

G20 Africa and Climate Governance: Past Performance and Prospects for Hamburg

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Introduction

G20 governance of Africa-related issues is a slowly yet steadily emerging field in the analysis of G20 summitry. It embraces G20 governance of all core issue areas, from health to macroeconomic policy, with an “Africa-focus.” This consists of direct attention to the continent as a whole; one of the 54 African countries; or an international organization founded and based in Africa, such as the African Union (AU) (Hallink, 2017). With climate change and sustainability as central priorities of the 2017 Hamburg Summit, it is important to consider the G20’s past performance on Africa from the perspective of climate change, to identify existing trends and to predict what to expect when the G20 leaders meet at Hamburg on 7-8 July, 2017.

Schools of Thought

G20 performance on Africa and climate change has given rise to two major schools of thought.

Incongruent Africa Focus

The first school — an incongruent Africa focus — argues that “The Marshall Plan and the Compact [with Africa] demonstrate that the German federal government still lacks an effective coordination and conceptual exchange between its ministries when it comes to the approach to Africa” (Schmuecker, 2017). Robin Schmuecker (2017) points out that the two documents “reflect surprisingly different policy approaches” that undermine the effectiveness of Germany’s Africa-focus, especially when it comes to climate change and protecting the environment. This school highlights that the Compact with Africa (CwA) has no explicit focus on climate change or sustainable development, while the Marshall Plan clearly addresses the need to promote sustainable development and meet the goals set out in the United Nations 2030 Agenda in addition to the Paris Agreement (Schmuecker, 2017).

Problematic Private Investment Initiative

The second school — a problematic private investment initiative — argues that various Africa-experts doubt the positive effects of the CwA (Pelz, 2017). This school contends “Within the framework of the Compact program, private investors are not required to meet environmental or social standards...” and African governments would be left responsible to ensure that such standards are met (Pelz, 2017). This school argues that the most pressing problem with the CwA is the emphasis on private investors as opposed to governments and inter-governmental organizations (Pelz, 2017).

Puzzles

These schools offer general insights about the G20’s governance of Africa and climate change. Yet they focus narrowly on the 2017 German presidency and its two African initiatives. They do not provide a systematic or comprehensive examination of the G20’s performance since the first leaders’ meeting in 2008. While examining what the Germany presidency has done so far for Africa and climate change is important, it is also essential to examine how the G20 has governed this connection

in the past, to acquire a more inclusive and evidence-based understanding of G20 Africa-climate governance. This will allow for a more accurate prediction of what to expect from the 2017 Hamburg Summit on climate change in Africa and how its performance can be improved.

Thesis

From London in 2009 to Antalya in 2015, G20 governance of Africa-related issues slowly strengthened in a small way — as measured by John J. Kirton's six dimensions of summit performance: domestic political management, deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery, and development of global governance (Hallink, 2017; Kirton, 2013). At Hangzhou in September 2016, performance dramatically increased to a record high in domestic political management, deliberation, direction setting, and the development of global governance, but not in decision making (Hallink, 2017). Under the Germany presidency, the rising focus on Africa has continued, sending positive signals for G20 performance on Africa at the 2017 leaders' summit.

G20 governance of climate change in Africa was moderate and limited. Between 2008 and 2016, performance was strong on deliberation, decision making, and development of global governance, and moderate on direction setting. Performance on delivery and domestic political management was weak.

Africa-related issues are set to take a prominent place in the leaders' discussions at the upcoming summit in Hamburg — the first G20 summit held by Germany. Yet the focus on climate change in Africa is less certain. At the beginning of the German presidency, two Africa initiatives were announced: the Compact with Africa and the Marshall Plan for Africa (Schmuecker, 2017). However, as the leaders' summit looms closer, the more comprehensive Marshall Plan for Africa seems to have fallen by the wayside and the CwA has taken prominence (Schmuecker, 2017). Thus, the Africa-focus at the G20 summit in July will likely be dominated by strengthening private investment throughout the continent rather than combatting climate change.

Dimensions of Performance

This analysis considers the issues areas of Africa and climate change together. The dimensions of performance are therefore evaluated by examining summit communiqué text that includes references to both Africa and climate change.

Domestic Political Management

The first dimension, domestic political management (DPM), is measured by counting the number of complements to each country member made in the communiqués and official documents from each G20 summit within the Africa-climate conclusions. Performance on this dimension between 2008 and 2016 was non-existent, with no communiqué complements made.

