

An Analysis of the G20's Significant Performance at the 2021 Rome Summit

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Research Report, G20 Research Group. I am grateful for the assistance of Brittaney Warren, Sonja Dobson, Duja Muhanna, Madeline Koch and other members of the G20 Research Group. Draft of November 15, 2021.

Introduction

Significance

The 16th regular G20 summit, taking place in Rome, Italy, on October 30–31, 2021, was a very significant event.

It built on the results of the G20's Riyadh Summit hosted by Saudi Arabia on November 20–21, 2020, and on the foundation from the highly successful G7 Cornwall Summit hosted by the United Kingdom on June 11–13, 2021. It took place just before the long-awaited United Nations climate summit, which Italy co-chaired with the United Kingdom in Glasgow, Scotland, on November 1–12.

It was the first G20 summit hosted by Italy, a core member of the G7, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union since their start. It brought G20 hosting back to a major democratic power with a long Mediterranean coastline that put it at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Atlantic worlds.

It was hosted by Prime Minister Mario Draghi, participating as Italy's leader in his first regular, in-person G20 summit with a comprehensive agenda, after hosting the virtual G20 Global Health Summit on May 21 and the G20 Summit on Afghanistan on October 12. It was infused with fresh energy from a few key new leaders, including US president Joe Biden at his first face-to-face G20 summit and Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida participating virtually for some portions immediately after the general election he called for October 31.

Also at their first in-person summit were Argentina's Alberto Fernández, the United Kingdom's Boris Johnson, and the European Union's Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel. Also relatively new were Kristalina Georgieva of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank's David Malpass. G20 summit veterans were Indonesia's Joko Widodo, who will host in 2022, Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, who hosted in 2020, Canada's Justin Trudeau, France's Emmanuel Macron, South Africa's Cyril Ramaphosa and Australia's Scott Morrison. The summit benefited from the presence of the greatest G20 veteran, Angela Merkel, who represented Germany while a new governing coalition was being formed back home. A few days before the summit, three leaders confirmed they would participate virtually rather than travel to Rome: Russia's Vladimir Putin, who hosted in 2013, China's Xi Jinping, who hosted in 2016, and Mexico's Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who has never travelled to a summit since his election and sent foreign minister Marcelo Ebrard. King Salman also did not go to Rome.

These leaders were supported by Pedro Sánchez of Spain, a permanent guest of the G20, as well as Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore and Mark Rutte of the Netherlands. Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo represented the African Union, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei represented the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda represented the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Other guest participants were Qu Donghu of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Randall Quarles of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), Guy Ryder of the International Labour Organization (ILO), Matthias Cormann of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Nkozi Okonjo-Iweala of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of the World Health Organization (WHO) and António Guterres of the United Nations.

Under its priority pillars of “People, Planet, Prosperity,” the Rome Summit confronted the central, cascading crises from the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and its economic, financial, employment and social devastation, especially for the health, well-being, equality, education and safety of women, girls and youth.

It simultaneously addressed the closely related, compounding challenges of climate change, to support the UN's Glasgow Summit, and of biodiversity loss to build on the results of the UN's virtual conference on October 11–15. This included financing development and the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially for food and energy security to confront the crises emerging on these subjects then.

On the G20's core finance and economic agenda, the leaders addressed fair international taxation, the need for more fiscal and monetary policy stimulus, financial fragilities in China and elsewhere, trade and tourism amid rising protectionism and fragmented, domesticizing supply chains, development and debt relief, incentivizing quality infrastructure, and governing the proliferating digital economy in an open, fair and trusted way.

Amid rising geopolitical tensions and strains on the established multilateral order, leaders sought to combat crime, corruption and terrorist finance, and cope with new flows of refugees, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the aftermath of the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in August.

The Debate

The prospects for the summit inspired a debate among several schools of thought.

As Italy's year as host began, the first school saw a severe struggle for success. Gordon Brown (2020) forecast a decade of low growth, high unemployment and a potential solvency crisis, with no “internationally coordinated plan for growth that recognises the limits of monetary policy when interest rates are near zero.” He called for an emergency G20 summit in February, to unleash new infrastructure spending, a Marshall Plan for the developing world, and action on tax havens and climate change.

The second school saw a big health challenge, centred on the vital, urgent need for a coordinated response to vaccinate the world against COVID-19. Tony Blair (2021) said “the G20 should commit to \$6bn in financing for health system absorption capacity and commission key global multilateral organisations to coordinate and centralise funding needs and disbursement.” He pointed to the common vulnerability of all countries and people as the reason why the G20 rationally should.

The third school saw the G20 gaining strength in global policy coordination and action. Chiara Oldani (2021) highlighted prospective advances on fair global taxation, due to member governments' massive deficits created by COVID-19, Italy's well-designed agenda, and the many preparatory ministerial and official-level meetings. But she added that chances of meeting the host's goals on debt restructuring and digital regulation were not high.

The fourth school saw promising progress on international corporate taxation, due to the agreement among G7 finance ministers in July and the biggest beneficiaries of the new regime being countries containing multinational firms' headquarters, above all the United States (Agyemang, Giles and Wheatley 2021). Larry Summers (2021) was cautiously optimistic, given the experience, expertise and wisdom of Mario Draghi as chair and of Joe Biden representing the United States, but concerned about the protectionist turn in US trade policy, the poorly executed US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US grudging vaccination record at home and abroad.

After the summit's end a new debate arose about the course and causes of its performance.

The first post-summit school saw "several important steps to accelerate economic recovery, enhance health security and strengthen multilateralism" (Bhatia 2021). Rajiv Bhatia (2021) judged that "the G20's measured decisions on climate change heralded the contours of likely solutions at Glasgow." He highlighted the achievements on support for the stability of the global economy, ensuring "timely, equitable and universal access" to vaccines, therapeutics, the stress on pandemic preparedness and response and the 1.5°C post-industrial temperature rise limit, the IMF's new Resilience and Sustainability Trust, and the historic international taxation regime. He noted as constraints the media attention on Glasgow and the physical absence of the leaders of China, Russia, Japan and Mexico, which allowed Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to play a more influential role.

The second school saw an average performance for the summit's overall impact. John Kirton judged it disappointing on climate change but stronger on its non-climate initiatives (Reguly 2021a).

The third school saw G20 greenwashing. Eric Reguly (2021b) noted that "the G20, whose Rome summit at the end of October was viewed as a warm-up act for COP26, was in effect accused of collective greenwashing even though most of its members had pledged to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 or 2060. Why? Because in 2020 alone the G20 countries paid out almost US\$600-billion in subsidies for the consumption and production of fossil fuels, according to Bloomberg."

The Argument

On its very broad and demanding agenda, the Rome Summit produced a significant performance, relative to the 15 regular G20 summits before (see Appendix A). Rome made important advances on COVID-19, some on climate change and many on economic recovery. This performance was propelled by several powerful forces from without and within, starting with the unprecedented shocks from outside and culminating with the distinctive dynamics of an in-person summit with the talented Mario Draghi in the host's chair.

To promote economic prosperity, leaders approved a revolutionary new international tax regime to have the world's richest digital and other multinational firms pay taxes to the countries where they earned their profits and pay a minimum tax. They decided how to channel the \$650 billion worth of new special drawing rights (SDRs) created by the IMF to the developing countries that needed them most to protect their suffering people, economy and ecology. They produced a credible macroeconomic policy message, promising both to keeping their members' large fiscal and monetary policy stimulus coming in mutually compatible, coherent ways until a sustained, shared economic

recovery took hold, while containing inflation should it become too strong and long. They boosted clean, green infrastructure and offered more debt relief to poor states.

