
**Assessing the Impact of the
Seoul Summit Development Commitments**

Case Study Mexico*

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Executive Summary

This case study reviews Mexico's advances with regard to 25 commitments related to development and employment made at G20 Summit of Seoul in 2010. The 25 commitments were identified by the G20 Research Group based on a methodology developed to measure the level of compliance of the G20 members.

The case study reveals that Mexico has made important progress on the relevant Seoul commitments with particular regard to financial inclusion and employment. However, the advances are not reported within the G20's Development Working Group due to two initial conflicts. First, the Mexican government assumes that since the commitments are aimed at the development and growth of developing countries and low-income countries, implementation depends on the political will of those countries and thus Mexico has no responsibility in their implementation. Second, these commitments were created on the basis of an equal level of development among the G20 country members, a level of equality that does not exist in Mexico as the country still faces major development challenges directly related to the commitments set within the G20.

The case study also identifies factors intrinsic to Mexican public administration affecting the implementation of the commitments of the G20. These factors relate closely to a lack of institutionalization within the Mexican government, which affects the distribution of tasks and communication among Mexican agencies. As the study shows, these institutional barriers may be a determining factor for Mexico's compliance with international commitments, and not only in the context of the G20.

Finally, the study reveals some positive impacts that the Mexican presidency of the G20 in 2012 could have on the implementation process.

1. Introduction

As a forum for voluntary political coordination, the very existence of the G20 depends on the effectiveness of the actions and commitments agreed to collectively by its members, who, in turn, depend on domestic implementation. Development has recently been included in the G20 agenda and has been claimed to be an advance, given that the intrinsic connection between financial measures and human wellbeing has been clearly recognized. With the Seoul Development Consensus (SDC) of 2010, development objectives were introduced as a means to promote economic growth in developing countries and acknowledge that shared growth is the best way to manage the effects of the financial crises. However, it is still too early conclusively to evaluate whether this new approach will have an impact on how the developed world interacts with developing countries.

This case study seeks to review the process of implementing the Seoul development and employment commitments in Mexico. Interviews were conducted with ten officials from different federal ministries including those responsible for various issues in the Development Working Group, which oversees the implementation of the development agenda.

As the development agenda of the Seoul Summit is aimed at non-G20 members and thus coordinated by international organizations, many of the public officials interviewed in Mexico share the perception that Mexico has no responsibility in taking national actions to implement

it. However, it is important to trace Mexico's process of implementing the selected commitments on the grounds that its national development cannot be detached from its international commitments.

The Seoul development agenda offers an opportunity for emerging countries to play a bridging role between the least developed and the most developed countries. However, it is also a challenge for countries like Mexico that still face major development problems and limitations of their own. Many of those limitations are present in their own institutions.

2. Methodology

Based on the 25 development commitments identified by the analysis and methodology of the G20 Research Group (20 on development alone, two on development and employment, and three on employment alone), this case study seeks to determine the extent to which commitments agreed by leaders at the Seoul G20 summit have been implemented and how these commitments have been translated into action by national governments.

To collect information, interviews and meetings were conducted with Mexican public officials involved in the processes of implementation at the federal level.

In order to identify the contacts, a review was carried out of the principal actors involved in the distinct issues on the G20 agenda. These actors were sent a letter explaining the general objectives of the study and requesting a meeting. Subsequently, the leaders of the Development Working Group provided a list of officials from government departments that, according to the Development Working Group, are responsible for the different issues. Although the majority of the officials were ones who had already been contacted, some of them indicated that they are not responsible for development issues.¹

For the meetings, a questionnaire comprising 18 questions was constructed with the aim of determining the role that each official plays in the G20 process in general and, in particular, in the implementation process of the distinct development commitments. Included in the questionnaire were questions about communication with the various units and with other areas, the definition of activities, follow-up and progress reporting. Likewise, it included questions about the impact and reach of the commitments.

The information provided in the interviews was supplemented with information derived from other forums and events in which the research team has participated, such as meetings held by the Mexican government, consultations and workshops. Also, the information presented in this study is supplemented by research and analysis of documents released by the Mexican government, the G20 and international organizations.

3. Seoul Development Consensus

In November 2010 the G20 leaders launched the *Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth*, a document that established the commitment of the G20 members to work in

¹ Of the list of nine Mexican officials provided by the Presidency of the Development Working Group for being those in charge of the development pillars, four were interviewed for this case study. Three claimed not be in charge of the development issues and did not agree to be interviewed. Two asked other public officials within their dependencies to be interviewed in their place.

partnership with developing countries, and low-income countries (LICs) in particular, to help them build the capacity to achieve and maximize their growth potential, thereby contributing to global rebalancing.

The SDC is often referred to as a new phase in the G20 as it marks the full inclusion of the issue of development in the agenda of this group. It acknowledges the importance of supporting developing countries and LICs to enhance their national development strategies in order to boost their economic growth. To do so, the SDC established six principles: focus on economic growth, global development partnerships, global or regional systemic issues, private sector participation, complementarity and outcome orientation. It identified nine core areas of action, known as development pillars: infrastructure, private investment and job creation, human resource development, trade, financial inclusion, growth with resilience, food security, domestic resource mobilization and knowledge sharing.

G20 members account for 90% of global gross domestic product (GDP), 80% of global commerce and two thirds of the world's population. In that light, it is itself a great achievement that, in the middle of the financial crisis, this group recognized the need to promote the development of other countries as an opportunity to face the challenges presented by the crisis and to generate growth jointly.

Compliance of emerging countries

The G20 could play a truly important role in promoting growth goals and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) if the Seoul commitments are fully implemented. Additionally, the SDC can be considered a turning point in terms of international cooperation as it “reflects the impact of the developing countries on the forum and the fact that their agenda has gained legitimacy, and committed the G20 more clearly to the less-developed countries and sectors.”²

However, general analyses of G20 compliance on development show that compliance has been relatively low, lower than in any other issue area.³ Moreover, if analyzed individually, the evidence reveals a gap between the rates of compliance of developed countries and emerging countries, as the average score for advanced countries is +0.53, while for developing countries it is -0.33.

This could suggest that advanced countries take their commitments more seriously. However, the preliminary report on development commitments of the Seoul Development Consensus, of which this study is a part, found that some emerging countries also contribute in compliance. This is the case for South Africa and China, with a compliance level of 81%, compared with the maximum level of 90% for the United Kingdom and Germany. In contrast, the two countries

² Aranda, Lourdes (2012). “The Role of Mexico in the G20.” Matías Romero Institute. Retrieved from: <http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/cuadernos/G20ceng.pdf>.

³ The series of studies performed by the G20 Research Group shows a positive trend in general G20 compliance: Washington +0.67 (or 83.5%), London +0.23 (or 61.5%), Pittsburgh +0.24 (or 62%), Toronto +0.28 (or 64%), Seoul +0.5 (or 75%), Cannes +0.54 (or 77%). However, the average compliance in development has been +0.16. Pittsburgh's compliance on development was the lowest (even negative) and Seoul was higher with a score of +0.60.

with the poorest compliance were Argentina with 43% and Mexico with 46%, which demonstrates that the level of compliance among emerging countries varies.⁴

The analysis also reveals a notable improvement in the level of compliance of Mexico. In the first period of analysis (from November 2010 to November 2011, one year after the SDC was issued), Mexico's score of +0.14 (or 46%) is the lowest in the group, while in the second period reviewed (from November 2011 to February 2012) its compliance score increased to +0.43 (or 72%).

However, as this case study shows, the compliance and implementation of the SDC commitments may bring significant challenges for countries such as Mexico, which has not completely addressed its own development problems. Through a revision of some structural variables, generally of an institutional type, the case study analyzes the processes and mechanisms for implementation used by the Mexican government.

Mexico's advances on the development commitments

To facilitate the understanding of this case study, the development commitments are presented below, grouped according to topic. The numbers listed in each commitment correspond to the complete list of commitments issued at the 2010 Seoul Summit as compiled by the G20 Research Group.⁵ As noted, this study reviews only the commitments identified as commitments directly related to development or to employment and development, which total 25.

For each topic, there is a brief overview of Mexico's progress and a comment on the results from the 2011 Los Cabos Summit, particularly within the Development Working Group. The summary includes Mexican government actions that relate indirectly to G20 development commitments, although they are not explicitly expressed as such.

Infrastructure

The G20 members reiterated their “commitment to completing an ambitious replenishment for the concessional lending facilities of the MDBs [multilateral development banks], especially the International Development Association, to help ensure that LICs have access to sufficient concessional resources” [46]. They also agreed “to establish a High-Level Panel (HLP) to recommend measures to mobilize infrastructure financing and review MDB's [multilateral development banks] policy frameworks” and promised to announce “the Chair of the HLP by December 2010 [108-109].

For the latter, the HLP was established and delivered its recommendations during the Cannes Summit in November 2011. However, these recommendations are aimed at the performance of the MDBs.⁶

⁴ This is also the case of the monetary commitments redefined to reflect the differences. The global compliance result in this commitment in particular is +0.53 for advanced countries and +0.25 for emerging countries, which is obviously much better than -0.33.

⁵ The complete list of commitments is available from the G20 Information Centre:
<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/commitments-10-seoul.html>.

⁶ High Level Panel on Infrastructure (October 2011). “Recommendations to G20.” Retrieved from:
http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/root/bank_objects/HLP_-_Full_report.pdf.

Regarding Mexico's contributions to the MDBs, the country seems to participate inconsistently. For instance, according to figures from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Mexico's current number of shares is 658,978 (7.01% of the institution's ownership) and capital contributions for 2009 were US\$7,309 million.⁷ In 2012, Mexico approved an additional subscription of 401,052 shares equivalent to US\$4,838,063,683.⁸ However, for over 50 years the IDB has approved operations in Mexico exceeding a value of US\$25 billion, making it the largest recipient of loans and disbursements from the IDB in Latin America and the Caribbean, and constituting the bulk of historical funding for bilateral relations.⁹

Moreover, Mexico is an extra-regional member of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE, for its initials in Spanish), to which it contributes US\$150 million. Through this institution and under the San Jose Accord, Bancomext (National Bank of Foreign Trade) provided US\$3.3 million for housing projects. This program, announced in June 2008, seeks to consolidate a financing market demand for affordable housing and address the housing backlog in Central America. By December 31, 2011, the program had made 25% of the initial funding available and had channeled 22.1% of the resources available.¹⁰ Mexico, through the BCIE, also provides funding to the project on "Construction of the Villa San Antonio - Goascorán Stretch of the Atlantic-Pacific Corridor" in Honduras, with a contribution of US\$ 89.9 million, including US\$55 million from the Mexican government. The BCIE also placed bonds for 700 million pesos on the Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, BMV). Of the BCIE's total concessional financing in 2010 of US\$71.4 million, 66.5% came from Mexico.

Finally, Mexico has been a regional partner of the Caribbean Development Bank since 1982 and has participated in all capitalizations of the institution. Mexico approved a capital increase of 150% for most of 2010, which involved a total additional contribution of US\$28.2 million. Additionally, Mexico accounts for the Special Development Fund, which provides resources on more favorable terms for special projects. The last contribution in December 2011 was of US\$3 million.¹¹

In 2012, two reports have been presented to the Development Working Group. The first document presents innovative finance serving infrastructure development as a viable solution to the misperception of risks and returns in LICs. It provides evidence of "the still existing gap between the view held by investors of investing in LICs and reality." It also encourages financial institutions to "expand their existing financing tools to share and mitigate risk" and the MDBs to "evolve from a 'lending' culture to an 'enabling' one."¹²

⁷ Inter-American Development Bank (2012). Participación de México. Retrieved from: <http://www.iadb.org/es/paises/mexico/participacion,1049.html>.

⁸ On May 14, 2012, the Mexican government issued a decree reforming articles 2 and 3 of the Act Establishing the Basis for Law Enforcement in Mexico, the Federal Executive Power, the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank. See: <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/200.pdf>.

⁹ Inter-American Development Bank (2012). "Un vistazo al BID en México." Retrieved from: <http://www.iadb.org/es/paises/mexico/un-vistazo-al-bid-en-mexico,1097.html>.

¹⁰ Proyecto Mesoamerica (2012). "Programa para el Desarrollo de Vivienda Social en Centroamérica." Retrieved from: http://www.proyectomesoamerica.org/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=190&Itemid=119.

¹¹ Caribbean Development Bank (2012). "Regional Members." Retrieved from: <http://www.caribank.org/about-cdb/member-countries>.

¹² Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (June 2012). "Misperception of Risk and Return in Low Income Countries." Retrieved from: <http://amexcid.gob.mx/images/pdf/G20DWG/Misperception-of-Risk-and-Return-in-Low-income-Countries.pdf>, pp. 5-6.

The second document is about best practices for infrastructure projects in urban mass transportation in mid-sized and large cities in developing countries. This report, jointly prepared by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, lays out the key aspects to ensure the sustainability of urban transport systems. It refers to the work done by the World Bank in Mexico through the Urban Transportation Transformation Program, among other national initiatives. In this project, the federal government supports a large-scale investment program in mass transit and public transport reform in several Mexican cities. As the report says, “the program facilitates private sector participation, introduction of clean technologies, incorporation of top social and environmental standards, and support for projects that are consistent with sustainable urban transport plans.”¹³

Additionally, the MDB Working Group on Infrastructure presented its progress report, which describes advances on initiatives to open up the infrastructure project pipeline (through increased private sector participation) and improve infrastructure-spending efficiency.¹⁴

One of the investment projects mentioned in the MDB Working Group’s report is “The Pacific Corridor,” which seeks to integrate the Mesoamerican region by facilitating the transport of goods and people. The corridor starts in Puebla (Mexico) and follows the coastal route parallel to the Pacific Ocean to Panama City, covering a total length of 3,244 kilometers. In 2010, the IADB announced the approval of two technical cooperation grants for US\$2.6 million to boost the Pacific Corridor.¹⁵ Currently, IADB is “supporting with a team of consultants the elaboration of all Terms of Reference required to develop the pre-investment studies for all projects identified for the Pacific Corridor, terms that are expected to be completed by mid-2012.”¹⁶

Trade

The G20 members have committed to “improve access and availability to trade with advanced economies and between developing and LICs” [112]. This includes the promotion of duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs, increased support for trade facilitation by strengthening the role for South-South cooperation, and the identification of barriers to regional trade integration.

Since 2008, the federal government of Mexico has focused its national competitiveness strategy on policies and regulations for foreign trade based on three main pillars: trade facilitation by tariff simplification and facilitation of customs and foreign trade, regulatory reform, and

¹³ World Bank and Asian Development Bank (2012). *Urban Mass Transport Infrastructure in Medium and Large Cities in Developing Countries*. Retrieved from: <http://amexcid.gob.mx/images/pdf/G20DWG/Urban-Mass-Transport-Infrastructure-in-Medium-and-Large-Cities-in-Developing-Countries.pdf>.

¹⁴ The MDB Working Group on Infrastructure comprises the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank Group.

¹⁵ Inter-American Development Bank (January 2010). “BID aprobó donación de US\$2,6 millones para el desarrollo del Corredor Pacífico del Proyecto Mesoamérica”. Retrieved from: <http://www.iadb.org/es/noticias/comunicados-de-prensa/2010-01-08/bid-aprobo-donacion-para-corredor-pacifico-del-proyecto-mesoamerica,6342.html>.

¹⁶ MDB Working Group on Infrastructure (April 2012). “Infrastructure Action Plan 2012 Follow-Up Report.” Retrieved from: <http://amexcid.gob.mx/images/pdf/G20DWG/Infrastructure-Action-Plan-2012-Follow-up-Report.pdf> p. 14.

simplification of procedures and access to technology.¹⁷ On the first, between 2008 and 2011, the Mexican government reduced the simple average tariff of 9.6 percent to 4.7 percent, which represented industry savings of US\$1.060 million in 2010 with positive effects on employment.¹⁸ By 2013, it is expected that 63% of Mexico's tariff lines will be duty free, reducing its average industrial tariff to just 4.3%.¹⁹

On the second point, the Mexican government has recently launched programs such as “Zero-Based Regulation” to reduce transaction costs faced by both businesses and citizens and to facilitate the quick opening of businesses. This combination of regulatory improvements is projected to save Mexican businesses and citizens US\$3.9 billion over a six-year period.²⁰ Regarding the simplification of procedures, Mexico claims to have eliminated 12,234 internal regulations and 1,358 bureaucratic steps for businesses. All these measures have led to Mexico moving up 27 positions in the trade facilitation report “Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World” published by the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation.²¹

According to Mexico's Ministry of the Economy, these measures are linked to Aid for Trade as they seek to support facilitation and trade liberalization to increase international trade, using it to promote economic development in Mexico.²² To carry out the strategies of initiatives of trade facilitation, regulatory reform and the simplification of procedures, Mexico receives technical assistance from international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank and the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT). However, the country does not proclaim itself to be a receiver of Aid for Trade as it considers the assistance provided by those organizations to be part of annual programs with their members.²³

On the other hand, Mexico does provide Aid for Trade mainly to the countries of Central America. For instance, the lack of transport and communications infrastructure in this region is considered a barrier to trade and development of the Mesoamerican region, which includes Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. Launched in June 2001 as the Puebla-Panama Plan, the Mesoamerican Project seeks to spur

¹⁷ Secretaría de Economía (January 2012). “Agenda Nacional para la Competitividad. Ayuda para el Comercio.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/41/47638129.pdf>.

