council and the G8. Beyond the positive and negative aspects of each, and beyond their common goal to ensure global security, there is another factor that unites them. These two institutions are fundamentally reactive to the perceived nuclear threats coming from rogue states. This responsive, defensive stance from non-rogue states allows these regimes to be in control of the international dialogue on their behaviour and might increase possibility of war.

There are three key lessons from the history of nuclear weaponry: First, we must not forget that apart from Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used militarily in sixty-five years. Second, nuclear weapons are not so much weapons as they are bargaining chips in international relations. Third, it is likely that a rogue state launching a nuclear weapon even with limited capabilities will suffer massive retaliation, which would make their offensive tactic equivalent to national suicide.

Understandably, the international community finds itself extremely uncomfortable when a state becomes a nuclear power, as it poses the danger of a shift in regional and global stability. Regardless if the threat nuclear rogue states pose is real or not, and regardless of their willingness to carry out a nuclear attack, the status quo of the balance of nuclear powers tends to be preferred by the international community.

Sociological liberalism is particularly relevant in addressing this situation. The lack of high-level dialogue between rogue states and countries in charge of collective security

arrangements, and rogue states' subsequent exclusion from the dialogue on their future might be responsible in a significant way for their unwillingness to cooperate. Furthermore, the states in charge of collective security's hostile reaction to bits and pieces of information coming from rogue states might be ultimately increasing the prospect of a war with them over nuclear matters.

While sociological liberalism could provide the larger framework for the nuclear disarmament of rogue states, it would fall upon the elements of institutional liberalism, specific organisations to articulate the solutions and to follow. The inclusion of both collective security authorities and rogue states could give birth to a new cooperative collective security arrangement which could have more chances of succeeding by being proactive in dealing with the nuclear issues than the current reactive structures.

While the current collective security arrangements have been successful in preventing wars over nuclear matters, let alone nuclear wars, the barricades they have built cannot last forever. Someday, those questions will need to be addressed and they must include both sides of the issue if a way out is to be found.

Essential to the idea of "pre-emptive peace" is the belief that inclusiveness of rogue states in the dialogue over nuclear matters is absolutely necessary to prevent war and maintain global peace and stability. While current collective security methods and institutions suffice to generally stabilise the problem, the envelope should and must be pushed further if the deadlocks over the proliferation of nuclear weapons in rogue states are to be removed.

## 3.2 A Foreign Ministers' G20

### 3.2.1 Background

When the G20\* was created in 1999, under the leadership of then-Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin in the wake of the Asian economic crisis, it was to ensure the economic policy and decision coordination of the world's biggest economies through the membership of their Finance Ministers to avoid systemic shocks and meltdowns in the global economy. (Martin, 2008) As of 2010, it is the primary forum for economic coordination between the leaders of the member states.

Gordon Smith and Barry Carin (2009: 17) defined the wider role the G20 will be called upon to take in the Centre for International Governance Innovation's Flashpoints for the Pittsburgh Summit:

*International cooperation is required to resolve major global commons problems. Progress on these global issues will require multi-element 'grand bargain' package deals with sufficient elements to allow every country to emerge a net 'winner', taking all elements into account. While consensus outcomes are ultimately adjudicated by the United Nations or other organisations with universal membership, reaching grand bargains requires a 'steering group' of key heads of government. Otherwise there will be no decision making of consequence. [...] The G20 has supplanted the G8 as the major mechanism to shape consensus on critical global issues.*

It could be argued that the same reasoning could be applied to the G20 to eventually work on coordination of policies regarding rogue states, as it is a critical global issue. The G20 formula could help to relieve the collective security deadlock over nuclear states. Different points of view can be considered, which can help craft a series of actions to build a common front.

Nowadays, it is hard to argue for military operations to enforce collective security against a rogue state, especially in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war that incurred far-reaching political, economical and human cost. In *Power and Interdependence*, speaking of the new globalised world's realities; Keohane and Nye (2001: 253) stated: "*What comes through most clearly*

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\* The members of the G20 are : Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the European Union.

*[...] is the difficulty of achieving desired results, in terms of domestic politics, through the use of military force.”* They further added that new international governance models are now necessary. To regulate the effects of interdependence, they argue the world needs to put forward frameworks of *“multilateral cooperation on a global level, forming international regimes to govern globalisation.”* (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 259).

