
The G20's Governance of Africa-Related Issues, 2008-2016

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Introduction

G20-Africa governance entails the G20's focus on and support of Africa-related issues. Africa-related issues include all of the main subjects addressed by the G20 that have an "Africa" focus. This consists of a direct mention of the continent as a whole; one of the 54 African countries; or an international organization founded and based in Africa, such as the African Union. This analysis will comprehensively examine G20-Africa governance since the first G20 summit in 2008 by assessing all eight dimensions of performance and by conducting a case study on each G20 leaders' summit.

Significance

The G20's governance of Africa-related issues has largely been overlooked in the scholarly literature. However, as the G20's focus on Africa grows so too will interest increase in the policy community. At the 2016 Hangzhou Summit under the Chinese presidency, Africa received far more attention from G20 leaders than ever before. This trend has continued under the German presidency in 2017, with the first ever Think 20 (T20) Africa Conference taking place in Johannesburg, South Africa, on February 1-3, 2017.

Several countries in Africa have experienced impressive growth rates over the past three decades. Yet, Africa still remains the poorest continent in the world and thus a key geographic focus and test for the new Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With the G20 as a global economic governance group directed and guided by a mission to ensure that globalization benefits all, the G20's focus on Africa-related issues — including poverty, development, health, food security and industrialization — is of primary importance to the G20 itself and the global community at large

Schools of Thought

The G20's performance on G20-Africa governance has been the subject of seven major schools of thought.

G20 as a Talk Shop on Africa

The first school argues that the G20 is merely a talk shop for Africa-related issue. Daniel Bradlow argued that although the G20 addressed African interests, the discussion "is often at a general level and without either making commitments to specific actions or providing specific details that could assist African countries and their partners in formulating and implementing their own strategies for addressing these interests" (2012). This school suggests that the "G20 performs its awareness promoting function more effectively [than] its global economic governance function" when it comes to Africa-related issues (Bradlow, 2012).

Underrepresented Africa

The second school asserts that Africa is underrepresented in the G20, due to the fact that only one G20 member is an African country. This school contends that underrepresentation is perhaps the primary reason for why Africa-related issues are not always incorporated into the G20 agenda or official summit documents.

Missed Opportunity for Africa

The third school agrees that Africa is underrepresented in the G20 due to the region's inability to exploit the opportunities for involvement made available by the G20 (Grant Makokera, 2014). In lead up to the 2014 Brisbane Summit, Catherine Grant Makokera argued that the G20's two African invited guests — Mauritania and Senegal — had already missed an opportunity to increase Africa's representation in the G20 before the summit had even began. As she correctly pointed out, "much of the real work on the agenda is done in the preparatory meetings that take place before heads of state get together at the (short-lived) annual event" (Grant Makokera, 2014). She went on to say that, "for example, in 2014 the Australians hosted more than 60 official G20 meetings in their role as chair. There was potential for Mauritania and Senegal to join most of these discussions but that was not the case and the two additional African chairs largely remained empty" (Grant Makokera, 2014).

Defensive, Self-Interested Africa

A fourth school sees defensive, self-interested South Africa as partly causing Africa's poor representation in the G20. It contends that South Africa does not actively try to further the interests of the continent as a whole but just those of South Africa alone. Peter Fabricius (2015) argues that Pretoria seems to downplay its representation of Africa in the G20. Fabricius (2015) contends that South Africa has made some attempts to represent the interests of Africa, "indirectly and unofficially through its participation in the G20's development working group, as well as more directly by providing feedback of G20 work to the AU and African development bank." However, "South Africa's membership ... [does] not amount to adequate African G20 representation" (Fabricius, 2015).

Hangzhou as a Disappointment

The fifth school — Hangzhou's Disappointment — highlights the failure of the Hangzhou Summit on issues of sustainable development in Africa, the refugee crisis in North Africa, and African industrial development (DW, 2016). Proponents assert that G20 leaders focused not on Africa but on the success and development of the G20 and the other more prosperous members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Investment in Africa

The sixth school — Investment in Africa — addresses how G20 leaders "should" govern Africa-related issues in the future, especially with regard to infrastructure investment in sub-Saharan Africa. It argues that, "financing infrastructure projects in Africa would help unlock the economic potential of the continent and make a contribution to a number of the overarching objectives of the G20" (Oji and Grant Makokera, N.D.). Proponents argue that the challenge for Africa "begins with the structuring and design of projects, as well as in determining viable processes by which funds for project development can be raised..." and that the G20 is well equipped to help in this regard (Oji and Grant Makokera, N.D.). This school also emphasizes the G20's 2012 commitment to "strengthen efforts to create a more conducive environment for development, including infrastructure development..." (G20, 2012). It contends that going forward, the G20 should give special focus to infrastructure investment in sub-Saharan Africa.

High Hopes for Germany

The seventh school — High Hopes for Germany — argues that the German presidency in July 2017 will deliver concrete success in G20 performance on Africa. Proponents predict that Germany will use its presidency in order to promote investment in infrastructure in Africa (Out-Law, 2016). This school emphasizes Germany's Federal Minister of Finance Dr. Wolfgang Schauble's statement at the Business 20 (B20) conference in December 2016, where he stated "Together with our African

partners, we want to encourage private investment and investment in infrastructure” (Out-Law, 2016). He continued, “this should help make private investment in Africa more attractive by making it more secure, and reducing the barriers to investment ... We call this a ‘compact with Africa’. The objective is to boost growth and jobs, promote inclusion and give people economic perspectives at home so that they do not have to leave their home country to seek subsistence elsewhere” (Out-Law, 2016).

Puzzles

Although these schools offer a range of general insights into the G20's governance of Africa-related issues, they focus narrowly on representation, agenda-setting, normative prescription and prediction. They do not provide a systematic or comprehensive examination of the G20's performance. To acquire a more inclusive and evidence-based understanding of G20-Africa governance, it is essential to examine carefully how the G20 has governed Africa-related issues in the past and the causes that lie behind. This examination begins by measuring the eight core dimensions of performance developed by John Kirton: domestic, political management, deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery, the development of global governance, distinctive mission done and deaths delayed. It includes matching their performance to key causes, guided by the systemic hub model of G20 governance, and conducting a detailed process tracing of critical cases to more clearly connect causes to effects. This analysis facilitates a more accurate understanding of the G20's governance of Africa-related issues, both historically and at present, and a better prediction of its future performance, starting at the Hamburg Summit on July 7–8, 2017.