¹⁸ Martínez, Lorenza (February 2011). “Estrategia de Facilitación Comercial.” Presented in Mexico City for the American Chamber Forum. Retrieved from: http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/Estrategia_Facilitacion_comercial_2011febreroSND.pdf.

¹⁹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Trade Organization (2011), “Aid for Trade at a Glance 2011: Showing Results.” Retrieved from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264117471-en> p. 120.

²⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Trade Organization (2011), “Aid for Trade at a Glance 2011: Showing Results.” Retrieved from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264117471-en> p. 120.

²¹ World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2012). Economy Profile Mexico. “Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World.” Retrieved from: [http://espanol.doingbusiness.org/~media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/MEX.pdf](http://espanol.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/MEX.pdf).

²² Secretaría de Economía (January, 2011). Agenda Nacional para la Competitividad. Ayuda para el Comercio. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/41/47638129.pdf>.

²³ Inter-American Development Bank and World Trade Organization (2009). “Implementing Aid for Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/iadb_reporto9_e.pdf.

integration and development among these eight Mesoamerican countries, plus Colombia, a member since 2006. The project includes investment programs in areas such as transport infrastructure, electrical and telecommunication interconnection, biofuels, competitiveness, health, environment, climate change prevention and mitigation of natural disasters, and social housing.²⁴

Trade-related infrastructure investments aim at connecting markets, reducing transport and trade costs, enhancing trade competitiveness, improving the climate for foreign investment, and delivering goods and services to world markets more efficiently.²⁵ For example, Mexico is currently involved with the Infrastructure Fund for Mesoamerica and the Caribbean, which provides financial support, technical assistance programs and infrastructure projects with support from the IADB and the BCIE.²⁶

The integration strategy is reinforced by other measures of trade policy implemented by Mexico's Ministry of the Economy. For instance, after a complex yet successful negotiating process, the trade agreements between Mexico and five other Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) were recently consolidated into a single free trade agreement.²⁷ This agreement is expected to enhance and facilitate trade in the region as it seeks to incorporate 98% of the existing rules into a single regulation and one certificate of origin, thus, reducing administrative trade-related costs. It is expected that small and medium enterprises in Mexico and Central America will benefit from reduced transaction costs, allowing them to strengthen their economies of scale to increase their productivity and efficiency.²⁸

Regarding the work done in 2012 by the Development Working Group on the issue of trade, no report has been presented other than the paragraphs included in the group statement.²⁹ These paragraphs reiterate the G20 members' commitment to make progress on implementing their duty-free/quota-free obligations consistent with the WTO Hong Kong Declaration, recognizing the importance of trade facilitation in reducing the costs of doing business, keeping the commitment on Aid for Trade financing and working to ensure the continued effectiveness of our Aid for Trade support, and calling for a rapid conclusion to the Doha trade negotiations.

One particular mention was to "the relevance of trade integration as a means of promoting growth, job creation, investment and integration into regional and global value chains." This point is relevant, as the issue of supply chains was one of the top priorities of the Mexican Ministry of the Economy concerning the G20 trade agenda. In an interview, Roberto Zapata,

²⁴ Proyecto Mesoamerica (2012). <http://www.proyectomesoamerica.org/>.

²⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Trade Organization (2009). "Aid for Trade at a Glance: Maintaining Momentum." Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4trade09_e.pdf.

²⁶ Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (March 2012). "México presenta Acuerdo de Yucatán en reunión anual del BID." Retrieved from: http://www.proyectomesoamerica.org/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=467&Itemid=85.

²⁷ Secretaría de Economía (January 2011). "El proceso de convergencia de los tratados de libre comercio entre México y Centroamérica para establecer un Acuerdo único." Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/40/47638120.pdf>.

²⁸ Secretaría de Economía (December, 2011). "El TLC entre México y Centroamérica permitirá construir una visión común para enfrentar los retos de la economía global". Retrieved from: <http://www.economia.gob.mx/eventos-noticias/sala-de-prensa/comunicados/7013-boletin-283-1>.

²⁹ Development Working Group (2012). "2012 Progress Report of the Development Working Group." Retrieved from: <http://amexcid.gob.mx/images/pdf/G20DWG/2012-Progress-Report-of-the-Development-Working-Group.pdf>.

Director General of Regional Multilateral Negotiations, who was responsible for coordinating the trade agenda for the Mexican presidency of the G20, emphasized that putting this topic on the agenda of the G20 was a great Mexican achievement. He also said that the main objectives were to demonstrate that discussions on this issue are possible and to contribute to advancing other discussions of international trade by indirectly spurring the Doha negotiations. Although the issue was not widely explored within the Development Working Group, it is expected to be included in the stocktaking that will take place in the fourth meeting of the group in October 2012.

Financial inclusion

The issue of financial inclusion has been well covered in the G20's Financial Track and its working groups almost since the leaders began meeting in Washington in November 2008. With particular regard to development, the G20 members acknowledged a strong commitment to financial inclusion and recognized "the benefits of improved access to finance to lift the lives of the poor and to support the contribution of SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises] to economic development" [124]. Regarding the launch of the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), G20 members agreed that it will "forward our work on financial inclusion, including implementation of the Financial Inclusion Action Plan," which includes all G20 countries, interested non-G20 countries and relevant stakeholders [125]. They also "welcome the commitment of Canada, Korea, the United States and the Inter-American Development Bank of \$528 million to the [SME Finance] Framework through grants and co-financing" [126].

Financial inclusion is one of the areas in which Mexico has made major advances. The National Program to Finance Development 2008–2012 recognizes "the positive impact that the financial system can have on the inclusion of all segments of the population in the economic development process by allowing well-paid savings, access to credit and the ability to deal successfully with different risks."³⁰

The Mexican government, through the National Commission for Banking and Securities (CNVB), has implemented several regulatory changes to foster financial inclusion. For example, in 2007 Mexico changed its banking laws to require that banks offer deposit products exempt from fees.³¹ Also, in August 2011 new schemes were introduced to allow banks to offer basic products bound in value and to allow the remote opening of accounts; both these mechanisms also have a positive impact on the prevention of money laundering.³² In September 2011 the National Council for Financial Inclusion (CONAIF) was created to coordinate the development of a national policy on financial inclusion.

³⁰ Gobierno de México (2008). "Programa nacional de financiamiento del Desarrollo 2008–2012." Retrieved from: <http://pbr.planeacion.unam.mx/materiales/Programa%20Nacional%20de%20Financiamiento%20para%20el%20Desarrollo%202008-2012.pdf>; Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2012). PRONAFIDE. http://www.shcp.gob.mx/POLITICAFINANCIERA/credito_publico_ii/pol_credito_publico/Paginas/pronafide.aspx. Translation by authors.

³¹ This change was made by the Law of Credit Institutions. See: <http://www.banxico.org.mx/informacion-para-la-prensa/comunicados/miscelaneos/boletines/%7B5DBB78AA-30F7-E252-1ECD-E419F9525A3D%7D.pdf>.

³² Diario Oficial (August 2011). "Resolución que reforma, deroga y adiciona las Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el artículo 115 de la Ley de Instituciones de Crédito." Retrieved from: http://www.hacienda.gob.mx/LASHCP/MarcoJuridico/InteligenciaFinanciera/disposiciones/dcg_instituciones_de_credito_12ago11.pdf.

Additionally, “niche banks” and “correspondent banking” were included in Mexican regulation in order to increase competition in the sector at a low cost. Correspondent banks, for example, rely on the infrastructure of convenience stores, gas stations, restaurants or hotels to offer banking services in remote towns.³³ These initiatives have resulted in an increase from 43% to 60% in the number of municipalities that currently have a banking presence.³⁴

Other measures include the spur of new technologies such as mobile banking, which was recently introduced into Mexican legislation (August 2011) to break the barriers of traditional financial services such as the lack of physical infrastructure in rural areas. However, it is difficult to affirm that these measures were introduced as a result of the SDC.

Also in January 2012, the Mexican government launched a pilot service of “mobile payments” in Santiago Nuyoo, a rural community located in the state of Oaxaca. Mobile banking allows for basic financial transactions such as payments for services, transfers from person to person, balance inquiries, purchases, and sending and receiving remittances through affordable mobile and loading/unloading cash at TELECOMM offices, the Mexican decentralized body for telecommunications.³⁵ Based on this pilot project, the Mexican government recently announced the development of a broader program of financial inclusion through rural satellite telephony that seeks to include around 32 million people living in towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants where the majority does not have access to basic financial services.³⁶

Another measure implemented by the Mexican government to expand the banking population is the electronic payment of subsidies and support for social programs. This funding is now delivered electronically through the National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) and all the beneficiaries of the “Oportunidades” program now have a debit card. This will be expanded to other social programs.

Additionally, the Mexican government has established programs aimed at increasing competition in the financial sector. One of the most recent programs is one that allows small savers to buy Treasury Certificates (Cetes-Directo), which were previously restricted to large investors. These expanded saving options allow almost any citizen the opportunity to invest in government instruments starting at a value of 100 pesos.

With the measures that have been implemented, banking use among the Mexican population has progressed. In 2004, the World Bank reported that only 25% of Mexico’s population had access to banking. In 2009, a survey conducted by the Treasury Department showed that this figure had reached 48%. By the end of 2012 new data will be available due to the National Survey of Financial Inclusion, developed by the Finance Ministry and Banco de Mexico

³³ Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (2011). Modelos de Negocio para Inclusión Financiera. Corresponsables bancarios. Retrieved from: <http://www.cnbv.gob.mx/Prensa/Tabla%20Lista%20%20Estudios/Comercios%20y%20Redes%20de%20Dist%20Esp.pdf>.

³⁴ Presidencia de la República (September 2011). “Discurso del Presidente Calderón en el Foro global de inclusión financiera y primer foro de la inclusión financiera del G20.” Retrieved from: <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/2011/09/el-presidente-calderon-en-el-foro-global-de-inclusion-financiera-y-primer-foro-de-la-inclusion-financiera-del-g-20/>.

³⁵ This project gathers information to evaluate the feasibility of expanding the service to other rural communities in Mexico, according to the Equal Opportunities Initiative of the National Development Plan 2007-2012. The study conducted by the World Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) on the results of this pilot project ended on July 6, 2012.

³⁶ TELECOMM (June 2012). “Avanza la banca rural vía telefonía celular”. Retrieved from: http://www.telecomm.net.mx/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=165&Itemid.

(Banxico). The new National Strategy for Financial Inclusion will be based on the results of this survey.³⁷

Despite this progress, Mexico is still one of the countries where the majority of the poor do not use formal financial services. According to the World Bank, while 16% of adults in sub-Saharan Africa report using a cell phone to pay bills or to send or receive money, in Mexico this figure is a mere 6%.³⁸ Moreover, in Mexico, the percentage of men and women over 15 years of age who have a bank account in a formal financial institution (33% and 22%, respectively) is below the world average (54.7% and 46.3%, respectively) and below other countries such as Brazil (61% and 51%) and Chile (43% and 41%). Other challenges in Mexico include the facts that only 6.7% of the population over 15 years old made savings in a financial institution in 2011 (compared to an average of 9.5% in Latin America), only 22% of the population has a debit card (versus 29% in Latin America) and only 13% of the population has a credit card (versus 18% in Latin America). Moreover, according to one study, about 64% of Mexico's municipalities have no bank branches, and in rural municipalities this figure is as high as 96%. Additionally, 70% of the economically active population does not use formal banking and about 36% of the poor population, mainly concentrated in rural areas, is excluded from access to financial services due to their lack of assets, their low level of education or other barriers to entry into the formal economy.³⁹

Another commitment on finance inclusion made at Seoul was to “increase access to finance for the poor and small and medium enterprises (SMEs)” [117]. In recent years, the Mexican government has explicitly recognized the importance and potential contribution of SMEs to national development and has established their financial inclusion as one of the main objectives of the Ministry of the Economy. The main mechanism has been the National Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (SME Fund), established in 2004 with a specific category of funding and complemented with a National System of Warranties. The main source of financing for the SME Fund is provided by the federal government, and supplemented by other sources. For 2011, the federal contribution was 67.5% of total project cost, followed by 13.5% from the private sector, 9.9% from local governments and the remaining 9.2% from academic institutions and financiers.⁴⁰

Through the “Mexico Emprende” program, the Ministry of the Economy supported 69,283 companies in 2011 by facilitating access to credit, generating an outlay of finance for SMEs of about 74,285 million pesos. The ministry finances this trust with 2,770 million pesos for the implementation of security programs with commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. These results represented a growth of 10.2% over the amount of credit generated in 2010.⁴¹

³⁷ El Economista (July 2012). “Inclusión financiera, reto de la siguiente administración: SHCP.” Retrieved from: <http://eleconomista.com.mx/sistema-financiero/2012/07/03/inclusion-financiera-reto-siguiente-administracion-shcp>.

³⁸ World Bank (2012). “The Little Data Book on Financial Inclusion 2012.” Retrieved from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOBALFIN/Resources/8519638-1332259343991/LDBFinIncl_Apr16.pdf, p. 103.

³⁹ Anibal Bustillo en Marco Antonio Martínez (December 13, 2011). “Viven 57% de los municipios sin bancos.” *Sin Embargo*. Retrieved from: http://www.sinembargo.mx/download/lo_mejor_de_sin_embargo/13122011.pdf.

⁴⁰ CONEVAL (2012). “Evaluación de Consistencia y Resultados 2011–2012: Fondo de Apoyo para la Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa” (Fondo PYME). Retrieved from: http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/transparencia/2012/fondo_pyme/informe_final/ecr_2011_2012_fpyme.pdf, p. 3.

⁴¹ Secretaría de Economía (2012). “México Emprende.” *Boletín*. Vol. II, Num. 7. Retrieved from: <http://www.contactopyme.gob.mx/archivos/boletin/boletinII-7.pdf>.

In 2011 the government strategy focused on emphasizing targeted resources to develop guarantee credits for sectors that have little or no attention from financial intermediaries. This strategy allowed for the launching of other sectorial programs such as the Program for the Financing of the Construction Industry, the Program for the Financing of New Entrepreneurs through Commercial Banks, the Finance Program for the Replacement Equipment Energy Efficiency for Companies, the Program of Support Rural Tourists to SMEs, the SME Financing Program for Chain Mining, and the Program to Support SMEs in the Automotive and Auto Parts Industry, among others.⁴²

Additionally, credit conditions for enterprises have improved. Today, the average interest rate on loans in the Mexico *Emprende* program is 16.9%, which is lower than in 2008, when the average was 24.9%. The credit period has also been extended, so that the current average term is 30 months, up from 24 months in 2008.⁴³

Finally, other government bodies, such as Bansefi, directly provide services to low-income savers. The development bank Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) offers special credit services to SMEs.

The Development Working Group did not include a specific document on financial inclusion in its report to the 2012 Los Cabos Summit. However, the general report mentions the work done by the Sub-group on Principles and Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs) to promote financial inclusion commitments and action plans in line with the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion. It also mentions the work done by the SME Finance Sub-group to improve the policy environment and to identify and scale up successful models of SME financing. It said that particular attention is focused on the SME Finance Challenge and SME Finance Framework, the SME Finance Initiative, the SME Finance Forum, innovative and scalable agrifinance models, the Women's Finance Knowledge Hub and the SME Finance Compact.⁴⁴

Information about Mexico's progress in other financial sector policies is available in the policy commitments document published by the Finance Track as part of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth for the Los Cabos Summit.⁴⁵

Employment

Three types of commitments relate directly and indirectly to employment. First, regarding commitments dually related to employment and development, the G20 members would seek to “improve the development of employable skills matched to employer and labor market needs in order to enhance the ability to attract investment, create jobs and increase productivity.” A commitment was also made to “support the development of internationally comparable skills

⁴² Secretaría de Economía (2012). “Programas de la SE en México *Emprende*.” Retrieved from: <http://economia.gob.mx/mexico-emprende/programas>.

⁴³ Secretaría de Economía (2012). “México *Emprende*.” *Boletín*. Vol. II, Num. 7. Retrieved from: <http://www.contactopyme.gob.mx/archivos/boletin/boletinII-7.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Development Working Group (2012). “2012 Progress Report of the Development Working Group.” Retrieved from: <http://amexcid.gob.mx/images/pdf/G20DWG/2012-Progress-Report-of-the-Development-Working-Group.pdf>.

⁴⁵ G20 (2012). Policy Commitments by G20 Members. Retrieved from: http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/Policy_Commitments_By_G20_Members.pdf

indicators and the enhancement of national strategies for skills development, building on the G20 Training Strategy” [110-111].⁴⁶ The two commitments are directly related to Pillar 2 on Human Resource Development.

Second, on employment-only commitments, the G20 members agreed to “implement a range of structural reforms to boost and sustain global demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase our growth potential, and where needed undertake: ... labor and human resource development reforms, including better targeted benefits schemes to increase participation; education and training to increase employment in quality jobs, boost productivity and thereby enhance potential growth” [55-56].

To review Mexican progress on these topics, this report considers several national employment initiatives recently undertaken by the federal government. As this is an issue studied by the International Labor Organization (ILO), which has published several studies on the subject, this report does not go into the detail about the programs.