To protect people and society, they advanced the critical tasks of delivering COVID-19 vaccines into the arms of the poorest people throughout the world, preparing for the similar pandemics sure to come and strengthening the WHO and international health architecture to this end.

To protect the planet, on the ecology, they affirmed the need to keep global heating under 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, agreed to protect much more of the Earth's disappearing nature on the land and the seas, plant one trillion trees, have developed countries give developing countries more climate finance, make stronger and faster cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and methane emissions, and end international coal financing in two months. However, they failed to end fossil fuel subsidies and coal trade and use at home, and the other things needed to meet their 1.5°C goal.

To produce peace and security, they advanced action against crime, corruption and terrorism, but they struggled to make much progress on acting against weapons of mass destruction and reconstructing a responsible Afghanistan.

These advances were spurred from the outside by the unprecedented shocks from COVID-19 and the ensuing economic and development crises, the less immediate climate change and closely related energy and food crises, the need for G20 initiative and support to make the major multilateral organizations and the UN, G7, BRICS and special summits respond effectively, and the high concentration of the relevant capabilities within the G20, whose leaders knew they must all cooperate to control these deadly shocks. They were brought together from the inside by their converging principles and practices on economic policy, COVID-19 and parts of climate change and by the solid domestic backing that allowed most of them to adjust to their colleagues abroad at a largely in-person summit, now with the globally well-connected host Mario Draghi, Boris Johnson, Joe Biden and Emmanuel Macron as hosts of the G7, UN and new special summits in 2021 that were working together as never before.

Plans and Preparations

Priorities

At Rome G20 leaders and their guests focused on Italy's priority agenda, publicly presented on December 1, 2020, as its presidency began. Under the three pillars of "People, Planet, Prosperity," the agenda came in five categories. COVID-19 and similar health contagion came first, composed of "ensuring a swift international response to the pandemic," providing "equitable, worldwide access to diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines and building up resilience to future health-related shocks" (G20 Italy 2021). Climate change came next, including green growth, renewable energies and the common environment. Commerce came third, covering livelihoods, economies and trade. Cohesion in society came fourth, embracing social inequality, women's empowerment, youth, the most vulnerable, jobs, social protection and food security. Connectivity came fifth, through closing the digital divide and bringing digitalization to all. Leaders would also address the G20's inherited, built-in agenda on financial regulation and supervision, reform of the international financial institutions (IFIs), crime and corruption, and terrorism.

Ministerial Meetings' Momentum

Rome's leaders would build on the results of Italy's full slate of ministerial meetings, involving 14 different portfolios and including five clustered ones, all held before the summit. They unfolded as follows: tourism on May 4; education and labour in Catania on June 22–23; foreign affairs and development in Matero on June 29; economy and finance on July 9–10 in Venice (in addition to the

traditional meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors at the IMF/World Bank spring and annual meetings); environment on July 22; climate and energy on July 23 in Naples; culture on July 29–30 in Rome; digital economy and research on August 5–6 in Trieste; health on September 5–6 in Rome; agriculture on September 17–18 in Florence; trade on October 5 in Sorrento; and finance and health on October 29 in Rome, with the health ministers participating by videoconference. Such pre-summit ministerials are the strongest predictor of summit members' compliance with their commitments on the same subjects, and generated other dimensions of performance too.

Two weeks before the summit, the fall meeting of finance ministers and central bankers, held in Washington DC on October 13, produced 55 commitments. They were led by the core economic subjects of financial regulation with 15, development with 13 and macroeconomic policy with four, along with tax, infrastructure and digitization with two each, and trade and IFI reform with one each. Beyond these 40 commitments that focused in traditional ways on prosperity, health had seven for third place, crime and corruption four, and climate change three.

G20 health ministers in September produced 72 commitments. This was the highest ever, exceeding the 51 at Berlin on May 20, 2017, the 69 at Mar del Plata, Argentina, on October 4, 2018, and the 62 at Okayama, Japan, on October 20, 2019. The joint health-finance ministers meeting on universal health coverage on June 28, 2019, produced none. On the eve of the summit, a second joint meeting of health and finance ministers produced another 28 commitments.

G20 environment ministers, in July, produced 80 commitments. The environment had 60, followed by climate change with seven, crime and corruption with five, development with four, and health and education with two each. Of the 80, 26 were highly binding commitments and 34 low binding ones.

The joint G20 energy and climate ministerial produced 57 commitments. They were led by energy with 25 and climate change with 16, followed by the environment with seven, international collaboration with four, labour and employment with three, and education with two. Of the 57 commitments, 29 were highly binding and 57 low binding ones.

G20 agriculture ministers in Florence on September 18 produced 13 commitments, with 13 on food and agriculture, three on climate change, two on the environment, and one each on development, science and technology, and trade.

G20 Special Summits

A further boost for progress on COVID-19 came from the G20's virtual Global Health Summit on May 21, 2021. It repeated the G20's first intersessional, subject-specific summit, also focused on COVID-19, held on March 26, 2020. The Rome health summit made 53 commitments, all on health, but with three related to development, two to trade, and one each to international cooperation, democracy, the economy, the environment, digitalization, and gender and age.

The second special, subject-specific G20 summit, on Afghanistan on October 12, broadened the G20 leaders' security governance. It produced an outcome document containing consensus principles, rather than decisional commitments.

Together with the Rome Summit, these two subject-specific summits raised the frequency of G20 summitry to a new high of three summits in one year. The first two, although virtual, helped to socialize new leaders into how to make the club work.

Compliance Momentum

Further support came from the substantial interim compliance by G20 members with the 20 priority commitments of the 107 total made at the G20 Riyadh Summit on November 21–22, 2020. By May

22, 2021, members had complied with them at a level of 74% (Dawe, Noh and Ignatov 2021b). This was just above the 72% average of all summits at the end of the full compliance period, from the end of one summit until just before the subsequent summit. Interim compliance with the Riyadh commitments was led by those on macroeconomics at 91%, followed by digitalization at 85%, climate change and health at 80% each, and gender at 79%. Then, below the 74% average, came crime and corruption at 70%, development at 69%, labour and employment at 68%, trade at 67%, international tax at 63%, energy at 55%, and the environment at 53%. All subjects thus averaged compliance in the positive range, above 50%.

This interim compliance was led by the EU at 93%, followed by the UK at 92%, Germany at 92%, France at 89%, Canada and Korea at 83% each, and Japan, Brazil, and Indonesia at 75% (Dawe, Noh and Ignatov 2021b). Coming below the 74% average were the US, Argentina, Australia and Turkey with 70% each, China, Russia and Saudi Arabia with 68% each, Italy at 63%, Mexico at 60%, and India and South Africa at 53%.

On the eve of the Rome Summit, final compliance with the Riyadh commitments had reached a strong 86%, well above the 72% average (Dawe, Noh and Ignatov 2021a) (see Appendix A). Among Rome's priorities, Riyadh's compliance was led by the two commitments on macroeconomic policy at 95%, followed by the three on health at 88% and the two on climate change at 88% too (see Appendix B-1). Elsewhere on the economy, the one commitment on the digital economy had 90%, the two on development and debt relief 84%, and the two on tax 98%. On society, beyond health, the two commitments on gender had 88%. The one commitment on energy (on fossil fuels subsidies) had 70%. In the political-security sphere, the one commitment on crime and corruption had 80%.