Thesis

From the London Summit in 2009 to the Antalya Summit in 2015, the G20's governance of Africa-related issues slowly strengthened in a small way. At Hangzhou in September 2016, however, it dramatically increased to a record high in domestic political management, deliberation, direction setting, and the development of global governance, but not in decision making. It thus seemed that the G20's new and increased focus on Africa under the Chinese presidency remained more talk than action. At the 2017 Hamburg Summit, given the German host Chancellor Angela Merkel's commitment to G20 investment in Africa, G20 performance will probably increase overall.

With the increasing weight of emerging economies, such as the BRICS members of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and G20 members Argentina and India preparing to host the G20 summit in 2018 and 2019 respectively, Africa-related issues will likely take a more central role in all dimensions of G20 performance. This slow, incrementally increasing performance in Africa-related issues is a result of equalizing capability within the G20 and the other five causal factors outlined in John J. Kirton's systemic hub model — international institutional failure; collective predominance and internal equality in capabilities; converging domestic characteristics; political control, capital, continuity, competence, and commitment; and controlled club participation as a network Hub. Standing out is shock activated vulnerability for G20 countries from Africa, with the escalating terrorism, health threat of Ebola, migration and famine erupting in Africa. Also important is a seventh factor: that is, increasing international focus on helping the world's poorest, as spurred by social media and the UN's SDGs.

Dimensions of Performance

The G20's slow, strengthening, and now spiking performance on Africa is seen across most dimensions of performance.

Domestic Political Management

The first is domestic political management (DPM), measured by counting the number of complements made in the communiqués and official documents released at each G20 Summit on Africa-related issues. This has been low, with only two communiqué complements made. The first communiqué complement was made to Italy in 2009 and the second to Japan at Hangzhou in 2016 (see Appendix B).

G20 leaders have also made a few complements to Africa itself, particularly with regard to institutions formed and based in Africa. In 2011, for example, the G20 leaders stated, “We welcome the initiative of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) to set up a targeted regional emergency humanitarian food reserve system, as a pilot project...” At Cannes, the G20 leaders stated, “We welcome the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative to integrate risk management in agricultural policies in Africa.”

Deliberation

The second dimension, deliberation, is measured by the number and portion of words, paragraphs, and documents dedicated to Africa in the leaders’ conclusions from all official summit documents issued in the leaders’ name. The public deliberation on Africa has gone through five distinct stages (see Appendix C). The first stage, in 2008, was characterized by a complete absence of Africa. The second stage, between 2009 and 2010, saw an increase, ranging from just under or over 2 per cent for all four summits. The third stage, between 2011 and 2012, saw a notable rise to 6.13 per cent at Cannes in 2011 and 4.95 per cent at Los Cabos in 2012. The fourth stage, lasting from 2013 to 2015, saw a decrease with an average ranging between 1 and 2 per cent. The fifth and current stage, beginning with the Hangzhou summit in September 2016, has an unprecedented increase to 8.04 per cent.

Direction Setting

The third dimension, direction setting, is measured by the number of affirmations made within the Africa-conclusions to financial stability and globalization for the benefit of all. The G20 historically performed poorly here (see Appendix D). However, at the 2016 Hangzhou summit, the G20 leaders outperformed their previous record with three affirmations to globalization for the benefit of all, a major advance from the one affirmation at Cannes in 2011 and Los Cabos in 2012. The G20 has never affirmed financial stability in its Africa-related conclusions.

Decision Making

On the fourth dimension, decision making, the G20 leaders made a relatively low number of Africa-related commitments when compared to those for development, trade, health, and energy (see Appendices E and F). Nevertheless, there has been an overall increase in the annual number since the first Africa-related commitment in 2009 (see Appendix E).

At Hangzhou, the G20 leaders made five Africa-related commitments, the same number made at Antalya in 2015. These two summits delivered the highest number of Africa-related commitments. The next highest was London in 2009 and Los Cabos in 2012, with a total of four commitments at each summit.

The majority of Africa-related commitments have been development ones, with a total of 14. This is far higher than any other issue area, demonstrating the G20 leaders’ focus on African development in particular (see Appendix E). At London in 2009, the first summit where an Africa-related commitment was made, all four were development ones. Other Africa-related commitments came on social policy, health, food and agriculture, and trade.

At Hangzhou, the five Africa-related commitments were again dominated by development, with four development ones. For example, G20 Leaders committed to “support industrialization in developing countries, especially those in Africa and Least Developed Countries.” The G20 leaders also committed to “[achieve a successful] 14th replenishment of the African Development Fund.”

Delivery

On the fifth dimension, delivery, the G20 Research Group has assessed compliance for five Africa-related commitments: three on development, one on climate change and one on international financial institution (IFI) reform (see Appendix G). The G20's overall average compliance score was +0.05 or 53%. Therefore, G20 compliance with Africa-related commitments has been relatively low compared to the G20's overall compliance average between 2008 and 2015 of +0.41 (71%). The average compliance score for the three African development commitments was +0.13 or 57%. G20 compliance with the climate change and IFI reform commitments fared relatively similar, at +0.25 (63%) and +0.05 (53%) respectively.

Development of Global Governance

The sixth dimension, the development of global governance (DGG), is measured by the number of communiqué mentions to inside and outside institutions in the Africa passages. DGG outside has typically been much stronger than DGG inside (see Appendix H).

The UN was the most frequently referenced outside institution, with the World Bank and OECD tying for second. For DGG inside, on the other hand, all five of the past references to inside institutions have been made to five different institutions: High Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment; Sokoni Africa Infrastructure Marketplace; Development Working Group; G20 Study Group on Climate Finance; and the AgResults Initiative.

