

G20 Development Governance, 1999-2011: Involvement, Innovation, Institutionalization, Impact

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Introduction

The G20, once conceived as a finance and economic forum, has been increasingly involved in international development. Development is quickly moving into a higher priority position, has been institutionalized and is being integrated into the G20’s current focus on promoting strong, sustained and balanced growth. Its impact, while very limited thus far, thus promises to increase in the years ahead.

This study traces the G20’s increasing involvement, integration, institutionalization and impact on development from 1999 to 2011. It finds that there has been a general trend toward an increased involvement and integration in and institutionalization of development. This was augmented dramatically by the Seoul Summit in November 2010. These trends should continue, with G20 development governance promising to have its first major impact on the global development agenda when Mexico hosts the seventh G20 summit in June 2012, with sustainable development and green growth as its priority themes.

The G20’s Creation, 1999

The Group of Twenty was created as an annual gathering of the finance ministers and central bank governors of the world’s systemically significant countries, in response to the Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. It brought together as equals the established countries of the Group of Eight — the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Canada and Russia — and the emerging countries of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Argentina, as well as Australia and the European Union. The managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the president of the World Bank also attend. The equality between the two Bretton Woods bodies ensured that development would have a place in G20 governance from the start.

The first three meetings, chaired by Paul Martin, Canada’s minister of finance, took place in Berlin in December 1999, Montreal in October 2000 and Ottawa in October 2001. From then on, the chair rotated usually alternating between emerging and advanced members, with ministerial meetings held in India in 2002, Mexico in 2003, Germany in 2004, China in 2005, Australia in 2006, South Africa in 2007 and Brazil in 2008. This move toward equality in hosting helped maintain a focus on the theme of development.

The G20's Development Mission, 1999-2001

Since the start, the G20 dealt with development in an expanding, largely ratchet-like way. At Berlin it defined its mission as promoting “sustainable world economic growth that benefits all.” At Montreal, it more directly declared its desire to reduce poverty, help heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and improve the effectiveness of official development assistance (ODA). At Ottawa in 2001, it supported the newly launched Doha Development Agenda at the World Trade Organization (WTO), reaffirmed support for poverty reduction and the needs of the poorest, and stressed the value of equity in the world.

The Expanding Development Agenda, 1999-2008

Over its first decade, the G20 gradually increased its involvement in development. While macroeconomic stability and financial regulation remained the dominant issues, development assumed a greater place and became incorporated into more areas of the agenda. When economic growth was strong, when there were no significant shocks to the international system, and when an emerging country hosted the G20, attention to development rose.

At Berlin in 1999, the G20 supported continued trade liberalization in order to bring about “broad-based benefits to the global economy.” At Montreal in 2000, members discussed the benefits of globalization for achieving “sustained and broad-based improvements in living standards,” which included providing developing countries with better access to advanced markets for their exports. Economic integration was declared to be a powerful force for reducing poverty and spurring economic growth, in order to improve the economies of HIPCs. The first mention of ODA came with a call for bilateral donors to improve their aid effectiveness. At Ottawa in 2001, despite the preoccupation with the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the G20 welcomed the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, expressed a desire to reduce the effects of the economic slowdown on developing countries and reaffirmed economic integration as a force for poverty reduction.

In 2002, when India became the first emerging economy to host the G20, about 75% of the communiqué’s ten paragraphs dealt with development. Poverty reduction and the needs of developing countries were related to the need for strong institutions, a favourable investment climate, transparency, infrastructure investment and human development. A section of the communiqué, entitled “Globalization, Trade, and Development,” discussed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the first time.

The 2003 meeting in Mexico introduced the principle of promoting growth of a more “balanced” nature between the developed and developing world. It reaffirmed the importance of international trade for development, connected trade with fulfillment of the MDG commitments, and urged debt relief to poor countries.

At Berlin in 2004, the G20 reaffirmed support for the MDGs, welcomed the role of the World Bank and IMF’s mechanisms for financing development, and supported reviving

the already-stalled Doha negotiations. A section entitled “Empowering the people and reducing poverty” discussed education, access to finance and social safety nets.