Regarding jobs creation, the National Employment Service (SNE) is the national framework that comprises most of the federal initiatives aimed at providing information, funds, training and labor mobility support for Mexican workers. Founded in 1978, the SNE is a federalized institution in which the states and the federal government share responsibility for the implementation of different programs and mechanisms through coordination agreements. This service operates through 165 offices across the country and includes the following programs: employment promotion services such as careers services (on site and through a web portal), employment fairs, labor exchange centers, workshops for job seekers and the Mexico-Canada Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (PTAT). All these mechanisms provide the unemployed and underemployed population with orientation services, occupational information and financial or in-kind support for job search and job mobility.⁴⁷

In 2009, due to the financial crisis, an estimated 700,000 workers in the Mexican manufacturing sector were at risk of dismissal. As a result, an agreement was reached with unions, workers and businesses with export demand contraction, which stipulated that the government would pay one third of a worker’s salary and the employer would pay another third. The program was directed at the automotive, auto-part, machinery and electronic equipment industries, where businesses were the most vulnerable to the international financial environment. From January to September 2010, half a million workers were able to save their jobs because of this program.

On skills development, the National System of People Skills (CONOCER) is a national strategy that aims to strengthen skills of workers. It involves the development of competency standards by employers, workers, labor leaders, educators and government (at federal and state levels), which are used as a reference in evaluating and certifying individuals and as inputs for

⁴⁶ The preliminary conceptual framework introduced by the OECD includes five areas of indicators: skills formation, skills utilization, matching of skills supply to demand, skills development outcomes and contextual factors (such as level of economic development, demographic characteristics, etc.). International Labour Organization (September 6, 2011). “Meeting Report: G20 Training Strategy Knowledge-Sharing Workshop on Skills for Employment.” Retrieved from: http://www.ilo.org/skills/events/WCMS_162422/lang-en/index.htm. The final report on skills indicators is due at the end of 2012 and the final report with comparable database will be realized by late 2014.

⁴⁷ Secretaría de Trabajo y Protección Social (2011). “Informe de labores.” Retrieved from: http://www.stps.gob.mx/bp/anexos/5TO_INFORME/5o_Inf_COMPLETO.pdf.

educational institutions to develop curricula aligned to the requirements of the manufacturing, social, educational and government sectors.⁴⁸ From 2007 to 2011, 99 committees on competency management were established, 251,260 certificates on labor competition were issued and 157 new competency standards were developed.⁴⁹⁻⁵⁰

The Program of Scholarships (Bécate) funds the unemployed, underemployed or those temporarily unemployed due to suspended labor relations, to provide training courses to promote their access to the labor market or allow them to keep their current employment as well as training on how to develop private-owned small businesses. From September 2010 to July 2011, 2,492 grants were provided by this program.

The Self-Employment Program on provides furniture, machinery, equipment and tools for people starting their own new business. From September 2010 to July 2011, nearly 4,000 initiatives were funded.

The domestic labor mobility program supports workers who move to another location where there is a demand for labor in agriculture, industry or services. From September 2010 to July 2011 over 145,000 grants were awarded for the agricultural sector and nearly 5,000 for industry and services. This helped to place nearly 74,000 workers.

The Skilled Workers Registration System is an online platform provided by the Ministry of Labor (STPS) to provide a mechanism for employers to record the training of their workers easily. This system was created in December 2009 and by July 2011, more than 2.7 million workers had registered. Additionally, the National Training System for the Tourism Sector, recently created as part of the National Agreement on Tourism, provides alternative access to various training tools. Through this online tool, the ministries of Tourism, Public Education (SEP) and Labor (STPS) seek to foster the professionalization of the tourist sector.

The Temporary Employment Program was launched by President Felipe Calderón as part of the National Agreement for the Family Economy and Employment. Through this mechanism, the ministries of Social Development (SEDESOL), Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), Communications and Transport (SCT) and Labor (STPS) contribute to the protection of the employment and income of Mexican families, especially the poorest. SEDESOL, SCT and SEMARNAT are in charge of the generation of temporary jobs, while the STPS provides support in matching job seekers with employment vacancies. From September 2010 to July 2011, over one million persons benefited from the implementation of over 17,000 community projects.⁵¹

⁴⁸ This program is operated by the Mexican National Council for Standardization and Certification of Labor Competencies (CONOCER), which was launched in 1995 but suspended operations from 2003 to 2005. In 2008 the Mexican government decided to renovate this council and launched the National Skills System. See <http://www.conocer.gob.mx/>.

⁴⁹ Consejo Nacional de Normalización y Certificación (2011). "Informe de labores del Sistema Nacional de Competencias." Retrieved from: http://www.conocer.gob.mx/pdfs/documentos/informe_2011_distribucion.pdf.

⁵⁰ One of the most successful programs involves the sugar industry in Mexico. Using the competency standards of competency developed by CONOCER, training within the sugar industry is organized in targeted areas such as workplace safety and environmental protection. Workers who successfully complete the training receive a nationally recognized certificate. Since the program began in 2007, over 700 workers have been trained and certified.

⁵¹ Secretaría de Trabajo y Protección Social (2011). "Informe de labores." Retrieved from: http://www.stps.gob.mx/bp/anexos/5TO_INFORME/5o_Inf_COMPLETO.pdf, p. 32.

The National Agreement on Labor Productivity, launched in 2009 by Felipe Calderón, seeks to strengthen competitiveness by protecting productivity. This agreement ensures that organized labor, business and the federal government promote policies and tools to increase productivity in the workplace and to distribute its benefits equitably.

In recent years, the Mexican government has taken steps to strengthen institutional coordination to promote better access for agricultural workers to decent work, labor rights, social security and welfare. In 2007, the government launched an initiative to support interagency work between five ministries to work in areas such as regulation and inspection, safety and welfare, education, and promoting the development and integration of information. In 2010 this strategy provided access to basic education to 67,722 children of migrant farm workers, while more than 17,000 workers and their families were provided access to health care services through health fairs across the country.

These programs and public policies undertaken by the Mexican government are not reported to the Development Working Group, nor were they mentioned in response to a request for information to the International Affairs Office of the Ministry of Labor, which is responsible for participating in this group.

Another specific commitment made in Seoul was to “improve income security and resilience to adverse shocks by assisting developing countries enhance social protection programs, including through further implementation of the UN Global Pulse Initiative, and by facilitating implementation of initiatives aimed at a quantified reduction of the average cost of transferring remittances” [114].

With regard to the part of this commitment related to remittances, no person responsible for this issue could be found within the Mexican government.⁵² In fact, most public expenditure, about 45%, goes to social development (education, health, social security, urbanization, housing and drinking water), while 25% is allocated to economic development (energy, communications, agricultural development, labor issues, business, tourism, science and technology).⁵³

On social protection, “Vivir Mejor” is the social strategy of the Mexican federal government, which is implemented through inter-institutional coordination. It includes all programs that provide access to education, food, health and decent housing for Mexico’s poorest families. These schemes combine access to essential services with the provision of cash and in-kind social transfers, creating the basis for the Mexican social protection floor.

“Oportunidades” is a means-tested conditional cash transfer, also providing benefits in kind, including access to basic health care and nutritional supplements. The program provides conditional cash transfers for children going to school and the elderly, and cash benefits for electricity, housing and food. In 2010, 5.8 million families, about 30 per cent of all Mexicans, received these benefits. The program has a budget of about US\$5.7 billion.

⁵² The presidency of the Development Working Group identified the person responsible for this issue as Gerardo Zúñiga, the Manager of International Economic Affairs at the Bank of Mexico (Banxico). However, he said that although he participates in the Development Working Group, he could not provide information about remittances, as this topic had never been discussed within the Group of Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, which he leads.

⁵³ Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2012). Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación. Retrieved from: <http://www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx/ptp/#>.

Other federal programs are the following: 1) “70 y Más,” a non-contributory pension scheme addresses old-age poverty by offering a monthly transfer of MXN500 (US\$41.65) to poor persons aged over 70 living in small towns. Beneficiaries also have access to activities and services geared to improving their physical and mental health. In January 2011, there were 2.1 million beneficiaries of this scheme. 2) “Seguro Popular,” a health insurance scheme that extended health access to previously uninsured families. The program is offered for free to the poorest and at a low cost for others. By 2011, 44 million people had registered. The program’s budget tripled from MXN18 billion (US\$1.56 million) in 2006 to MXN52 billion (US\$4.5 billion) in 2010. The long-term aim is to provide health coverage for a total of 51 million people.

These programs and their coordination under Vivir Mejor have contributed to social development in Mexico. According to the Ministry for Social Development, 2.8 million more people would have been in extreme poverty between 2006 and 2008 without social programs.⁵⁴ This extent of coverage and scope of social programs in Mexico, has made SEDESOL consider that Mexico has long ago fulfilled the G20 commitment to develop a social floor. In fact, according to information provided during the interview with Blanca Lilia García, deputy director of SEDESOL’s international affairs, Mexico has a comprehensive system of social development that is not limited to the actions recommended by the G20.

Finally, the G20 members recognized the importance of promoting “private investment in value chains” and committed to “develop key indicators for measuring and maximizing the economic and employment impact of private sector investment” [113].⁵⁵

Officials at the Ministry of Economy responsible for participating in the Development Working Group provided no information for this study. However, the document presented as part of the results of this group, entitled “Policy Note on the Business Environment for Inclusive Business Models,” mentions two examples of Mexican programs.⁵⁶ First, Mexico’s Insurance Funds (Fondos de Aseguramiento), a program run by state-owned Agroasemex, is mentioned as an example of financing to small farmers as a policy to support inclusive models that integrate them into the value chain of production. This program provides farmers with crop and livestock insurance, while catastrophe insurance is provided by federal and state governments.⁵⁷ Second, a program coordinated by the National Housing Commission (CONAVI), which provides 6 million mortgage credits under its 2007–12 housing program, has been targeted. Most of this plan focuses on families earning less than \$920 a month. The program provides subsidies to poor families.

⁵⁴ International Labour Organization (2011). “Social Protection Floor: For a Fair and Inclusive Globalization.” Retrieved from: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/secsoc/downloads/bachelet.pdf>, p. 65.

⁵⁵ The report for the 2012 G20 Los Cabos Summit prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in collaboration with other members of the Inter-Agency Working Group, includes 11 key policy recommendations in four areas: improving the business climate and the regulatory framework for foreign and domestic investment; assisting developing countries to attract the most value-adding investment to their economies; promoting responsible investment in value-chains; and stimulating investment in local enterprise development. See UNCTAD (2012). “Promoting Responsible Investment for Sustainable Development and Job Creation.” Retrieved from: http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Miscellaneous%20Documents/diae_g20_Mexico_en.pdf.

⁵⁶ International Finance Corporation (2012). “Policy Note on the Business Environment for Inclusive Business Models.” Retrieved from: <http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/canalsherpas/18g20.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2012). “Fondos de Aseguramiento.” <http://www.agroasemex.gob.mx/index.php/es/informaciongeneral/fondosaseguramiento>.

Domestic Resource Mobilization

In Seoul, it was agreed that G20 member countries “will implement a range of structural reforms to boost and sustain global demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase our growth potential, and where needed undertake: Tax reform to enhance productivity by removing distortions and improving the incentives to work, invest and innovate” [57]. Also, it was agreed to “build sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social equity by improving developing country tax administration systems and policies and highlighting the relationship between non-cooperative jurisdictions and development” [118].

In recent years, the government of Mexico has made significant changes in tax law and has undertaken efforts to strengthen tax revenues and to modernize its tax system to make it more competitive and efficient.⁵⁸ However, several analyses indicate that Mexico needs much broader tax reform to reduce its dependency on oil revenues. Key areas for reform include cutting subsidies to energy consumption and reviewing tax exemptions, deductions and special schemes that distort tax administration.

According to the information provided by Hugo Garduño, Adviser to Under Minister of Finance, the tax burden as a proportion of GDP in Mexico is sufficiently low that it is not considered a restriction on work, investment and innovation. However, tax collection in Mexico is considerably lower than in other members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For example, the base of value-added tax (VAT) is very limited and therefore only a small part of the base potential is actually being taxed. This issue directly relates to one of the main challenges of Mexico: the large informal sector that has grown mainly from the economic crisis. For the OECD, informality represents a barrier to productivity growth. It suggests that Mexico address the barrier by reducing the costs of working in the formal sector and reducing the barriers to formalization measures that were included in the labor reform that has been promoted in recent years.⁵⁹

While strengthening the tax base is a key issue for Mexico, the adoption of fiscal and labor reforms is a particularly sensitive issue because of the high political cost such reforms represent.

International development cooperation

The Seoul Action Plan includes general commitments on cooperation with developing countries and LICs. The G20 members committed to work in partnership “to help them build the capacity to achieve and maximize their growth potential, thereby contributing to global rebalancing” [17-107].⁶⁰ G20 leaders also stated that they “will focus efforts to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing countries, low-income countries (LICs)” [46] with particular regard to the nine development pillars. They also

⁵⁸ Information about the changes in 2011: http://www.sat.gob.mx/sitio_internet/informacion_fiscal/reforma_fiscal/157_19722.html; information about changes in 2010: http://www.sat.gob.mx/sitio_internet/informacion_fiscal/reforma_fiscal/157_17068.html.

⁵⁹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011). “Estudios económicos de la OCDE.” México. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/10/47905766.pdf>, pp. 24-25.

⁶⁰ Commitment 107 is very similar to commitment 17: “We commit to work in partnership with other developing countries, LICs in particular, to help them build the capacity to achieve and maintain their maximum economic growth potential.”

committed to “scale up and mainstream sharing of knowledge and experience, especially between developing countries, in order to improve their capacity and ensure that the broadest range of experiences are used to help tailor national policies” [119].

Additionally, G20 members specifically pledged to “take concrete actions to increase our financial and technical support, including fulfilling Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments by advanced countries” [47]. They also reaffirmed their “respective ODA pledges and commitments to assist the poorest countries and mobilize domestic resources, following on from the Monterrey Consensus and other fora” [122].

They also stated general commitments to express their support to other development strategies, including the MDGs: “We reaffirm our commitment to the achievement of the MDGs and will align our work in accordance with globally agreed development principles for sustainable economic, social and environmental development, to complement the outcomes of the UN High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs held in September 2010 in New York, as well as with processes such as the Fourth UN LDC [Least-Developed Countries] Summit in Turkey and the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea, both to be held in 2011” [121]. “We further mandate the Development Working Group to monitor implementation of the Multi-Year Action Plan, so that we may review progress and consider the need for any further steps at the 2011 Summit in France” [123].

Until very recently, Mexico carried out its policy of development cooperation through the General Directorate of Technical and Scientific Cooperation, part of the Economic Relations and International Cooperation Unit (URECI), in charge of the regional, bilateral and multilateral economic relations and international economic promotion within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In September 2011 Mexico created the Mexican Agency of International Cooperation for Development (AMEXCID) as a new body charged specifically with addressing issues related to international cooperation for development.⁶¹

With AMEXCID it is expected that the scope of Mexico’s international cooperation will be reinforced. However, Mexico continues to play different roles in the international cooperation sphere, as a: receiver of cooperation from developed countries and international organizations; provider of cooperation in areas of mutual interest to various countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and as South-South cooperator, with horizontal exchange programs with countries such as Chile, Brazil and India.

Most of the South-South cooperation of Mexico is in Latin America: 48% with South America, followed by Central America and the Caribbean at 38% and 14%, respectively. In this cooperation, 78% was performed bilaterally, and 14% and 8% was trilateral within the region.⁶²

At the same time, Mexico received US\$473 million of ODA in 2010, compared to US\$184 million the previous year. Bilaterally, it is led by Mexico’s cooperation with Spain, Japan, Germany and Russia. At the multilateral level, Mexico undertook 167 projects in 2011, 42 more

⁶¹ The Law for International Development Cooperation (LCID), passed in April 2011, established priorities for Mexico, namely: poverty reduction; disaster prevention; the combat against inequality and social exclusion; the promotion of education and culture; environmental protection and mitigation of climate change; and the promotion of science and technology, public security, health, defence, human rights, gender equality, transparency and accountability. The two final priorities cover all the other areas.

⁶² AMEXCID (2011). “Informe Anual de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo.” Retrieved from: <http://www.amexcid.gob.mx/images/pdf/Informe-Anual-2011-CTC-AMEXCID.pdf>.

than those registered in 2010, most of them aligned with the National Development Plan and largely to the MDGs. Of the projects with United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 33% focused on the environment, which is MDG 7. Likewise, all the projects with the Food and Agriculture Organization and 21% of those executed by UNDP focused on the achievement of MDG 1 on poverty and hunger. Similarly, the 10 projects implemented by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization in 2011 focused on meeting the various MDGs.

Finally, on behalf of several Latin American countries, Mexico also practices trilateral cooperation in partnership with developed countries such as Japan, Germany and Spain and with United Nations agencies.

4. Share of responsibilities in Mexico

Before the division of responsibilities for the implementation of commitments can be discussed, it is important to review some particular facts of public administration and bureaucratic structure in Mexico. These reveal some of the obstacles to the fulfillment of the commitments set in the Seoul development agenda.