Distinctive Mission Done

The seventh dimension, distinctive mission done, entails the G20's success in furthering its distinctive missions — to promote financial stability and to ensure that globalization benefits all. However, it is also useful to examine the G20's success in furthering the G7's distinctive missions of democracy and human rights.

Africa's performance in various indicators of democratic progress; human rights; financial stability; and globalization for the benefit of all, or more specifically, human development, are the relevant measures. This method is not a perfect indicator of the G20's performance in distinctive mission done in the African context, as it implies direct causation between the G20's actions and improvement, or lack thereof, in the various indicators discussed. Nevertheless, it can suggest whether a positive or negative correlation exists between the G20's actions and Africa's performance on these indicators.

Democracy

The level of democracy in a country or continent can be measured by the “democracy index” developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). EIU scores countries on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 representing a full authoritarian regime and 10 representing a full democracy.

In 2008, EIU awarded the 44 countries of sub-Saharan Africa an average score of 4.28 (EIU, 2017).

By contrast, the overall world average was 5.55 that year (EIU, 2017). North America's average was 8.64 and Western Europe's average was 8.61 (EIU, 2017).

In 2016, EIU gave sub-Saharan Africa an average score of 4.37, for a small rise since the 2008 start (EIU, 2017). This was again lower, although not dramatically, than the world average of 5.52, which saw a 0.3 point decrease since 2008 (EIU, 2017). North America's average was 8.56, which also demonstrated a drop from 2008 due to the United States' fall to the status of a "flawed democracy" (EIU, 2017). Finally, Western Europe's average also fell from 8.61 to 8.42. Africa, on the other hand, saw an increase of 0.9

Individual Liberty and Human Rights

On individual liberty or human rights, there are currently no indices like the EIU's democracy index that quantify the level of individual liberty or human rights experienced by a country's citizens. Freedom House, however, rates the level of freedom experienced in every country and region in the world. In this system, a country is deemed as either "not free", "partly free", or "free".

For the 48 of the 54 countries in Africa, in 2006, two years before the first G20 leaders' summit, 23% of the 48 African countries were deemed to be "free," 46 per cent partly free, and 31% not free (Freedom House, 2017).

In 2016, 12% of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were labeled free, 49% partly free, and 39% "not free" (Freedom House, 2017). This represents a significant decrease in the percentage of free countries and an increase in the "partly free" and "not free" ones (Freedom House, 2017).

Financial Stability

On financial stability, as there is no index that ranks a country's financial stability, this component

can be examined in a more qualitative way by considering whether a financial crisis has emerged from Africa. The world has witnessed an Asian-turned-global crisis, an American-turned-global crisis, and almost a European-turned-global crisis, but not an African one. While this may suggest that Africa has remained relatively stable financially, this could also mean that the economies of Africa are not significant enough or systemically connected enough to initiate such a crisis. It is reasonable to argue, however, that South Africa and Nigeria are big enough and important enough to matter but have remained stable and thus have not started a crisis. Finally, Africa as a whole remained relatively stable throughout the 2008 crisis and has remained relatively stable since.

A recent article, however, emphasizes "less than two years after International Monetary Fund Managing Director Chirstine Lagarde heralded Africa for its "remarkable resilience," some of the continent's "brightest stars" [or most prosperous economies] are now seeking bailouts" (Mail & Guardian, 2016). As evidence, the authors point to the fact that "Ghana, Angola and Mozambique have turned to the IMF for help in the past year." It is also argued that Zambia may also have to seek help from the IMF soon (Mail & Guardian, 2016)

Globalization for the Benefit of All

The fourth component, globalization for the benefit of all, can be measured by the Human Development Index (or HDI). The HDI is a "summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development" (UNDP, 2017). The three key dimensions include: "a healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living" (UNDP, 2017). The HDI is a "geometric mean of normalized indices" for each of these three dimensions (UNDP, 2017).

Unfortunately, it does not provide the specific HDI scores for sub-Saharan Africa for the year 2007 or 2008 (the year before the first summit and the year of the first summit). However, it does provide the scores for 2000 and 2010. In 2000, sub-Saharan Africa's score was 0.422. This is considerably

lower than the world's score of 0.597. It is, however, higher than the overall score for least developed countries, which was 0.399. The overall score for developing countries was 0.568 and the overall score for OECD countries was 0.834 (UNDP, 2017).

In 2010, sub-Saharan Africa's score rose to 0.499; the world's overall score was 0.697; the overall score for least developed countries was 0.484; the OECD's was 0.872; and the overall score for developing countries was 0.642. Therefore, between 2000 and 2010, sub-Saharan Africa saw a significant increase in HDI but remained lower than the world, OECD, and developing country average (UNDP, 2017). It remained higher than the overall score for least developed countries.

In 2014, sub-Saharan Africa's score rose to 0.518, representing an increase from 2000 and 2010. However, it remained relatively low compared to the world's score of 0.711 and the OECD countries' score of 0.880. The score for all developing countries was 0.660, also considerably higher than sub-Saharan Africa. However, sub-Saharan Africa's score was once again a little bit higher than the score for all least developed countries, which was 0.502.

The HDI figures for 2000, 2010 and 2014 demonstrate that although Africa's, and sub-Saharan Africa's in particular, HDI score has consistently remained under the world, OECD, and developing countries average, it consistently increased since 2000 and remained considerably higher than the HDI average for all least developed countries.

Deaths Delayed

The eighth dimension of performance is deaths delayed. This dimension is difficult to quantitatively measure. Nevertheless, one way is to examine past Africa-related commitments to see how many the G20 has made in order to delay or prevent deaths in Africa. With the crisis in Libya, the refugee crisis in North Africa, and the crisis in the horn of Africa in 2011, one would expect the G20 leaders to make some commitments pertaining to these issues. Out of the total 34 Africa-related commitments, however, no commitments have been made on issues like the aforementioned crises, which may have been the most likely to result in deaths. There have been, however, commitments made regarding food security in 2009 and poverty reduction, which are also clearly related to deaths. Overall, it can be concluded that although the G20 has likely had some success in deaths delayed, G20 performance in deaths delayed in Africa could certainly be improved.