In China in 2005 the G20’s involvement, integration and innovation in development soared. It released its first document specifically devoted to development. The theme of the summit included “balanced” growth, as the G20 members noted their concern over low growth and increasing poverty in some developing countries despite the overall expansion of the world economy. Support for Doha, trade liberalization and the MDGs again appeared.

The meeting expansively expressed support for the World Bank and IMF’s work on helping poor countries deal with commodity shocks and high oil prices. It connected its reform agenda to development more explicitly. For the first time, it focused on reform of the international financial institutions (IFIs), including a call for updating the quota system, and elaborated on the link between such reform and effectiveness on the one hand and poverty reduction on the other. It laid out a clear and renewed role for the World Bank in international development.

In the lengthy G20 Statement on Global Development Issues, members agreed that “the G20 should play an active role in addressing critical development issues.” The document discussed familiar issues in greater detail, referring to the importance of country-led and country-specific development approaches, the mobilization of development resources — including welcoming efforts to reach the goal of 0.7% of gross national product as ODA — and innovative financing mechanisms.

At Australia in 2006 the G20 showed its development agenda was here to stay. It endorsed broad-based economic growth for poverty reduction, the Doha negotiations and IMF reform, but focused less on development than in previous years. It also built on the 2005 statement to support greater aid effectiveness and debt relief, with all members pledging support for the new Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Climate change was noted for the first time.

The 2007 meeting in South Africa called for “balanced and sustainable growth” and endorsed Doha negotiations, IFI reform and the MDGs. It linked the economy with climate change.

At Brazil in 2008, the G20 began by supporting poverty reduction, social inclusion and global growth. It innovatively emphasized the need to minimize the impact of the new global financial crisis on emerging and low-income countries and called for a restoration of credit and capital flows to developing countries. It defined a role for the multilateral development banks (MDBs). Members also stressed the importance of reducing the impacts of commodity price volatility, maintaining aid flows and sustaining infrastructure investment through the MDBs and IFI reform. Doha was noted too.

Decisional Commitments on Development: China as Champion

During the G20's first decade, the number of its specific development commitments increased. There were none in 1999, four in 2000, one each in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and none in 2004. In China in 2005, there was a sharp spike to a new high of eight commitments on development, associated mostly with trade. But there were only two in 2006, one in 2007 and one in 2008. China alone was the G20's real action-oriented development champion, if in a largely trade-liberalizing and private sector partnership way.

The G20's impact on the global development agenda remained modest. The G20 largely added its weight to ideas and initiatives that had begun elsewhere. Yet bringing these initiatives to a consensus among the most influential established and emerging powers, and among their finance ministers rather than their development and planning ministers, were important achievements indeed.

The G20 Summit's Rising Development Performance, 2008-10

Once the G20 started meeting at the leaders' level, from 2008 to 2010 G20 attention to development steadily rose (see Appendix A). A significant number of distributional principles were affirmed (see Appendix B). Development commitments consistently increased and their delivery became relatively strong (see Appendix A). The G20 relationship with other international development institutions was low but spiked at the fifth summit, in Seoul in November 2010 (see Appendix C).

Washington, November 2008: Open Markets for Poverty Reduction

The first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008, hosted by U.S. President George Bush, had only a peripheral interest in development. The predominant focus on financial issues meant that the G20 devoted to development the smallest amount of absolute and relative attention in the communiqué in the history of all the G20 summits. Washington did, however, affirm the importance of good governance, accountability, transparency and a broad range of social and equity concerns reminiscent of the "Montreal consensus" of 2000. It declared: "Our work will be guided by a shared belief that market principles, open trade and investment regimes, and effectively regulated financial markets foster the dynamism, innovation, and entrepreneurship that are essential for economic growth, employment and poverty reduction." As in China in 2005, open trade and now markets, investment and entrepreneurship were the instruments identified to get poverty reduced.

London, April 2009: Stimulus and IFI Reform for Development

At the second G20 summit, in London in April 2009, British prime minister and host Gordon Brown brought development to the centre stage. The agenda still focused heavily on financial regulation and supervision and macroeconomic stimulus. But it extended to

development-related areas such as expanded access to credit, climate adaptation and IFI reform.