The creation of a Group of 20 of the Foreign Ministers of countries represented in the Leaders’ G20, as a successor to the G8 Foreign Ministers could address global collective security issues all the while dealing with the questions pertaining to nuclear rogue states. The establishment of such a group would probably not be very difficult, as it could follow in the tracks of the G8 Foreign Ministers’ forum both in actions and relation to the Leaders’ forum.

The idea has been briefly discussed before. John Kirton first brought it up in a presentation to the Canadian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in November 2001. He saw a possibility of the creation of a Foreign Ministers’ G20 as a tool to coordinate international action against terrorism, since the war on terror would require an effort extending beyond the G8 countries. (Kirton, 2001: 7) Risto E. J. Penttilä (Penttilä, 2003: 83) also discusses the idea:

*If the G8 identified a need for consultation with ‘systematically important’ countries on global-security matters, the G20 would provide a natural framework. Such consultations could take place on an ad hoc basis simply by calling a meeting of G20 foreign ministers. If results were positive one could set up an annual consultation with an option of calling an ad hoc meeting when the world situation demanded.*

While a basic concept was put forward, the idea has not been developed further. Considering the G20 currently exists at both the leaders’ and finance ministers’ levels, having a new branch with the foreign ministers is not a far-fetched idea, it could be seen as a very natural expansion of the organisation. It would fall very much in line with the “global steering committee” spirit of the G20.

Such a high-level collective security group would be in a unique position to address the combined issues of rogue states and nuclear proliferation. However, for the spirit of inclusiveness that marked the foundation of the G20 to truly take hold, something more must

be done in regard to dealing with rogue states and the nuclear threat they might pose to global security.

As discussed earlier, sociological liberalism in international relations argues that links and relationships between individuals can matter more in the global order than relationships between states. Following that reasoning, to increase the chances of success and progress on non-proliferation and disarmament with rogue states, a Group of 20 of the Foreign Ministers could also include the Foreign Minister of the rogue state it wishes to deal with as guest. While this idea might prove controversial, the proposed G20's chances of resolving the litigious situation with rogue states could dramatically increase because of that inclusion.

### **3.2.2 Representativeness**

This Foreign Ministers G20 would represent the world's biggest powers, all the major economic players – North America, Europe, India and East Asia. Also, all the permanent members of the UN Security Council would be represented in this organisation – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. All these factors put together makes such a group carry considerable political weight should agreements come to fruition through its activities and discussions.

A major improvement over the Foreign Ministers' G8 would be China's inclusion. As of 2010, China is not taking part in the G8 Foreign Ministers' discussion. As a major power in the world and as an influent nation located strategically in the neighbourhood of both North Korea and Iran, it will be a key player in the resolution of the nuclear tensions with either or both states.

A high-level representation at the Foreign Ministers' level would give such an organisation credibility, both in image and in effect. It would display the very public faces of the G20 members states' chief diplomats without compromising the heads of state or the heads of government, whose actions must be even more calculated.



There is a group whose activities are currently stalled that resembles this G20 idea. The suspended Six Party group on North Korea groups North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States' deputy foreign ministers to address the questions surrounding North Korea's nuclear programme. The Council on Foreign Relations elaborated on the reasons why the group has not managed to agree:

The Six-Party Talks and other regional efforts preceding it failed to meet the North Korean challenge because the participating states *"placed their own immediate priorities and concerns above the collective need to halt North Korea's nuclear program. While Japan and the United States consistently have pushed for strong sanctions in response to North Korean weapons testing, China, South Korea, and Russia often have pushed for less stringent sanctions out of fear that a sudden toppling of the regime would lead to major refugee influxes."* (Zissis and Bajoria, 2009)

There are several lessons that can be learned from this situation. First, it might be possible that increasing the political importance of the group by lifting it to the Ministers' level could facilitate the decision-making process. Second, the overemphasis on sanctions rather than engaging in constructive dialogue with North Korea and the other participating states to find solutions may have been greatly responsible for North Korea's withdrawal from the talks.