Causes of Performance

The G20's slowly rising performance can be attributed to seven causes. These include the six causal factors of performance in John J. Kirton's systemic hub model — relative vulnerability; international institutional failure; collective predominance and internal equality in capabilities; converging domestic characteristics; political control, capital, continuity, competence, and commitment; and controlled club participation as a network hub — in addition to a seventh factor: that is, increasing international focus on helping the world's poorest.

Relative Vulnerability

The first cause of shock activated vulnerability emanating from Africa is one of the less salient causes. The food crisis in 2011 in East Africa did not prompt the G20 in Los Cabos, or any other summit thereafter, to make any commitments on food security in Africa. Rather, the commitments at Los Cabos were focused on labour and employment; macroeconomic policy; social policy; and climate change. However, at the 2014 Brisbane Summit, the G20 leaders' response to Africa-related shocks was stronger than previously witnessed. At Brisbane, the G20 leaders delivered a separate document on Ebola, committing to “do what is necessary to ensure the international effort can extinguish the outbreak and address its medium-term economic and humanitarian costs” (G20, 2014). On the

migrant crisis in North Africa, largely beginning in 2015, the G20 leaders did not make any commitments regarding migration or refugee flows in Africa in particular at Antalya in 2015 or Hangzhou in 2016.

Leading up to the Hamburg Summit in July, the increased Africa-focus appeared to be a direct result of the migrant crisis in North Africa. Although Germany was concerned with increasing investment in the continent through the “Compact with Africa,” the migrant crisis in North Africa was one of many causal factors. More specifically, the German government argued that “increased investment on the continent will foster conditions that will incentivize Africans to remain at home” (German Development Institute, 2017). This suggests that G20 performance on Africa-related issues may be becoming more sensitive to shocks emanating from Africa.

Furthermore, the continuing prevalence of poverty, food insecurity, climate change, and health issues in Africa contribute to the vulnerability of the G20 members. In a globalized world of food insecurity, infectious diseases and widespread poverty, the G20 members are vulnerable. Therefore, in order to ensure their own safety, G20 members must consider prevalent issues in Africa, and other least developed countries. Although the G20 has not consistently or explicitly targeted some of these issues, by working to foster development in Africa the G20 leaders are helping to mitigate problems of poverty, food insecurity, and poor health. “Shocks” or “risks” in Africa, such as the more recent North African migrant crisis and the long-existing issue of poverty, are directly related to the G20’s performance on Africa-related issues.

International Institutional Failure

Since the inception of the leaders’ summits in 2008, the G20 leaders have included an increasing number of Africa-related issue areas in their summit agendas. This expanding deliberation is largely due to the second cause — failure of international institutions to successfully deal with pressing and growing global challenges (Cooper and Thakur, 2013). The failure of these international institutions and multilateral organizations, including the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Union, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to overcome a number of key issues in Africa has arguably forced the G20 to pay attention to Africa-related issues and has thus led to the G20’s rising performance in Africa-related issues.

Collective Predominance and Internal Equality in Capabilities

The G20’s rising performance on Africa is largely due to the third cause — rising relative capability of the various emerging economies within the G20, most prominently, China and India, who tend to give African countries a greater focus in their own foreign policy agendas (Quartz Africa, 2015). As these emerging economies rise relative to their other G20 partners, the G20 becomes more internally equal, which allows these emerging economies to have a greater influence on the agenda and the documents produced at each summit, the decisions made, and delivery of the commitments agreed on.

Converging Domestic Characteristics

The fourth cause — converging domestic characteristics among G20 members — has considerable importance as a cause. The most important common characteristics are those in line with the G20’s distinctive mission: that is, promoting financial stability and ensuring that globalization benefits all around the world. While working to ensure that globalization benefits all, the G20 leaders have come to focus on helping the world’s poorest and least developed countries, which, as a result, includes the African continent.

Moreover, several G20 members have had colonies or clients on the continent: notably, the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Russia and the U.S. Moreover, China and India have been increasingly concerned with Africa-related issues since the beginning of the G20 leaders' summits and even before the G20 leaders met for the first time. China held the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006 (Cooper and Thakur, 2013). Roughly two years later, in April 2008, India held its first India-Africa Summit (Cooper and Thakur, 2013). Germany has also expressed the importance of increasing cooperation with Africa on the issues of infrastructure and industrialization (DW, 2017). This shared growing focus within the G20 on enhanced cooperation with Africa, particularly in the area of development, has led the G20 to pay greater attention to Africa in its summit documents and improve its overall performance on Africa-related issues.

Political Cohesion

The fifth cause of performance — political cohesion: comprising political control, capital, continuity, competence, and personal connection — relates to the domestic politics in each of the G20 leaders' countries. A core component of this is the continuity of the leaders. Strong continuity allows each G20 member to become more familiar and comfortable within the G20 club. As G20 members come to better understand the inner workings of the club, they are better situated to advance their own interests. Angela Merkel, for example, assumed office in 2005, prior to the beginning of the G20 leaders' summit and has therefore attended every G20 leaders' summit. As an experienced G20 attendee, Merkel was arguably more comfortable identifying issues close to heart, including Africa-related issues, while serving as the 2017 host.

Controlled Club Participation as a Network Hub

The sixth cause of performance is controlled club participation as a network hub. As Kirton argues, "Control of the size and quality of participants increases the attachment to the exclusive club and its prestige" (Kirton, 2014). Furthermore, as Hajnal contends, "The G20's relative informality has enabled leaders to develop good personal relationships ... and to understand one another's political and economic circumstances and constraints" (Hajnal, 2013). As the club has become more connected over the years, leaders feel better able to express their interest in values that are important to their own countries. As a result, as the G20 leaders have grown closer, leaders have pushed a wider array of issues that are deemed to be important by their own countries, including issues relating to Africa.

Rising Focus on Helping the World's Poorest

A seventh contributing cause is the general international trend of a rising focus on least developed countries and helping the world's poorest. Related to multilateral organizational success at the UN, this began in 2001 with the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. The adoption of UN MDGs was followed by the G7's debt cancellation for the world's poorest nations at the 2005 finance ministers' meeting in London in the lead up to that year's Gleneagles Summit. This trend was then continued in 2015 with the adoption of the United Nations SDGs. The 2008 American-turned-global financial crisis was the central focus of the G20 for the first number of summits. After the immediate crisis had been dealt with, the G20 leaders were able to broaden the array of issues they incorporated into each summit, including Africa-related ones.