By member, compliance was now led by Germany at 100%, Korea, the UK and EU at 98%, followed by Australia and France at 95%, and Canada and the US at 93%, and Japan at 88% (see Appendix B-2). The rest of the members were below the 86% average: China and Turkey at 85%, Brazil and host Saudi Arabia at 83%, Italy at 82%, Argentina at 80%, Indonesia and Russia at 78%, South Africa at 73%, Mexico at 70% and India at 68%.

Surrounding Summit Support

G7 Cornwall, June

The G7's Cornwall Summit on June 11–13 provided a very strong boost. It produced 429 commitments, the most of any G7 summit since the start in 1975. Those commitments closely complemented the G20's Rome priority themes. For people, Cornwall produced 89 commitments on health, along with 17 on gender, and one on labour and employment. For the planet, it produced 123 commitments, with 55 on the environment, 54 on climate change and 14 on energy. For prosperity, it generated 33 on the digital economy, 21 on trade, 16 on macroeconomic policy, 15 on development, nine on infrastructure and three on international taxation. For political-security, it made 21 on democracy, 19 on regional security, 14 on human rights, seven on crime and corruption, two on weapons and non-proliferation, and two on terrorism.

BRICS New Delhi Summit, September

The BRICS New Delhi Summit on September 9 provided only small support. It produced 34 commitments, much fewer than many previous BRICS stand-alone summits. There were few on the Rome G20's core priorities. For people, health had only five and socioeconomics three. For the planet, climate change had only two, the environment and food and agriculture one each, and energy none. For prosperity, macroeconomics and trade had two each, and IFI reform and the digital economy had one each. On political-security, crime and corruption had four, human rights two, and non-proliferation and terrorism one each. At the top were international cooperation with five and BRICS cooperation with three.

Special Summits

More support came from several special summits in late September, held at, by or on the margins of the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). For climate change, UNGA began with Xi Jinping promising on September 21 to end China's financing for international coal plants. Biden followed that day by promising to double US climate financing for developed countries to \$11.4 billion a year by 2024. During that week the US and EU announced a 30% cut by 2030 in their methane emissions. The US and China agreed to cut hydrofluorocarbons. Germany said it would spend €11.5 billion on energy efficiency in buildings.

For health, on September 22, at the COVID-19 summit Biden chaired, he promised a major increase in US COVID-19 doses for developing countries, with three for them for every one administered in the US. On September 26 Macron announced France was doubling its COVID-19 vaccine donations abroad to 120 million doses, or more than all used in France thus far.

For food, the UN Food Systems Summit took place on September 23. For energy, on September 24, at the Energy Summit hosted by the UN Development Programme, over 35 countries committed over \$400 billion in new finance and investment for energy poverty and decarbonization.

The Approach to the Rome Summit

Five weeks before the Rome Summit, there were still many moving parts. It was still difficult to know what the summit outcomes would be. G20 sherpas were trying to shrink the very long communiqué down to a manageable size of no more than 20 pages. Some wanted half that. There was also a discussion of a summit focused on Afghanistan, perhaps on the margins of the Rome Summit. In the third week of September, Draghi was working the phones, including a call with Putin on September 22, to arrange this.

The sherpas met again in mid October to advance the work. They began their final sherpa meeting, on site in Rome, on October 28. Before small groups met to try to create momentum.

Just before the sherpa meeting, progress on the health portfolio was going well, including on preparedness. Canada had been trying to raise tertiary or secondary health issues exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as mental health or related concerns over youth and seniors, to prepare for future challenges. Other members, including aid donors, were reluctant to discuss financing and to be held accountable for statements that might extend beyond the crisis.

All aspects of climate change remained a major fight, especially anything not in the Paris Agreement. Canada and its partners had been arguing that the science had evolved since 2015, so the Paris Agreement was only a starting point. There were divisions within the G20, sometimes between the G7 members against the rest, or the five the BRICS members acting as a bloc, sometimes joined by Saudi Arabia or sometimes Argentina. Indonesia tended to side closely with China. After the Climate Finance Delivery Plan developed by Germany and Canada was released on October 25, no more announcements on climate finance were likely.

On the economy and development, on SDR channelling, no one wanted any concessionary financing.

On October 29, the draft communiqué had leaders promise to speed up vaccine development from 300 to 100 days.

On climate change, the fifth draft from October 28 said: "We remain committed to the (2015) Paris Agreement goal to hold the global average temperature increase well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels" (Strupczewski and Jones 2021). But it contained few

commitments to those ends. Leaders recognized “the key relevance” of achieving net zero carbon emissions by the middle of the century. An earlier draft had said “by 2050,” which was now in brackets, indicating text that was still being negotiated. It added: “Keeping 1.5°C within reach will require meaningful and effective actions by all countries.” An earlier draft had said “immediate action” was needed and acknowledged that current national plans to curb emissions needed strengthening, but did not specify how. This draft included, as had earlier drafts, a commitment to halt financing of overseas coal-fired power generation by the end of 2021 and to “do our utmost” to stop building new coal power plants before the end of the 2030s. It again promised to phase out fossil fuel subsidies “over the medium term.” It pledged to “strive to reduce our collective methane emissions significantly.”

On climate finance, it stated: “We stress the importance of fulfilling the joint commitment to the goal of developed countries to mobilize USD 100 billion annually from public and private sources through to 2025 to address the needs of developing countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation” (Strupczewski and Jones 2021).

On the evening of October 29, the joint meeting of finance and health ministers issued a two-and-a-half page communiqué. Its major deliverable, containing four of its 28 commitments, was the creation of a G20 Joint Finance-Health Task Force at the officials level, to build on the work of the existing G20 Informal Group of Finance and Health Experts. The Task Force, with a mandate to address pandemic preparedness and response, would report to health and finance ministers in early 2022.

On the other critical health priorities, G20 health and finance ministers (2021) promised “to help advance toward the global goals of vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all countries by the end of 2021 and 70 percent by mid-2022, as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO)’s global vaccination strategy, we will take steps to help boost the supply of vaccines and essential medical products and inputs in developing countries and remove relevant supply and financing constraints.” It acknowledged that financing for prevention, preparedness and response “has to become more adequate, more sustainable and better coordinated,” affirmed “the crucial leadership role of the WHO in the international health work” and reaffirmed the principle of taking “into account processes that are considering support of a possible convention, agreement or other international instrument in the context of the WHO on pandemic preparedness and response.” The only specific health issues apart from COVID-19 noted were sexual and reproductive health and antimicrobial resistance. So much was missing. Even on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, there was no new international financing facility, as the US-Indonesian initiative to create one had been rejected by other members.

Summit Schedule

The summit started on Saturday, October 30, at 11h45 with Session I on the “Global Economy and Global Health.” Then at 15h00 came the leaders’ side event on “Supporting SMEs and Women-Owned Business to Build Forward Better,” with an address by Queen Maxima of the Netherlands. A cultural event followed that evening at 19h00.

The second day, Sunday, October 31, was devoted largely to climate change. It began at 10h30 with a leaders’ side event on the role of the private sector, featuring an address by the UK’s Prince of Wales. Then at 11h05 began Session II on “Climate Change and Environment,” followed at 13h50 by Session III on “Sustainable Development.” At 15h40 came the Closing Session, followed by the closing press conference.