### **3.2.3 BRICs of Peace: A Role for Emerging Powers**

Inside the G20 there is a grouping of countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China – which has become known as an acronym: the BRICs. These countries may not have a lot in common culturally, but globalisation has made them allies as they form a counterbalance to the G7 countries, and their existence is the reason for the coming together of the G20.

While China and Russia have already established their positions as major global security players, Brazil and India increasingly make their voices heard, something that twenty or even ten years ago would have seemed rather unlikely. For example, under Lula da Silva's leadership, Brazil has become a particularly vocal actor on the international stage, more

specifically in the case of Iran's nuclear program. As opposed to many countries, Brazil's government does believe the claim of the Iranian government that their nuclear programme is strictly civilian:

*Mr Lula da Silva's visit [to Iran] has been the focus of intensifying diplomatic efforts, amid Brazilian hopes he will find a compromise in the dispute over Iran's nuclear program and US fears that he could complicate efforts to agree a sanctions resolution at the United Nations. US officials acknowledge that Brazil's bid to chart a diplomatic path of its own - and similar efforts by other 'rising powers' such as Turkey - are a new challenge for US foreign policy. As Brazil becomes more assertive globally and begins to assert its influence, we are going to bump into Brazil on new issues and in new places - such as Iran, the Middle East, Haiti. (Dombey, 2010)*

Thomas Shannon, US ambassador to Brazil, told the Financial Times that while Brazil's emergence was "very positive" overall, "it is challenging for both of us because it means we have to rethink how we understand our relationship." (Dombey, 2010)

What this means is that when it comes to collective security arrangements, the world is undergoing a paradigm shift. Considering Russia and China's traditional indifference to mild sympathy for North Korea and Iran, and their increasing power and presence on the world stage, it is now a reality that solely like-minded G7 countries can no longer effectively operate collective security arrangements. A solution will require an international dialogue that the G20 is able to foster.

The dialogue on international security and rogue states at the G20 would allow for rebalancing in perceptions and approaches. Considering the fact that the rhetoric of the G8 has not been able to end the standoff with rogue states over nuclear matters, it would be worth considering a wider dialogue with more members who are not necessarily as preoccupied with rogue states as the G8 members are, as they could serve as intermediaries and bridge builders between countries of different opinions, and between G20 countries and rogue states themselves.

### **3.2.4 Dealing with Rogue States**

The behaviour of Iran and North Korea and their use of nuclear energy unsettle many. Removing the threat that they pose permanently is required to make the world more secure and preventing the possibility of the military use of a nuclear weapon, unlikely as it may be.

What the existing institutions have done to this day is to adopt a reactionary stance – albeit understandably. However, the international lockdown on North Korea and Iran has effectively put these regimes in cages. This in the long run is not helpful in ending the nuclear threat.

Trust building is necessary. Informal dialogue between the highest instances of diplomacy and reaching out to rogue states is essential. Given the fact that things have stalled; direct, inclusive dialogue between the G20 and Iran or North Korea could be a venture worthy of exploring. While five or eight years ago, we might have asked “Why should we do this?”, it seems that a question that would be appropriate to ask now would be “Why shouldn’t we try?”

## **3.3 UN Reforms in Collective Security**

### **3.3.1 Background**

*The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better. When considering whether to authorise or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat at hand and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. (Annan, 2005: 33)*

The United Nations has had successes and shortcomings in its 65-year existence. However it is important to remember that it played no small part in preventing the occurrence of another conflict of the size of the Second World War. Because the end of the Cold War and globalisation have changed the dynamics of international relations, the United Nations must change as well if it is to keep up with the world of the twenty-first-century.

To carry out its role as a collective security institution, adaptation is necessary for the UNSC to be relevant in today's world. However, the suggested changes this paper puts forward do not advocate the deconstruction of current structures and the rebuilding of new ones to improve the UNSC's capacities and responsibilities. Instead, it suggests that by making the most of what it currently holds in powers and in resources with a few alterations, the UNSC can greatly expand its role as a collective security organisation in facing up to rogue states. Because of the international recognition it enjoys, it will likely remain the international focal point for execution when it comes to carrying action on challenging rogue states, and that is its capacities should be reinforced.