Case Studies

The connection between these causes and their effects can be seen more clearly by tracing the process in several critical cases from 2008 to 2016.

Washington, D.C., United States 2008

The 2008 Washington summit was labelled as a “strong success” by leading G20 scholar John Kirton; however, the G20 leaders performed poorly in all dimensions of performance when it came to Africa-related issues (Kirton, 2014). The focus of the first summit in Washington, D.C. was the American-turned-global financial crisis, which was a far greater shock than anything Africa produced. The G20 leaders thus paid considerable attention to isolating and identifying the root causes of the financial crisis; agreeing on future steps to mitigate the impact of the crisis; and discussing the necessity for reform of financial markets and improved regulation (Hajnal, 2013). As a result, little attention was paid to other issue areas, including Africa-related issues. There was no mention of Africa in any of the official documents produced at the summit, despite the presence at the summit of the head of South Africa, the World Bank and UN.

London, United Kingdom 2009

The G20 London Summit in 2009 was a very strong success (Kirton, 2014). In London, the leaders worked together to stabilize financial markets and coordinate regulatory reform (Heinbecker, 2011). The London summit also “mobilized \$1.1 trillion in new money directed at fiscal stimulus and economic development” (Kirton, 2014). The 2009 London Summit was also the first time G20 leaders incorporated Africa-related issues.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, the G20 performed poorly with no communiqué complements in the Africa-related conclusions (see Appendix B).

On deliberation, Africa appeared for the first time. 113 words in the conclusions were on Africa-related issues, or 1.85 per cent of the total word count. Africa-related issues arose in two out of the three summit documents (see Appendix C).

On direction setting in the Africa-related conclusions, no affirmations were made of the G20's distinctive missions of promoting financial stability and ensuring globalization works for the benefit of all (see Appendix D).

On decision making, two Africa-related commitments were produced, both on development (see Appendix E). These were the G20 leaders' first Africa-related commitments.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group at the University of Toronto has assessed one Africa-related commitment from the 2009 London Summit (see Appendix G). The commitment (2009L-76) stated “[we reaffirm our historic commitment] to achieving our respective ODA pledges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and the Gleneagles commitments, especially to sub-Saharan Africa.” With this particular commitment, the G20 members' average compliance was +0.30 or 65 per cent.

On DGG, no references arose within the Africa-related conclusions to inside institutions; however, there were four references to outside institutions, including the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Pittsburgh, United States 2009

The Pittsburgh Summit in 2009 hosted by Barak Obama is also seen as a strong success overall (Kirton, 2014). There was some success on Africa too. By this point the immediate shock of the American-turned-global financial crisis had slightly dissipated, and, as Paul Heinbecker (2011)

indicates, the G20 shifted their focus away from the crisis and towards “longer-term macroeconomic governance.” This paved the way for improved performance on issue areas beyond those concerned with stabilizing the financial crisis, including those relating to Africa.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, there were no communiqué complements.

On deliberation, there was a further increase from London in communiqué conclusions, with a total of 2.38 per cent on Africa. Africa-related issues were also featured in all summit documents.

On direction setting, no affirmations were made of the G20's distinctive missions of promoting financial stability and ensuring globalization works for the benefit of all.

With decision making, the G20 leaders delivered a new high with three Africa-related commitments. They were on IFI reform, development, and food security.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group assessed two Africa commitments made at Pittsburgh. Average compliance was 50%, for a slight decrease in performance from London in 2009.

On the development of global governance, a dramatic increase arose, with 13 references to outside institutions in the Africa-related conclusions. This was led by the World Bank. The G20 made no references to inside institutions.

Toronto, Canada 2010

The fourth G20 leaders' summit, held in Toronto, Canada, was again a summit of strong success overall (Kirton, 2014). Hosted by the only G20 member that belonged to both the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, its focus was on furthering regulatory reform of the financial sector; strengthening international financial institutions; working against protectionism by emphasizing the importance of trade and investment liberalization; and fiscal consolidation through setting deficit and debt targets (Heinbecker, 2011). Performance on Africa-related issues was strong in deliberation and development of global governance and moderate in decision making.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, there were no communiqué complements in the Africa-related conclusions.

On deliberation, there was another slight increase, with 2.40 per cent of the words dedicated to Africa. However, Africa-related issues only appeared in half the official summit documents.

On direction setting, no affirmations were made.

On decision making, only one Africa commitment came. It read “We will fulfill our commitment to ensure an ambitious replenishment for the concessional lending facilities of the MDBs, especially the International Development Association and the African Development Fund.”

The G20 Research Group has not assessed delivery with the Africa-related commitment made at the Toronto Summit in 2010.

There were twelve references to outside institutions within the Africa-related conclusions, led by the African Development Bank, African Development Fund, and the International Development Association. No references were made to inside institutions.

Seoul, Korea 2010

The 2010 G20 Summit in Seoul, Korea was a summit of only substantial success (Kirton, 2014). But, it was notable for its focus on the importance of the emerging economies within the G20 and beyond (Heinbecker, 2011). The G20 leaders adopted the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, emphasizing the need to help foster economic growth in the world's poorest countries, including those in the African continent. Yet, performance on Africa-related issues only slightly increased in some dimensions

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, no communiqué complements came.

On deliberation, there was a slight decrease from Toronto. Only 2.08 per cent of the words were on Africa-related issues. However, Africa-related issues were featured in 60 per cent of the official summit documents, an increase from the year before.

On direction setting, no affirmations of the distinctive mission were made.

On decision making, two Africa-related commitments doubled performance from the year before.

The G20 Research Group has not assessed delivery with any of the Africa-related commitments made at the Seoul Summit in 2010.

On development of global governance, performance was again strong with nine references to outside institutions, led by the World Trade Organization. No references were made to inside institutions.