Mexican bureaucracy

Unlike countries such as the U.S., Spain, the UK or Canada, whose civil service was established a long ago, Mexico's civil service was only established very recently.⁶³ In fact, Mexican public administration went through a long period of reform from 1970 to 1982, and then began a period of modernization that culminated in the promulgation of the Law for the Professional Career Civil Service of April 2003.⁶⁴ Before that, Mexican public administration was characterized by a complete lack of autonomy and was based on a system of patronage or what is known in the Anglo-Saxon countries as the spoils system, in which the recruitment of public servants is based on loyalty rather than merit.⁶⁵

Myriad and complex factors explain the lack of autonomy of public administration in Mexico, such as a fragmented legislation and lack of uniformity and clarity in the labor laws governing public servants and trusted employees.⁶⁶ But the key reasons appear to be mostly political. For example, the exercise of one-party government that prevailed for a long time in Mexico with authoritarian methods and a predominantly presidential system made the public administration a corporatist representation of this system, and an unconditional executive mechanism of the president's objectives.

⁶³ Secretaría de la Función Pública (2012). "Antecedentes del SPC." Retrieved from: <http://www.spc.gob.mx/antecedentes1.htm>.

⁶⁴ For a detailed analysis on the process of modernization of the Mexican Public Administration see http://www.gestionypoliticapublica.cide.edu/num_anteriores/Vol.XVIII_No.I_1ersem/03_Jose_Juan_Sanchez.pdf.

⁶⁵ Martínez, Rafael (2003). "La profesionalización de la Administración Pública en México." *Dilemas y Perspectivas*. Colección Iberoamérica. Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas. Retrieved from: <http://www.inap.org.mx/portal/images/RAP/la%20profesionalizacion%20de%20la%20administracion%20publica%20en%20mexico.pdf>, p. 17.

⁶⁶ See Merino in Martínez (2003) for a detailed analysis on the reasons <http://www.inap.org.mx/portal/images/RAP/la%20profesionalizacion%20de%20la%20administracion%20publica%20en%20mexico.pdf>.

In the 1990s, new models and initiatives for the modernization of the public administration began at different levels. Additionally, political party changes in Mexico, both at the level of the presidency in 2000 as well as previous changes in other levels of government, became an influence in the modernization of the system. Another important factor has been a process of political and administrative decentralization, where the states of the Mexican Republic have gained new powers and resources.

Other major changes were introduced recently, during the government of Felipe Calderon, with the Program for Management Development (2007-2012), the Performance Budgeting and Performance Evaluation System,⁶⁷ the publication of the Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government Information (2002), which gave rise to the Federal Institute of Access to Information (2003), the implementation of professional career service (2003) and the creation of the Ministry of Public Service (2003).

As a result, issues such as the professionalization of public servants, accountability and transparency in resource management are forming the basis for institutional change. Moreover, it is expected that these changes will improve not only governance but also the provision of service to society. Further expected improvements include better legal and administrative conditions for economic entities and to regain the credibility and confidence in public officials, who had earned a reputation for corruption.

However, changes are not automatic. They require structural modifications in human resource management, the institutionalization of processes and, above all, changes in attitudes that do not occur in the short term (internationalization and socialization).⁶⁸ This is why less than a decade after enactment of the law of professionalization of the civil service, some personal practices – inherited from the previous system – still prevail. For example, a significant number of posts, mostly middle and upper positions within the three levels of government, are appointed or designated on the basis of public trust (recommendation, party quotas or political commitments). While this phenomenon has been declining due to the level of specialization in some areas, the “subculture of loyalty” remains dominant in many Mexican departments.⁶⁹

One of the main challenges of the new public management in Mexico is to achieve autonomy and institutionalization of the public administration, which involves prioritizing management over policy. To the extent that these challenges are met, a greater impact on the continuity of programs and projects and an improvement in meeting commitments may be achieved, not only internally but also the externally.

In this context, another challenge is to translate international commitments into national changes. For example, during the last 15 years, Mexico has adopted international standards of human rights. However, this process has not culminated in a full internalization of these

⁶⁷ These strategies involve a new approach to public management to encourage the achievement of results, which requires modifying the process of planning, programming, budgeting and expenditure exercises and emphasizing the evaluation of government programs. Institutional change has been supported by other actions.

⁶⁸ Martínez, Rafael (2008). “Cinco mitos sobre el Servicio Profesional de carrera en México.” *Convergencia*. Vol. 15, No. 408. Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México. Retrieved from: <http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/pdf/105/10504808.pdf>; Sánchez (2009).

⁶⁹ Merino en Martínez (2003) <http://www.inap.org.mx/portal/images/RAP/la%20profesionalizacion%20de%20la%20administracion%20publica%20en%20mexico.pdf>, p. 103.

standards in the country. With Vicente Fox, Mexico's foreign policy on human rights radically changed. Mexico adopted an open policy to international scrutiny and monitoring, and became a promoter in multilateral fora. There were also several internal initiatives, both legislative and at the public policy level. However, efforts were not reflected in a substantial improvement of human rights in the country during the presidency of Fox.⁷⁰

Mexico in the G20

President Felipe Calderón participated in all seven summits of the G20 to date.⁷¹ Likewise, between 2005 and 2009, Mexico participated in the G5, together with a group of emerging countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa), in the broader dialogue in the G8 summits. From a governmental perspective, Mexico has played an active role in the transition from dialogue in the G8 and G5 to the G20.

Within the forum of the G20, Mexico has promoted issues such as the reform and capitalization of international financial institutions, with the dual aim that these institutions strengthen their capacity for financing and broaden the participation of developing countries in decision-making. Also, together with other emerging countries, Mexico has promoted the importance of maintaining markets open to trade and investment, as an essential condition for economic recovery. In particular, Mexico has highlighted the issue of climate change and, more recently, the issue of green growth in the G20 agenda.⁷²

According to the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mexico accepted the invitation to preside over the G20 “with the aim of influencing the forging of an international economic architecture that encourages and supports the development of countries like ours.”⁷³ Furthermore, it is considered to be “a unique opportunity to contribute to the development of a more favorable international financial architecture for developing countries, while fostering coordination among the emerging economies and the most developed countries. This will result in increased development opportunities for our country.”⁷⁴

During its presidency, Mexico sought to “follow up on previous agreements,” “work to make important contributions to these and other issues on the G20 agenda” and “make the G20 dialogue as inclusive, open and transparent as possible” by encouraging the participation of non-members, international organizations, think tanks and the private sector.⁷⁵

The importance of the G20 as a lever for global development has been widely recognized by the Mexican government, valued as “a vital forum for building the solid foundations needed to

⁷⁰ Anaya, Alejandro (2010). “Internalización de las normas internacionales de derechos humanos en México.” *CIDE*. Retrieved from: <http://www.cide.edu/publicaciones/status/dts/DTEI199.pdf>.

⁷¹ Washington, USA (November 2008); London, UK (April 2009); Pittsburgh, USA (September 2009); Toronto, Canada (June 2010); Seoul, Korea (November 2010); Cannes, France (2011); and Los Cabos, Mexico (June 2012).

⁷² S.R.E. (2011). “Informe de Labores.” Retrieved from: <http://www.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/doctransparencia/infolab/5infolab.pdf>, p. 86-87.

⁷³ S.R.E. (2011). “Informe de Labores.” Retrieved from: <http://www.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/doctransparencia/infolab/5infolab.pdf>, p. 9.

⁷⁴ S.R.E. (2011). “Informe de Labores.” Retrieved from: <http://www.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/doctransparencia/infolab/5infolab.pdf>, p. 66.

⁷⁵ G20 (2012). “Mexican Presidency of the G20.” <http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/mexican-presidency-of-the-g20>.

achieve high rates of long-term global growth and dynamic economic development.”⁷⁶ In Seoul in 2010, the government of Mexico expressed its commitment to contribute to the Multi-Year Action Plan (MYAP) in order to remove obstacles to growth and promote a more sustainable economy and the creation of jobs. It reiterated its rejection of protectionism and supported the commitment to take the necessary measures to conclude as quickly as possible the Doha Round of negotiations of the World Trade Organization.⁷⁷

In 2012, Mexico reaffirmed that one of its goals during its presidency of the G20, specifically through the Development Working Group, was to continue the implementation of the MYAP by continuing the work on two of the previous priorities food security and infrastructure, and by incorporating the new priority of green growth.⁷⁸

Institutional obstacles for compliance

Despite the great importance of this international mechanism for Mexico, the information obtained reveals the existence of four institutional constraints regarding the manner in which Mexico participates in the G20: 1) limitations in the mandate of the Mexican Sherpa and in Mexico’s public administrative system; 2) institutional changes in the way that Mexico conducts its foreign policy of development cooperation; 3) distribution of responsibilities for Mexico’s participation in international forums. These institutional barriers may, in fact, be a determining factor for compliance with G20 commitments.

The Sherpa’s Mandate and Mexico’s public administrative system

While in other countries the official who serves as Sherpa is part of the direct cabinet of the President or Prime Minister, in Mexico this responsibility lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷⁹ The Mexican Sherpa is the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Lourdes Aranda who was appointed in December 2003. Since 2005 she has been the Sherpa for the Group of Five (G5) and for the Expanded Dialogue with the G8 countries.

With regard to the G20, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for overseeing the pre-summit process while Ambassador Aranda is the personal representative of President Felipe Calderón. In brief, she coordinates the work undertaken by the Sherpa’s Track, which includes negotiating issues on employment, food security, development, anticorruption, tourism, and multilateral trade, and the monitoring of the progress of these groups. At the same time, she is also responsible for conducting all the necessary work prior to the G20 Summits and, under the Mexican presidency of the Group, she is also responsible for other coordination activities with the Finance Track, as well as meeting with other relevant stakeholders.

⁷⁶ See <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/newsdesk/deauville/g8deauville2011-calderon-en.html>.

⁷⁷ S.R.E. (2011). “Informe de Labores.” Retrieved from: <http://www.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/doctransparencia/infolab/5infolab.pdf>; S.R.E. (November 2010). “Informe de la participación del Presidente Lic. Felipe Calderón Hinojosa en la V Cumbre de Líderes del G20 y en la XVII Cumbre de Líderes económicos del APEC.” Retrieved from: http://www.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/61/2/2010-12-14-1/assets/documentos/CUMBRE_G20_Y_APEC.pdf.

⁷⁸ Granguillhome, Rogelio (March 2012). “El grupo de los 20 y la agenda de desarrollo.” *El Financiero*. Retrieved from: <http://www.g20mexico.org/index.php/es/publicaciones/370-el-grupo-de-los-20-y-la-agenda-de-desarrollo>.

⁷⁹ To see the list of Sherpas, see: <http://www.g20.org/index.php/en/who-are-the-sherpas>.

Being a forum for voluntary political coordination, the existence and effectiveness of the G20 actually depend on the domestic implementation of the actions and commitments agreed to collectively by members countries. As the specific mandate of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs is “to broaden and deepen political, economic, and cultural cooperation with various regions of the world for the development of all Mexicans,”⁸⁰ its mandate is strictly directed toward the exterior of the country.

Given the fact that the Mexican Sherpa does not have a domestic mandate, there seems to be a limitation in terms of the fulfillment of the commitments. She does not hold responsibilities for the domestic implementation of commitments in general, nor for those particularly related to development. Her duties are limited to the communication of information among the different Mexican Ministries and to ensuring that the G20 leaders also receive their information. This was highlighted during the interview with the Sous-Sherpa Berenice Díaz, who explained that the implementation of commitments is a responsibility of each of the Mexican Ministries involved, and that there is not *one* office or public official explicitly in charge of monitoring overall compliance. This was also firmly reiterated during the interviews with Bruno Figueroa from the DWG and Diego Cándano from the Office of International Affairs of the office of President Calderón.

A further responsibility of the Sherpa is to communicate and brief the different departments and areas on the importance of the G20 to Mexico, the role of Mexico within this forum and the mechanisms and dynamics of the different working groups. An obvious obstacle in this process has been the frequent changes of staff in some departments, particularly the heads the ministries.⁸¹

Additionally, the information collected signals a lack of communication between ministries, as well as a lack of common goals. Past practices appear to prevail, affecting competition and cooperation between different departments. This is because in the old system, the programs implemented by one government department were actually tools for building political power to maintain a regime based on power needs and personal loyalty.⁸² According to specialists, this also led to an absence of shared goals or inter-ministerial cooperation and linkages, inhibiting formal procedures of cooperation even when there are common purposes, unless there is a specific political reason. By contrast, the most common practice was that each agency would develop its own programs and try to implement them using their own resources, without cooperating with others.⁸³

The officers interviewed recognized the coordinating role of the Sherpa office but their cooperation with this office is limited to staying informed and providing feedback when requested.

⁸⁰ S.R.E. (2012). “Misión y Visión.” <http://www.sre.gob.mx/index.php/cancilleria/mision-y-vision>.

⁸¹ For example, during the administration of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), the Minister of Labor has changed in one occasion: Javier Lozano Alarcón (2006-2011) and Rosalinda Velez Juarez (2011-present). In the Ministry of Finance, there have been three Ministers: Agustín Carstens (2006-2009), Ernesto Cordero Arroyo (2009 - 2011) and José Antonio Meade Kuribreña (2011-present). In the Ministry of Economy, there have been three ministries: Eduardo Sojo Garza-Aldape (2006-2008), Gerardo Ruiz Mateos (2008-2010) and Bruno Ferrari García de Alba (2010-present).

⁸² Chain en Sánchez (2003), p. 93.

⁸³ Martínez (2003), <http://www.inap.org.mx/portal/images/RAP/la%20profesionalizacion%20de%20la%20administracion%20publica%20en%20mexico.pdf>, p. 111.

The Mexican Sherpa does not hold authority over other Mexican agencies to request them to submit progress on implementation. Ambassador Aranda, in her coordinating role, only communicates information from G20 Sherpas to the Mexican Ministries and makes occasional requests for information or “opinions” from other Ministries depending on the issues and needs facing upcoming Sherpas’ or leaders’ meetings. However, as discussed in another section of this study, under the Mexican presidency of the G20, the influence of the Sherpa and its office has increased recently due to the mechanisms implemented to ensure the communication and flow of information between Mexican departments in preparation for the Los Cabos Summit. These mechanisms, strongly supported by the office of President Calderón, were *only* implemented after Mexico took the presidency of the G20.

The Institutional Process for Development and Co-operation

Second, the way in which Mexico leads its policy of international cooperation for development appears to restrict compliance with its development commitments. One of the responsibilities delegated to AMEXCID as a result of Mexico’s presidency of the G20, is the supervision of the Development Working Group, and therefore of the coordination of the Seoul development agenda. While AMEXCID is still part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and consists of much the same staff as the now defunct URECI officials who also participate in the DWG, the change in institutional structure in itself represents a challenge.⁸⁴

Mexico’s Participation in International Forums

In practical terms, follow-up on compliance with Mexico’s international commitments is the responsibility of the Offices of International Affairs of the various government agencies. These offices are not involved in the process of implementation, and as such they limit themselves to the collection of information provided by other areas of their units responsible for the execution of public policies. This is the way in which the Mexican government operates in the majority of international forums; in other words, these issues are not exclusive to the G20 or the Development Working Group.

Another important constraint is the way in which responsibilities are institutionally distributed. Depending on the issue, various government ministries participate: the Department of Labor and Social Welfare attends to the issues of employment, skills development and social security; the Department of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food attends to the issue of food security; the Department of Finance and Public Credit deals with infrastructure and financial inclusion; and the Department of Economy attends to the issues of trade, private investment and employment.

Although these conflicts are the result of particular institutional barriers within the Mexican public administration, they are also related to the fact that the G20 is a relatively new forum whose processes are still in construction. Moreover, some of the institutional conflicts are linked to the very nature of the forum, as due to its nature as a space for voluntary political coordination and cooperation, its dynamics and processes vary according to the issues discussed and the country in charge of the presidency.

⁸⁴ See AMEXCID organizational chart in Annex.

5. Emerging economy, Mexico's dilemma

The Seoul development agenda has been criticized by some observers who highlight its illegitimacy due to its nature as a development strategy decided by the twenty richest countries in the world, aimed at the developing world, but without engaging in consultation with the non-G20 members on the agenda.⁸⁵ This study does not debate the representativeness or legitimacy of the G20. However, the information collected suggests that there is a dilemma for a country like Mexico, which is still in the transition process towards the status of a developed country. The structural factors reviewed in this section, arising from the particular nature of Mexico as an emerging power, show further limitations on Mexico's compliance with international development commitments.

An agenda for third-party countries

The predominant perception among the officials interviewed is that considering the Seoul development commitments are focused on actions and policies directed at third countries, developing countries and least-developed countries, Mexico has no responsibility for their implementation. This is related to the general way in which the commitments are written, as some of them do not specify what the role of G20 members will be achieving the objectives encouraged or promoted in third-party countries. For instance, *"We will focus efforts to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) ..."* or *"We commit to work in partnership with other developing countries, LICs in particular, to help them build the capacity to achieve and maintain their maximum economic growth potential."*

Furthermore, as the Multi-Year Action Plan calls for international organizations to perform specific actions, the perception that Mexico has no individual obligation in implementation is reinforced. For instance, AMEXCID is assumed to be in charge of the ninth development pillar – knowledge transfer – in as much as it is the only issue that directly relates to the way in which Mexico conducts its international cooperation and because Mexico is one of the co-facilitator countries for this issue. But even in this case, it was reiterated that "in charge" means coordination and monitoring of the advances and proposals made by the international organizations involved, and not being directly responsible for domestic compliance. This is because the commitment in the Declaration reads: *"to scale up and mainstream sharing of knowledge and experience, especially between developing countries, in order to improve their capacity and ensure that the broadest range of experiences are used to help tailor national policies"*.⁸⁶ However, the MYAP says *"We encourage international organizations such as the UN, World Bank, OECD and RDBs that operate knowledge sharing platforms to strengthen and broaden sources of knowledge on growth and development."*⁸⁷

However, even when implementation responsibility for the G20 members is not explicit in some of the commitments, there is an undeniable connection between the agendas of other working groups and that of the DWG. For instance, commitments relating to employment development are part of the agenda of the Ministers of Employment and the Action Plan of Investment and Jobs Creation. It would be expected that Mexico's status as an emerging country would make it

⁸⁵ Alexander, Nancy (2011). "The G20: 'Maestro' of the Development Finance World?" Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Retrieved from: [http://www.boell.org/downloads/G20_DAP_Alexander-2\(1\).pdf](http://www.boell.org/downloads/G20_DAP_Alexander-2(1).pdf).