The opening session began with remarks by Mario Draghi, which were livestreamed. The private discussions were led off by a video message from King Salman.

Late Saturday afternoon Biden met with the leaders of the UK, France and Germany to discuss the Iran nuclear deal.

As the summit progressed, it was well on track to produce the prospective achievements on many of the important issues it addressed. In a press briefing on the second day of the Rome Summit, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov recognized the Italian presidency's desire to negotiate the declaration but would have appreciated it being distributed earlier. He had been told that the G7 had negotiated the text first, before it was circulated to the other members, a process he considered disrespectful.

Results

The G20's Rome Summit produced a significant performance, relative to the 15 regular G20 summits in the past (see Appendix C). This performance was based on what appeared in its communiqué released on October 31, but depended on what would happen in the days and months ahead (Kirton 2021a, b, c).

Economy

On the economy, G20 leaders produced a strong performance. They approved the revolutionary new tax regime with multinational corporations paying taxes to the governments of countries where they make their profits and a 15% minimum tax. This made it more likely that all leaders could get their legislatures to make the necessary domestic legal changes, confident that they would not lose business as a result. It would help them raise the revenue they needed to control their soaring deficits and invest in the greener digital economy they sought. It also responded to the growing anger about unfairness among their people, who had seen the COVID-19 pandemic make the digital multinationals even richer and avoid taxes, while poorer people could not. And it further prevented a protectionist trade war on the fastest growing economic sector, as several countries could now safely remove the unilateral digital taxes they have imposed, and others their threatened retaliation, in favour of the new global level playing field.

Leaders also agreed to channel some of the SDRs they had been allocated by the IMF in August to the poor countries that needed them the most. They stated: "We welcome the recent pledges worth around USD [45] billion, as a step towards a total global ambition of USD 100 billion of voluntary contributions for countries most in need." Trudeau announced that Canada would channel \$3.7 billion, or 20% of its SDRs, to support low-income and other vulnerable countries, with approximately \$982 million to be distributed to the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. A month before the summit, Macron had pledged that France would donate 20% of its SDRs to poor countries in Africa, and that he would encourage the G20 to do so for a total of \$100 billion.

On macroeconomic policy, leaders offered an appropriate macroeconomic policy message, promising continued fiscal and monetary stimulus until the recovery was secure, while keeping inflation under control. They stated in paragraph 3: "We remain determined to use all available tools for as long as required to address the adverse consequences of the pandemic ... We will continue to sustain the recovery, avoiding any premature withdrawal of support measures, while preserving financial stability and long-term fiscal sustainability and safeguarding against downside risks and negative spill-overs. Central banks are monitoring current price dynamics closely. They will act as needed to meet their mandates, including price stability."

On development, leaders pledged more debt relief for hard-hit states. In paragraph 12 they looked forward to an "ambitious" 20th replenishment of the International Development Association by December 2021, "including through the sustainable use of [its] balance sheet" (G20 2021).

Health

On health, leaders produced a significant performance. A major advance came on delivering doses, donations and domestic manufacturing support for vaccinating poor people in poor countries against COVID-19. The communiqué stated that “to help advance toward the global goals of vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all countries by the end of 2021 and 70 percent by mid-2022, as recommended by the [WHO’s] global vaccination strategy, we will take steps to help boost the supply of vaccines and essential medical products and inputs in developing countries and remove relevant supply and financing constraints” (G20 2021). Large and realistic promises of contributions from India, Canada and others rendered this commitment and the outcome target of vaccinating 70% of the world’s adults by the end of 2022 credible.

Modi said that India was ready to produce five billion doses by the end of 2022 for the world. Among the G7 members, Trudeau announced Canada would donate at least 200 million doses to the COVAX facility by the end of 2022, including an immediate contribution of up to 10 million Moderna doses. He also announced an investment of up to \$15 million to COVAX Manufacturing Task Force partners, to support creating a South Africa Technology Transfer Hub to develop and produce mRNA vaccines and technologies for Africa.

Johnson announced that the UK would donate 20 million doses of the AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccine to developing countries. There have already been 10 million doses sent to the UN-backed COVAX vaccine-sharing program, and 10 million more would follow in the coming weeks. Macron said France would reach 120 million donated doses by mid 2022.

On pandemic response, leaders promised: “we will support science to shorten the cycle for the development of safe and effective vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics from 300 to 100 days following the identification of such threats and work to make them widely available” (G20 2021). Trudeau confirmed Canada’s support for a G20 commitment on pandemic preparedness, including through the establishment of the G20 Joint Finance-Health Task Force.

G20 leaders also addressed the many other diseases where action had been diverted by the focus on COVID-19. On mental health they noted “the repercussions of the pandemic on mental health and well-being, due to isolation, unemployment, food insecurity, increased violence against women and girls and constrained access to education as well as health services, including sexual and reproductive health” (G20 2021). They also addressed non-communicable disease, AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, zoonotic diseases that flow from animals to humans and antimicrobial resistance.

On the WHO, leaders repeatedly affirmed that it stood at the centre of the global health architecture and the new policy and institutional initiatives they took. But on the need to reform it, they promised only, in paragraph 6 to “support the ongoing work on strengthening the leading and coordination role of an adequately and sustainably funded WHO” (G20 2021).

Climate Change

On climate change, the world’s only existential threat, G20 leaders facing a world on fire and flooding fast took only baby steps to fight or flee from the dangers that all could see.

Their first specific advance was, as promised, to “put an end to the provision of international public finance for new unabated coal power generation abroad by the end of 2021” (G20 2021). In doing so they broadened the scope from the Cornwall Summit’s G7 members to include all G20 members.

Their second specific advance was to strengthen carbon sinks, in long-proven, low-cost, jobs-rich ways. In paragraph 19 they stated: “Acknowledging the urgency of combating land degradation and creating new carbon sinks, we share the aspirational goal to collectively plant 1 trillion trees, focusing

on the most degraded ecosystems in the planet, and urge other countries to join forces with the G20 to reach this global goal by 2030, including through climate projects, with the involvement of the private sector and civil society” (G20 2021). More broadly, they finally gave serious attention to natural sinks as well as emissions sources, by devoting four paragraphs to the sinks as well as nine to sources.

However, they did very little else. Indeed, they started their treatment of climate change by saying that what they had done in at the UN summit in Paris six years earlier was still good enough now, specifically “we remain committed to the Paris Agreement goal to hold the global average temperature increase well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (G20 2021). Physically, the climate has changed a great deal for the worse since 2015, but politically the G20's target did not change at all.

Leaders stated “we recall and reaffirm the commitment made by developed countries, to the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and annually through 2025 to address the needs of developing countries” (G20 2021). But they did not acknowledge they were still about \$20 billion short, nor did they provide the small sums to keep the promise first made in 2009. They merely said “that the goal is expected to be met no later than 2023.”

No new action was promised on fossil fuel subsidies, a 12-year-old promise still not kept. At Rome leaders said: “We will increase our efforts to implement the commitment made in 2009 in Pittsburgh to phase out and rationalize, over the medium term, inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption and commit to achieve this objective” (G20 2021). But they did not say by when or how.