### **3.3.2 The Good Offices of the Secretary General: A Vital Role**

The United Nations' Secretary-General is possibly the most known figure in the organisation. Article 97 of the UN Charter defines the Secretary-General's role as "chief administrative officer" of the organisation. While this descriptions seems to imply a bureaucratic management position, the notoriety of the Secretary-General has in recent years played a pivotal role in avoiding armed conflicts, as explained by Kofi Annan (2005: 30):

*Although it is difficult to demonstrate, the United Nations has almost certainly prevented many wars by using the Secretary-General's "good offices" to help resolve conflicts peacefully. And over the past 15 years, more civil wars have ended through mediation than in the previous two centuries, in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination and the resources to implement peace agreements. But we could undoubtedly save many more lives if we had the capacity and personnel to do so.*

Since it is the UN's goal to preserve world peace, the role of the Secretary-General has evolved from being a high-profile administrator to being an active participant or arbitrator in conflict resolution. However since this function has not become an official one yet, it remains without proper resources, both in regard to finance and staffing. (United Nations, 2004: 18)

The "good offices" of the UN Secretary General is also known as "quiet diplomacy" which is aimed at "*defusing crises and providing hostile parties the opportunity to talk freely and test*

*intentions.*” (United Nations, 2004: 31). This de facto function of the UN Secretary-General could prove an interesting as a tool to incite cooperation of rogue states with the international community. In this perspective, the Secretary-General himself could become an important element to a new collective security arrangement.

For instance, he could be directly involved with the leadership of rogue states to serve as a preliminary, trust-building contact for a wider accord with regional and international powers. These tasks could also be assigned to a Deputy Secretary-General in charge of such matters. The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UNHLPCC) has already put a suggestion in this direction forward in 2004:

*The additional Deputy Secretary-General and his/her office would assist the Secretary-General in systematically overseeing the work of the United Nations system in the area of peace and security, with the aim of formulating integrated strategies and ensuring concerted action. Such an office should not be operational and would not duplicate, but instead rationalise and make more effective, existing bureaucratic functions. It would integrate inputs from the various departments and agencies and prepare early warning reports and strategy options for decision by the Secretary-General.* (United Nations, 2004: 91)

In a world where direct high-level contacts have become a way to foster solutions on litigious matters, signs point at the fact that the UN Secretary-General and his immediate surroundings will be increasingly called upon to play a role in the prevention of conflicts. For instance, even after leaving office, Kofi Annan was called upon in early 2008 to help mediate a political arrangement in Kenya to prevent further violence in the aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan presidential election. The influence of a UN Secretary-General in conflict resolution is something that any collective security system should consider including in its initial operations towards a rogue state.

### **3.3.3 Reviving the Military Staff Committee**

On collective security arrangements, one of the most interesting groupings that the UN Charter had originally commissioned is the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which has been qualified by historian Eric Grove as “*a sterile monument to the faded hopes of the founders of the UN.*”

(Hill, n.d.) Article 47 of the Charter states that the Committee's role is *"to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."* The MSC's Representatives are high-level officers of the five permanent Security Council members meeting every two weeks at the United Nations Headquarters.

Felicity Hill (n.d.) has summed up the ironically brief, six-decade old history of the MSC in a paper for Global Policy Forum:

*The first Security Council resolution (passed without a vote) directed the Military Staff Committee to begin work on 1 February 1946. Twenty-nine months later on 2 July 1948, it reported to the Security Council that it was unable to fulfil its mandate (S/879). The Permanent Five members submitted reflections on the reasons why it had failed (China, France, UK, USA MS/417, Soviet Union MS/420). These stubborn Cold War positions remained in place until 1990, when the MSC almost rose from the dead to undertake the role of coordinating a naval interdiction against Iraq under SC resolution 665 (S/21640). However, two or three informal meetings of the MSC held in the French Mission concluded to not formally activate the Committee.*

Through the MSC, the permanent five members of the UNSC are required to maintain a certain quota of military forces that would be at its disposal should the Council authorise intervening in a conflict. From documents analysed by Hill on the composition of such a force, the British had recommended it in the late 1940s that it should consist of:

- ◆ Air force - 750 bombers, 500 fighters, 25 others, total 1500
- ◆ Naval Forces - 3 battleships, 6 carrier (4 fleet, 2 light), 12 cruisers, 33 destroyers, 64 frigates, 24 minesweepers, 14 submarines, assault life for four brigade groups (16,000 men)
- ◆ Army - 15 divisions (375,000 - 450,000 men)

Keeping a permanent force of this size, even today, at the disposal of the UNSC could prove to be a major deterrent and a constant reminder to rogue states that the UN possesses a way to enforce its collective security mandate. However, East-West military partnerships raise

questions of political compatibility, national sovereignty and interoperability questions. The international atmosphere might not be suitable for the major powers ready to agree to such a collective arrangement just yet, even though it could help in facing rogue states. However, putting together a limited contingent of forces from the permanent members' armies as a test could prove to be an interesting first step.

Hill referenced a 1990 article by Ralph M. Goldman, who advocated a revival of the MSC, saying that in a post-Cold War world, NATO and the Warsaw Pact will diminish in importance and that the MSC would be in a good position to fill the gaps. More specifically, he argues that the MSC could start by holding a mandate of smaller scale, and in which it could be useful in dealing with rogue states.

The establishment of trust between rogue states and the international community will require some time. The close monitoring of a rogue state's civilian nuclear programme by an international authority will likely be a condition to the reintegration of this state in the international community. As such, Hill summed up Goldman's proposal, suggesting that the MSC could serve a role in monitoring compliance, which in the context of this paper could extend to nuclear disarmament and the supervision of civilian nuclear programmes in rogue states:

*To reduce the burdens on national intelligence agencies, the MSC could become a third-party observer in matters of treaty compliance. This public, multilateral and therefore objective entity could provide a common intelligence pool, which might encourage reduction in intelligence budgets. It could also help monitor early warning missions to prevent surprise attacks or accidental military encounters.*

Continuing on this idea, the suggested minimal UN contingent could serve both as an enforcer of UNSC sanctions requiring a physical presence or as a security unit for the protection of supervisory teams. The idea could be developed even further by giving an international contingent access to nuclear energy production sites or the control of both incoming and outgoing materials and personnel in facilities.

In short, the forgotten MSC holds many possibilities that could prove useful for the UNSC's collective security mission to be carried out in today's world. To be functional, it requires a political will to cooperate, both between the permanent members themselves and between those powers and the state whose behaviour they are trying to change.

### **3.3.4 The Key: Representativeness**

The main change that would be recommendable for the UNSC itself would be adding new permanent members. The current permanent members, the victors of the Second World War, are still important world powers today. However, the inclusion of Brazil, India and South Africa because of their increasing economic, demographic, political and international importance ought to be considered. Former UN Secretary-General Annan contemplated that *“a change in the Council's composition is needed to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole”*, to which he suggested two new permanent seats for Africa and Asia, and one or two for Europe and the Americas. (Annan, 2005: 42f.) By recognising this demographic change, the dynamics and methods of dealing with rogue states would likely be affected. One only needs to look at the recent fuel swap proposal of Brazil and Turkey with Iran. Whether such changes would be beneficial in the longer term for collective security arrangements would remain to be seen.



## 4. CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to find the most effective arrangement for global collective security to prevent interstate conflict with rogue states that could be considered a nuclear menace. It has examined the question by exploring the current capacities of two organisations dealing with collective security: The United Nations Security Council and the Group of Eight.

The theory of social liberalism in international relations may hold the key to a safer future. Globalisation gives room to fulfil this theory's central belief that close relationships between individuals, both country's leaders and chief diplomats, can contribute greatly to a more peaceful world. The more time they spent with each other, the more intimate this link becomes, and the more the trust increases.

We are indeed witnessing the rise of a "personal diplomacy". Bill Clinton's surprising effectiveness in the North Korean hostage situation, his warm welcome put on by Pyongyang, and the trust-building exercise between the Obama and Medvedev administrations over Iran as well as the personal involvement of Lula da Silva in that dossier indicates an important, yet subtle shift in international diplomacy. Collective security institutions must realise the importance of this phenomenon and capitalise upon it.