Deliberation

The second dimension, deliberation, is measured by the number and percentage of words, paragraphs and documents dedicated to both Africa and climate change in the leaders' conclusions in all official summit documents.

The summit with the strongest performance on this dimension was London in 2009 with 62.62 per cent of the Africa conclusions on climate change. The second highest was Pittsburgh in 2009 with 51.76 per cent, followed by Cannes in 2011 with 51.51. As a percentage of the total words found in all official summit documents, performance was highest at Hangzhou in 2016, with 3.87 per cent on Africa and climate change. This was followed with 3.27 per cent at Cannes and 2.43 per cent at Los Cabos in 2012.

Direction Setting

The third dimension, direction setting, considers the affirmations made within the Africa and climate conclusions of the G20's dual distinctive mission of promoting financial stability and ensuring that globalization benefits all. No affirmations to financial stability were made between 2008 and 2016. The first affirmations to globalization for the benefit of all came at Hangzhou in 2016, with a total of two. The leaders stated "We are determined to foster an innovative, invigorated, interconnected and inclusive world economy to usher in a new era of global growth and sustainable development, taking into account the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Paris Agreement" and "We launch the G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialization in Africa and LDCs to strengthen their inclusive growth and development potential" (G20 Leaders, 2016).

Decision Making

On the fourth dimension, decision making, the G20 leaders delivered 35 Africa-related commitments, of which only five, or 14.29 per cent, explicitly referred to climate change. Climate change was the second highest sub-issue area for all Africa-related commitments, after development. Other Africa-related commitments came on health, trade, social policy, food and agriculture, and labour and employment.

The first Africa-climate commitments were made at Cannes in 2011. The leaders stated "We are committed to the success of the upcoming Durban Conference on Climate Change" and "We stand ready to work towards operationalization of the Green Climate Fund as part of a balanced outcome in Durban, building upon the report of the Transitional Committee" (G20 Research Group, 2017). The next commitments came at Los Cabos in 2012 and St. Petersburg in 2013. Then they disappeared. No Africa-climate commitments were made at Brisbane in 2014, Antalya in 2015, or Hangzhou in 2016. It is time for the Hamburg Summit to bring them back.

Delivery

On the fifth dimension, delivery, the G20 Research Group has assessed two Africa-climate commitments. Overall, the average compliance with the two commitments was -0.34 or 33 per cent. This was below the G20's overall average between 2008 and 2016 of +0.40 or 70 per cent (G20 Research Group, 2017). It was also lower than the average for all assessed Africa-related commitments: -0.08 or 46 per cent. This is consistent with the G20 Research Group's finding that compliance tends to be lower when a regional focus is included in the commitment text.

The first was made in 2011, which included the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. Average compliance with this commitment was -0.45 or 28 per cent, led by Australia, France, Germany, South Korea and the United Kingdom — all of which received a score of full compliance.

The second assessed commitment was made at St. Petersburg in 2013. It read "We are committed to a full implementation of the outcome of Durban." Average compliance was -0.25 or 38 per cent, led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with full compliance.

Development of Global Governance

The sixth dimension, development of global governance (DGG), is measured by the number of communiqué references to institutions inside and outside the G20 in the Africa and climate passages (Hallink, 2017). No references to inside institutions came until the Cannes Summit in 2011, where three references were made. These were made to the G20 finance ministers, G20 agriculture ministers, and the G20 study group on climate finance. There was a total of 23 references to outside institutions between 2008 and 2016.

Prospects for Hamburg

The German presidency championed two Africa initiatives for the 2017 Hamburg Summit: the Marshall Plan for Africa, authored by the Germany Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the Compact with Africa, authored by the Germany Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the IMF (Schmuecker, 2017).

The CwA (two pages) is a far less comprehensive initiative than the Marshall Plan for Africa (34 pages), and is solely focused on strengthening private investment in Africa (BMF, 2017; BMZ, 2017). The Marshall Plan is an all-inclusive initiative, addressing peace and security, education, sustainable development, social protection, and food security (BMZ, 2017).

At the foreign ministers and central bank governors meeting in Baden-Baden on 18 March, no mention of the Marshall Plan came, suggesting that the Marshall Plan for Africa has fallen by the wayside. The finance ministers and central bank governors did, however, launch the Compact with Africa, “aimed at fostering private investment including in infrastructure” (G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 2017). The CwA does not mention the importance of sustainability with the implementation of the initiative, leaving the initiative at odds with Hamburg’s climate change agenda.