⁸⁶ See <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/commitments-10-seoul.html>.

⁸⁷ See <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-development.html>.

especially aware of the close relationship between the development agendas of the various working groups. Instead, the majority of public officials perceive that application and compliance of the Seoul commitments fall directly under the scope of participating international organizations, without requiring specific actions at the national level other than collectively monitoring work done by international agencies.

Development disparities

Even though it is rhetorically established that commitments are determined by the national interests and objectives of each country, the Seoul Consensus was built on a supposed equality in conditions of development amongst the member states. This means that the commitments established may be elementary for advanced member nations of the G20 as they are part of their domestic policy and their policy of international cooperation. However, this is not so clear in the case of Mexico.

One is the commitment to channel 0.7% of GDP to Official Development Assistance, a commitment that obtained a high level of compliance for Seoul amongst all member states. However, this commitment does not make sense for an emerging country like Mexico that does not report to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

As a middle-income country, Mexico's policy of international development cooperation has traditionally focused on technical and scientific cooperation, given that the country does not have any "official funds" to provide economic support to other countries in a systematic way.⁸⁸ This does not mean that the Seoul development commitments are totally contrary to Mexico's national policies. Indeed, they are quite complementary in as much as many of them incorporate some of the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, an agenda to which Mexico has been committed for many years. Mexico itself has made important progress in the last decade in terms of improving quality of life of its citizens, especially in the areas of education, health and employment. The incorporation of the Millennium Development Goals in Mexico's domestic development agenda and policies has been key to the advances seen in recent years.

For instance, Mexico has reduced its poverty rate to 5.3 percent, which in 1990 stood at 9.3%, and is close to meeting its goal of 4.6%.⁸⁹ Likewise, great advances have been achieved in gender equality and health. On the goal of achieving universal primary education, all Mexican school-age children now have a place in school. Mexico now has on average 8.7 years of education, a higher average than in as Brazil, China and India.

Even though Mexico was one of the countries most affected during the economic crisis of 2008 (Mexico's GDP fell 6.2% in 2009), the Mexican economy has been in a process of significant recovery due to the increase in demand for exports, the reactivation of manufacturing activity and commercial investment.

⁸⁸ Technical and scientific cooperation is defined as "the flow of resources, information, experiences, applied technology and general knowledge that assists in the resolution of specific problems of production plan and scientific and technological apparatus within the strategy of economic and social development of the country" (Pérez y Sierra, 1998, p. 119). Translation by authors.

⁸⁹ Presidencia de la República (2011). Los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en México. Informe de Avances 2010. Retrieved from: <http://www.objetivosdesarrollodelmilenio.org.mx/ODM/doctos/Inf2010.pdf> p. 20.

Institutional factors

Further limiting institutional factors reinforce the lack of continuity in implementation of development commitments, even when both agendas are carried out by the same offices of international affairs. For example, it is paradoxical to talk of promoting the adoption of national strategies of skills development in other countries unless Mexico also domestically promotes these kinds of strategies.

This has resulted in a lack of congruence between the implementation of development commitments of the G20 and the actions that Mexico already takes in order to fulfill other international commitments, even when the issues and aims are the same. This makes it clear that the diverse development challenges that Mexico faces in its condition as a middle-income economy limit its potential actions towards third-party countries, and as such its fulfillment of the Seoul development commitments.

Furthermore, there is a disconnect between the development commitments dealt with in the DWG and those commitments from the other working groups. This is evident in the interviews that were carried out with public officials in charge of issues of employment, social welfare, food security, and trade.

For instance, in the Ministry of Employment, the Office of International Affairs is responsible for Mexico's participation in the G20 on issues of employment. At the same time, its leader Anel Valencia is the representative for the Ministry in the Development Working Group. Therefore, this international office is in charge of two G20 agendas: the employment agenda, which originates from the Working Group on Employment and Social Dimension of Globalization (made up of the Labor Ministries) and the agenda on employment and development conducted by the Development Working Group.

Since the former agenda actually embraces the commitments of the latter, this bureaucratic assignment of tasks should not be an obstacle but an advantage for the implementation of the development commitments. However, according to information collected during interviews, the real scope of work of the Mexican Ministry of Employment, and thus the Office of International Affairs, is restricted to the Meeting of Labor Ministers of the G20 and all the processes that this meeting involves, such as the Task Force on Youth Employment.

Thus, the Office of International Affairs assumes that its role, as part of the DWG, is basically an advisory and consultative one. The Office issues opinions and comments on documents and reports when requested by the DWG and participates in the meetings but takes no responsibility for the implementation of the commitments. Indeed, as the commitments are aimed at third-party countries, it is assumed that the responsibility relates to the work done by the international organizations involved, which in the case of employment are the ILO, the OECD, the World Bank and UNESCO. This, in their opinion, also has to do with the limited resources of the countries. Even when countries make proposals in the DWG, they often end up leaving the issues to international organizations, as the Ministries do not have resources to implement them.

The Office is, however, well aware that there has to be consistency between the documents issued by the DWG and the broader agenda of the Ministries of Labor. They play an important role in maintaining coherence across the messages issued by both groups and in trying to align

both agendas. Their responsibility is to ensure that both groups know what the priorities of each group are and to seek congruence.

The issue of infrastructure provides another clear example. According to the Development Working Group, the responsibility for progress in this area is shared between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Communications and Transport (STC). However, when requesting information from the latter, they noted that the SCT has been involved only in a technical function. In particular, their work has been to coordinate the technical efforts within the SCT in the following three activities: support for the development of the infrastructure concept note which Mexico presented as part of its initiative within the working group; support the development and technical review of the proposal on the Pillar of Infrastructure, urban transport and sustainability and support the technical review of preliminary documents prepared by the multilateral development agencies on the actions to track their commitments agreed in 2011.

This seems to be the case for the Office of International Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture. This office coordinates all the work related to food security in the G20. This issue is discussed in different groups and at different levels: in the Sherpas' Track it is reviewed through the Working Group on Agriculture and the DWG, and in the Financial Track through the Energy and Commodity Markets Working Group from the standpoint of price volatility. The Office also coordinates the work with other technical areas of the Ministry of Agriculture through the Undersecretary of Agriculture.

Therefore the Channel on Agriculture is rather an *ad hoc* mechanism. However, although the division of tasks is bureaucratic, the Office of International Affairs is well aware that the issues are linked. It plays a role of conciliation and coordination in order to ensure that the documents are not contradictory. However, when it turns to the accomplishment of the commitments, it argues that since the initiatives and recommendations of the G20 are calls for global coordination on public policy, exchange of information, best practices, etc., the commitments are not related to agricultural policy in Mexico *per se*. From their perspective, Mexico has contributed to G20 initiatives, for instance with AMIS by providing information to the agencies, and has fulfilled commitments such as the non-imposition of export taxes. The Office assumes that the implementation of these commitments is an integral part of agricultural policy in Mexico, but they maintain that it is not responsible for it.

In short, from the perspective of the office of the Mexican Sherpa and the Development Working Group, the responsibility of the Seoul commitments lies directly under other Mexican federal government ministries through their international offices. However, in the understanding of the latter, this is not part of their responsibilities for two reasons: on one hand, it is assumed that the development commitments are for third-party countries so the relevant international organizations are responsible for their implementation; and on the other, it is assumed that their duty is limited to addressing the issues of the other groups in which they participate and to ensuring consistency between the messages of both sides.

Also, these international offices are in charge of many other issues, not just the G20; including the coordination of Mexico's participation in other international fora and their obligations under various international treaties. For instance, Anel Valencia coordinates issues related to Mexico's National Administrative Office of the NAALC, the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor, and the International Labor Organization, as well as the collaboration with other agencies of the United Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

Additionally, during Mexico's presidency of the G20, these offices took on new responsibilities regarding the coordination of events, ministerial meetings, inter-secretarial meetings and the publication of documents in preparation for the Los Cabos Leaders' Summit. These duties had to be carried out without increasing the size of the existing body of staff. They also play a role in other mechanisms of the G20 such as the B20 and L20, in the case of employment. Both Anel Valencia and Kenneth Smith are part of the different groups in the G20 as government liaisons.

5. Effects on employment

According to the official data from July 2009 to March 2012, the Mexican economy grew by 15%. In 2010, approximately 800,000 new formal jobs were created, in 2011 600,000 and in the period January-April of 2012 340,000 new jobs were created. The rate of unemployment fell to less than 5%.⁹⁰

Additionally, other advances have been made toward the objective of achieving full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people. For instance, in generating human capital, Mexico has employed a strategy aimed at technical and qualified education that includes the opening of 105 new universities and 52 new campuses from 2006 to the present. Also, almost eight million scholarships have been offered for students from low-income households, so that today almost one in every three students receives support. However, the real impact of public spending in Mexico is far from known.⁹¹

Despite the advances, there remain challenges in various sectors in Mexico, such as the improvement of the public education system, improvement of infrastructure, modernization of labor laws, and promoting private investment in the energy sector. Mexico holds the highest level of relative poverty in the OECD (one out of every five Mexicans lives in poverty, compared to the OECD average of one out of every ten)⁹² and it has one of the highest rates of child poverty, surpassed only by Israel.⁹³ The average Mexican earns approximately \$11,100 each year, a figure that is much below the OECD average of \$22,387 per year. This income gap, according to the OECD, is due principally to the slow growth of productivity in the country.⁹⁴ In addition, there exists a great inequity within the Mexican population: the income of the richest 20% of the population is \$29,003 per year, while the poorest 20% lives on \$2,236 per year. This great discrepancy places Mexico in the OECD's second place on income inequality, after Chile.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Presidencia de la República (May 2012). "Discurso del Presidente Calderón en Reunión de Ministro de Trabajo y Empleo del G20." Retrieved from: <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/05/reunion-de-ministros-de-trabajo-y-empleo-del-g20/>.

⁹¹ UNDP (2001). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano México 2011. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/latinamericathecaribbean/mexico/NHDR_Mexico_2011.pdf p. 15

⁹² Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011). Society at a Glance: Mexico Key Findings. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/36/47573255.pdf>.

⁹³ More than 1 in every 4 Mexican children lived in poor households in 2008 (25.8%), much higher than the OECD average of 1 in 8 children (12.7%). In the decade beginning in the year 2000, the rates of child poverty were reduced significantly in Mexico, partly due to the expansion of social programs like "Oportunidades." Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011). *Doing Better for Families: Mexico* <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/28/47701052.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012). "Economic Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth." Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/44/49655279.pdf>.

⁹⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011). "Society at a Glance: Mexico Key Findings." Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/36/47573255.pdf>.

Additionally, having a generous social security system can have negative impacts on employment. For instance, as social protection services provided for non-formal employees are practically free to the worker as they are almost entirely funded by the government, they could be considered a subsidy to non-formal employment. In fact, these incoherent social policies provide incentives for workers and companies to engage in low-productivity activity. Thus, it is better for a worker to be employed informally if part of the services provided is paid in cash and if the worker maintains access to social protection. Similarly, a company has an incentive to evade social security contributions by paying lower wages than the legal minimum (with benefits), instead offering workers attractive redundancy settlements with the addition of free social protection.⁹⁶

In employment, more than 60% of people between 15 and 64 years of age in Mexico have paid work, a figure below the OECD average of 66%. Moreover, the incidence of informal employment has increased substantially in recent years, with roots in the economic crisis.⁹⁷ In education, 35% of adults between 25 and 64 years of age have the equivalent of tertiary education, much below the OECD average of 74%.

6. Mexico's presidency, an implementation catalyst

The information collected during the interviews shows that, along with all the international visibility and political exposure Mexico received due to the Los Cabos Summit, the presidency of the G20 has had two positive effects in Mexico that may contribute to improving its compliance with the SDC commitments. First, Mexico has witnessed improvements in communication due to the channels that were implemented to ensure a constant flow of information. Second, there has been a notable increase in interest on the part of the Mexican presidency in the accountability of the G20 process.

Communication and transparency of information

The presidency of the G20 has raised awareness in Mexico about this economic forum and about the topics negotiated within both Tracks. The Mexican public hardly knew of this mechanism for negotiation before Mexico took the presidency of the group. According to information provided by officials, since last year the Mexican government began a media campaign to promote the flow of information on the importance of the Leaders' Summit taking place in Mexico and the Mexican government's priorities. This campaign intensified after January 2012 and reached its peak during the Summit of Leaders in Los Cabos. From January to June, the principal officers in charge of the agenda maintained a presence in the media to provide information about the negotiation process and the expectations of the Mexican presidency.

Moreover, the communication and information campaign was also very active within the Mexican government to both define the position of Mexico and to communicate the decisions made. Several communication mechanisms, implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and supported by the office of the President of Mexico, made possible a

⁹⁶ UNDP (2001). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano México 2011. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/latinamericathecaribbean/mexico/NHDR_Mexico_2011.pdf p. 57

⁹⁷ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012). "Economic Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth." Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/44/49655279.pdf>.

very fluid exchange and coordination of information in preparation for the the Los Cabos Leaders' Summit.

This, according to most of the officials interviewed, marked an important difference in the way in which the various Mexican agencies communicated, when compared to communication processes before the Mexican presidency of the G20. Previously, the coordination seemed to be smooth but not very active, and was mostly communicated through written memorandums.

Due to several activities resulting from Mexico's G20 presidency, the process of coordination within the Mexican government became very intensive, including inter-ministerial meetings, seminars and workshops. Additionally, constant telephone and electronic communication was maintained. Likewise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implemented a three-level coordination scheme very similar to the one that was developed when Mexico hosted the COP16 in Cancun. First, a core group of negotiators was established, which included representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Economy, the Bank of Mexico and the Sherpa office, who met twice a week and were in constant communication. This group, in coordination with the Office of International Affairs of the President of Mexico, made most of the decisions regarding coordination of the Los Cabos Summit. The second group was a coordination group within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, led by the office of the Sherpa, to organize all the different areas participating in that Mexican Agency, including the DWG and to manage the information coming out of the other working groups. The third level of the coordination was with other government departments.

Since the Presidency of the G20, the Sherpa office has played a fundamental role in coordinating the work and results of the different Mexican departments, although it does not have a direct role or responsibility for tracking the implementation of the commitments. In fact, the coordination of actions realized within the G20 and the coordination of the participation of the different secretariats of the government is the primary responsibility of each country's Sherpa.

For instance, in November 2011, the Sherpa requested that every department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other government departments involved in the G20 process, establish a work plan and submit a schedule of their activities to be performed throughout 2012. Furthermore, the Sherpa coordinated a position paper where the Mexican government identified the priorities, mandate and status of each item on the G20 agenda. This document specified the compliance and results to be achieved during the presidency of Mexico. According to the Sherpa office, this is the first time that a G20 presidency stated, in writing, an evaluation of progress along the principal axes of the agenda, what the problems were, and where to go. This analysis was made to offer transparency in the flow of information within the Mexican ministries and among other G20 countries and international organizations to inform them of the priorities and interests of Mexico.

However, it is clear from the information obtained that this process of coordination has been complicated for two main reasons. First, there seems to be a lack of understanding on the part of the other government departments regarding the functioning of the G20 due to its relatively recent creation and given that, being a forum for political dialogue without a secretariat and governing body, its non-institutionalized processes vary depending on the country in charge of the presidency. In this, the office of the Sherpa had to make efforts to communicate with the other Ministries – other than the Ministry of Finance, which is very familiar with the G20 process – on the importance of the forum and the importance of having a coordinated position on every topic. Second, as mentioned before, the fact that the Sherpa is part of a government

department and not of the office of the Mexican president appears to generate a conflict of hierarchy due to the fact that there is no official obligation for any government department to coordinate with, or report its activities to, other departments.

The coordination process by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in particular the Sherpa office, was strongly supported by the office of President Calderon, through the Office of International Affairs. This close relation was signaled as particular to Mexico and certainly seemed to have relieved the conflict of hierarchies between the Sherpa office and the other Mexican dependencies.

While the survival of these mechanisms and new communication channels is not assured after October, when Mexico ends its presidency of the G20, they may have a positive impact on compliance in the long term.

Interest in accountability

The presidency of the G20 seems to have laid the foundations for improving implementation of commitments, as the Mexican government has had to undertake a general analysis of the state of the various commitments acquired by Mexico on different issues (at the request of its own president, Felipe Calderón). This exercise resulted in reports by the different ministries on the progress and implementation of the commitments and was used as the basis from which to determine the priorities of Mexico, which later resulted in the aforementioned position document. Consequently, there is an expressed recognition by the Mexican government regarding the relevance of executing the commitments agreed to in the G20. Most of the officials interviewed recognized this interest from the presidency of Mexico and the office of the Sherpa, however, they were not aware of how this goal would be achieved.