The emerging economies, backed by development organizations and the United Nations, used the G20 to push for a large stimulus package targeted to development and to ensuring that the poorest of the poor did not suffer unduly from the financial crisis. A letter from UN security general Ban Ki-moon to Brown encouraged the G20 to lead on development, suggesting a development-oriented stimulus package of \$1 trillion. The London Summit did indeed mobilize \$1.1 trillion in new money for global stimulus overall. Developing countries were potentially major beneficiaries of this massive new funding awarded to the IMF, MDBs and other institutions. The World Bank received \$100 billion of the total. The passage on accelerated IFI reform contained a promise to make sure that developing countries got better treatment from global institutions and an increased position in the global economic balance of power. The G20 thus sought to advance the global architecture in the interests of development, moving from simply mobilizing more money for aid and poverty reduction through traditional instruments to making structural changes that would reorient the centres of global institutional power in finance and economies toward low-income countries.

London did less on other development fronts. Britain worked to include climate change in a development context, spurred by Commonwealth members from Africa who pointed to climate change control as their most pressing concern. However, resistance from emerging economies and others, which saw the G20 as an inappropriate forum to advance climate governance, meant that this initiative did not go very far. In similar fashion, the day before the summit, Brown and Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd called for stronger ethics in the global economy and for meeting the needs of the poor by reaching the MDGs. The MDGs, however, received only one line in the communiqué. Aid commitments were similarly brief.

Deliberation and decision making on development shot up dramatically relative to Washington. However, compliance with London's commitments on the MDGs, ODA and climate adaptation was poor. Within the G20, most of the G7 members did well in delivering their MDG and ODA commitments. But overall most complied little with their commitment on voluntarily increasing resources for social protection. More IFI reform was required before it could be considered a success.

London's surge in development performance was driven first by the fear that economic devastation would destroy the gains made in development and democracy over the past two decades. There was a sense that the fates of the developed and developing worlds were intricately connected, and that failure in one would mean failure in the other. A second key cause was the personal commitment of Brown to global poverty reduction and his determination as host to embed development in various aspects of the G20 agenda. Brown maintained the core agenda of Washington — financial regulation, macroeconomic management, IFI reform, trade and investment liberalization, and development — but reorganized priorities within them. He added financial and social inclusion as a key agenda item to advance development in important ways.

Pittsburgh, September 2009

At Pittsburgh in September 2009, with U.S. president Barack Obama now in the chair, overall progress on development stalled slightly, but momentum on IFI reform and MDB resources were sustained. Developing countries looked to the G20 to complete its “unfinished business” in promoting development in a fair and inclusive way, a call that saw modest success. Although Pittsburgh did not scrap London’s development advances, it did not drive them forward in a significant way.

IFI reform took centre stage. Consensus on IMF quota reform was slow to achieve and contentious, with initial proposals rejected by Brazil and other emerging economies as not going far enough. The eager emerging economies confronted the reluctant Europeans, with the U.S. mediating and encouraging the Europeans to accept greater reform. In the end, the communiqué stipulated a 5% shift in quota share. Numerous commitments also were made to replenish MDB resources and to reform the World Bank further.

Other areas of development saw modest success. The much acclaimed Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth vaguely promised to pursue economic growth that narrowed development imbalances and promoted poverty reduction. The launch of a G20 SME Finance Challenge for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and a G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group could contribute to development, but how was not specified. The G20 also pledged increased aid transparency. It reiterated its London promises on improving progress toward the MDGs and increased ODA.

At Pittsburgh the absolute number of words devoted to development increased, but the percentage of development words decreased. The number of development commitments increased significantly, due largely to those on IFI reform. However the G20’s delivery of these commitments was dismal. Delivery appeared promising at first, beginning with Canada’s pre-summit announcement of a \$2.6 billion callable capital contribution to the African Development Bank. Compliance with the commitments on IFI reform and MDB replenishment was positive. But compliance with the pledges on ODA, the MDGs, aid effectiveness and aid transparency was in the negative range. Pittsburgh was thus left with a low record of compliance with development commitments.

Toronto, June 2010: Conception of the Seoul Development Consensus

The Toronto Summit in June 2010 produced a modest but promising development performance. From the beginning, Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper as host focused firmly on the erupting eurocrisis in Greece. He was determined that the G20 should remain focused on the economy and finance, limiting other agenda items to implementing commitments already made at previous summits. This kept development on the agenda.