At the central bank governors and finance ministers’ meeting, however, sustainable development in Africa made an appearance. The final communique read “we will deepen as well as broaden international economic and financial cooperation with African countries to foster sustainable and inclusive growth in line with the African Union’s 2063 Agenda” (G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 2017). Nevertheless, it appears that the more comprehensive and environmentally-conscious Marshall Plan for Africa was forgotten as the CwA made significant strides. This signalled that private infrastructure investment will likely take precedence over climate change in Africa at the leaders’ summit.

With Germany’s emphasis on climate change, and the country’s past performance on delivery with Africa-climate commitments — Germany is one of the only G20 members to have received a full compliance score on all assessed Africa-climate commitments — there can be reasonable hope that German Chancellor Angela Merkel will deliver moderate success in all dimensions of performance on Africa and climate change when the leaders sit down in July.

Nevertheless, the Hamburg Summit’s focus on Africa will likely be dominated by private investment in infrastructure, while the summit’s focus on climate change will address the world at large, sparing any references to specific geographic regions, including Africa. The presence of U.S. President Donald Trump at the summit table will probably limit success on climate change in Africa even further, considering his recent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and his general opposition to the necessity of combatting climate change.

G20 performance on Africa and climate change is unlikely to soar to new heights at Hamburg this year, but instead will continue its moderate and limited performance from years past. This somewhat pessimistic outlook for the Hamburg summit can be changed if the following two proposals are operationalized.

Possibilities and Proposals for Hamburg

The first proposal, feasible for the G20 leaders to adopt, is to commit to a more climate sensitive Marshall Plan and connect it to the CwA. The Marshall Plan for Africa explicitly mentions the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda (BMZ, 2017). Thus, in order to produce a summit of success for

Africa and climate change, the G20 leaders must adopt a stronger climate sensitive Marshall Plan. While proponents of the CwA have argued that the initiative will help address the root causes of migration, few have considered the impact on climate change (Lay, 2017). The two-page document has no mention of climate change, sustainable development, the United Nations SDGs, or the Paris Agreement.

The second proposal, although tied to the first, is that the CwA needs to be re-worked to ensure that climate change and sustainable development are explicit components of the initiative. The compact is primarily concerned with fostering private infrastructure investment in Africa and, if gone unchecked, could have serious implications for the environment and the objectives set out in the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda (Lay, 2017; Schmuecker, 2017). Put simply, the G20 leaders must consider the CwA's potential environmental effects and revise the initiative accordingly. This would ensure that the Marshall Plan for Africa and the CwA are congruent in their primary objectives.

Conclusion

The G20's performance on Africa and climate change from 2008-2016 was moderate and limited. With the absence of any mentions of the Marshall Plan at the finance ministers and central bank governors' meeting in Baden Baden, and the lack of any references to climate change in the Compact with Africa, it is likely that G20 performance will remain limited, with no significant strides made. This can change if the German presidency is able to get the other G20 leaders, especially President Trump, on board with the implementation of the Marshall Plan for Africa and the modification of the CwA so as to ensure its congruency with the objectives set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement and the UN's 2030 Agenda.

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Appendix A: Overall Performance 2008-2016

Summit	Domestic Political Management	Deliberation		Direction Setting	Decision Making	Delivery		Development of Global Governance	
	# of Complements	% of Total Words	% of Total Paragraphs	Globalization for the Benefit of All	# of Commitments	Average Compliance Score	# of Assessed	Inside	Outside
2008 Washington	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
2009 London	0	1.07	0.61	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
2009 Pittsburgh	0	2.24	0.78	0	0	N/A	0	0	7
2010 Toronto	0	0.97	0.52	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
2010 Seoul	0	0.91	0.29	0	0	N/A	0	0	4
2011 Cannes	0	3.27	2.63	0	2	-0.45	1	1	5
2012 Los Cabos	0	2.43	0.98	0	1	N/A	0	3	3
2013 St. Petersburg	0	0.31	0.19	0	1	-0.25	1	0	1
2014 Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
2015 Antalya	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
2016 Hangzhou	0	3.87	0.55	2	0	N/A	0	1	4
Total	0	N/A	N/A	2	5	N/A	3	0.45	23
Average	0	1.37	0.60	0.18	0.45	-0.34	0.27	5	2.10

Appendix B: Summary of Conclusions on Africa and Climate in G20 Leaders' Documents