The office of the Mexican Sherpa is especially aware of the importance of compliance with commitments, not only for Mexico but also for the overall group. For instance, the Mexican Sous-Sherpa reported that at some point it was thought to ask each of the G20 working groups to include in their final reports a specific section on the progress on commitments implementation. However, this idea was abandoned because it was considered that it could create a lot of pressure among the working groups, as there are topics in which implementation has advanced a great deal and others, which have been recently included, where the advances are limited. So they preferred to seek other mechanisms that do not diminish the confidence-building asset that this forum has already obtained based on the political will of its members.

This recognition from the Mexican government is confirmed in the G20 Accountability Framework, published in the Annexes of the Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan. This mechanism seeks to establish the procedures that the Group will follow to report on policy implementation and compliance progress, with the aim of improving transparency and reinforcing credibility and trust.⁹⁸ While this initiative is not exclusive to the Mexican government, as it applies to the Group as a whole, the fact that it is one of the results of the Mexican presidency may influence the way in which Mexico takes on implementation and commits itself to compliance.

⁹⁸ G20 (2012). "The Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan." Retrieved from: http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/Los_Cabos_Growth_and_Jobs_Action_Plan_2012.pdf.

Congruently, the compliance reports of the *G20 Research Group* demonstrate that there exists a “positive hosting effect,” meaning that those countries that presided over the Group previously eventually improve their level of compliance with commitments.⁹⁹ This is a perception shared by the officials of the Mexican government, and the accountability of the G20 has been a personal interest of President Felipe Calderon.

Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that this is the final year of the Calderon administration. The new administration will begin on December 1, 2012. This means that several public officials, who have led the G20 process from Seoul to this year’s Mexican presidency, will change. As such, it is not possible to determine the extent to which these factors may “oblige” the next Mexican government to comply or not comply with commitments.

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⁹⁹ See Preliminary Assessment on Implementing the G20 Seoul Development and Employment Commitments of the G20 Research Group.

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8. Annexes

Questions to public officials (in Spanish)

Sample questionnaire was made to officials of the Ministry of Labour and Social

***Las preguntas se adaptan de acuerdo a la Secretaría y los temas que cada uno atiende

Objetivos particulares para el caso de empleo y desarrollo:

- Conocer los avances de **México** para el cumplimiento de los compromisos establecidos en la Declaración de Seúl y en el Plan de Acción Multianual en Desarrollo de 2010:
 - *Del pilar de **desarrollo de recursos humanos***
 - *Crear indicadores comparables internacionalmente sobre habilidades*
 - *Mejorar las estrategias nacionales permiten acceder al empleo*
 - *Del pilar de **crecimiento incluyente (piso social)***
 - *Apoyar a los países en desarrollo a fortalecer y mejorar los programas de protección social*
- Conocer los mecanismos y actividades que el gobierno mexicano ha instrumentado para promover el cumplimiento de dichos compromisos (negociación, coordinación, implementación, seguimiento y monitoreo)
- Describir el proceso al **interior de la STPS** y la interacción con **otras dependencias** para la implementación de los compromisos **de empleo**
- Conocer la relación entre el Grupo de Desarrollo y el de Empleo para la implementación y cumplimiento de los compromisos **de desarrollo y empleo**, y con el Track de Finanzas (en caso de que exista).
- Sabemos que la implementación y cumplimiento de los compromisos en materia **de empleo y desarrollo** es un proceso complejo y de largo plazo que incluye la participación de diversos actores cuyas actividades no son directamente responsabilidad **de la STPS**. Sin embargo, en esta etapa del estudio nos interesa en particular *conocer las actividades que en el área a su cargo se realizan* para lograr la implementación y eventual cumplimiento de los compromisos.
- Nos interesa además *distinguir entre las actividades realizadas en calidad de la actual Presidencia de México del G20* y aquellas que están relacionadas directamente con la implementación de los compromisos adquiridos, incluso antes de que México asumiera la presidencia para entender cómo serán realizadas cuando Rusia asuma la presidencia

Preguntas guía

Enfoque

1. ¿Podría describir en términos generales cómo son comunicados **al interior de su dependencia** los resultados de las cumbres ministeriales y las cumbres de líderes del G20?
2. ¿Considera que los compromisos **de empleo** establecidos en la Declaración de Seúl son compatibles con los objetivos de desarrollo de México?
3. ¿Cómo se define cuáles de los compromisos del G20 en materia **de empleo** son prioritarios para México?, ¿es una responsabilidad del área a su cargo o se comparte con otras dependencias?
4. ¿Cuál es el rol específico **de la STPS** en el proceso de implementación de los compromisos del G20 en materia **de empleo**?, ¿es el mismo rol que tenía antes de que México asumiera la presidencia del G20?
5. ¿Cuáles de los siguientes objetivos establecidos en el Plan de Acción Multianual son responsabilidad directa del área a su cargo y/o en cuáles participa?
 - Improve the development of employable skills matched to employer and labor market needs in order to enhance the ability to attract investment, create decent jobs and increase productivity.
 - Support the development of internationally comparable skills indicators and the enhancement of national strategies for skills development, building on the G20 Training Strategy.
 - Implement a range of structural reforms to to boost and sustain global demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase our growth potential, and where needed undertake
 - Labor market and human resource development reforms, including better targeted benefits schemes to increase participation
 - Education and training to increase employment in quality jobs, boost productivity and thereby enhance potential growth.
 - Tax reform to enhance productivity by removing distortions and improving the incentives to work, invest and innovate.

*** *Para las siguientes preguntas nos interesa en particular conocer las actividades que la **STPS** realiza en general para el G20, haciendo la distinción de aquellas que realiza actualmente en la calidad de México como Presidente****

Definición de actividades

6. ¿Cómo participa usted en el proceso de implementación y cumplimiento de los compromisos **de empleo y desarrollo** del G20?, ¿cómo participa su equipo?
7. ¿Cuáles son los mecanismos o actividades que se han establecido en el área a su cargo para llevar al eventual cumplimiento de estos compromisos?

8. ¿Cómo se establecen las metas a seguir en su equipo de trabajo para cumplir dichas actividades?, ¿cómo se determina la asignación de recursos humanos/financieros?
9. En la realización de las metas, ¿cómo participan otros actores y cómo complementan el trabajo que usted realiza con respecto a los compromisos **de empleo**?
 - Otras áreas dentro de la STPS
 - Otras dependencias
 - Otros países
 - Organismos internacionales
10. ¿Conoce los reportes del *G20 Research Group*? En caso afirmativo, ¿los considera relevantes en el proceso de implementación?

Seguimiento de actividades y monitoreo

11. Por favor describa el proceso de seguimiento de las actividades. ¿A quién y cómo se reportan los avances?, ¿existen algún proceso establecido de monitoreo en el área a su cargo?
12. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son los principales factores que inciden (positiva/negativamente) en la implementación de los compromisos de empleo? En general y a nivel operativo en su área
13. ¿Qué papel juegan otros actores en términos de la implementación y seguimiento? Otras áreas **de la STPS**, consultores externos, otras dependencias del gobierno mexicano, empresarios, ONG, organismos internacionales.

Impacto y alcance

14. Comente brevemente cuáles son los avances **de México** en cuanto a los objetivos mencionados en la pregunta 5
15. ¿Cuál considera que es el impacto de la implementación de los compromisos **de empleo** del G20 a nivel nacional e internacional?
16. En términos generales, ¿cómo calificaría el desempeño de México en cuanto a la implementación de los compromisos **de empleo**?, ¿cómo calificaría el desempeño del área a su cargo?
17. En su opinión, ¿la presidencia actual de México en el G20 tiene o tendrá alguna incidencia en el proceso de implementación de los compromisos **de desarrollo**?, ¿en particular respecto a los compromisos **de empleo**?

List of interviews

Complete list of people who participated in the interviews.

- AMEXCID:
Bruno Figueroa, Chief of Staff, Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation
- Sherpa office:
Berenice Díaz Ceballos, Coordinator of Advisors and Sous-sherpa, Under Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Presidencia de México:
Diego Cándano, Deputy Director General of International Affairs, Office of the President of Mexico
- STPS:
Claudia Anel Valencia, Head of International Affairs, Ministry of Labor
Eduardo Velasquillo, Director of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Ministry of Labor
- SAGARPA:
Francisco Calderón, Deputy Director General for Economic and International Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Agriculture
- SEDESOL:
Blanca Lilia García, Deputy Director of International Affairs, Ministry of Social Development
- SHCP:
Roberto Marino, Special Representative of the G20 presidency of Mexico, Ministry of Finance
Hugo Garduño, Advisor to the Office of the Under Secretary of Finance
Alejandro Hernández Alva, Advisor to the Office of the Under Secretary of Finance
- ECONOMÍA
Roberto Zapata, Director General of Regional Multilateral Negotiations, Ministry of Economy
Roberto Corona Guzmán, Deputy Director for Asia and Multilateral Organizations, Ministry of Economy
- Otros
Mateo Lejarza, City Council Member, Centre for State Reform

Summary of Interviews (in Spanish)

Consideraciones Generales

- Hasta el momento hemos realizado ocho entrevistas. Las otras entrevistas han sido reprogramadas después de Los Cabos como Cumbre de los funcionarios involucrados han cancelado nuestras reuniones debido a sus apretadas agendas.

- Existe una preocupación expresada por la mayoría de las personas entrevistadas relacionada con cómo se puede calificar el desempeño de México en la implementación de los compromisos de desarrollo de Seúl, si la mayoría de ellos están enfocados en los países en desarrollo, no en los miembros del G20.
- Incluso ellos señalan que es prematuro medir los avances en tanto varias de las acciones fueron acordadas apenas en Cannes.
- La mayoría de los entrevistados hasta el momento coinciden en que el principal factor que incide en la implementación de los compromisos del G20 (no en particular los de desarrollo, sino en general) es la voluntad política.
- Hemos identificado un problema intrínseco relacionado con la administración pública mexicana: el seguimiento de los compromisos internacionales asumidos por México son atendidos por las Oficinas de Relaciones Internacionales de las distintas secretarías del gobierno mexicano y no por las subsecretarías o áreas que ejecutan las políticas públicas.
- Este conflicto no es particular del G20 en México, sino en general así se llevan los temas en los foros internacionales. Esto no necesariamente implica que no se estén implementando los compromisos, pero sí podría generar un problema en cuanto a cómo se reportan los avances.
- Este es el caso para los temas de los participantes mexicanos en el Grupo de desarrollo, concerniente a los temas de: agricultura, empleo, piso social, remesas.
- Quizá esta percepción cambie una vez que realicemos las entrevistas pendientes (relacionadas con los compromisos de tipo más económico y financiero) pues para esos temas, los responsables en el grupo de desarrollo no son oficiales de asuntos internacionales, sino de subsecretarías.
- Entre los puntos más destacados los entrevistados señalan la importancia que tiene el tema de la “inclusión” para México: inclusión de otros actores como sociedad civil, países no miembro, sector privado, etc.

GRUPO DE TRABAJO DE DESARROLLO:

Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AMEXCID)

Rogelio Granguillhome
Director Ejecutivo y Presidente del Grupo de Desarrollo

Bruno Figueroa
Coordinador de Asesores

- La AMEXCID, agencia de desarrollo mexicana, es órgano desconcertado de la Secretaría de Relaciones Internacionales creado a finales de 2011. Nos indicó que el rol de los encargados del GTD es meramente de coordinación pues la responsabilidad de los pilares de desarrollo recae en otras secretarías del gobierno mexicano.
- En lo particular, la SRE no es responsable del seguimiento específico de ninguno de los compromisos, los cuales son competencia de otras dependencias.
 - La agencia funge como responsable solamente del pilar 9 de desarrollo, en tanto es el único que específicamente se refiere a cómo llevar la cooperación internacional, responsabilidad directa de AMEXCID.

- Nos señaló que la responsabilidad de los distintos temas de la agenda de desarrollo corresponde a distintas secretarías de estado:
 - Crecimiento sostenido e inclusión financiera: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público
 - Piso social: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social
 - Remesas: Banco de México
 - Seguridad alimentaria: Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación
 - Comercio: Secretaría de Economía
 - Infraestructura: Secretaría de Finanzas y Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes
 - Inversión privada y empleo: Secretaría de Economía
 - Desarrollo de recursos humanos: Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social
 - Movilización de recursos: Secretaría de Finanzas
 - Transferencia de conocimientos: AMEXCID
- Sin embargo, el cumplimiento de los compromisos contenidos en el MYAP requiere de un trabajo de coordinación que es, precisamente, el que desempeña la SRE a través de la AMEXCID. Esta agencia es la instancia del gobierno federal encargada de coordinar esta labor intersecretarial y aportar al G20 la información correspondiente de la posición de nuestro países en cada compromiso y pilar.
- El grupo de desarrollo solamente recoge las conclusiones, las acciones, los reportes que se plasman en los informes del Grupo. La responsabilidad queda fuera de este grupo.
- En cuanto a la comunicación, el Embajador nos comentó que el gobierno federal mantiene una política de apertura e inclusión en todas sus actividades en el G20. A través de comunicados de prensa se dan a conocer, tanto interna como externamente, los principales resultados de reuniones de distinto nivel, incluyendo cumbres ministeriales y de líderes.
- En cuanto al proceso interno, el procedimiento normal, tanto de definición de la posición de México como de información de las decisiones adoptadas en los diversos foros y reuniones del G20 es mediante reuniones intersecretariales, seminarios y talleres. Adicionalmente, mantenemos un flujo permanente de comunicación telefónica y por medios electrónicos entre los principales actores gubernamentales involucrados en cada tema.
- En este punto, también nos especificó que la comunicación entre las secretarías de gobierno se intensificó a partir de que México asumió la presidencia del Grupo.
 - Actualmente hay reuniones inter e intra-secretariales semanalmente para informar y reportar avances: presenciales + comunicación escrita.
 - Antes de que México fuera presidente del grupo, la comunicación era solo escrita.
- Los objetivos de desarrollo de Seúl están enfocados fundamentalmente a apoyar los esfuerzos de desarrollo económico en los países de menor ingreso, posición plenamente compartida por México, y coincidente con los objetivos que figuran en la Ley de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo.
- En cuanto a las prioridades establecidas por México, se comentó que México propuso, y así fue aceptado, que los trabajos del GTD se centraran en dos prioridades:
 - el seguimiento de los compromisos adoptados en el MYAP en materia de seguridad alimentaria e infraestructura
 - la inclusión en forma transversal del tema de crecimiento verde incluyente en la agenda de desarrollo del G20

- En relación al papel que desempeñan en la implementación, reiteró que el papel de la S.R.E es el de coordinar al conjunto del gobierno federal y dar seguimiento puntual a los compromisos asumidos en el MYAP.
 - El papel del presidente del GTD, se centra en convocar las reuniones formales, dar seguimiento puntual a los trabajos en cada pilar y tema y presentar los acuerdos alcanzados los Sherpas para su consideración y adopción por parte de los Líderes en la Cumbre de Los Cabos. Asimismo, le corresponde preparar el traspaso del GTD a la presidencia rusa del G20.
- Sobre el establecimiento de metas y acciones: desde que México tomó la presidencia del G20, se definió un programa de trabajo para todo el año en el que se definieron el número de reuniones a ser convocadas.
 - Para cada una de ellas, se establece un sub-programa de trabajo en el que se define su agenda específica, se convocan las reuniones internas e internacionales preparatorias necesarias y se elaboran los documentos pertinentes.
 - Los objetivos para cada reunión fueron los siguientes:
 - Primera reunión, 30 y 31 de enero: definir el plan de trabajo de la presidencia mexicana, introduciendo las tres prioridades
 - Segunda reunión, finales de marzo Seúl: avanzar en las tres prioridades con miras a entregables para la cumbre de mayo
 - Deliberadamente se dejaron fuera los otros pilares
 - Para el tema de crecimiento verde se organizó un taller específico sobre el tema para avanzar en este tema nuevo y dar más espacio a la discusión y que se trabajara de forma más acelerada
 - Tercera, mediados de mayo en Los Cabos: el objetivo era cerrar los entregables para la Cumbre de líderes, no solo los prioritarios sino todos.
 - Dar seguimiento puntual a los *strames of work* y acordar el informe del grupo de trabajo de desarrollo.
 - Identificar los temas que se consideren esenciales para la declaración de líderes
 - Cuarta, octubre: el objetivo es establecer el plan de trabajo para 2013 y entregar un informe final a la Presidencia de Rusia
 - Cerrar entregables que no estarán listos para Los Cabos sino que están previstos para después.
- Seguimiento de acciones: De acuerdo con lo establecido en el MYAP, cada compromiso específico es objeto de seguimiento puntual por parte de los países co-facilitadores de cada pilar, así como de los organismos internacionales que los apoyan para la realización de estudios, diagnósticos y/o propuestas.
 - Asimismo, cada pilar estableció desde 2010 un plan de trabajo cuyo avance es presentado en forma periódica al GTD.
 - No todas las acciones requieren de la participación de todos los miembros del GTD. La mayoría están centradas en apoyar a los países de menor ingreso, en particular a países africanos y algunos asiáticos.
 - En cuanto a las acciones, se centra una atención especial al desarrollo de capacidades así como a la identificación y difusión de mejores prácticas en materia de diseño e instrumentación de políticas y estrategias nacionales de desarrollo.
 - El GTD realiza reuniones periódicas en las que se da seguimiento puntual a cada acción.