Cannes, France 2011

The Cannes Summit was said to be a summit of substantial success overall (Kirton, 2014). Its priorities included reform of the IMF; strengthening financial regulation; reducing excessive commodity price volatility and enhancing food security; supporting employment and strengthening the social dimension of globalization; fighting corruption; and supporting infrastructure development in the most vulnerable countries.

Cannes was the first summit to dramatically increase G20 performance on Africa across several performance dimensions, notably: deliberation, direction setting and decision making.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, there were no communiqué complements.

On deliberation, performance tripled from the previous year, with 6 per cent of the communiqué on Africa. Africa also appeared in all of the summit documents.

Direction setting also notably increased. Prior to Cannes, the G20 had never affirmed the distinctive mission of financial stability and globalization for the benefit of all. However, at Cannes, the G20 leaders made three affirmations to the principle of globalization for the benefit of all, covering not only G20 members but also countries throughout Africa.

Decision making also significantly increased. The G20 leaders produced five Africa-related commitments, three more commitments than the year prior and two more commitments than the previous high in 2009. Of the five, two were on climate change, one was on development, one was on macroeconomic policy, and one was on trade. Africa became far more than just a development concern.

On delivery, the one assessed Africa commitment stated, "We stand ready to work towards operationalization of the Green Climate Fund as part of a balanced outcome in Durban, building upon the report of the Transitional Committee." Average compliance was +0.25 or 63%. This was slightly higher than the G20's compliance with the 2009 Pittsburgh Africa-related commitments.

On development of global governance, the leaders made a reference to inside institutes for the first time, with one to the High Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment and one to the Sokoni Africa Infrastructure Marketplace.

Los Cabos, Mexico 2012

Los Cabos in 2012 was a summit of significant success overall (Kirton, 2014). It focused on food security; green growth; commodity price volatility; job creation; and corruption (Hajnal, 2013). As Hajnal points out, however, the Euro crisis took much of the leaders' attention (Hajnal, 2013). Nevertheless, there was also a notable increase in performance on Africa, including direction setting and, above all, decision making.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, no communiqué complements came.

On deliberation, the G20 slightly decreased performance, dropping from 6.13 per cent at Los Cabos to 4.95 per cent. Nevertheless, performance remained much higher than all summits prior to Cannes in 2011.

On direction setting, Los Cabos continued the G20's increased performance from Cannes in 2011 with one affirmation of ensuring globalization benefits all.

On decision making, the G20 again performed strongly, producing five Africa-related commitments. They covered the subjects of climate change, labour and employment, social policy, and macroeconomic policy.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group has not assessed compliance with any commitments made at Los Cabos in 2012.

On development of global governance, two references were made to inside institutions within the Africa conclusions. Only three references were made to outside institutions.

St. Petersburg, Russia 2013

Upon assuming the presidency for St. Petersburg in September 2013, Russia outlined various objectives, including: creating jobs and employment; reforming the international financial architecture; promoting sustainable growth; ensuring energy sustainability; and emphasizing the importance of development for all (Hajnal, 2013). The crisis in Syria and the use of deadly chemical weapons also took up a considerable amount of the leaders' attention (Hajnal, 2013). Although African performance in various dimensions decreased, the G20 still performed relatively strongly, with three Africa-related commitments and substantial DGG.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, no communiqué complements came.

On deliberation, performance dramatically decreased to 0.96 of all words in the official summit documents. Africa appeared in only 18.20 per cent of all summit documents.

On direction setting, no affirmations came.

On decision making, three Africa commitments were produced, covering development and climate change.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group assessed one commitment (2013-180). Average compliance was -0.25 or 38%, a notable decline from the +0.25 or 63% at Cannes.

On development of global governance, the leaders made one reference to inside institutions and nine references to outside institutions.

Brisbane, Australia 2014

The 2014 Brisbane Summit has been labeled as a “small, selected success” (Kirton, 2014). It is argued that the Brisbane summit largely failed to “control [the day’s] central global challenges” (Kirton, 2014). Yet on Africa, where the deadly disease of Ebola had erupted, the G20 leaders made a notable stride in deliberation and delivered the same number of commitments as at St. Petersburg.

Dimensions of Performance

With domestic political management, the G20 performed poorly with no communiqué complements in the Africa-related conclusions.

On deliberation, the G20 leaders increased their performance from St. Petersburg to 2.74 per cent of the conclusions. Africa-related issues appeared in 20 per cent of the official summit documents.

On direction setting, no affirmations were made.

On decision making, three Africa-related commitments were produced, all of which were on health.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group has not assessed compliance with any of the Africa-related commitments made at Brisbane in 2014.

On development of global governance, no references to inside institutions appeared, but six to outside institutions did. This represented a small decrease in performance from the year before.

Antalya, Turkey 2015

The 2015 Antalya Summit again produced moderate performance on Africa in most dimensions and a notable increase in decision making. Its five Africa-related commitments were a significant increase from the year before.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, no communiqué complements came.

On deliberation, performance decreased from Brisbane. At Antalya, only 0.25 per cent of the total words and 16.70 per cent of the official documents were on Africa.

On direction setting, no affirmations were made.

On decision making, performance returned to an earlier peak, with five Africa-related commitments on development.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group assessed compliance with one Africa-related commitment (2015-69). Its average compliance score with this commitment was 0 or 50%. This represented a significant increase from the -0.25 at St. Petersburg.

On development of global governance, performance plunged as no references to inside or outside institutions were made.

Hangzhou, China 2016

The 2016 Hangzhou Summit was unique for its focus on Africa. Africa was identified as a priority several times in the official declarations leading up to the summit.

On December 1st, 2015, President Xi delivered his first formal statement on the G20 Summit in Hangzhou. Xi identified the importance of industrialization in Africa and least developed countries (LDCs) as a priority. The topic appeared again in China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi's May 26, 2016 address.

He presented a list of ten expected deliverables for the G20 Hangzhou summit on September 5-6, 2016. Seventh on the list was the industrialization of Africa and LDCs. Wang's inclusion of African industrialization can be seen as a larger part of the Chinese government's emphasis on development as a priority for the summit. "As the [world's] biggest developing country, China has the responsibility of maintaining and expanding the rights and interests of other developing countries," said Wang (Hallink, 2016). It can also be seen as part of China's growing concern with and focus on African development in general.