Year	# of Words	% of Total Words	% of Words in Africa Conclusions	# of Paragraphs	% of Total Paragraphs	% of Paragraphs in Africa Conclusions	# of Documents	% of Total Documents	# of Dedicated Documents
2008 Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009 London	66	1.07	62.26	1	0.61	50	1	33.33	0
2009 Pittsburgh	207	2.24	51.76	1	0.78	33.33	1	33.33	0
2010 Toronto	108	0.97	26.21	1	0.52	25	1	25	0
2010 Seoul	144	0.91	38.61	1	0.29	25	1	20	0
2011 Cannes	461	3.27	51.51	4	2.63	40	3	100	0
2012 Los Cabos	310	2.43	43.60	2	0.98	50	1	25	0
2013 St. Petersburg	89	0.31	34.36	1	0.19	25	1	9.09	0
2014 Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2015 Antalya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2016 Hangzhou	620	3.87	48.17	6	0.55	50	1	25	0

Notes:

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G20 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

"# of Words" is the number of Africa-related subjects for the year specified, excluding document titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

"% of Total Words" refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year specified.

"# of Paragraphs" is the number of paragraphs containing references to Africa for the year specified. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

"% of Total Paragraphs" refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year specified.

"# of Documents" is the number of documents that contain Africa subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

"% of Total Documents" refers to the total number of documents for the year specified.

"# of Dedicated Documents" is the number of documents for the year that contains an Africa-related subject in the title. Meeting in addition to scheduled annual meeting.

Appendix C: Africa and Climate Direction Setting, 2008-2016

Promoting Financial Stability

Value	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Financial system stability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prevent future crisis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stabilize impact of crisis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overall total	0										

Notes: The unit of analysis is the sentence.

Inclusions: Financial system stability; prevent future crisis; stabilize the impact of crisis; manage the impact of the crisis.

Exclusions: General reference to a crisis; another crisis that is not the global financial crisis.

Globalization for the Benefit of All

Value	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Inclusive growth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Global growth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Equal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poorest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Most vulnerable	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Inclusive world economy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
All parts of world	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Overall Total	2										

Notes: The unit of analysis is the sentence.

Inclusions: Inclusive growth; global growth; equal; poorest; the poor; most vulnerable; inclusive world economy; all parts of the globe.

Exclusions: Least developed countries; broadly-shared growth; wide-spread growth.

Appendix D: Africa-Related Commitments by Core Issue Area, 2008-2016

Issue	Total	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Macroeconomic policy	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Labour and employment	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Climate change	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0
International taxation	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Trade	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
IFI reform	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social policy	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Health	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Development	17	0	3	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	5	4
Food and agriculture	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G8/G20 governance	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	35	0	3	3	1	2	5	5	3	3	5	5

Notes: IFI = international financial institution.

Appendix E: Delivery of G20 Africa-Related Commitments, 2008-2016

Commitment	Average	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Korea	Mexico	Russia	Saudi Arabia	South Africa	Turkey	United Kingdom	United States	European Union	
2009L-75	+0.30	-1	1	1	1	-1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	-1	-1	1	1	1	
2009L-76	+0.30	-1	1	1	1	-1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	-1	-1	1	1	1	
2009P-68	+0.05	-1	0	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	0	1	1	-1	0	0	1	-1	1	1	0	
2009P-88	-0.05	-1	1	-1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	-1	-1	1	0	-1	-1	1	1	1	
2010-35	-0.05	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	
2011-247	-0.45	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-1	
2013-180	-0.25	-1	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	1	0	0	
2015-69	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	1	0	-1	0	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	1	1	
Average																						-0.08

Note: Bold is G20 delivery of Africa-climate commitments.

Appendix F: Africa and Climate Development of Global Governance, 2008-2016

Institution	Total	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Inside												
Finance Ministers	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Agriculture Ministers	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
G20 Study Group on Climate Finance	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
G20 Energy Ministers	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Inside Total	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	1
Outside												
International Finance Corporation	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Development Association	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
African Development Bank	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Nations	5	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
World Bank	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Green Climate Fund	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Fund for Agricultural Development	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Partnership for Africa's Development	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
World Food Programme	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Multilateral Development Banks	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
World Trade Organization	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
United Nations Industrial Development Organization	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Outside Total	23	0	0	7	0	4	5	3	1	0	0	4
Overall Total	28	0	0	7	0	4	7	6	1	0	0	5
Inside to Outside Ratio	5:23	0	0	0:7	0	0:4	2:5	1	0:1	0	0	1:4

Note: The unit of analysis is the paragraph.