Moreover, because Canada sought to ensure that the June 2010 summit complemented the one that Korea would host in November, Toronto introduced the new development emphasis that Seoul would highlight later. Toronto made one new commitment to

establish the Development Working Group, which would create a development agenda and devise a multi-year action plan for adoption at Seoul. This initiative came from a paper drafted and circulated by Korea, as it prepared to scale up the G20's development focus at Seoul. As a result of Korea's strong desire, the Development Working Group was the first such group to operate under the leaders' personal representatives (sherpas), rather than their finance ministers. This development of G20 governance allowed the development agenda to expand beyond the finance ministers' traditional frame.

Toronto's heavy focus on delivering promises already made worked well for compliance. Delivery of the commitment to accelerate IFI reform was almost perfect. Delivery of the commitment on new approaches to development financing was substantial, especially for G7 members.

In all, at Toronto, the G20 deliberation on development continued its upward trajectory. Decision making remained the same as at Washington and London. The G20 did commit to write off all Haiti's official debt, in the wake of the devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. Together with the launch of Korea's development initiative, this thrust the G20 into the new approach to development that came at Seoul.

Seoul, November 2010: Creation of the Seoul Development Consensus

The Seoul Summit did more for development than any other G20 summit, largely as a result of the Seoul Development Consensus, which marked a new direction in the G20's approach to development although its details were lacking in certain key areas. As the G20 moved from short-term crisis response to the promotion of long-term, sustainable growth, development assumed greater prominence. This rise was reinforced by Korea's position as a country that had recently gone through rapid and successful development, with expertise and financial resources to share.

Korea as G20 host thus offered a two-tiered agenda. It first focused on the standard G20 issues, including traditional development. It also included a second tier that featured a new approach to development, centred on the Seoul Development Consensus and its corresponding Action Plan. The consensus was based on nine pillars: resilient growth, financial inclusion, infrastructure, private investment and job creation, trade, food security, domestic resource mobilization, human resource development and knowledge sharing. The last four appeared at the G20 for the first time.

The introduction of agriculture and food security into the heart of the G20's development work solidified an important trend that had been building over the past few years at the G8 summit and elsewhere. It addressed a critical need, given the declining investment in agricultural research and hunger reduction over the previous few decades. The consensus also repudiated some of the most contentious, market-oriented development strategies of the recent past, focusing more on inclusive growth and strong human capital development. Seoul also agreed that sometimes, in certain circumstances, capital controls in non-advanced countries may be acceptable. This solidified a major shift in

development thinking towards a country-led approach with greater policy-making flexibility. The Seoul Summit thus strongly supported egalitarian, country-specific development principles through the Action Plan.

The Shortcomings of the Seoul Development Consensus

Some criticized the new plan on the grounds that there was little new, especially as the neoliberal approach of the Washington consensus had already long since been abandoned. Others suggested that the Seoul Development Consensus focused too much on physical capital rather than on social capital and, in that sense, did not break enough from the development models of the past. Moreover, despite efforts from Obama and others, the G20 failed to mobilize new financial resources for the fulfilment of the Seoul Development Consensus. The consensus also failed to adequately respond to civil society's call for greater accountability in G20 action on development, putting in place no new mechanisms for follow-up from previous years and neglecting to provide greater representation to low-income countries or to civil society itself. The Seoul Development Consensus also missed a major opportunity to incorporate sustainable development and green growth into mainstream development policy. Although Korean president Lee Myung-bak was vocal in his promotion of his country's green growth policies, the communiqué left green growth as a discrete issue area, failing to link long-term sustainability, food security, climate change and development.

The Impact of the Seoul Summit

Seoul was the most productive and innovative development G20 summit to date. Deliberation on development more than doubled. Seoul referred to fewer democratic norms than other summits, but to significantly more distributional norms. Decision making more than tripled, due to the Seoul Development Consensus and Action Plan, IFI reform and the reiteration of past summit commitments. Delivery of the one commitment on delivering ODA was complied with at a level of 80%, a score significantly higher than on all other ODA commitments assessed thus far. Seoul created more development-related linkages with outside organizations than any other summit by far, suggesting that it sought to coordinate an array of organizations for better policy coherence and cooperation, a major strength of the G20 approach. Seoul was thus the most important G20 summit for development yet. As emerging economies continued to gain economic strength, this focus was likely to continue.