President Xi's address just before the summit emphasized four key goals, which once again included the industrialization of Africa and LDCs (Hallink, 2016). Xi stated "to narrow the global development divide, we are leading the way in implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. We will issue a G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialization in Africa and LDCs and work for the early entry into force of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change to ensure equal access by all people to the benefits of development" (Hallink, 2016). The continuous inclusions of Africa leading up to the summit pointed to a potential, and seemingly promising, turning point in G20-Africa governance.

The Hangzhou Summit, however, primarily turned out to be a talk shop on Africa. G20 deliberation soared to a new height but decision making remained at the Antalya peak. Those who had high hopes for Hangzhou as a turning point were largely disappointed (DW, 2016). Nevertheless, the G20's newly improved performance in Africa-related direction-setting, deliberation, and development of global governance pointed to an increased focus on Africa-related issues for the G20.

Dimensions of Performance

On domestic political management, the first communiqué complement came. It was to Japan for the first meeting of the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS in Kyoto.

On deliberation, G20 performance soared to new heights, with 8.04 per cent of all words on Africa. This marked the highest share of words on Africa-related issues at any G20 summit before. Africa-related issues were featured in 75 per cent of all summit documents.

On direction setting, Hangzhou saw a new high, with two affirmations to the distinctive mission of ensuring globalization benefits all.

On decision making, the G20 continued the increase in performance from Antalya, delivering five Africa-related commitments, covering development and international taxation.

On delivery, the G20 Research Group has not assessed compliance with any Africa-related commitments made at the 2016 Hangzhou Summit.

On development of global governance, the G20 leaders produced a new high with fourteen references to outside institutions. No references to inside institutions were made.

Conclusion

G20 performance in Africa-related issues between 2008 and 2015 showed slow, incremental increases, with a significant rise in performance on domestic political management, deliberation, direction setting and development of global governance at the Hangzhou Summit in 2016. With the continued emphasis on Africa in the lead up to the 2017 Hamburg Summit, it is predicted that G20-Africa governance will further increase in all dimensions of performance, including decision making and delivery. The advancement in performance in G20-Africa governance is largely a result of the rising capability of the emerging economies within the G20, especially that of China and the other BRICS countries beyond Russia, and their ability to influence the G20 agenda in favour of their fellow emerging and least developed countries outside the G20. Moreover, with Argentina and India gearing up to host the 2018 and 2019 summits, there should be a widening focus on Africa and LDCs in general. Other factors that have contributed to the incremental increase in performance on Africa are relative vulnerability; international institutional failure; converging domestic characteristics; political control and continuity; club participation; and the rising focus in the international system on helping the world's poorest.

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Appendix A: Overall Performance on Africa-Related Issues, 2008-2016

Summit	Domestic Political Management	Deliberation		Direction Setting	Decision Making	Delivery		Development of Global Governance	
	# compliments	% total words	% total paragraphs	Globalization for the benefit of all	# commitments	Average compliance score	# assessed	Inside	Outside
2008 Washington	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
2009 London	0	1.84	1.22	0	2	+0.30	1	0	4
2009 Pittsburgh	0	2.38	2.33	0	3	0	2	0	13
2010 Toronto	0	2.40	2.08	0	1	N/A	0	0	12
2010 Seoul	0	2.08	1.16	0	2	N/A	0	0	9
2011 Cannes	0	6.13	6.58	1	5	+0.25	1	2	9
2012 Los Cabos	0	4.95	1.95	1	5	N/A	0	2	3
2013 St. Petersburg	0	0.96	0.75	0	3	-0.25	1	1	9
2014 Brisbane	0	2.74	0.91	0	3	N/A	0	0	6
2015 Antalya	0	0.25	0.28	0	5	0	1	0	0
2016 Hangzhou	1	8.04	1.10	3	5	N/A	0	0	14
Total	1	N/A	N/A	5	34	N/A	6	5	7.18
Average	9.09	2.70	1.67	0.46	3.09	+0.05	0.55	0.460	79

Notes: Bold is highest ever.

Appendix B: Domestic Political Management, 2008-2016

Summit	Total	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Korea	Mexico	Russia	Saudi Arabia	South Africa	Turkey	United Kingdom	United States	European Union
2008 Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009 London	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009 Pittsburgh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010 Toronto	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010 Seoul	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2011 Cannes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2012 Los Cabos	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2013 St. Petersburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2014 Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2015 Antalya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2016 Hangzhou	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix C: Summary of Conclusions on Africa in G20 Leaders' Documents

Year	# words	% total words	# paragraphs	% total paragraphs	# documents	% total documents	# dedicated documents
2008 Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009 London	113	1.84	2	1.22	2	66.70	0
2009 Pittsburgh	220	2.38	3	2.33	1	100.00	0
2010 Toronto	266	2.40	4	2.08	1	50.00	0
2010 Seoul	328	2.08	4	1.16	3	60.00	0
2011 Cannes	863	6.13	10	6.58	3	100.00	0
2012 Los Cabos	630	4.95	4	1.95	2	50.00	0
2013 St. Petersburg	276	0.96	4	0.75	2	18.20	0
2014 Brisbane	250	2.74	2	0.91	1	20.00	0
2015 Antalya	35	0.25	1	0.28	1	16.70	0
2016 Hangzhou	1,287	8.04	12	1.10	3	75.00	0

Notes:

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G20 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded. "# of Words" is the number of Africa-related subjects for the year specified, excluding document titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

"% of Total Words" refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year specified.

"# of Paragraphs" is the number of paragraphs containing references to Africa for the year specified. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

"% of Total Paragraphs" refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year specified.

"# of Documents" is the number of documents that contain Africa subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

"% of Total Documents" refers to the total number of documents for the year specified.

"# of Dedicated Documents" is the number of documents for the year that contains an Africa-related subject in the title.

Meeting in addition to scheduled annual meeting.

Appendix D: Direction Setting, 2008-2016

Promoting Financial Stability

Value	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Financial system stability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prevent future crisis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stabilize impact of crisis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overall total	0										

Notes: The unit of analysis is the sentence.