- Los co-facilitadores de cada pilar tienen la responsabilidad de presentar, junto con los organismos e instituciones internacionales correspondientes, el estado que guarda cada asunto.
- Respecto a los factores que inciden en la implementación de los compromisos, el funcionario opinó que, la voluntad política de cumplir el compromiso asumido es un factor determinante para la instrumentación de los compromisos.
 - El MYAP fue acordado al más alto nivel para ofrecer apoyo a los LICs y complementar las acciones de cooperación que los países del G20 realizan a nivel bilateral o a través de organismos internacionales y regionales.
- A nivel operativo se trata de apoyo en materia de capacitación y diseño de políticas que se llevan a cabo en forma voluntaria y con base en prioridades nacionales en los LICs. Sólo algunas acciones fijan compromisos, también voluntarios, para los países miembros del G20.
 - Tal es el caso del compromiso de reducir el costo las remesas a 5% en el año 2014, del 9% actual, o sobre la extensión de la liberalización arancelaria y de cuotas comerciales a los países de menor desarrollo (DFQF).
- Para la puesta en marcha de algunos programas, de manera voluntaria algunos miembros del G20 ponen a disposición recursos propios.
 - Por ejemplo, de Alemania que financia la contienda "G20 Challenge on Inclusive Business Innovation", dentro del pilar Private investment and job creation
- Los organismos internacionales juegan un papel central en el proceso de seguimiento de los compromisos, en la medida en que constituyen entidades "imparciales" que apoyan la elaboración de propuestas, guías, documentos analíticos, etc en cada tema.
- También se han tenido actividades de vinculación con países no G20, en desarrollo y desarrollados, con sector empresarial (B20) y sociedad civil.
 - Esta participación de otros actores permita la credibilidad, transparencia y legitimidad a los trabajos del GTD.
- Existe una conciencia en el grupo de la importancia de dar seguimiento a los compromisos y su implementación. Desde su perspectiva, los países co-facilitadores son de facto los responsables del cumplimiento de las acciones en tanto monitorean constantemente las acciones para elaborar los reportes de los grupos. A ello debe agregarse el papel de supervisión del GTD mediante sus reuniones periódicas, así como los informes y "entregables" que son presentados para endoso de los Líderes del G20.
 - Mención especial merece el seguimiento al Plan de Acción de los Bancos Multilaterales de Desarrollo y las recomendaciones del Panel de Alto Nivel sobre financiamiento para infraestructura.
 - Se solicitó en Cannes un reporte de seguimiento al Plan de Acción, el cual fue discutido a nivel del Grupo de Trabajo sobre y será presentado divulgado en la Cumbre de Los Cabos.
 - En el caso del pilar de Inversión privada y creación de empleos, se elaboró un Summery Report on Private Investment and Job Creation, también para divulgarse en Los Cabos.
- Al interior, cada dependencia del gobierno mexicano es responsable de hacer sus propias evaluaciones pero éstas están más relacionadas con el avance de las actividades y no tanto sobre la situación del cumplimiento de los compromisos. No es un proceso global de monitoreo.
- Es su opinión es aún prematuro evaluar un impacto de la agenda de Seúl que pueda ser medible, ya que es un proceso en curso: los 9 pilares del MYAP comenzaron a

desarrollarse durante la Presidencia francesa (enero - noviembre 2010), presentándose los primeros resultados en la Cumbre de Cannes.

- No hay impactos a nivel nacional en la medida en que las acciones están dirigidas a países en desarrollo y los no G20.
- México está firmemente comprometido con el MYAP. En materia de inclusión financiera el número de personas con acceso a servicios bancarios aumentó de 25% de la población en 2004 a 60% en 2009, mediante la reducción obligatoria de, la autorización de bancos de “nichos,” la disminución de la cantidad requerida para invertir en Bonos federales, la ampliación de pagos salariales por medios electrónicos, etc. que abren a la población el acceso a créditos y otros instrumentos financieros.
- Importancia de actividades de outreach o vinculación. A la fecha se han realizado las siguientes:
 - Reunión con países del Commonwealth y Francofonía (75 países en desarrollo) al margen de la reunión de primavera del Banco Mundial (19 de abril)
 - Sesión en el marco de la OEA (20 de abril)
 - Almuerzo de trabajo con representantes del B20 (3 de mayo)
 - *Task Forces* de Seguridad Alimentaria y Crecimiento Verde del B20.
 - Participantes: Alejandro Ramírez (Cinépolis) y Aurora Adame (Bimbo)
 - Almuerzo de trabajo con fundaciones (4 mayo)
 - Fundaciones participantes: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, ONE Campaign, Mary Robinson Foundation - Climate Justice
 - Seminario internacional sobre el G20 y la agenda de desarrollo (7 mayo)
 - 150 participantes provenientes de más de 16 países, representando más de 25 organizaciones de la sociedad civil
- Desde su punto de vista, México va muy bien con la implementación de las actividades a cargo del Grupo de Trabajo de Desarrollo: se han cumplido muy bien los objetivos establecidos en el calendario de trabajo que se presentó a principios de año
 - México ha tendido un papel relevante en la ampliación de la agenda de desarrollo del G20, al haber logrado la inclusión de crecimiento verde incluyente en forma transversal. Aún queda mucho por avanzar para lograr que este tema impacte todos los pilares del MYAP.
 - No obstante ello, durante la presidencia mexicana se logró incluir un proyecto sobre transporte urbano masivo en ciudades medianas y grandes en países en desarrollo, así como la inclusión de un proyecto para el desarrollo sustentable en pequeños agricultores rurales.
 - Adicionalmente, se acordaron dos proyectos fuera del MYAP: uno en materia de elaboración de una guía sobre mejores marcos políticos nacionales en materia de crecimiento verde incluyente aplicables a países en desarrollo, en especial LICs, con apoyo del Banco Mundial, Naciones Unidas, la OCDE y el Banco Africano de Desarrollo; y un estudio realizado por la Corporación Financiera Internacional sobre mejores prácticas para el desarrollo de un entorno que apoye la movilización de fondos privados para inversiones verdes en países en desarrollo.

OFICINA DE LA SHERPA:

Subsecretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

Lourdes Aranda

Subsecretaria de Relaciones Exteriores y Sherpa

Berenice Díaz Ceballos

Coordinadora de Asesores y Sous-sherpa

- La Sous-sherpa nos proporcionó información en general sobre los procesos del G20 en México, y no en particular con la implementación de los compromisos de desarrollo
- Ha sido difícil que las distintas dependencias entiendan cómo funciona el G20 en tanto los procesos de este foro son muy particulares y no se parecen a otros foros internacionales en donde participa México.
- Es un rasgo particular de México que la Sherpa sea la Subsecretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y no alguien de la oficina del presidente de México
- Otro aspecto distintivo del caso de México la estrecha relación entre la Cancillería y la oficina de la Presidencia de México
- Para la presidencia mexicana se estableció un mecanismo de coordinación que considera tres niveles:
 - Coregroup: conformado por la Secretaría de Finanzas, Secretaría de Economía, la Cancillería y el Banco de México
 - Coordinación al interior de la cancillería: con las distintas áreas que llevan los diferentes temas
 - Coordinación con otras dependencias: para gestionar la coordinación con todas las áreas interesadas. Cuestiones como la planificación pero también lo sustantivo. Cada quien puso su calendario y sus razones
- Dada la amplitud de la agenda, hay una inercia al interior de los grupos que a veces hace complicado que todos entiendan los niveles en la estructura del G20
- Los Sherpas se coordinan con el área económica y financiera, pero al mismo tiempo los Sherpas coordinan el resto del proceso que involucra a otras dependencias
- No todas las decisiones que se toman en las otras dependencias están necesariamente vinculadas a las decisiones políticas (a veces son muy técnicas). El papel de la Sherpa es asegurar esta congruencia para que cuando los documentos lleguen a nivel de los líderes, haya un mensaje coherente
- A pesar de que esta coordinación es a veces complicada, sobre todo por la intensidad de actividades derivada de la presidencia de México, la relación ha sido fluida.
 - Un obstáculo evidente han sido los frecuentes cambios de los titulares de algunas dependencias. La oficina de la Sherpa tiene que hacer entender a los nuevos funcionarios cuáles es el papel de México en el G20 y porqué es tan importante (cuestión de imagen, repercusiones en la vida diaria, etc)
- Desde su perspectiva, el G20 tiene 3 puntos primordiales:
 - 1) sirve para generar confianza entre líderes de las economías mundiales
 - 2) *breaking global deadlocks*: avanzar en aquellos temas en los que están atorados las negociaciones para llegar a acuerdos
 - 3) desarrollo de la parte normativa
- Al no ser jurídicamente vinculante, las recomendaciones adoptadas implican que en el nivel nacional los gobiernos deben hacer reformas internas y estructurales, incluyendo cambios en la legislación, para que externamente no generen un desequilibrio.

- Los acuerdos del G20 implican tomar ciertas decisiones a nivel nacional que no afecten a la parte externa (otros países). Todos estos cambios retrasan el cumplimiento de los compromisos.
 - Por ejemplo, US no aportó dinero para los fondos de 430 mil millones de dólares para el FMI. No lo hizo porque eso requeriría pasar una ley interna en su congreso que en un año electoral, es sumamente difícil. Ello afecta la implementación y cumplimiento de los compromisos
- La Presidencia de la República ha dado muy buen respaldo a Cancillería.
- Semanalmente se realizan dos telepresencias que han contribuido a una mejor organización del proceso
 - Una donde participan todas las dependencias presentan sus agendas, temas, grupos de trabajo presentan sus avances
 - Otra telepresencia: medios de comunicación, entrevistas, mensajes del gobierno de México
- Esto se hace realiza a partir de que México se asumió como presidente, antes no
- Durante el segundo semestre, la presidencia de México quiere poner énfasis en el tema de cumplimiento
- Pero el reto está en cómo hacer para cumplir con los compromisos.
 - Se había pensado en solicitar a cada grupo de trabajo que incluyera una sección de cumplimiento en sus reportes. Pero ello no se hizo porque se consideró que sería muy difícil
 - Se decidió entonces centrarse en la parte global: cómo hacer para el seguimiento global. Se sigue discutiendo al respecto
- El proceso de seguimiento es complicado porque cada grupo de trabajo tiene su propia dinámica. En algunos la participación de los organismos internacionales es más preponderante
- A fin de dar transparencia al proceso, la presidencia mexicana elaboró un documento de posición donde se especificaron los mandatos, cuáles son los resultados y el cumplimiento que se debe tener en los mandatos
 - Esta es la primera vez que una presidencia establece por escrito cómo se ven los temas (el *state of the art*), cuáles son los problemas y hacia dónde quiere ir
 - El documento lo hizo la Secretaría de Hacienda y la Cancillería (ésta última coordinó las dependencias)
 - El paper se publicó en enero: la idea era integrar a todos
- Adicionalmente, se hicieron otros dos documentos: uno sobre financiamiento al cambio climático y otro al crecimiento verde
 - Se discutieron con todas las dependencias: hasta que todas estuvieron de acuerdo en el contenido, se compartieron al interior del gobierno para que sirvieran de guía sobre lo que México quería lograr
 - El documento fue una especie de *road map*: sirvió de guía para que todos los participantes estuvieran en el mismo entendido y evitar jugar los rumores o malentendidos con otros actores, como los organismos internacionales
- La presidencia mexicana buscó mantener continuidad de la agenda anterior (compromisos anteriores) pero al mismo tiempo se incluyó una propuesta mexicana y los temas que se consideraron prioritarios a partir de un examen o revisión de la situación mundial y económica
 - Pero al mismo tiempo, se trató de mantener los temas limitados al *scope* del G20 que es el tema financiero pues hay otros organismos para los otros temas y en el entendido de que el G20 no es un *steering committee*

- La funcionaria no ve viable el establecimiento de un secretariado por lo menos en los próximos 3-4 años: quizá después sí será necesario pero por el momento este tema no se está discutiendo
- De lo que sí se está hablando es por ejemplo de fortalecer el papel de la Troika:
 - Hoy cada vez que México quiere sacar una agenda, la debe consultar primero con Francia y con Rusia. Esto no sucedía antes.
 - Sin embargo, no se quiere que la Troika se convierta en un steering committee de los Sherpas o de los diferentes grupos
- Desde su perspectiva, monitorear el progreso es difícil pues depende del tema y el país.
 - En este respecto, lo más que se ha avanzado hasta el momento es el MAP *peer review* (en el ámbito de finanzas) que constituye el primer foro en el que los países se sientan hablar y de estos temas. Antes de esto no existía ningún foro ni siquiera a nivel bilateral
 - Es un proceso muy importante porque los países presentan un informe de cumplimiento pero carece de “dientes” o sanciones a quienes no cumple.
- Desde su punto de vista, este es un proceso por etapas:
 - Primero debe construirse el *confidence building* entre los países para que tengan la disposición a sentarse en una mesa
 - Luego deben tener la disposición de hablar o comentar y presentar información
 - Luego deben aceptar recomendaciones de entre pares y finalmente aplicarlas y sujetarse a revisión
- Si existe una institucionalización en términos de que la gente reconoce, acepta y envía informes. Los países se prestan a platicar, discutir y recibir observaciones
- El reto es establecer mecanismos de implementación pero sin inhibir la participación y la cooperación y sin
- Con o sin la presidencia México ha ido haciendo avances. La reunión de Los Cabos si ha sido el acelerador porque el Presidente está muy interesado en el tema de cumplimiento

PRESIDENCIA MEXICANA

Oficina de Presidencia de la República

Diego Cándano

Director General Adjunto de Asuntos Internacionales

- Nos proporcionó información sobre cómo la presidencia de México está coordinando las negociaciones del G20 en general, no sobre la agenda de desarrollo
- Existe un grupo de trabajo coordinado por Presidencia, en el que participan 10-12 funcionarios de distintas secretarías: generalmente son los encargados de las oficinas de asuntos internacionales
- Si bien su oficina no está directamente a cargo de la implementación de los compromisos, por instrucción del Presidente Calderón se solicitó a los diferentes dependencias del gobierno un informe sobre el estado y los avances de cada uno de los temas de la agenda del G20
 - En particular, esta solicitud fue el año pasado a partir de que México asumió la presidencia del G20 y en relación a los compromisos de Cannes

- Se realizó una matriz de los compromisos asumidos versus implementación de cada uno
- La coordinación formal de los trabajos del G20 es responsabilidad de la SRE pero su oficina ha brindado un importante apoyo de las actividades de coordinación de la oficina de Sherpa
- No existe un área dentro de la oficina de presidente que esté directamente vinculada con la aplicación de los compromisos del G20. Sin embargo, dependiendo de los temas, hay gente del gabinete federal que supervisa o monitorea la aplicación
- Se percibe que la presidencia de México del G20 puede ayudar a catalizar la implementación de México, pero este “spill-over effect” sólo puede ser medido después de la Cumbre

SEGURIDAD ALIMENTARIA:

Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (SAGARPA)

Kenneth Smith
Coordinador de Asuntos Internacionales

Francisco Calderón
Director General Adjunto de Estudios Económicos y Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales

- Francisco Calderón en representación de Kenneth Smith
- Durante la presidencia de Francia, el tema de seguridad alimentaria se sube a nivel de los ministros junto con el tema de volatilidad de precios.
- Para México este es un tema de coyuntura, por la crisis económica, pero también es de estructura
 - México busca atacar el fondo del problema: sea cual sea la fuente de la demanda, el hecho es que el problema de fondo es la productividad alimentaria
 - Se busca dar continuidad a los compromisos adquiridos en Francia
- Su oficina coordina el trabajo con otras áreas que llevan la parte técnica de los temas
 - Los temas de agricultura de se ven con la Subsecretaría de Agricultura
 - Su oficina participa el grupo de desarrollo
- El canal de agricultura es *ad hoc*: los temas se llevan el Track de Finanzas, el Grupo de Agricultura y otros en Grupo de Trabajo de Desarrollo
 - Si bien, la división es burocrática los temas se entrelazan por lo que buscan la congruencia entre el grupo
 - Previo a que México asumiera la presidencia, existía un menor involucramiento por parte de la oficina de asuntos internacionales
- Se inició con reuniones de seguimiento.
 - En Cannes se entregó un reporte
- Las iniciativas del G20 son básicamente llamados a cooperación del g20
 - Siap: Servicio de Información Agroalimentaria y Pesquera, órgano desconcentrado de la SAGARPA
 - El tema de nutrición, lo lleva la Cancillería
 - El tema de trigo. En lo operativo se involucran ya directamente cada área

- En su opinión, los factores del éxito en la implementación no depende de los países
 - Hay restricciones a la exportación.
 - Voluntad de los países
- Otra área muy importante es la de Coordinación de política sectorial.
 - Enlace con sociedad civil en coordinación con la S.R.E. y el área de Asuntos Internacionales de la SAGARPA
- Se emplean consultores externos para cuestiones técnicas: como procesar información, realizar análisis. En temas particulares de comercio y agricultura
- La oficina ejerce un rol de conciliación para producir lo sustancial
- Según su perspectiva, existen coincidencias entre los países en que es necesaria la implementación de los compromisos del G20. Incluso para la credibilidad del foro
- Hay nuevas iniciativas de México para seguir avanzado. Por ejemplo, la coordinación de respuestas científicas e innovación, compartir información sobre genética, el mejoramiento de variedades de semilla
- Los reportes de avances son al interior para el G20