On its second priority of planet, Rome thus produced a substantial performance, at best. It agreed that a 1.5°C post-industrial temperature rise is the most appropriate target. It promised to generate enough action at the UN's Glasgow climate conference to keep this goal within reach. It agreed to end international coal financing this year. It promised to start giving \$100 billion a year to developing countries for climate finance by 2024. And it promised to protect more nature, in support of the UN's biodiversity conference in 2022.

G20 leaders could still do much more during the next two days at the UN climate summit in Glasgow, where many went directly from Rome. They could comply with their Rome commitments much more strongly than ever before G20 Bali Summit in October 2022. And they could hold another summit in the spring, as they did in 2009, 2010, 2020 and in 2021.

But as the leaders gave their closing press conferences, Rome was on track to go down as a summit that performed at least as well as most of the 15 previous summits. It supplied a performance that was strong on the economy, significant on health and solid on climate change. Compared to current global needs, that was enough on the economy and health, but not even close on the existential threat of climate change.

Dimensions of Performance

Domestic Political Management

Attendance at the summit was complete (see Appendix A). But participating only virtually were the leaders from China, Japan, Mexico, Russia and Saudi Arabia. This limited leaders' bilateral encounters, above all one between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.

The communiqué contained four compliments to two G20 members, with two to Italy and two to Saudi Arabia. All thus went to the present and immediate past host. By subject, two were on the environment, and one each on climate change and health. The four were close to the G20's previous average of 4.4 but above all summits after Hangzhou in 2016.

Deliberation

In its public deliberation, Rome's performance was solid. Its 15-page communiqué of 10,060 words ranked eighth among the 16 summits. It was dominated by the conclusions on its three priorities of climate change, health and the economy, including development (see Appendix D). Development stood first with 2,491 words for 26% of the communiqué. Climate change in second had 2,015 words for 21% of the communiqué; this was the second most ever on the subject, following the over 5,000 words at Hamburg in 2017. Health in third had 1,545 words, for 16% of the communiqué, second only to Riyadh in 2020. In fourth place came gender, with 1,510 words for 16% of the communiqué. Macroeconomic policy in fifth had 1,405 words for 15%, the third lowest number of words on the issue after Washington in 2008 and Osaka in 2019. Biodiversity in sixth had 1,089 words for 12% of the communiqué.

Direction Setting

Principles and normative direction setting was solid. The communiqué's five references to financial stability were below average. But its 27 affirmations of globalization for all were about average and led by the principle of inclusion with 15 affirmations, followed by reducing inequalities with three, equitable access and education/connectivity for all with two each, and one each for references to broad sharing, no one left behind, and benefits equally shared.

Decision Making

In its decision making, Rome's performance was significant. It made 225 commitments, the fourth highest among the 16 regular G20 summits. It followed the 529 at Hamburg in 2017, the 282 at Cannes in 2011, and the 281 at St. Petersburg in 2013. There were a few commitments that did not include all G20 leaders, similar to the recent summits where the US was represented by a dissenting Donald Trump.

The 225 Rome commitments were led by health with 35, followed by the digital economy with 26, crime and corruption with 23, and the climate change and the environment with 21 each (see Appendix E). This was the second highest number of climate commitments ever, just behind the 22 at Hamburg in 2017. Rome's 21 climate commitments contained 17 that were highly binding and four that were low binding.

They were followed by development with 18, gender with 17, trade with 12, eight each on energy and on food and agriculture, and seven each on macroeconomic policy and financial regulation.

On this decisional dimensions of performance, the people's health came first, the planet's climate and environment second, and prosperity through the traditional staples of macroeconomic policy and financial regulation a distant third. The big surprise was the digital economy in second and crime and corruption in third.

Delivery

Delivery of these decision is likely to be strong, based on the high number and breadth of pre-summit ministerial meetings, supported by the many proven compliance catalysts contained within the commitments and the references in the communiqué to the principles or processes of accountability.

A strong 48% of the 225 commitments were highly binding ones. Climate change had 71% highly binding commitments, but health 40%, and macroeconomic policy 29%. Elsewhere highly binding commitments were 86% of the financial regulation ones, 75% of the food and agriculture ones, 65% of the crime corruption ones, 50 % of the energy ones, 46% of the digital economy ones, 42% of the trade ones, 33% of the environment ones, 28% of the development ones, and 24% of the gender ones.

Development of Global Governance

The institutional development of global governance was small. The communiqué made 31 reference to institutions inside the G20 for 30% of the total and 70 to those outside for 70% (see Appendix F).

The 31 references to inside institutions were led by the FSB with 10, followed by the G20 in general with seven, the finance ministers with four, central bank governors and the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion with three each, health ministers with two, and the G20 Africa Partnership and tourism ministers with one each. This shows the G20's focus on economics and finance, on its distinctive foundational mission of financial stability more than globalization for all, and the absence of any environmental or climate bodies.

The 70 references to outside institutions were led by the OECD with 13, followed by the WHO and the IMF with 10 each, the WTO with seven and the Financial Action Task Force with five. Then came the World Bank, and ILO with three each, the FAO with two and the World Organization for Animal Health, UN Environment Programme, Paris Club, UN Environment Assembly, UN-Habitat, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), UN, the International Energy Forum, the International Office for Migration, UN High Commission for Refugees, the International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics, the World Tourism Organization, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization with one each. This showed the weakness and fragmentation of the environmental bodies, relative to the economic and health ones. The first place for the OECD signalled its emergence as the de facto analytical secretariat for the G20 and the dominance of the rich democratic powers as a result.

Causes

This significant performance was propelled by six strong forces (see Appendix G).

Shock-Activated Vulnerability

The first force was the unprecedentedly strong severity and scope of the shocks that exposed the vulnerability of all G20 members, including the most powerful ones. Those shocks came from COVID-19, climate change and economic contraction, and then energy, food and Afghanistan.

By the time the leaders met in Rome, COVID-19 had already killed millions and cost trillions, and the toll would mount. The most vulnerable country by far was the United States, followed in turn by its fellow G20 members of Brazil, India, Mexico and Russia. On October 29, daily new cases globally started rising for the first time in two months and the number of deaths passed the 5 million mark on the summit's last day.

Climate shocks reached a new peak in G20 countries in 2021 and were scientifically certain to get worse. They compounded the closely related energy and food shocks arising in the autumn. Toward the end of September an energy crisis in Europe and a food crisis arose, both from price spikes and supply shortages.

Economic shocks from the COVID-19 crisis saw gross domestic product (GDP) plunge in 2020, a fragile two-speed recovery return in 2021, and serious economic distress remain for several G20 members and many beyond. Financial and economic concerns about China grew.

Security shocks started with the Taliban swiftly taking power in Afghanistan on August 15, thus fostering terrorism from al Qaeda and ISIS and outward migration flows from the many Afghans desperate to leave.

Communiqué-recognized shocks and vulnerabilities on such subjects appeared often in the outcome documents of summit and the ministerial meetings, particularly the meetings on health, Afghanistan, finance and agriculture. At the summit itself, by a strict definition, the communiqué identified nine shock-activated vulnerabilities, with four on the COVID-19 health crisis, two on the economic crisis and 2008 global financial crisis, one on the food crisis, and, in paragraph 21, one on “the critical and urgent threat of climate change,” and one unidentified crisis that seemed to refer to the COVID-19–induced economic recession. The communiqué opened with two references to the COVID-19 health crisis and one to the ensuing economic crisis. The COVID-19 crowd-out continued, in a way that spurred the significant performance on health, the strong performance on the economy, and the only substantial performance on climate change.