This high development performance was largely driven by Korean leadership. Lee was determined from very early on to make his new development consensus the major accomplishment of the summit. This would contribute to improved development efforts throughout the G20 and the wider world. Korea was in the unique position of having recently switched from aid recipient to aid donor. It thus had great ambition to channel its recent successes into a new model that captured the strengths of the Korean approach.

Throughout the G20 more broadly, the desire to act on development was also higher than before. With the 2008 financial crisis fading further from memory, but desires to promote strong, stable growth still strong, advanced and emerging economies alike could see the

sense of focusing on development. Moreover, the issues of food and commodity price volatility were increasingly receiving public attention, as statistics emerged that more and more people were experiencing hunger and malnutrition, representing a backslide on the MDG to halve world hunger by 2015. Thus, Seoul innovatively produced the Seoul Development Consensus, IMF voice and vote reform, financial safety nets, a new agenda on financial regulation for developing countries and, in one phrase, a call for the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases.

Cannes, November 2011

For the sixth G20 summit, in Cannes on November 3-4, 2011, France as host planned to give development a prominent place. It sought to build on the Seoul Development Consensus, advance food security and push for a controversial financial transaction tax (FTT) to fund development and environmental aid commitments.

France had first announced this innovative financing mechanism at the Toronto Summit. It was received well by much of civil society but encountered significant resistance from various G20 members, including Canada and the United States. At Cannes, the FTT initiative received support from Germany, empathy from South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, but opposition from the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and Australia. It failed. Other recommendations contained in “Innovation with Impact: Financing 21st Century Development,” the report submitted by Bill Gates to the G20 at Cannes, had greater appeal.

France’s development plans for Cannes highlighted infrastructure and food security. On infrastructure, France planned to build on the High-Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment created at Seoul to identify projects to bring together financing from both the public and private sectors. It would also continue to involve the MDBs in this initiative. Small advances were made here.

On food security, France focused on securing commitments for increased agriculture production and more responsible agricultural investment, in order to counter both food scarcity and price volatility. The first ever meeting of G20 agricultural ministers, held in June 2011, provided a firm plan for the leaders to endorse.

On trade, the Cannes Summit implicitly recognized that the long-overdue, decade-long Doha Development Agenda would never get done. The G20 shifted to a short-term goal of opening members’ markets up to the poorest countries in the world.

On the Seoul Development Consensus itself, there were modest advances. They came particularly on the pillars of infrastructure and food security. Cannes’s greatest potential impact came from the development of G20 governance, with the first G20 agricultural ministerial and the first G20 development ministerial (together with finance ministers) held in September. Cannes also identified the future hosting of the G20 summits, giving its developed and emerging members an equal place. Cannes also continued the tradition, begun at Toronto, of inviting two developing countries from Africa as part of its five guests. In all, these institutional building blocks were important advances, at a summit

where the development agenda was overshadowed by yet another erupting financial crisis, this one directly affecting the developed G7 imperial power serving as host.

Conclusion

This analysis shows that the G20, at both the ministerial and leaders' levels, has had an increasing involvement with, and made innovative initiatives in, the development sphere. It has increasingly addressed standard development issues such as ODA, expanded the development level with other instruments and issue areas such as trade, and, at Seoul in 2010, introduced the new concept of domestic financial regulation for the poor. This growing development effort, cumulative but not continuous, is seen across all major dimensions of G20 governance: deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery and the development of global governance both inside and outside the G20.

It is in this last dimension that the G20's impact on development — still largely invisible outside IFI reform and MDB resource raising — is most likely to come. At a time of continuing financial crisis and slow growth in developing countries, the world badly needs the G20 to do development as a key component of its work, and do so in both old and new ways. Its contribution will come not by bringing to life very old ideas such as the FTT, but by infusing the development dimension equally into all of the expanding areas of finance, economic, social and political issues with which it deals.