EMPLEO

Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social

Claudia Anel Valencia
Titular de Asuntos Internacionales

Eduardo Velasquillo
Director de Asuntos Políticos Hemisféricos

- Existe una coordinación clara con el GTD pero no se asumen como responsables de los compromisos de empleo y desarrollo
- El ámbito del trabajo es la reunión de ministros de trabajo y empleo del G20. Se percibe que no hay una coordinación muy buena con GTD: no se conoce lo que hace el GTD
- Lo que impulsamos en las declaraciones de ministros es vincularlo algunos de los temas que lleva GDT,
- De alguna forma se buscó que las experiencias que han probado ser buenas en el GTD se comparta con los ministros: esa es la propuesta pero falta ver cómo se va a concretar
- lo que se está acordando en ese grupo cuya agencia es muy amplio, ven a GDT a veces como algo inmanejable: los países con sus propios intereses, los organismos internacionales también tienen sus propias agendas, los co-facilitadores buscan darle
- Se pierde el propósito original, los países proponen pero como los ministerios no tienen recursos entonces terminan dejando los temas a los organismos internacionales
 - Y al final son los OI quienes impulsan su propia agenda en cada uno de los pilares
- El GDT solicita insumos pero ellos no asumen el rol de coordinar, solo brindan opiniones
- Lo que se trata es alinear lo que está en los pilares con la otra agenda
- La STPS tiene incidencia en los tres pilares de empleo pero principalmente en el tema de desarrollo de habilidades y la plataforma de buenas prácticas de skills, donde también participa la OIT

- Particularmente participan en desarrollo de habilidades: revisan las propuestas de OIT
- Por ejemplo, propusieron incluir el Programa Bécate como una de las buenas prácticas de México para incluirse en la plataforma
- También se trata de alertar cuáles son los temas que coinciden entre ambas agendas y lograr que exista una congruencia
- Uno de los temas de ministros: convergencia de políticas a nivel nacional e internacional. No son temas tan separados
- El valor del G20 es que las discusiones que se llevan a cabo en los ministros de trabajo
- Por ejemplo, en el piso social: OIT lo empezó a tratar en 2009 y otros organismos de naciones unidas, se insertó en el G20, como una caja de resonancia, te dice cuáles son los temas o tendencias
- Desde su perspectiva, no hay una liga muy clara pero al final de cuentas las discusiones se reflejan en otros lados
- Revisan los documentos que el GDT les envían para contribuir dando comentarios y buscar que sean consistente
- Ante la limitante de recursos para apoyar a terceros países, ellos buscan un manejo eficiente de recursos
- Solicitaron opinión de otras dependencias por ejemplo con la SEDESOL, la SHCP y el IMSS
 - Como el tema se empezó a mover mucho en Paris, y se requería tener una posición de país se consultó internamente con otras agencias
 - La STPS tuvo un papel muy protagónico al interior para coordinarse y para ver qué posición tomar como gobierno mexicano. SEDESOL tenía una posición muy abierta sobre el piso social en contraste con otras áreas más reticente
 - Al final constataron que hay muchos elementos en política social del gobierno federal que coinciden con los elementos del tema de piso social de la OIT
- Sobre el papel de la oficina de asuntos internacionales, comentó que son un área que coordina pero sí consultan la información con otras áreas
- Se rigen por el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y el Plan Sectorial: que es muy claro en la líneas de las condiciones
 - No es que Seúl de las pautas para la agenda nacional y ésta está dictada por sus propios intereses
- El área internacional es la encargada de la relación con los organismos y los mecanismos internacionales como el G20. Pero a nivel de secretaria otras áreas que contribuyen mucho
 - Subsecretaría de Empleo y Productividad laboral: parte operativa de los programas de desarrollo
 - En particular este año de la Subsecretaría de empleo dado que el año pasado se aprobó en los ministros: el establecimiento del Task Force de empleo, integrado por especialistas de empleo que en el caso de México pertenecen a la Subsecretaría de Empleo
 - Subsecretaría de Trabajo e Inclusión social

Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)

Blanca Lilia

Directora Adjunta de Asuntos Internacionales

- Su rol se limita a proporcionar información a la cancillería en el piso de protección social, acorde a la estrategia de política social de la SEDESOL
- Desde su perspectiva, México ya cuenta con un piso social, y éste no comenzó en 2009. La política social de México va más allá de lo que el G20 establece como objetivos
- México cuenta con una amplia estrategia social que incluye:
 - Sistema social para los que están en el mercado laboral. IMSS, ISSSTE, Petróleos, Militares
 - Sistema social para los que no, a través de la SEDESOL. Una acción integral en el marco de una estrategia de Vivir Mejor
- Que tiene 4 vertientes:
 - Desarrollo de capacidades humanas
 - Acceso a los servicios de salud
 - Acceso a educación
 - Acceso a alimentación
- El programa Oportunidades consta de varios mecanismos:
 - Becas para niñas a partir de primaria y hasta la universidad
 - Apoyo a niñas en Preparatoria. Bonos por puntos de acuerdo a cómo terminan los grados. Generan un fondo de ahorro que al final de sus estudios pueden acceder
 - Las madres reciben apoyo económico y otros servicios
 - Acceso a salud
 - Cursos y talleres preventivos para salud, alimentación
 - Dado el incremento de los precios de alimentos 2009, se incorporó un apoyo alimentario en efectivo
 - También se dan algunos apoyos en gasolina
- Antes de 2009, el programa se mantuvo más orientado a la población rural. Ahora se reforzó la parte urbana con una nueva metodología.
 - Se identificó que en las ciudades existen otras necesidades diferentes a las rurales
 - Se proveen mecanismos de ahorro. Familiarizarse con instrumentos bancarios
- Oportunidades no es un programa aislado. Es el más integral pero va a comparado de otros programas.
 - Estancias infantiles, subsidio para adecuar la casa para recibir a niños.
 - Diferencia: Por cada niño que se tenga el gobierno da un apoyo. 2007. Bajo monitoreo. Premio de la ONU por el servicio público
 - Revisiones periódicas año con año se revisan las reglas de operación con base a las reglas de operación
- En los programas sociales del gobierno mexicano hay institucionalidad, en tanto son implementados por una Secretaría de Desarrollo Social.
 - Formato de política pública y legislación
- También son legítimos porque son evaluados por un Consejo de Evaluación de Política social
 - Se evalúan todos los programas: Leche, 70 y más, Seguro popular, Empleo temporal.
 - Este último busca generar engranajes para que las personas tengan acceso a un empleo. Opciones productivas. A partir de las crisis se han reforzado

- 70 y mas. Es una pensión no contributiva. A partir de este año SEDESOL la aplica a nivel nacional.
 - 2007 fue creado para adultos en zonas rurales y bajo ciertas características
- La estrategia federal va mas allá de lo que la OIT plantea de un piso social
- Este año la propuesta de la plataforma será hospedada por el PNUD
 - México solo ha hecho propuestas y en esto se trabaja en conjunto con la Secretaría del Trabajo que se coordinen los organismos internacionales para no duplicar y aprovechar los potenciales
 - Se busca que no quede fuera la opinión de México
 - Hacia el interior y hacia terceros
- México tiene mucho que aportar como su institucionalidad en materia de protección social
- La presidencia de México le da mucho mayor visibilidad a los temas de protección social
- Los avances se coordinan con Cancillería.
- La protección social es un tema mas noble
 - Han avanzado mucho en moverse en la institucionalidad
 - El desafío es encontrar iniciativas sin duplicar lo que ya hacen otros organismos

Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP)

Roberto Marino

Representante Especial de la Presidencia de México del G20

- Su función es asistir a foros internacionales y nacionales para presentar las prioridades de México, en su calidad de presidencia del G20
- También compila información de esos foros para recoger las inquietudes que otros países no miembros del G20 tienen respecto al foro.
- Emite comunicados sobre sus actividades que comparte con ambos canales y con la oficina de Presidencia
- Argumenta que México trató de dar continuidad en la agenda
 - Considera que las prioridades son temas de todos, son universales
 - Lo que hace México es poner un énfasis en temas en particular
- En su opinión, ya existe una consciencia sobre *accountability* entre el grupo
 - Existe este compromiso a auto evaluar
 - Considera que la academia puede servir en este proceso de verificación o monitoreo del cumplimiento
- Considera que las presidencias dejan huella
 - Por ejemplo, en Corea, quedó una huella o inercia del conocimiento del grupo.
 - Eleva además la percepción del país de los compromisos

Hugo Garduño

- Existe una marcada diferencia entre ser presidente del g20 y no
- La Secretaría de Hacienda fija el Track de Finanzas. Todo lo demás se deja a la Cancillería, son ellos los que comunican al resto de la agenda
- Antes de ser presidencia, la coordinación será mas autónoma

- El común denominador es el de los Líderes y la preparación de las Cumbres
- Los que atienden los 9 pilares de desarrollo son de cancillería. Antes de que México fuera presidente, había comunicación
 - Pero no implica una duplicación, sino complementarias
- Inclusión financiera: se ha llevado preponderantemente por el Track de Finanzas, aunque a través del consenso de Seúl, se incluyó también la agenda del GTD
- Los dos temas compartidos son inclusión financiera y volatilidad de precios.
- Lo de política fiscal, en realidad no se ha llevado
- Antes de la presidencia, no se tenía una injerencia directa en el GTD.
 - Las consultas no eran sistemáticas
 - Solo se consultaba cuando se solicitaban expresamente opiniones directas
- A partir de la presidencia, se incrementó de forma significativa la coordinación en términos de logística y organización por un lado, pero al mismo tiempo en cuanto a lo sustantivo.
 - A diferencia de antes, ahora participan dentro del GTD, particularmente en el tema de infraestructura
- Desde la presidencia se decidió enfocarse en tres y luego los demás
- Inclusión financiera se llevó mas allá y llevó a un plano más amplio a raíz del liderazgo mexicano. Esto es una diferencia significativa con relación a Francia
- Otro cambio se presentó en cuanto al tema de volatilidad de precios
 - Este tema se le dio a Hacienda y SAGARPA ahora solo ve food security
- Los mecanismos de coordinación de información se aceleraron mucho
- No se sabe si se mantendrán posterior a la presidencia de México
 - Pero el próximo año, México será parte de la Troica por lo que de alguna manera se tendrá una injerencia informal
- El papel de la Sherpa va variando dependiendo del país
 - Unos son mas político, otros son más directamente relacionados con el ámbito económico
 - Por ejemplo, en el caso de la India, el sherpa es Deputy de Finanzas, por lo tanto asiste a los dos tracks del G20
 - La cancillería tiene recursos muy importantes para llevar a cabo pero depende del tipo de tarea, quién se encarga lo de sustancia o se encarga de la coordinación
- El track de finanzas tienen distintos
 - Afortunadamente la división de los temas de G20 coincide con la estructura orgánica de la Secretaría de Hacienda por lo que se facilita mucho el seguimiento del cumplimiento
- No es papel de la SHCP, es un mecanismo de coordinación en donde cancillería
- Resaltó la importancia de tener en cuenta que los la agenda de los pilares de desarrollo es mucho más joven y sus impactos son a largo plazo.
- Cambian los compromisos.
- Uno de los compromisos de la presidencia es hacer un ejercicio de metas- accountability mechanism

COMERCIO- SECRETARÍA DE ECONOMÍA

Roberto Zapata

- Cuando se habla de comercio, hay formas
 - Uno, el comercio multilateral que se ve rige por la OMC, cuyo papel es negociar los flujos de comercio observando asimetrías
 - La segunda, las negociaciones regionales y bilaterales
- En ambos, lo que se busca es construir capacidades para que se aborden en ambas
- México se ha enfocado en tres puntos principales que se derivan de la agenda de la OMC
 - Facilitación de comercio
 - Ayuda para comercio
 - Regional. Bilateral. Iniciativas que buscan provocar un desarrollo general
- Por ejemplo, el TLC único con Centroamérica. Se generó un comercio consolidado de reglas, con mayor acceso de forma integrada y que den reglas mas sencillas para las pymes regionales. 2011- Proceso de aprobación en los países
- Comercio es una herramienta para el desarrollo
- Mesoamérica. Aid for trade. Articular las políticas más allá del tema comercial. Infraestructura. Políticas públicas más homologadas. Ventanillas únicas de comercio exterior, procedimientos aduaneros. Ventanillas únicas.
- Otra línea derivada de esto es la creación de capacidades en términos de conocimiento. Intercambios de funcionarios.
- Aid for trade, México se ha enfocado en creación de capacidades
 - Iniciativas de carácter unilateral para no esperarse a que se pongan de acuerdo los demás, por ejemplo, mediante la reducción de aranceles y simplificación de comercio
- Proceso de consulta pública. Medidas publicadas transparencia que no necesariamente se hace en otro países
- Para que en el G20 hiciera una diferencia, el reto era presentar al comercio de una forma no antagónica como en Doha
- Cadena de suministro es lo que en años recientes ha sido la forma que ha dado resultados. Por ejemplo, a China la sacó de la pobreza
- Otros países como, Singapur, Camboya, Vietnam, Laos, Bangladesh también han logrado avances gracias a la cadena de suministros
- Este tema, también es importante para México pues es el país es parte esencial de la cadena entre Asia y Norteamérica
- Se buscó generar una discusión neutral y provocadora. Si se tiene éxito, entonces en el futuro la discusión se sube a líneas de acción que pueda dar bocanada al sistema Intel de comercio
- Turquía, Chile, China, Colombia, Camboya, Perú son ejemplos de países que han abrazado
- Se buscaba romper el impasse y crear momentum más a mediano y largo plazo

OTRO

Mateo Lejarza

- La participación en el g20 tiene como objetivo presentar un Nuevo pacto social. En otros mecanismos el Diálogo con los sindicatos es más institucionalizado, Unión Europea
- En su opinión, el G20 es un instrumento que nace de la insuficiencia de la OMC y de Naciones Unidas (gobernanza y crecimiento económico)
- El éxito de G20 va en detrimento de la Gobernanza y el crecimiento económico

- Estados Unidos vs, Europa. Significa que México podría idear una nueva formula. Y el G20 es su posibilidad mas grande.
- Hay una cúpula de las fuerzas sindicales que si ejerce influencia que los líderes no lo pueden negar
- B20- su sola presencia advierte que no se sienten representados por sus gobiernos
- La política exterior debe estar alineada con la nacional
- Los compromisos del G20 no constituyen un proyecto de nación solamente es una posición ante un evento
- Crecer al 4% no esta mal pero no es suficiente para la crisis de competitividad del país.
- No se asumen como corresponsables. Esperan que los otros tomen acción.
- México tiene que plantearse su discusión interna
- México no suscribe todos los tratados y luego los suscribe pero no los aplica
- En primer término, es necesaria una reforma fiscal y otra de telecomunicaciones. Luego una reforma laboral y educativa y al final la del estado. Eso crearía empleos. Puedes pasar del primer sector al tercero pero solamente si hay de por medio el diseño un plan nacional
- En su opinión, Seúl arrastra la idea de restablecer el orden anterior en lugar de imponer uno nuevo
- Papel preponderante de la sociedad, asumir el impacto que tiene la transmisión económico
- No considera que el G20 haya contribuido en materia de los compromisos de desarrollo-labor
- Lo que se discute en el marco del G20 son las reformas estructurales peor en México la reforma laboral se relaciona directamente con la eficiencia del mercado y no en términos de la competitividad de los trabajadores y su capacidad productiva. La reforma que se comenta no se han tocado temas como la inversión en tecnología, la formación de profesional, la discusión se enfrasca en el abaratamiento de seguridad social, de los costos de despidos y de los costos de los juicios.

- Las políticas públicas que el gobierno implementa en desarrollo de habilidades no responden al G20 sino a políticas nacionales que la Secretaría del Trabajo ha generado desde hace mucho tiempo pero se enfocan en becar a los desempleados en lugar de ofrecer un seguro de desempleo.
- Los esfuerzos por lograr la normalización de las competencias laborales quedaron incompletos. En realidad en México no se conocen cuáles son competencias y habilidades que necesitamos para la vocación de México en cuanto al sector exportador como al mercado interno.
- No se conocen cuáles son las habilidades de los empleados ni de los desempleados. Por lo que si México creciera al 7% durante el próximo año, no se sabe si contaríamos con los ingenieros, enfermeras, médicos, necesarios para sostener dicho crecimiento. Y el círculo se vuelve virtuoso en tanto no logramos un crecimiento tal puesto que precisamente no contamos con esos ingenieros, enfermeras, médicos, etc.
- No existe una detección de la demanda y ello ha llevado a que en México las contrataciones se den basadas en la oferta de trabajadores en lugar de la demanda. Al haber tantos ingenieros desempleados, las empresas terminan contratándolos cuando en realidad el perfil que la empresa requiere es otro.
- El esfuerzo se inició pero no concluyó porque las empresas no están dispuestas a compartir su know-how. No existe una política empresarial de cooperación. Las

empresas quieren capacitar sí, pero a los trabajadores que ya contrataron y no a los demás y no comparten sus técnicas y métodos de capacitación.

- Por ejemplo, Telmex cuenta con los más altos estándares de técnicos en telecomunicaciones pero no quiso compartir su capacitación para las certificaciones.

AMEXCID organizational chart