Media-highlighted shock-activated vulnerability was strong. In the 20 days between September 1 and 22, the front page of the *Financial Times* included stories on the economy on 16 days, digitalization on 16 days, health on 10 days, democracy on 10 days and climate change on six days, led by extreme weather events. This suggested a broad performance at Rome. In the Sunday *New York Times* during that same period, climate change appeared on the front page of all three issues, health in two and the economy, digitalization and democracy in one, suggesting a strong performance on climate change.

In the week of the summit, from October 26 to November 1, climate led every day, with 50% on four of those days. Health, the economy and climate were absent from the October 17 edition of the *New York Times* but rose to 17% each in the October 24 edition and on the October 31 health had 20% and climate 20%. Toward the end of the month, climate coverage was pulled by the Glasgow Summit along with the Rome Summit.

Scientific shocks were very strong, led by those in the much-quoted report of the IPCC published on August 8. On the eve of the summit, reports from the World Meteorological Organization and IEA were more shocking still.

Multilateral Organizational Failure

The second force was the significant multilateral organizational failure in controlling these shocks without the G20's help.

The WHO and its affiliates depend on G20 members to provide the needed COVID-19 doses, dollars and domestic manufacturing support to create the emergency response mechanisms and healthcare systems to cope with pandemics such as COVID-19, to finance and strengthen the WHO itself, and to treat the many diseases sidelined by COVID-19.

UN climate summits and ministerial meetings since the 2015 Paris Agreement had massively failed to stop the soaring climate emergency now facing the world. They were due to fail again at Glasgow, unless the G20 made the big decisions at Rome the day before. They would also fail on biodiversity and the UN conference in Kunming in 2022, without a big boost from the G20 at Rome.

The IMF and World Bank had done better, notably with the IMF's creation of \$650 billion in SDRs. But they had not controlled the mounting debts of poor countries, nor did they compel those

indebted countries' private sector creditors to do their fair share. G20 leaders, whose countries controlled these core multilateral organizations, were needed to produce these SDRs and act at Rome to finalize channelling the SDRs to those most in need.

In the political-security domain, the UN Security Council, led by its Permanent Five members, had failed to stop the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August or to control the many crises arising there in the aftermath.

The strongest success from a multilateral organization came from the OECD on the new international tax regime. But here the secret to its success was working from the start with the G20.

Predominant Equalizing Capability

The third force was the strong globally predominant, internally equalizing capabilities of G20 members.

They possessed almost all of the world's safe, effective COVID-19 vaccines, produced about 80% of the sources of greenhouse gas emissions, contained most of the world's natural sinks that suck these emissions out of the atmosphere and were responsible for over 80% of the global economy. They had 80% of the solutions to the shocks they were facing.

G20 predominance was increasing, with its members growing economically faster than those outside.

But its internal equalization was declining, as developed members grew faster than emerging and developing ones, even as the two most powerful members — the US and China — converged at the top. These two, with their economies now slowing and equalizing, knew that they needed help from each other and all their G20 colleagues too. China's growth rate was well above that of the US, but was slowing substantially, while concerns about a financial crisis in the overleveraged property sector grew.

The OECD reported that GDP changes from the fourth quarter in 2019 to the second quarter in 2021 were led by G7 members, starting with the US at +0.8%, and followed by Canada at -1.1%, Japan at -1.5%, the EU at -2.5%, Germany at -3.2%, France at -3.2%, Italy at -3.8% and the UK at -4.2%.

Given this configuration of capabilities, no G20 member could solve the COVID-19, climate and economic shocks and vulnerabilities alone.

Common Converging Principles and Practices

The fourth force was G20 members' convergence on common principles and domestic practices on health, climate and economic recovery. Most big G20 members were producing, sharing or financing COVID-19 vaccines. Almost all were acting to control climate change and stimulate their economies in fiscal and monetary ways. They were all committed, careful Keynesians now.

On climate change, in the months leading up to the summit, Turkey announced a target of net zero by 2053 and ratified the Paris Agreement on October 6. The week before the summit, Australia pledged net zero by 2050 and a \$15 billion investment in carbon technology. Saudi Arabia promised net zero emissions by 2050 and interim reduction targets by 2030. On October 28, China submitted a new nationally determined contribution (NDC) that was stronger than its 2015 one for the Paris Summit, but still contained the same targets as those announced in 2020 at the Climate Action Summit—, and Indonesia ~~that day~~ suggested it could end coal use by 2040. In the US, just before he flew to Rome, Joe Biden reached a deal among his Congressional Democrats to pass his

now \$1.75 trillion stimulus bill, which included \$500 billion for climate change. However, India announced that it would not submit a new NDC, as it was a victim and not cause of climate change.

However, more broadly, converging political characteristics of democracy were small and shrinking. Although Biden had bolstered democracy in the US, it was declining in the BRICS and some members of MIKTA — Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia — and beyond.

Domestic Political Cohesion

The fifth force was the substantial political backing that most G20 leaders had at home, allowing them to adjust to their G20 colleagues abroad, in order to forge the needed agreements at Rome. This domestic support was good enough in all G7 members, very strong in China and Russia, and substantial in India and South Africa, if not in Brazil.

It was strong in Italy, making Draghi an influential summit host. It was substantial in the US, where Biden had over three years in office left, although his approval ratings had been weakened by his Afghanistan withdrawal and a divided Congress where the passage of his historic \$1.2 trillion infrastructure bill and \$1.75 trillion reconciliation bill remained in doubt. It was significant in the UK, where Johnson had a parliamentary majority, strong public approval and his next election only in 2024.

However, it was small in Japan, where the governing Liberal Democratic Party replaced the unpopular Yoshihide Suga with Fumio Kishida, who called a general election on October 31. Polls published by the *Nikkei* and *Yomiuri* newspapers on October 29 indicated the party could lose its current 276 seats and even its majority in the 465-seat lower house, making it depend on its coalition partner, New Komeito.

It was significant in Germany, where, after the elections on September 26, veteran Angela Merkel was being replaced by her finance minister, Olaf Scholz, from the opposition Social Democratic Party, backed by a coalition with the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party. Merkel brought Scholz to Rome as her finance minister, and to participate in her bilateral meetings there. In France, an unpopular Macron faced what could be a close election in April 2022.

Domestic political cohesion was strong in China and Russia (after its managed parliamentary elections in September), substantial for India, but small in Brazil and South Africa. In most other members, the leaders had firm control.

Club at the Global Network Hub

The final force was the G20 summit's growth to new heights as its leaders' personally valued club, at the hub of an expanding network of global summit governance. Rome finally restored in-person G20 summitry, even if the leaders of Japan, Russia, Mexico, China and Saudi Arabia appeared only virtually. And Rome capped a year of unprecedented G20-centred summitry that would culminate in Glasgow right after Rome ended.

For the majority of leaders who travelled to Rome, interpersonal bonds flourished, bolstered by the many bilateral and small group meetings taking place on the margins. Draghi had high international expertise and experience, especially in the finance and economic field. Since his appointment in early February he had participated in two G7 summits, chaired two virtual G20 summits, and participated in Biden's Leaders Summit on Climate in April. Italy belonged to several summit institutions of global relevance and reach: the EU, NATO, the Asia-Europe Meeting, and, most recently, the Belt and Road Forum.