The 2012 Los Cabos Summit, hosted by Mexico, will be the second G20 summit hosted by a recently developing country and one that might come without a financial crisis to divert attention elsewhere. With green growth as its focus, and its twinning with Brazil's Rio+20 summit scheduled immediately afterward, the impact of the G20 Los Cabos Summit on development could be substantial. It also provides an opportunity for the G20 to introduce such development innovations as bringing more development-devoted multilateral organizations to the summit, supporting the UN's actions on the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases, addressing the migration dimension of development (beyond remittances), adding an accountability mechanism to assess the results of the Seoul Development Consensus and bringing G20 foreign ministers together to strengthen the political foundations for development worldwide.

Appendix A: G20 Summit Conclusions on Development

	# words	% total words	# para	% total para	# of docs	% total docs	# ded docs	# commits	% total commits	Avg compl
Washington	651	17.8	9	12.6	1	100	0	12	12.6	n/a ^a
London	1,726	27.6	28	30.4	3	100	1	13	14.7	+0.15 (2)
Pittsburgh	2,292	24.5	20	18.3	1	100	0	22	17.2	-0.05 (3)
Toronto	3,899	34.5	61	42.3	2	100	1	12	19.7	+0.53 (2)
Seoul	9,195	58.1	105	47.9	5	100	2	39	25	+0.60 (1)
Average	3,553	32.5	44.6	30.3	2.4	100	0.8	20	18.2	+0.31 ^b

Notes:

words: Number of development-related words in communiqué (see below for list of inclusions and exclusions).

% total words: Number of development-related words as a percent of total words in communiqué.

para: Number of development-related paragraphs in communiqué.

% total para: Number of development-related paragraphs as a percent of total paragraphs in communiqué.

of docs: Number of official documents released at summit that contain development-related conclusions.

% of total docs: Percentage of all documents that have development-related conclusions.

ded docs: Number of official summit documents that are exclusively devoted to development.

commits: Number of development-related commitments in communiqué.

% total commits: Number of development-related commitments as a percent of total commitments in communiqué.

Avg compl: Average compliance score for development-related commitments, based on those selected for compliance assessment. Number of commitments included is indicated in brackets.

^a No available compliance data on development from the Washington Summit.

^b Excludes the Washington Summit.

Appendix B: G20 Development Direction Setting

Democratic Norms Affirmed

Value	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	Average
Transparency						
International mobility of ideas					1	0.2
Access to ideas in all countries						
Good governance						
Accountable international institutions	2	2	3	2		1.8
Surveillance/monitoring						
Rule of law						
Supporting NEPAD						
Information/knowledge exchange						
Accountability						
Creditors rights						
Openness						
Multistakeholder consultation						
Total	2	2	3	2	1	2
Type spread						

NEPAD = New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Distributional Norms Affirmed

Value	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	Average
Growth benefiting all			2	2	3	1.4
Attacking income inequalities						
Reduce/fight poverty			2	1	9	2.4
Needs of low-income countries				1		0.2
World's poorest and most vulnerable	1		1	1	3	1.2
Equity and well-being for all peoples						
Sound domestic social policies						
Socially effective response to crisis		2	1		1	0.8
Millennium Development Goals				2	2	0.8
Equitable global economy						
Fairness						
Broadly shared		2		2		0.8
Reducing development gaps			9	2	2	2.6
Country-led solutions	1		2		4	1.4
Total	2	5	17	11	24	11.8
Type spread	2	2	6	7	7	4.8

Appendix C: Development of Global Governance

Instructions Given to International Organizations and New G20 Bodies Created

	World Bank	IMF	WTO	OECD	ILO	MDBs/ RDBs	UN/UN bodies	FAO	Summit total	Creation of new bodies
Washington									0	0
London		2					1		3	0
Pittsburgh	5					1			6	2
Toronto	1					1			2	1
Seoul	10	3	4	5	3	6	14	3	48	2
Average	3.2	1	0.8	1	0.6	1.6	3	0.6	11.8	1

Notes: FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization; ILO = International Labour Organization; IMF = International Monetary Fund; MDBs = multilateral development banks; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; RDBs = regional development banks; WTO = World Trade Organization.