Personal links and trust building between high-level officials are not new phenomena. Through the years, many national leaders' and chief diplomats' good relationships with other states' officials have helped them to fulfil their international responsibilities. What is new here is that the personal relationships between high-level diplomats are no the exception; they are becoming a necessity to end deadlocks in global matters. The other new reality is the growing demand for people privy to these kinds of personal interactions, both in numbers and in scale.

The BRIC's formation is a signal to the Western nations that their monopoly on issues ranging from the economy to global security is ending. The West ought to come to terms with the diversity of opinion on issues like nuclear rogue states, if global security is to be ensured.

#### **4.1 Maintaining Collective Security Institutions**

The UNSC, a formal collective security institution, is simply too important to disappear, and it is relevant today despite arguments to the contrary. It will and it should remain the de facto collective security executive. While representativeness reforms will be necessary in the long run because of changing demographics and shifting powers, the institution will not be cast aside anytime soon.

The G8, an informal collective security institution, has helped to direct the debates on rogue states and has provided a drawing board for the G8's leadership to work on. While it deserves to be maintained for its practicality, the G8 must be open to the idea of merging with the G20 to expand the collective security dialogue and work on a less pro-Western approach to rogue states.

#### **4.2 The Need for a Global Collective Security Framework**

An official, yet informal international framework must allow the stakeholders, superpowers, major powers and regional powers to deal with each other on the issue of rogue states. The function of this broader framework could be to allow a smoother dialogue between states of different opinions to come to a solution by exchanging with each other at high levels and easing the work of the UNSC. The G20, an already established organisation, is a prime candidate to become a key player on the world stage as a helper to facilitate the work of official collective security arrangements.

#### **4.3 Facing the Opposition by Inclusion**

A collective security arrangement is effective if it has unanimity from all of its members. It would do well to include the troublemaking state as an integral and active part in the discussions. While there is no guarantee of a positive outcome or substantial developments from such an inclusion, the lack of precedents in terms of state-to-rogue state, multiparty dialogue makes it an option that could be interesting to explore.

An expanded foreign ministers' forum on rogue states would be an interesting trust-building method that could have a twofold effect:

First, there is a chance that inclusion of the rogue state in the talks and the presence of “bridging” states like Brazil or Turkey might lead to the socialisation of its diplomatic elite. The main reason behind this idea is that challenges are usually issued through press conferences or international institutions where there are not many chances for the decision-makers to interact with personally with each other. This can lead to massive problems in signalling between parties and misinterpretation of intentions. Essentially, the lack of direct, face-to-face contact can amount to a situation of information failure, which is most dangerous in the context of nuclear tensions.

Second, their presence as well as the presence of countries, which objectives are less aligned with the G7-G8 could help smoothen the dialogue and centre it more on mutually acceptable solutions rather than on sanctions. The author believes that if foreign ministers work on ways to solve their differences together rather than on finding ways to establish new punishments that will antagonise a rogue state, the world will ultimately benefit from increased security.

#### **4.4 Pre-emptive Peace: A Collective Security Model for the Twenty-First-Century**

A tandem approach between current formal and informal institutions, with a few changes, could work well as a collective security arrangement for dealing with rogue states that might pose a nuclear threat. The goal of this dual approach is to establish a climate in which tensions can be subdued before the possibility of conflict arises, and to foster a climate of multilateral cooperation that would satisfy both sides of the conflict.

The two ideas that are at the heart of this proposed collective security arrangement are inclusiveness to represent both neutral and opposing parties in order for dialogue to be held, and informality in cultivating high-level positive working relationships that are more likely to produce results for peace.

The proposed Foreign Ministers' G20 could serve as a greater framework for discussions between high-level representatives of the concerned parties, their allies, their rivals, and neutral actors to discuss challenges, solutions and goals to be reached. When solutions are agreed upon, they could be forwarded to the UNSC whose role would be to apply them and to monitor that all involved parties stick to their commitments.

While this is a mere basic proposal and there is no guarantee of its success, the current international deadlock, and rising tensions with Iran continuing to enrich uranium, North Korea sinking the South Korea corvette *Cheonan*, and Burma rumoured to be attempting to acquire nuclear weapons makes the need to find a collective security arrangement to deal with rogue states all the more pressing.

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