Other spokes in the global summit network came from the new Quadrilateral, where the US, Japan, Australia and Korea held their first video summit in March and their first in-person summit at the White House on September 24. The Quad agreed to act on COVID-19, infrastructure, climate change, technology, space and cybersecurity — all major G20 priorities at Rome.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Rome Summit was one of the better performing G20 summits, through its supply of the timely, well-tailored global governance the world needed. But it still did not do nearly enough to meet the soaring demand for global solutions, above all on climate change. A final judgement waited until the UN's Glasgow Summit to see how it would build on Rome's advances, whether the G20 mounted more summits before the regular one chaired by Indonesia in Bali on October 30–31, 2022, and whether G20 members until then would comply highly with the 225 commitments they made at Rome.

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Appendix A: G20 Summit Performance, 2008–2021

| Summit | Grade | Domestic political management | | | Deliberation | | | Direction setting | | | | Decision making | Delivery | | | Development of global governance | | | | | |
|---------------------|-------|-------------------------------|---------------|------------------------|--------------|-------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|---------|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------------------|--------|--------------|--------|-------------------|--------|
| | | Attendance | # compliments | % members complimented | # days | # documents | # words | Stability | Inclusion | Democracy | Liberty | # commitments | Compliance | Compliance | # assessed | Internal | | External | | Engagement groups | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | # references | Spread | # references | Spread | # references | Spread |
| 2008 Washington | A– | 100% | 0 | 0% | 2 | 2 | 3,567 | 16 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 95 | +0.51 | 76% | 8 | 0 | 4 | 39 | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| 2009 London | A | 100% | 1 | 5% | 2 | 3 | 6,155 | 29 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 129 | +0.13 | 57% | 8 | 12 | 4 | 120 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| 2009 Pittsburgh | A– | 100% | 0 | 0% | 2 | 2 | 9,257 | 11 | 21 | 28 | 1 | 128 | +0.37 | 69% | 17 | 47 | 4 | 115 | 26 | 0 | 0 |
| 2010 Toronto | A– | 90% | 8 | 15% | 2 | 5 | 11,078 | 47 | 32 | 11 | 1 | 61 | +0.40 | 70% | 16 | 71 | 4 | 164 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| 2010 Seoul | B | 95% | 5 | 15% | 2 | 5 | 15,776 | 66 | 36 | 18 | 4 | 153 | +0.34 | 67% | 42 | 99 | 4 | 237 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| 2011 Cannes | B | 95% | 11 | 35% | 2 | 3 | 14,107 | 42 | 8 | 22 | 0 | 282 | +0.41 | 71% | 26 | 59 | 4 | 247 | 27 | 4 | 2 |
| 2012 Los Cabos | A– | 95% | 6 | 15% | 2 | 2 | 12,682 | 43 | 23 | 31 | 3 | 180 | +0.54 | 77% | 21 | 65 | 4 | 138 | 20 | 7 | 2 |
| 2013 St. Petersburg | A | 90% | 15 | 55% | 2 | 11 | 28,766 | 73 | 108 | 15 | 3 | 281 | +0.35 | 68% | 26 | 190 | 4 | 237 | 27 | 9 | 5 |
| 2014 Brisbane | B | 90% | 10 | 40% | 2 | 5 | 9,111 | 10 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 205 | +0.42 | 71% | 29 | 39 | 4 | 42 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| 2015 Antalya | B | 90% | 0 | 0% | 2 | 6 | 5,983 | 13 | 22 | 0 | 2 | 198 | +0.42 | 71% | 24 | 42 | 4 | 54 | 11 | 8 | 6 |
| 2016 Hangzhou | B+ | 95% | 7 | 25% | 2 | 4 | 16,004 | 11 | 29 | 34 | 5 | 213 | +0.43 | 72% | 31 | 179 | 4 | 223 | 19 | 14 | 6 |
| 2017 Hamburg | B+ | 95% | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 34,746 | 42 | 61 | 2 | 11 | 529 | +0.38 | 69% | 36 | 54 | 6 | 307 | 19 | | |
| 2018 Buenos Aires | B– | 90% | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 13,515 | 23 | 53 | 7 | 2 | 128 | +0.56 | 78% | 22 | 20 | 5 | 24 | 15 | | |
| 2019 Osaka | | 95% | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 6,623 | 13 | 16 | 7 | 6 | 143 | +0.56 | 78% | 19 | 56 | 5 | 54 | 17 | | |
| 2020 Riyadh | | 100% ^a | 3 | 10% | 2 | 1 | 5,697 | 13 | 20 | 6 | 6 | 107 | +0.72 | 86% | | | | | | | |
| 2021 Rome | | 100% ^b | 4 | 10% | 2 | 1 | 10,060 | 5 | 27 | | | 225 | | N/A | | 31 | 8 | 70 | 25 | | |
| Total 2008–2020 | | | 66 | | 30 | 63 | 193,067 | 452 | 449 | 188 | 34 | 2,832 | - | - | 278 | 933 | 60 | 2,001 | 289 | 42 | 21 |
| Average 2008–2020 | N/A | 90% | 4.4 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 12,871.1 | 30.1 | 29.9 | 14.5 | 2.6 | 188.8 | +0.43 | 72% | 21.4 | 66.6 | 4.3 | 142.9 | 20.6 | 3.8 | 1.9 |

Notes:

N/A = not applicable. Only documents issued at a summit in the leaders' name are included.

Grade is based on a scoring scheme created by John Kirton, as follows: A+ Extremely Strong, A Very Strong, A-Strong, B+ Significant, B Substantial, B- Solid, C Small, D Very Small, F Failure (including made things worse). Available at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/scoring.html>.

Domestic political management: participation by G20 members and at least one representative from the European Union and excludes invited countries; compliments are references to full members in summit documents.

Deliberation: duration of the summit and the documents collectively released in the leaders' name at the summit.

Direction setting: number of statements of fact, causation and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty.

Decision making: number of commitments as identified by the G20 Research Group.

Delivery: scores are measured on a scale from -1 (no compliance) to +1 (full compliance, or fulfilment of goal set out in commitment). Figures are cumulative scores based on compliance reports.

Development of global governance: internal are references to G20 institutions in summit documents; external are references to institutions outside the G20; engagement groups are references to engagement groups. Spread indicates the number of different institutions mentioned.

^a 2020 Riyadh attendance = Donald Trump attended, but left early and was first replaced by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and then by Larry Kudlow.

^b 2021 Rome attendance = 75% of participants attend in person; 25% participated virtually (China, Japan, Mexico, Russia and Saudi Arabia).