Inclusions: Financial system stability; prevent future crisis; stabilize the impact of crisis; manage the impact of the crisis.

Exclusions: General reference to a crisis; another crisis that is not the global financial crisis.

Globalization for the Benefit of All

Value	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Inclusive growth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Global growth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Equal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poorest	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Most vulnerable	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Inclusive world economy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
All parts of the globe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
Overall total	5										

Notes: The unit of analysis is the sentence.

Inclusions: Inclusive growth; global growth; equal; poorest; the poor; most vulnerable; inclusive world economy; all parts of the globe.

Exclusions: Least developed countries; broadly-shared growth; wide-spread growth.

Appendix E: Africa-Related Commitments by Core Issue Area, 2008-2016

Issue	Total	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Macroeconomic policy	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Labour and employment	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Climate change	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0
International taxation	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Trade	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
IFI reform	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social policy	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Health	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Development	16	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	5	4
Food and agriculture	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G8/G20 governance	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	34	0	2	3	1	2	5	5	3	3	5	5

Note: IFI = international financial institution.

Appendix F: G20 Commitments by Core Issue Area, 2008-2016

Issue	Total	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Macroeconomic policy	403	6	15	28	14	29	91	71	66	34	21	28
Financial regulation	271	59	45	23	12	24	38	18	20	7	8	17
Development	193	4	15	9	8	22	17	10	50	20	20	18
Trade	133	5	14	6	9	17	15	10	12	9	14	22
IFI reform	120	14	29	11	4	16	22	8	5	4	2	5
Energy	106	0	0	17	1	14	18	10	19	16	3	8
Employment-Labour	100	0	4	3	0	4	8	18	29	16	10	8
Democracy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accountability	80	4	3	15	3	4	5	13	9	17	2	5
Crime-Corruption	78	3	0	3	3	9	5	7	33	4	4	7
Food & agriculture	64	0	0	3	2	2	36	4	11	0	3	3
Climate change	53	0	3	3	3	8	8	5	11	7	3	2
ICT	49	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	47
G8/G20 governance	39	0	0	3	0	2	12	3	12	0	0	7
Health	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	2	3
Infrastructure	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	8
Terrorism	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	12	3
Social policy	13	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	0	0	3	1
Microeconomics	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	0	2
Taxation	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
Gender	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	0
Environment	5	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0
Education	5	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Migration/Refugees	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3
Investment	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	1,836	95	129	128	61	153	282	180	281	205	113	209

Note: ICT = information and communications technologies; IFI = international financial institution.

Appendix G: Delivery of G20 Africa-Related Commitments, 2008-2016

Commitment	Average	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Korea	Mexico	Russia	Saudi Arabia	South Africa	Turkey	United Kingdom	United States	European Union
2009L-76	+0.30	-1	1	1	1	-1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	-1	-1	1	1	1
2009P-68	+0.05	-1	0	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	0	1	1	-1	0	0	1	-1	1	1	0
2009P-88	-0.05	-1	1	-1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	-1	-1	1	0	-1	-1	1	1	1
2011-247	+0.25	0	1	1	-1	1	0	1	1	1	0	-1	1	1	0	-1	0	0	1	-1	0
2013-180	-0.25	-1	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	1	0	0
2015-69	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	1	0	-1	0	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	1	1
Average	+0.05	-0.83	0.50	-0.33	0.33	-0.17	0.67	1	-0.17	-0.17	0.17	0.33	0	-0.50	0	-0.50	-0.17	-0.67	0.83	0.50	0.50

Notes:

2009L-76: [we reaffirm our historic commitment] to achieving our respective ODA pledges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and the Gleneagles commitments, especially to sub-Saharan Africa. (development) +0.30

2009P-68: We reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the Multilateral Development Banks and their concessional lending facilities, especially the International Development Agency (IDA) and the African Development Fund, are appropriately funded. (IFI reform) +0.05

2009P-88: We reaffirm our historic commitment to meet the Millennium Development Goals and our respective Official Development Assistance (ODA) pledges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and those made at Gleneagles, especially to sub-Saharan Africa, to 2010 and beyond. (development) -0.05

2011-247: We stand ready to work towards operationalization of the Green Climate Fund as part of a balanced outcome in Durban, building upon the report of the Transitional Committee (Climate Change) +0.25

2013-180: [We are committed to a full implementation of the outcome of] Durban (climate). -0.25

2015-69: In this first phase, we will cooperate and collaborate with African countries on [technology development and deployment] [taking into consideration national needs and contexts.] (development) 0

Appendix H: Development of Global Governance – Africa, 2008-2016

	Total	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Inside												
High Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Sokoni Africa Infrastructure Marketplace	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Development Working Group	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
G20 Study Group on Climate Finance	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
AgResults Initiative	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Inside Total	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0
Outside												
Durban Conference on Climate Change	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Development Association	4	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
African Development Fund	4	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Nations	8	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	0	2
World Bank	6	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
International Development Agency	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Monetary Fund	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
International Finance Corporation	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Asian Infrastructure Financing Initiative	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Asian Development Bank	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Fund for Agriculture and Development	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
World Food Programme	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Inter American Development Bank	3	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Food and Agriculture Organization	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Partnership for Africa's Development	3	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
World Health Organization	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
African Water Facility	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Investment Climate Facility for Africa	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Nations Framework for Climate	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0

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	Total	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos	2013 St. Petersburg	2014 Brisbane	2015 Antalya	2016 Hangzhou
Change Control												
Association of Southeast Asian Nations +3	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
African Union	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Conference to the Parties #17	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Conference to the Parties #18	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Conference to the Parties #19	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Economic Community of West African States	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
World Trade Organization's Integrated Trade Information Portal	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
African Development Bank	5	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
World Trade Organization	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Outside total	79	0	4	13	12	9	9	3	9	6	0	14
Overall total	84	0	4	13	12	9	11	5	10	6	0	14
Inside to outside ratio	5:79	0	0:4	0:13	0:12	0:9	1:5	2:3	1:9	0:6	0	0:14

Note: The unit of analysis is the paragraph.