Appendix B: 2020 G20 Riyadh Summit Final Compliance

B-1: By Commitment

| Rank | Commitment | Average | |
|------|--|---------|------------|
| | | Score | Percentage |
| 1 | International taxation: Base erosion and profit shifting | +1.00 | 100% |
| 2 | Climate change: Paris Agreement | +0.95 | 98% |
| 3 | International taxation: Tax systems | +0.90 | 95% |
| | Macroeconomics: Capital markets | | |
| | Macroeconomics: Inclusive growth | | |
| 6 | Development: COVID-19 | +0.85 | 93% |
| | Gender: Inequalities | | |
| 8 | Digital Economy: Consumer rights | +0.80 | 90% |
| | Health: Information sharing | | |
| | Health: Preparedness and response | | |
| 11 | Gender: Economic participation and entrepreneurship | +0.70 | 85% |
| | Health: Vaccine distribution | | |
| 13 | Development: Debt relief | +0.65 | 83% |
| | Labour and employment: Job protection | | |
| | Trade: Investment | | |
| 16 | Crime and corruption: Threats | +0.60 | 80% |
| 17 | Climate change: Circular carbon economy | +0.55 | 78% |
| 18 | Environment: Marine plastic litter | +0.45 | 73% |
| 19 | Energy: Fossil fuels | +0.40 | 70% |
| 20 | Trade: Open markets | +0.12 | 56% |

B-2: By Member

| Rank | Member | Average | |
|------|----------------|---------|------------|
| | | Score | Percentage |
| 1 | Germany | +1.00 | 100% |
| 2 | European Union | +0.95 | 98% |
| | Korea | | |
| | United Kingdom | | |
| 5 | Australia | +0.90 | 95% |
| | France | | |
| 7 | Canada | +0.85 | 93% |
| | United States | | |
| 9 | Japan | +0.75 | 88% |
| 10 | China | +0.70 | 85% |
| | Turkey | | |
| 12 | Brazil | +0.65 | 83% |
| | Saudi Arabia | | |
| 14 | Italy | +0.63 | 82% |
| 15 | Argentina | +0.60 | 80% |
| 16 | Indonesia | +0.55 | 78% |
| | Russia | | |
| 18 | South Africa | +0.45 | 73% |
| 19 | Mexico | +0.40 | 70% |
| 20 | India | +0.35 | 68% |

Appendix C: 2021 G20 Rome Summit Performance by Subject

| | |
|--|----|
| PEOPLE: HEALTH | |
| COVID-19 | B+ |
| Mental health | C- |
| PLANET: ECOLOGY | |
| Climate change: Agreed: International coal financing ban in 2021 | B |
| Biodiversity | B |
| Other environment (oceans, plastics, pollution) | B |
| PROSPERITY: ECONOMY | |
| Macroeconomic policy | B- |
| International tax: 15% minimum tax | A |
| Trade | C- |
| Channeling special drawing rights | B |
| Development and debt | B- |
| Infrastructure | B |
| Digital economy | C+ |
| POLITICAL-SECURITY | |
| Crime and corruption | C |
| Terrorism | C |
| Nuclear proliferation | C |
| Afghanistan | B- |

Appendix D: 2021 G20 Rome Summit Conclusions

| Issue | # words | % total words | # paragraphs | % total paragraphs | # documents | % total documents | # dedicated documents |
|----------------------|---------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Total | 9,442 | 100 | 61 | 61 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Development | 2,491 | 26 | 15 | 24.5 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Climate change | 2,015 | 21 | 12 | 19.5 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Health | 1,545 | 16 | 8 | 13 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Gender | 1,510 | 16 | 9 | 15 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Macroeconomics | 1,405 | 15 | 1 | 1.5 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Biodiversity | 1,089 | 11.5 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Food and agriculture | 743 | 8 | 4 | 6.5 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Crime and corruption | 735 | 8 | 4 | 6.5 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Tax | 409 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 100 | 0 |
| Brain health | 371 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 100 | 0 |

Identified by Duja Muhanna, November 1, 2021.

Appendix E: 2021 G20 Rome Summit Declaration Commitments

| Issue | Number | Percentage |
|--|--------------------------------------|------------|
| Health | 35 | 16 |
| Digital economy | 26 | 12 |
| Crime and corruption | 23 | 10 |
| Climate change | 21 (17 high binding, 4 low binding) | 9 |
| Environment | 21 (11 high binding, 10 low binding) | 9 |
| Development | 18 | 8 |
| Gender | 17 | 8 |
| Trade | 12 | 5 |
| Food and agriculture | 8 | 4 |
| Energy | 8 | 4 |
| Macroeconomic growth | 7 | 3 |
| Financial regulation | 7 | 3 |
| Labour and employment | 5 | 2 |
| Social policy | 4 | 2 |
| Education | 4 | 2 |
| Infrastructure | 4 | 2 |
| Reform of international financial institutions | 2 | 4 |
| Migration and refugees | 2 | 1 |
| Taxation | 1 | 0.4 |
| Total | 225 | 100 |

Compiled by Brittaney Warren, October 31, 2021.

Appendix F: 2021 G20 Rome Summit Development of Global Governance

F-1: Inside

| | Number of references |
|--|----------------------|
| Central bank governors | 3 |
| finance ministers | 4 |
| Health ministers | 2 |
| G20 Africa Partnership | 1 |
| G20 | 7 |
| Financial Stability Board | 10 |
| Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion | 3 |
| Ministers of tourism | 1 |
| Total | 31 |

F-2: Outside

| | Number of references |
|--|----------------------|
| World Health Organization | 10 |
| World Trade Organization | 7 |
| World Bank | 3 |
| International Monetary Fund | 10 |
| Food and Agriculture Organization | 2 |
| World Organization for Animal Health | 1 |
| United Nations Environment Programme | 1 |
| Paris Club | 1 |
| United Nations Environment Assembly | 1 |
| Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development | 13 |
| UN-Habitat | 1 |
| Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change | 1 |
| International Energy Agency | 1 |
| United Nations | 1 |
| International Energy Forum | 1 |
| International Labour Organization | 3 |
| International Organization for Migration | 1 |
| United Nations High Commission for Refugees | 1 |
| International Civil Aviation Organization | 1 |
| International Maritime Organization | 1 |
| International Telecommunication Union | 1 |
| Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics | 1 |
| United Nations World Tourism Organization | 1 |
| United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization | 1 |
| Financial Action Task Force | 5 |
| Total | 70 |

Compiled by Sonja Dobson, October 31, 2021.

Appendix G: Propellers of the 2021 G20 Rome Summit's Performance

| Summit | Performance | | Causes | | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-------|--------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Performance | Total | Total | Shock-activated vulnerability | Multilateral organizational failure | Predominant equalizing capability | Common, converging policies and practices | Domestic political cohesion | Club at the network hub |
| 2020 Riyadh | Small | 4 | 34 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| 2021 Rome | Significant | 7 | 43 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 9 |

Notes: Riyadh's shock-activated vulnerability was strong due to height of the first and second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic, depth of the economic downturn, and new peaks in greenhouse gas concentrations and rising extreme weather events. Its strong multilateral organizational failure was due to the inability of the World Health Organization, UN Climate, International Monetary Fund and World Bank to arrest these shocks and offset the vulnerabilities they produced. On predominant equalizing capability it was solid as G20 predominance remained high and China's state of COVID-19 and economic growth was much higher than those of the United States. On common, converging policies and practices, Riyadh's performance was small as democracy was declining in China, Russia, Brazil and Turkey, and Donald Trump, who represented the United States at the summit, denied that Joe Biden had been elected president in November. Domestic political cohesion was small, as it was high only in China and Russia but low in the United States, after Trump's electoral defeat. On the G20 as a club at the network hub, Riyadh was very small, as it was an entirely virtual summit and King Salman's Saudi Arabia is not a member or a participant in the major plurilateral summits of global relevance and reach.

| Scale | | |
|-------|----|----------------------|
| 10 | A+ | Exceptionally strong |
| 9 | A | Very strong |
| 8 | A- | Strong |
| 7 | B+ | Significant |
| 6 | B | Substantial |
| 5 | B- | Solid |
| 4 | C+ | Small |
| 3 | C | Very small |
| 0 | F | Failure/Non-existent |